A-1-CA-35898 | Omnilex

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Court of Appeals of New Mexico
Filed 1/23/2019 10:14 AM
Mark Reynolds

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
Court of Appeals of New Mexico
Filed 1/23/2019 10:14 AM

2727 SAN PEDRO LLC,
A. ~<—
Petitioner-Appellant, Mark Reynolds |
v. A-1-CA-35898
BERNALILLO COUNTY ASSESSOR,

Respondent-Appellee.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY
Clay Campbell, District Judge

John R. Polk,
Albuquerque, NM

Vance, Chavez & Associates, LLC
Claud Eugene Vance
Albuquerque, NM

for Appellant

Robles, Rael & Anaya, P.C.
Charles Rennick

Marcus J. Rael, Jr.
Albuquerque, NM
for Appellee
MEMORANDUM OPINION
VARGAS, Judge.
{1} 2727 San Pedro LLC (Taxpayer) appeals the district court’s affirmation of the
Bernalillo County Valuation Protests Board’s (the Board) decision to uphold the

Bernalillo County Assessor’s (the Assessor) valuation of Taxpayer’s property for

tax year 2015. Taxpayer claims that the district court erroneously concluded that it
had not overcome the presumption that the Assessor’s valuation was correct. As a
result of this error, Taxpayer argues that the district court failed to properly shift the
burden to the Assessor to prove that her method of valuation utilized a generally
accepted appraisal technique. Finally, Taxpayer contends that the Assessor failed to
use a generally accepted appraisal technique in valuing its property, and, as such, the
Assessor’s valuation was not supported by substantial evidence. We agree with
Taxpayer that it overcame the presumption of correctness and that the burden shifted
to the Assessor. We also agree with Taxpayer that the Assessor’s valuation was not
supported by substantial evidence because the Assessor failed to put on evidence
that the expense rate it utilized was appropriate for Taxpayer’s property type. We
reverse the district court with instructions to remand the matter back to the Board
for further proceedings.

BACKGROUND

23 This is the second of two appeals Taxpayer filed objecting to the Assessor’s
valuation of Taxpayer’s commercial building at 2727 San Pedro NE in Albuquerque,
New Mexico (Property). In its initial appeal, Taxpayer filed a petition protesting the
Assessor’s 2014 valuation of the Property. 2727 San Pedro LLC v. Bernalillo Cty.
Assessor (San Pedro I), 2017-NMCA-008, 7 1, 389 P.3d 287. The Board and the

district court affirmed the Assessor’s valuation. Jd. We granted Taxpayer’s petition

for a writ of certiorari and, following briefing and oral argument, issued an opinion
on September 13, 2016, vacating the district court’s decision and remanding the
matter to the Board for additional proceedings because the Assessor failed to satisfy
her burden “to prove that [her] method of valuation utilized a generally accepted
appraisal technique.” Jd. J§ 2, 25, 29 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Specifically, we concluded that the Assessor failed to show that the market data on
which she relied to calculate Taxpayer’s value was applicable “in this market, for
this property type, and during this time period,” preventing a reasonable person from
concluding that the methodology used was based on a generally accepted appraisal
technique. /d. J 25 (emphasis omitted).

3} While its 2014 protest was pending in the district court, Taxpayer received its
2015 notice of value from the Assessor for the Property, valuing the Property at the
same amount of the 2014 valuation. Taxpayer protested this valuation, again
repeating its argument that the income method of appraisal was most appropriate
and the actual income produced from the Property was insufficient to justify the
Assessor’s valuation. A hearing before the Board on Taxpayer’s 2015 protest took
place in December 2015.

{44 Upon conclusion of the hearing, the Board determined the Assessor’s
valuation was the most reliable, and Taxpayer did not overcome the presumption of

correctness in favor of that valuation. Taxpayer appealed the Board’s decision to the

district court pursuant to Rule 1-074 NMRA. The district court agreed with the
Board and concluded Taxpayer did not present evidence tending to disprove the
factual correctness of the Assessor’s valuation. Taxpayer appealed the district
court’s decision by filing a petition for a writ of certiorari in this Court pursuant to
Rule 12-505 NMRA, which we granted.

DISCUSSION

{5} Taxpayer raises five issues on appeal that we group into two general
categories. First, Taxpayer claims that the district court erroneously concluded that
it had not overcome the presumption that the Assessor’s valuation was correct and
therefore failed to shift the burden to the Assessor to prove that her method of
valuation utilized a generally accepted appraisal technique. Second, Taxpayer
contends that the Assessor failed to use a generally accepted appraisal technique in
valuing the Property when it used unreliable hearsay to support its valuation. The
Assessor’s valuation, Taxpayer claims, was therefore not supported by substantial
evidence.

Standard of Review

{6} District courts sit in an appellate capacity when reviewing an administrative
decision. See Rule 1-074(T). “Upon a grant of a petition for writ of certiorari under
Rule 12-505, this Court conducts the same review of an administrative order as the

district court sitting in its appellate capacity, while at the same time determining

whether the district court erred in the first appeal.” Town & Country Food Stores,
Inc. v. N.M. Reg. & Licensing Dep’t, 2012-NMCA-046, J 8, 277 P.3d 490
(alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). We employ a whole
record review when reviewing administrative decisions. See In re Otero Cty. Elec.
Coop., Inc., 1989-NMSC-033, J 6, 108 N.M. 462, 774 P.2d 1050. “This standard
requires that we independently review the entire record of the administrative hearing
to determine whether the decision was arbitrary and capricious, not supported by
substantial evidence, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” San Pedro I, 2017-
NMCA-008, § 15 (omission, alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation
omitted). “To the extent [Taxpayer] contends that there are errors of law in the
[district] court’s conclusions or in those findings that function as conclusions, we
apply a de novo standard of review.” Jones v. Schoellkopf, 2005-NMCA-124, { 8,
138 N.M. 477, 122 P.3d 844. “When the facts are not in dispute, but the parties
disagree on the legal conclusion to be drawn from those facts, we review the issues
de novo.” Id. However, “we give a heightened degree of deference to legal questions
that implicate special agency expertise or the determination of fundamental policies
within the scope of the agency’s statutory function.” Jicarilla Apache Nation v.
Rodarte, 2004-NMSC-035, ¢ 25, 136 N.M. 630, 103 P.3d 554 (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted).

Statutory Scheme for Valuation of Property for Taxation

(7; | Our Property Tax Code (the Code), NMSA 1978 §§ 7-35-1 to -38-93(1973,
as amended through 2018), sets out the method for valuation of real property in New
Mexico and authorizes the Taxation and Revenue Department (Department) or the
county assessor to determine those values. Section 7-36-15(A). Unless otherwise
authorized by the Code, “the value of property for property taxation purposes shall
be its market value as determined by the application of the sales of comparable
property, income or cost methods of valuation or any combination of these
methods.” Section 7-36-15(B). The Department or the county assessor “shall apply
generally accepted appraisal techniques” in determining property values. Section 7-
36-15(B)(1).

{8} As she had done in 2014, the Assessor used the income method of valuation
to determine the value of Taxpayer’s Property. “The income method of valuation is
a method used to value property by capitalizing its income when the market value
method cannot be used due to lack of data on sales of comparable properties . . .
[and] is determined by dividing the annual income by the applicable capitalization
rate.” 3.6.5.22(A)(1) NMAC (2001) “ ‘[I]ncome’ . . . is net income or the difference
between annual revenue or receipts, actual or imputed, from rental of the property
and the annual expenses relating to the property[,]” 3.6.5.22(A)(5) NMAC, and “is

based upon the fair rent which can be imputed to the property ...based upon rent

actually received . . . by the owner and upon typical rentals received in the area for
similar property in similar use[.]” 3.6.5.22(A)(3) NMAC. Expenses relating to the
property that are deducted to arrive at a property’s income are defined as “the outlay
or average annual allocation of money or money’s worth that can fairly be charged
against the revenue or receipts from the property. . . . [and] are limited to those which
are ordinary and necessary in the production of the revenue and receipts from the
property and do not include debt retirement, interest on funds invested in the
property or income taxes.” 3.6.5.22(A)(6) NMAC.

{93 “The value of property determined by the county assessor is presumed to be
correct.” First Nat'l Bank v. Bernalillo Cty. Valuation Protest Bd., 1977-NMCA-
005, 7 24, 90 N.M. 110, 560 P.2d 174. A taxpayer, however, can overcome the
presumption of correctness by “showing that the assessor did not follow the statutory
provisions of the [Code] or by presenting evidence tending to dispute the factual
correctness of the valuation” based on generally accepted appraisal techniques. Id.
“When a taxpayer overcomes the presumption of correctness of the assessor’s
method of valuation, the burden shifts to the assessor to prove that his or [her]
method of valuation utilized a ‘generally accepted appraisal technique.’ ” Jd. J 25.
Both the Board and the district court concluded that Taxpayer did not overcome the

presumption of correctness of the Assessor’s valuation.

Taxpayer Overcame The Assessor’s Presumption of Correctness

{109} At the hearing before the Board, the Assessor advised that she valued the
Property by using the actual average rent collected from the Property and
market-based values derived from other similar properties for the vacancy and
expense rates. Using those numbers, she arrived at a value of $923,800. Taxpayer,
by contrast, presented evidence of its actual 2014 expenses through an Annual
Property Operating Data (APOD) report, from which he derived a Property value of
$721,200.

{11} Weighing all the evidence presented at the hearing, the Board concluded the
“Assessor’s valuation is the most reliable and . . . [Taxpayer] has not overcome the
presumption of correctness in favor of that valuation.” Similarly, the district court
held Taxpayer failed to overcome the presumption of correctness because Taxpayer
“failed to show the Assessor did not use a generally accepted appraisal technique.”
In arriving at its conclusion, the district court stated, “To the extent [Taxpayer]
claims the valuation is incorrect merely because it uses market rates rather than the
[P]roperty’s actual vacancy and expense rates, the [district c]ourt rejects the
argument.”

{123 Taxpayer contends it overcame the presumption of correctness when it
applied the income method of appraisal to the Property, utilizing the actual income

and expenses from the Property to derive a value different from the Assessor’s and

the Assessor failed to introduce evidence showing Taxpayer did not use a generally
accepted appraisal technique in arriving at that different value. The Assessor
responds that because the record contains evidence supporting its valuation of the
property, the Board’s finding below should remain undisturbed.

{13} The standard to overcome the presumption of correctness, however, does not
require a taxpayer to prove that the Assessor’s valuation is not supported by the
evidence, as the Assessor contends. Nor is it to present evidence which is more
reliable than the Assessor’s, as the Board intimated. Instead, to overcome the
presumption of correctness, a taxpayer need only present evidence tending to dispute
the valuation of the Assessor. See San Pedro I, 2017-NMCA-008, § 22.

{144 In San Pedro I, we considered whether Taxpayer presented sufficient
evidence to overcome the statutory presumption of correctness when it “proposed a
market value based upon its own application of the income method of valuation.”
Id. | 22. Noting that “[Taxpayer’s] application of the income method of valuation
[using actual expenses] differs from that advocated by the Assessor,” and that the
Assessor did not claim that Taxpayer’s methodology was not a generally accepted
appraisal technique, we concluded that Taxpayer’s evidence of value disputed the
factual correctness of the Assessor’s method of valuation. Jd. Thus, Taxpayer
overcame the statutory presumption of correctness and “shifted the burden of proof

to the Assessor to prove that his or her method of valuation utilized a generally

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accepted appraisal technique.” /d. (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation
omitted).

{15} At the hearing before the Board that gave rise to this appeal, Taxpayer again
presented evidence using actual expenses to calculate the value of the Property
applying the income method of valuation, with the result differing from that
advocated by the Assessor, just as it had in San Pedro I. Once again, the Assessor
did not claim Taxpayer’s approach was not a generally accepted appraisal technique.
As was the case in San Pedro I, Taxpayer’s evidence of differing value “tends to
dispute the factual correctness of the method of valuation.” /d. ( alterations, internal
quotation marks, and citation omitted.) “[T]he burden of proof [therefore] shifted to
the Assessor to prove that her method of valuation utilized a generally accepted
appraisal technique.” /d. (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted).

The Assessor Failed to Provide Substantial Evidence That She Used a Generally
Accepted Appraisal Technique.

{16} | We next turn to the issue of whether substantial evidence exists to support the
Board’s conclusion that the Assessor used a generally accepted appraisal technique
in her application of the income method to value the Property. See id. FJ 23, 25.
Initially, we note that the Board found that Taxpayer did not show that the Assessor
failed to use generally accepted appraisal techniques, implicitly concluding that the

Assessor’s appraisal techniques were, in fact, generally accepted.

{17} Taxpayer raises three specific objections to challenge the Board’s implicit
finding. First, Taxpayer argues that the Assessor improperly imposed a flat
percentage expense limit in calculating the value of the Property. Second, Taxpayer
contends that the Assessor’s use of market data for five unidentified properties to
calculate the applicable expense rate violated his right to a fair hearing and therefore,
due process rights. Third, Taxpayer claims that the Board’s findings that the
Assessor used a generally accepted appraisal technique was not supported by
substantial evidence because it was based exclusively on hearsay and did not include
evidence that the income and expense information relied upon by the Assessor were
for properties that were comparable to Taxpayer’s Property. At the root of all three
of Taxpayer’s arguments is his objection to the Assessor’s use of five unidentified
properties to calculate the expense rate to be used in the valuation of the Property.
“Whether an appraisal technique is ‘generally accepted’ is a question of fact.” Id.
{ 20. We defer to the Board’s factual determinations where they are supported by
substantial evidence. See E/ Castillo Ret. Residences v. Martinez, 2017-NMSC-026,
q 21, 401 P.3d 751.

{18} In applying the income method of valuation to value Taxpayer’s Property, the
Assessor used a combination of market and actual data. Because Taxpayer’s

argument on appeal focuses on the information relied upon by the Assessor to

calculate the expense rate component of the Assessor’s income method valuation,
we begin our analysis there.

4193 At the hearing before the Board, the Assessor presented a pro forma
explaining her calculation of the value of the Property using the income approach.
The pro forma notes that the Assessor applied a forty-five percent expense rate! in
arriving at a valuation of $923,800. Juanita Chavez, an employee of the Assessor,
testified that to determine the appropriate expense rate to calculate the Property’s
value, the Assessor compiled information related to expense rates for other office
buildings in the area and arrived at a forty-one percent expense rate, which she
increased to forty-five percent for purposes of calculating the Property’s value. The
expense information contains five entries listing two properties on San Pedro Drive,
two properties on Uptown Boulevard, and one property on Prospect. The Assessor
testified that the expense rate information she used was provided to the Assessor’s
office by other taxpayers and was for properties located in the same neighborhood
designation as Taxpayer’s Property. Ms. Chavez explained that the five properties
she used to calculate the expense rate were all office buildings, were all properties

offering full-service leases, and were all of the office buildings in the same

' In reviewing the Assessor’s calculations, we note, as the district court did, that the
amount of operation expenses set out in the Assessor’s pro forma used to calculate
the Property’s value is actually forty-eight percent of the effective gross income,
rather than the forty-five percent noted.

neighborhood whose information was available to her. The expense rates shown are
for the years 2011, 2012, and 2013 and range from twenty-five percent of effective
gross income to fifty-nine percent of effective gross income. It is unclear whether
the entries are for five different properties or just three, as the two Uptown Boulevard
properties and two San Pedro Drive properties show expense rates for different
years, allowing for the possibility that the Assessor’s information shows the expense
rate for the same properties over different time periods.

20} To rebut the information provided by the Assessor, Taxpayer provided
testimony from realtor, Ken Shaffer, and from appraiser, Ron Alfred. When asked
for his expert opinion on the market expense rate for office space similar in age to
the Property, Alfred presented two data sheets for properties he contended were
similar. The first property, located on Louisiana Boulevard, was quickly discounted
because it was subject to triple-net leases, requiring tenants to pay the cost of most
property expenses. Alfred, however, also pointed to a building located in downtown
Albuquerque, which he conceded was not located in the same area as the Property,
but was newer in effective age and similar in construction type and type of lease.
The downtown property, Alfred testified, had an expense rate of fifty-nine percent
of effective gross income.

(21; Taxpayer also called Ken Shaffer, a commercial realtor, to testify on his

behalf. Shaffer testified that commercial realtors generally develop an APOD for a

property in order to bring it to market to sell. Generally, his APOD contains all
expenses usually connected with an office building. Use of an APOD, he testified,
is a generally accepted appraisal technique to develop the net operating income of a
property relative to the income approach.

{22}, Addressing the Assessor’s information, Shaffer testified that expense rate
information averaged from five properties is not statistically reliable, and the
Assessor should have used at least thirty properties. Explaining the considerations at
play in evaluating property values and expense rates, Shaffer testified that Class C
office properties, such as Taxpayer’s Property, face the biggest challenge in the
existing market, with owners frequently having to offer a period of free rent,
significant tenant improvements, and a short lease term. Further, Shaffer noted that
to determine whether expenses are “ordinary and necessary,” as required by the
regulation, they must be set out by line-item in order to be properly reviewed.
Finally, Shaffer explained that expense rates will differ between commercial
properties and it was necessary to consider the property itself, stating as one such
example, “You have a lot of common area and trees to take care of, that’s going to
give you higher expenses because you have a lot more land to take care of.”

{23} Considering the evidence that was presented, we cannot say that, under the
circumstances of this case, the Board’s factual determinations are supported by

substantial evidence. See id. Just as we found that the Assessor failed to provide

sufficient evidence that the expense rates on which she relied applied to Taxpayer’s
office building in San Pedro I, we find similar shortfalls here. See 2017-NMCA-
008, 25. We are unable to determine from the evidence presented by the Assessor
whether the properties upon which she relied to arrive at her expense rate were of
the property type of Taxpayer’s Property. See id. (noting that without data showing
that forty-five percent is appropriate for the property type at issue, we cannot
conclude the assessor used generally accepted appraisal techniques); see also Edith
J. Friedman, Encyclopedia of Real Estate Appraising, at 381 (3d ed. 1978) (stating
that “[t]he cost of operating an office building varies with its age, condition in which
it has been maintained, size, shape, height, mechanical and other equipment, and the
services provided by the landlord”). Shaffer testified that Class C properties such as
Taxpayer’s face unique challenges, requiring the owners of those properties to incur
expenses that are not applicable to owners of other office buildings. Absent data
showing that the five properties on which the Assessor relied to arrive at her forty-
five percent expense rate are either similar to Taxpayer’s Property in those qualities
that affect the operating expenses of an office building or that the Assessor adjusted
the expense rate to account for the lack of similarity, we cannot conclude that the
Assessor’s valuation was conducted using generally accepted appraisal techniques.

24 We understand that the Assessor is subject to certain statutory constraints that

limit her ability to disclose information related to the Property. See § 7-38-19(E)

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(requiring information regarding income and expenses of specific property may only
be released as authorized by Section 7-38-4). Nonetheless, the Assessor is permitted
to release information if it is to be used in a way that does not identify the property
owner. Section 7-38-4(A)(5). Nothing in the statute prohibits the assessor from
testifying about the itemized expenses, age, size, and condition of comparable
properties on which the Assessor relies, as well as the services provided by the
landlords for those properties. See Encyclopedia of Real Estate Appraising, supra,
at 381. Nonetheless, the Assessor did not provide the Board with that information.
We find that, on whole record review, substantial evidence does not exist to support
the conclusion that the Assessor used generally accepted accounting principles when
she valued Taxpayer’s Property.

CONCLUSION

{25} We therefore reverse the district court’s order and remand the matter to the
district court with instructions to vacate the Board’s decision and remand the matter
to the Board for further proceedings in accordance with this decision.

26} ITISSO ORDERED.

JULIE J. VARGAS) Judge

1
WE CONCUR:
2
3
J. MILES HANISEE, Judge
4 5
Kristina Bogardus
KRISTINA BOGARDUS, Judge
17

January 23, 2019- 2727 San Pedro LLC v. Bernalillo County Assessor, No. A-1-CA-35898

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