September 21, 2022- The Acequia Compound Owners’ Association, Inc. v. Orchard Metal Capital Corp., No. A-1-CA-38797

OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

Corrections to this opinion/decision not affecting the outcome, at the Court's discretion, can occur up to the time of publication with NM Compilation Commission. The Court will ensure that the electronic version of this opinion/decision is updated accordingly in Odyssey.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
Opinion Number:
Filing Date: September 21, 2022
No. A-1-CA-38797
Court of Appeals of New Mexico Filed 9/21/2022 9:35 AM
Mark Reynolds
THE ACEQUIA COMPOUND OWNERS' ASSOCIATION, INC.,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
V.
ORCHARD METAL CAPITAL CORP.,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SANTA FE COUNTY Francis J. Mathew, District Judge
Katz Herdman MacGillivray & Fullerton PC Frank T. Herdman Brecken N. Larson
Santa Fe, NM
for Appellee
Holland & Hart LLP Larry J. Montaño 20 Julia Broggi 21 22
Santa Fe, NM
for Appellant
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19

OPINION	1
WRAY, Judge.	2
{1} 	Defendant Orchard Metal Capital Corporation (OMC) appeals the district	3
court’s entry of partial summary judgment and an injunction in favor of Plaintiff the	4
Acequia Compound Association (the Association), as well as the dismissal without	5
prejudice of the Association’s remaining claim. We affirm.	6
BACKGROUND	7
{2} 	The Association is a condominium association that is responsible for the	8
administration, management, operation, and control of the common elements of the	9
Acequia Compound Condominium (Condominium Property). The Condominium	10
Property is located at the southern end of a public street, Halona Street, in Santa Fe,	11
New Mexico. An easement (Condominium Property Easement) runs along the west	12
side 	of 	the 	Condominium 	Property, 	connecting 	Halona 	Street 	to 	both 	the	13
Condominium Property to the east and several other abutting properties to the west,	14
including property owned at one time by the New Mexico Association of Counties	15
(NMAC), located 	at 613 Old Santa Fe Trail. 	The language of the original	16
Condominium Property Easement granted a “non-exclusive access-egress and	17
underground utility easement twenty feet in width along the west boundary of the	18
property of grantor [the Association]” and asserted that the “easement granted herein	19

2
shall run with the land [and] serve only the following described property, hereinafter	1
the dominant estate,” which was defined as 613 Old Santa Fe Trail.	2
{3} 	Defendant OMC owns property at 621 Old Santa Fe Trail, immediately to the	3
south of 613 Old Santa Fe Trail. The Condominium Property and OMC property do	4
not abut; 613 Old Santa Fe Trail is located to the north of the OMC property and the	5
Condominium Property is located directly to the east of 613 Old Santa Fe Trail.	6
NMAC, the owner of 613 Old Santa Fe Trail at the time, granted OMC an easement	7
(the Wedge Easement) for OMC to use the southeastern wedge of 613 Old Santa Fe	8
Trail in return for a one-time fee of $5,000 and payment of maintenance costs. See	9
Appendix A. This southeastern wedge of 613 Old Santa Fe Trail abuts (1) the	10
western edge of the Condominium Property Easement, and (2) the northern edge of	11
OMC’s property at 621 Old Santa Fe Trail. The Wedge Easement connects	12
Defendant OMC’s property at 621 Old Santa Fe Trail to the Condominium Property	13
Easement, giving Defendant OMC access to Halona Street.1 The Wedge Easement	14
was subsequently amended to ensure that	15
[OMC] acknowledges and represents that [NMAC] has made no	16
representations or warranties whatsoever regarding the access from the	17
[Wedge Easement] beyond the boundary line of [613 Old Santa Fe	18
1Appendix A includes an image that depicts the long rectangular property, 613
Old Santa Fe Trail, outlined in black in the middle of the page, and the Condominium
Property Easement highlighted in light grayscale to the far right. The property at 621
Old Santa Fe Trail is located directly to the south of 613 Old Santa Fe Trail and the
Wedge Easement is in darker grayscale to the left of the Condominium Property
Easement.

3
Trail] to the public portion of Halona Street or the “Halona Road	1
extension”2 referenced in paragraph 3 of the April 10, 2013 Easement	2
Agreement.	3
After obtaining the Wedge Easement, Defendant OMC removed a portion of a fence	4
at the northeastern corner of its property, 621 Old Santa Fe Trail. The removal of the	5
fence allowed OMC’s president to enter and exit OMC’s property by traveling across	6
613 Old Santa Fe Trail, using the Wedge Easement to access the Condominium	7
Property Easement and travel to Halona Street.	8
{4} 	The Association filed a complaint for trespass and injunctive relief against	9
Defendant OMC, alleging that OMC was trespassing and causing or permitting	10
others to trespass on the Condominium Property. The Association quickly moved	11
for partial summary judgment on the issue of OMC’s trespass and sought an	12
injunction to prevent OMC from trespassing and to require OMC to erect a fence to	13
prevent others from trespassing. OMC filed a motion to strike the affidavit of the	14
Association’s president and alleged that she lacked personal knowledge about the	15
number of vehicles entering the Condominium Property Easement going to or from	16
OMC’s property. In response to the Association’s motion for summary judgment,	17
Defendant OMC contended that by granting the Wedge Easement, NMAC had	18
authorized OMC to use the Condominium Property Easement, which was next to	19
NMAC’s property at 613 Old Santa Fe Trail. After hearing argument, the district	20
2The record does not indicate to what the “Halona Road extension” refers.

4
court determined that OMC had failed to rebut the Association’s evidence that	1
established OMC’s trespass. Although the district court enjoined OMC and its	2
employees and agents from trespassing, the district court declined to require the	3
construction of a fence or other permanent barrier. As a practical matter, the district	4
court noted that the case would go forward “at least . . . for the purpose of the	5
establishment of the appropriate remedy as it relates to the gap in the fence.” In the	6
order granting partial summary judgment, the district court ordered that	7
1. 	[OMC], including [OMC]’s employees and agents (which	8
includes its president, David Lamb), is permanently enjoined and	9
prohibited from using the [Condominium Property] Easement across	10
[the Association’s] property.	11
2. 	[The Association’s] request for an injunction requiring	12
[OMC] to install a permanent barrier on the northern boundary of the	13
[OMC] Property is not granted at this time but the request for such relief	14
is reserved and may be raised by motion or at trial at a later date.	15
{5} 	Following entry of the district court’s order, the Association filed a second	16
summary judgment motion and argued again that the district court should require	17
OMC to erect a fence or other permanent barrier. Attached to this motion was	18
another affidavit from the Association’s president, as well as multiple video	19
recordings purporting to depict traffic moving across the Condominium Property	20
Easement to and from OMC’s property (621 Old Santa Fe Trail). OMC again moved	21
to strike the affidavit. At the hearing, the district court agreed that certain paragraphs	22
of the affidavit were speculative and argumentative and additionally declined to	23

5
consider the video recordings. Following the district court’s ruling, the Association	1
withdrew its summary judgment motion and moved to dismiss without prejudice its	2
remaining claim related to the permanent barrier. OMC opposed the motion and	3
argued that the dismissal should be with prejudice. During the hearing, the district	4
court asked OMC if the Association could refile a lawsuit if the trespass continued,	5
regardless of whether the present case was dismissed with or without prejudice.	6
OMC responded that it was positioned to defend against the current claims and that	7
to dismiss without prejudice would be unfair. OMC acknowledged that the district	8
court had the discretion to dismiss with or without prejudice but maintained that it	9
would only be “fair to OMC to dismiss it with prejudice at this stage in the	10
litigation.” The district court ruled that OMC had failed to demonstrate that any	11
prejudice 	would 	result 	from 	dismissal 	without 	prejudice 	and 	granted 	the	12
Association’s motion to dismiss without prejudice. This appeal followed.	13
DISCUSSION	14
{6} 	OMC argues that the district court improperly granted partial summary	15
judgment to the Association and wrongly dismissed the Association’s remaining	16
claim without prejudice. We review grants of summary judgment de novo. City of	17
Rio Rancho v. Amrep Sw. Inc., 2011-NMSC-037, ¶ 14, 150 N.M. 428, 260 P.3d 414.	18
Whether to dismiss claims with or without prejudice is within the district court’s	19
discretion, and we review that decision for abuse of discretion. 	Trinosky v.	20

6
Johnstone, 2011-NMCA-045, ¶¶ 18, 20, 149 N.M. 605, 252 P.3d 829. We consider	1
each argument in turn.	2
I. 	The District Court Properly Granted Summary Judgment	3
{7} 	The district court properly grants summary judgment if “there are no genuine	4
issues of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”	5
City of Rio Rancho, 2011-NMSC-037, ¶ 14 (internal quotation marks and citation	6
omitted). OMC offers several arguments to support its position that the district court	7
improperly granted summary judgment on the Association’s trespass claim. To put	8
the Association’s trespass claim in context, we briefly explain the connection	9
between trespass and easements. “The gist of an action of trespass to real property	10
is in tort for the alleged injury to the right of possession.” Pacheco v. Martinez, 1981-	11
NMCA-116, ¶ 14, 97 N.M. 37, 636 P.2d 308. New Mexico law explains that “[a]n	12
easement creates a nonpossessory right to enter and use land in the possession of	13
another and obligates the possessor not to interfere with the uses authorized by the	14
easement.” City of Rio Rancho, 2011-NMSC-037, ¶ 33 (quoting Restatement (Third)	15
of Prop.: Servitudes § 1.2(1) (2000)). A trespass claimant, like the Association, must	16
prove that the defendant had no right to enter and use the land. But if an easement	17
grants the right to enter and use land, use of that land in accordance with the	18
easement causes no injury to the right of possession, and no action for trespass exists.	19

7
{8} 	In the present case, to make a prima facie case for summary judgment, the	1
Association had to demonstrate that the undisputed material facts established that	2
OMC had no right to enter and use the Condominium Property Easement. See City	3
of Rio Rancho, 2011-NMSC-037, ¶ 14 (“The party moving for summary judgment	4
has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case for summary judgment by	5
presenting such evidence as is sufficient in law to raise a presumption of fact or	6
establish the fact in question unless rebutted.” (internal quotation marks and citation	7
omitted)). In its response, OMC primarily contends that as a matter of law, OMC	8
“may use the [Condominium Property Easement] for ingress/egress [across 613 Old	9
Santa Fe Trail] by virtue of the [Wedge] Easement.” The Association responds that	10
the undisputed facts show that the Wedge Easement, “permitting OMC to cross over	11
a tiny portion of 613 Old Santa Fe Trail, cannot, as a matter of law,” create a right	12
for 	OMC 	to 	use 	the 	Condominium 	Property 	Easement. 	We 	agree 	with 	the	13
Association and explain.	14
{9} 	An easement that is “created to benefit a dominant estate cannot be expanded,	15
changed, or modified without the express consent of the servient estate.” Mayer v.	16
Smith, 2015-NMCA-060, ¶ 29, 350 P.3d 1191 (omission, internal quotation marks,	17
and citation omitted). An easement can be either appurtenant or in gross. See	18
Luevano v. Group One, 1989-NMCA-061, ¶ 9, 108 N.M. 774, 779 P.2d 552. An	19
appurtenant easement is generally granted to an adjoining property owner for the	20

8
benefit of the adjoining property. See Skeen v. Boyles, 2009-NMCA-080, ¶ 23, 146	1
N.M. 627, 213 P.3d 531. In the present case, the parties do not dispute that the	2
Condominium Property Easement is an easement appurtenant to the property at 613	3
Old Santa Fe Trail, granted for the benefit of that property. The dominant estate for	4
purposes of the Condominium Property Easement is 613 Old Santa Fe Trail, and the	5
servient estate is the Condominium Property. “The owner of the dominant estate	6
cannot change the extent of the easement or subject the servient estate to an	7
additional burden not contemplated by the grant of easement.” Kikta v. Hughes,	8
1988-NMCA-105, ¶ 14, 108 N.M. 61, 766 P.2d 321.	9
{10} 	Along these lines, “[a]n easement can be used only in connection with the	10
estate to which it is appurtenant.” 28A C.J.S. Easements § 226 (2022); see Weeks v.	11
Wolf Creek Indus., 941 So. 2d 263, 269 (Ala. 2006) (“To be sure, if the grant is for the	12
benefit of some particular land it can[]not be used to accommodate some other tract	13
of land adjoining or lying beyond.” (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation	14
omitted)); Zeh v. Karker, 351 N.Y.S.2d 478, 479 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974) (“It is well	15
settled that a right of way granted in connection with one parcel may not be used for	16
the benefit of any land other than that to which it was made appurtenant when it was	17
granted.”); Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Servitudes § 4.11 (2000) (“Unless the	18
terms of the servitude . . . provide otherwise, an appurtenant easement or profit may	19
not be used for the benefit of property other than the dominant estate.”). When the	20

9
holder of a dominant estate also owns a separate estate, which is not appurtenant to	1
the easement, the holder of the dominant estate generally cannot use the easement to	2
reach that separate estate, absent some right granted by the easement. See Jordan v.	3
Rash, 745 S.W.2d 549, 553 (Tex. App. 1988) (“Unless the wording of an easement	4
creates a more extended right of use, the grantee cannot use it to benefit other	5
premises owned by him or others.”); Lichteig v. Churinetz, 519 A.2d 99, 102 (Conn.	6
App. Ct. 1986) (“An easement cannot be used for the benefit of land other than the	7
dominant estate.”); Cleve v. Nairin, 264 S.W. 741, 742 (Ky. Ct. App. 1924) (“There	8
is no dissent from the rule that an easement for the benefit of a particular piece of	9
land cannot be enlarged and extended to other parcels of land, whether adjoining or	10
distinct tracts to which the right is not attached.”). In the present case, OMC claims	11
the right to use the Condominium Property Easement based on (1) the language of	12
the Condominium Property Easement, and (2) cases from other jurisdictions holding	13
that dominant easement holders can permit use of the servient property under some	14
circumstances.	15
{11} 	Beginning 	with 	the 	language 	of 	the 	easement, 	OMC 	argues 	that 	the	16
Condominium Property Easement does not limit use of the easement “for a specific	17
purpose or a specific number of people or vehicles,” and its purpose “is expressly	18
stated as ‘non-exclusive access-egress.’” We agree with OMC that “the purpose of	19
the access would include access in order to use the easement in a manner that is	20

10
reasonably 	necessary 	for 	the 	full 	enjoyment” 	of 	the 	Condominium 	Property	1
Easement by the dominant estate (613 Old Santa Fe Trail). See City of Rio Rancho,	2
2011-NMSC-037, ¶ 33. We disagree, however, that generally an easement permits	3
all uses that it fails to specifically limit or prohibit, and here, the Condominium	4
Property Easement is not silent. The language of the Condominium Property	5
Easement not only does not give the dominant estate (613 Old Santa Fe Trail) the	6
right to allow third parties to use the easement to benefit other premises, it explicitly	7
states that it “shall serve only” the dominant estate (613 Old Santa Fe Trail). Thus,	8
the language of the Condominium Property Easement does not grant “a more	9
extended right of use” in order to benefit premises other than the dominant estate	10
(613 Old Santa Fe Trail). See Jordan, 745 S.W.2d at 553; see, e.g., Dethlefsen v.	11
Weddle, 2012-NMCA-077, ¶ 12, 284 P.3d 452 (“[T]he written language of an	12
easement should be conclusive.”).	13
{12} 	Defendant OMC cites authorities in which the dominant estate was permitted	14
to allow third parties to use an easement in order to benefit the dominant estate. See	15
Weeks, 941 So. 2d at 267, 269, 271-72 ; Fruth Farms, Ltd. v. Vill. of Holgate, 442 F.	16
Supp. 2d 470, 474-75, 477 (N.D. Ohio 2006); Cellco P’ship v. Shelby Cnty., 172 S.W.3d	17
574, 581, 584, 597 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) ; Gowen v. Cote, 875 S.W.2d 637, 639-42	18
(Mo. Ct. App. 1994). These cases address the use of the easement either by guests or	19
invitees to a dominant estate or for the enjoyment of new developments on the	20

11
dominant property. OMC seeks to extend these cases to permit the dominant estate	1
to grant others access to the easement across the servient estate in order to reach a	2
different property. OMC argues that the dominant estate (613 Old Santa Fe Trail)	3
benefits from OMC’s use, because OMC agreed to pay $5,000 and expenses for the	4
Wedge Easement. As we explain, extending these cases as OMC suggests—fee	5
notwithstanding—disregards the general rule that easements cannot be used to	6
benefit property that is not appurtenant to the easement. See 28A C.J.S. Easements	7
§ 226. Two cases illustrate the distinction between this general rule and the cases on	8
which OMC relies.	9
{13} 	OMC has repeatedly cited Arcidi v. Town of Rye, 846 A.2d 535 (N.H. 2004). In	10
Arcidi, the dominant easement owner, identified as VPI, had an easement to use the	11
plaintiff’s property to access VPI’s property (access easement). Id. at 697, 699. VPI	12
additionally gave the town an easement to build a pump station on VPI’s property	13
(pump station easement). Id. at 697. The plaintiff argued that the town had no right to	14
use the access easement, and the Arcidi court held that “VPI, as the dominant estate	15
holder, may authorize others, such as the town, to use the appurtenant easement over	16
the plaintiff’s property[, and t]hus, the town has the right to use the [appurtenant]	17
easement over the plaintiff’s property because VPI has permitted it to do so.” Id. at	18
698, 	701. 	The 	Arcidi 	court 	applied 	this 	legal 	principle 	because 	the 	factual	19
circumstances supported it; the third party, the town, used the easement over the	20

12
plaintiff’s property in order to access its development, which was on the dominant	1
estate. In the present case, OMC used the Condominium Property Easement to cross	2
the dominant estate (613 Old Santa Fe Trail) to access a different property (621 Old	3
Santa Fe Trail).	4
{14} 	Occupying the other, more relevant sphere is Southwick v. Planning Board of	5
Plymouth, in which a town held an easement over private roads that were	6
appurtenant to a lot owned by the town. 839 N.E.2d 351, 353, 355 (Mass. App. Ct.	7
2005). The lot owned by the town abutted another parcel that was landlocked with	8
no right to access the private roads. Id. at 352-53. A developer intending to build a	9
subdivision on the landlocked parcel obtained a separate easement from the town to	10
access the lot owned by the town, but access to the proposed subdivision would have	11
also required use of the town’s appurtenant easement over the private roads. Id. at	12
353-54. The proposed subdivision developer relied on the minimal burden it claimed	13
would be placed on the easement by extending its use for the benefit of two	14
additional lots. Id. at 354. The Southwick court concluded that the developer’s	15
argument confused “the question of overburdening an easement by frequency, type	16
or intensity of use” with “the question of which land may enjoy the benefit of an	17
appurtenant easement.” Id. (emphasis added). The Southwick court explained that	18
the proposed subdivision developer had “demonstrated no legal right to use any	19
portion” of the town’s road easement. Id. at 355 n.13.	20

13
{15} 	The present case more closely resembles Southwick than Arcidi. The Arcidi	1
court and the courts in the other cases cited by OMC considered whether a dominant	2
easement owner could allow others to use the easement to access the dominant	3
easement owner’s property. In the present case, however, the dominant easement	4
owner (613 Old Santa Fe Trail) has allowed OMC to cross the Condominium	5
Property Easement to access property that is not the dominant estate or appurtenant	6
to the Condominium Property Easement. This scenario is similar to Southwick, in	7
which the town permitted the proposed subdivision developer to use the town’s	8
easement over the private roads, together with a separate easement over the town’s	9
property, to reach the landlocked subdivision property. The separate easement over	10
the town’s property did not give the developer the right to use the private road	11
easement, which had been granted to the town by the servient estate solely to access	12
the town’s property. Just as the developer in Southwick could not use the private road	13
easement because the landlocked property was not appurtenant to the private road	14
easement, OMC has no right to use the Condominium Property Easement—	15
notwithstanding the Wedge Easement—to reach 621 Old Santa Fe Trail, because	16
621 Old Santa Fe Trail is not appurtenant to the Condominium Property Easement.	17
Because, as a matter of law, OMC had no right to use the Condominium Property	18
Easement in order to reach 621 Old Santa Fe Trail, we reject OMC’s primary basis	19
for challenging the district court’s grant of summary judgment.	20

14
{16} 	OMC additionally contends that disputed material facts demonstrated that	1
OMC’s use of the Condominium Property Easement was reasonable and challenges	2
(1) the quality of the evidence submitted by the Association to support summary	3
judgment; (2) the Association’s failure to address OMC’s affirmative defenses	4
relating to the impact of the Wedge Easement, failure to join the owners of 613 Old	5
Santa Fe Trail, and the acts or omissions of other parties; and (3) OMC’s request to	6
conduct additional discovery. Each of these arguments is based on the relevance of	7
additional disputed facts or a need for more evidence. Our analysis of the	8
Association’s trespass claim, however, relies entirely on OMC’s undisputed use of	9
the Condominium Property Easement and concludes OMC had no legal right to do	10
so. No additional facts or evidence are relevant. OMC had no legal right to use the	11
easement, and the district court properly granted summary judgment on the	12
Association’s trespass claim. We therefore affirm the district court.	13
II. 	The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Dismissing the	14
Association’s Remaining Claim Without Prejudice	15
{17} 	OMC additionally argues that the district court abused its discretion to grant	16
the Association’s motion to dismiss the remaining claim without prejudice. “An	17
abuse of discretion will be found when the district court’s decision is clearly	18
untenable or contrary to logic and reason” or when the district court “exercises its	19
discretion based on a misunderstanding of the law.” Trinosky, 2011-NMCA-045,	20
¶ 23 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citations omitted). OMC contends that	21

15
“[t]he district court abused its discretion by granting [the Association’s] motion to	1
dismiss without prejudice because it is ‘clearly untenable’ and ‘contrary to logic and	2
reason.’” Specifically, OMC argues that “[t]he equities in this case favor[ed]	3
dismissal with prejudice,” because (1) the Association could not produce evidence	4
to support its claim to force OMC to build a barrier; (2) OMC had already expended	5
significant time and money in its defense; (3) the Association hoped to refile before	6
a more favorable judge; and (4) the Association identified no equities supporting	7
dismissal without prejudice. OMC’s arguments do not suggest that the district court	8
misapprehended the law, so we consider only whether the decision to dismiss	9
without prejudice was contrary to logic and reason.	10
{18} 	Rule 1-041(A)(2) NMRA permits the district court to dismiss an action “on	11
motion of the plaintiff . . . upon such terms and conditions as the court deems	12
proper.” According to the rule, “[u]nless otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal	13
under this paragraph is without prejudice.” Id. The district court indicated at the	14
hearing that it saw no prejudice to OMC in granting the Association’s motion,	15
because regardless of whether the claim was dismissed with or without prejudice,	16
the Association could refile a trespass claim if trespass by third parties was ongoing.	17
The district court’s ruling was permissible under Rule 1-041(A)(2) and not contrary	18
to logic and reason. We therefore affirm the grant of the Association’s motion to	19
dismiss the remaining claim without prejudice.	20

16
CONCLUSION	1
{19} 	For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the district court.	2
{20} 	IT IS SO ORDERED.	3
_________________________________	4
KATHERINE A. WRAY, Judge	5
WE CONCUR:	6
_________________________________	7
SHAMMARA H. HENDERSON, Judge	8
_________________________________	9
JANE B. YOHALEM, Judge	10

APPENDIX A
PUBLIC NOTICE
REFERENCE AND BASIS OF BEARINGS:
INIS SURVEY IS BASED ON THOSE RECORDED DOCUMENTS NOTED HEREON. CITY OF SANTA FE STAFF MUST APPROVE ALL DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED WITH AN APPLICATION FOR. A BUILDING PERMIT AND MAY REQUIRE SUBMITTAL OF ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTATION TO PROVE LEGAL LOT OF RECORD.
PLAT OF SURVEY FOR ALAN AND TOMIA GOULD, PREPARED BY SALVADOR E. VAGY, M.M.P.R. NO. 4405, DATED JANUARY 21, 1999, BEARINGS & DISTANCES IN PARENTHESIS FROM THE SURVEY.
LEGEND
CAPPED PERAR FOUND UNLESS
WARRANTY DOED FROM ALAN MA. SOULD AND TOFRA COULD, HUSBAND AND WIFE, TO NEW MEXICO ASSOCIATION OF COUNTIES RECORDED W THE OFFICE OF THE COUNTY CLERK, SANTA FE COUNTY, NEW MEXICO ON DECEMBER 31, 1953 W BOOK 1585, PAGES 893-635, AS WISTRUMENT NO. 1035.570.
URUTY POLE WIN OVERHEAD UTKUTY LINE.
WATER METER
CAS METER.
ELECTRIC METER.
.
.
SANITARY SERER MANHOLE
30 20 19 ₲
SCALE- 1'=30
M:45:J') =- 23.99
MSC XXXXXX 1727. FAGE 697
Y GLI PPE
STRUCTURE
STUCADED
XIT MONTH K KANES PLAY SK. 487, PG. 035
OLD SANTA FE TRAIL
STRUCTURE
STRUCTURE E13 OUD SANTA FE TRAR
EXHIBIT C
PLAT BK 739, 92 542
OXNYE DE SANTA FE J
CELIA MEDRAHO
THE FOREGOING INSTRUMENT WAS ACKNOWLEDGED BEFORE ME
HEREBY CERTEY THAT THIS INSTRUMENT
THIS 26 DAY OF DANS 2013.
8-3-15
AX THE PACECITY OF THE RECORDS OF SANTA FE COUNTY.
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES
WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL OF OFFICE GERALDINE SALAZAR COUNTY CLERK, SANTA FE COUNTY, NU
SURVEYOR'S CERTIFICATION
(, JAMES A MEDRANO, A NEW MEXICO REGISTERED PROFESSIONAL SURVEYOR CERINY THAT I CONDUCTED AND AN RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS SURVEY, THAT THIS SURVEY IS TRIE AND CORRECT TO THE BEST OF WY ANOWLEDGE AND SEUSF, AND THAT THE BREVEY AND FLAT HEET THE MINHEN STANDARDS FOR SURVEYING IN NEW MEXICO.
DEPUTY
U.P.C. # 1-054-099-305-431 INDEXING INFORMATION FOR COUNTY CLERK
I FURTHER CERTIFY THAT THIS SURVEY IS NOT A LANG DASION OF SVROMSION AS DEFINED 9 THE NEW MEXICO SVEKOMISION ACT AND THAT THIS IS A BIAMDARY RONEY FLAT OF AN EXISTING TRACT CE TRACTS
AMENDED BOUNDARY SURVEY PLAT FOR
LANGMARK SURVEYS
P.C. BCK EFT4
SANTA FE, NM 87502
18. (506) 473-1587
FAX. (506)473-0964
PROJECT NO. 98-53 SDY.
PLAT NO W-333.
Land Records Corp. SFTC ALB11195 SF 1716105.001
RP- Page 71
8.26-13
PONDEROSA CAPITAL, LLC LOT 10, BLOCK 88 KINGS OFFICIAL MAP 613 OLD SANTA FE TRAIL WITHIN PROJECTED SECTION 25, T. 17 N., R. 9 E., N.M.P.M. SANTA FE COUNTY, NEW MEXICO
ES VNOTYR
762019
17