Michael Bazerman v. New Jersey Department of Education, Office of Student Protection, 8/29/2023, (#256-23)

256-23
New Jersey Commissioner of Education
Final Decision
Michael Bazerman,
Petitioner,
v.
New Jersey Department of Education, Office of
Student Protection,
Respondent.
Synopsis
Petitioner appealed the determination of the respondent New Jersey Department of Education, Office of
Student Protection (OSP), permanently disqualifying him – pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7.1 – from performing
electrical work in New Jersey school facilities after a background check revealed a conviction in New York
State for official misconduct. The issue in this case is whether petitioner’s New York official misconduct
offense, a Class A misdemeanor crime codified at N.Y.P.L. 195.00, is substantially equivalent to New Jersey’s
official misconduct offense, a second-degree crime codified at N.J.S.A. 2C:30-2. 	The parties filed cross
motions for summary decision.
The ALJ found, inter alia, that: 	there are no material facts at issue and the matter is ripe for summary
decision; petitioner works as a low voltage electrician; he was required to submit to a criminal background
check when his employer applied for an installation job at a New Jersey (NJ) public school; the background
check revealed a 2013 conviction under N.Y.P.L. 195.00 for official misconduct in New York (NY); 	the
conviction stemmed from an audit wherein petitioner was unable to account for $5,811 that the New York
Police Department (NYPD) reimbursed him for surveillance and wiretap equipment he purchased while
employed as a detective for the NYPD; although both N.Y.P.L. 195.00 and N.J.S.A. 2C:30-2 use the same
language, the offenses were not substantially equivalent because they subject the offender to different
penalties. 	The ALJ concluded that because the NY and NJ statutes are not substantially equivalent, the
petitioner should not be permanently barred from employment on NJ school projects; accordingly,
petitioner’s motion for summary decision was granted.
Upon review, the Commissioner rejected the Initial Decision, finding the appeal to be untimely. The
Commissioner noted that, even assuming the petition was timely filed, petitioner’s position – adopted by
the ALJ – that N.Y.P.L. 195.00 and N.J.S.A. 2C:30-2 are not substantially equivalent because the penalties
imposed for each offense differ, is unavailing. Instead, the Commissioner found, inter alia, that N.Y.P.L.
195.00 and N.J.S.A. 2C:30-2 are substantially equivalent crimes, and a plain language reading of N.J.S.A.
18A:6-7.1(d) makes clear that the appropriate inquiry is whether the crimes or offenses are substantially
equivalent, not whether the penalties associated with them are substantially equivalent. 	Accordingly,
OSP’s motion for summary decision was granted and the petition was dismissed.
This synopsis is not part of the Commissioner’s decision. It has been prepared for the convenience of the reader. It
has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Commissioner.

OAL Dkt. No. EDU 05310-22
Agency Dkt. No. 92-4/22
New Jersey Commissioner of Education
Final Decision
Michael Bazerman,
Petitioner,
v.
New Jersey Department of Education, Office of
Student Protection,
Respondent.
The record of this matter, the Initial Decision of the Office of Administrative Law (OAL), the
exceptions filed by respondent pursuant to N.J.A.C. 1:1-18.4, and petitioner’s reply thereto have been
reviewed and considered.
This matter concerns whether N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7.1 permanently disqualifies petitioner from
performing electrical work at public school facilities after a background check revealed that he was
convicted of official misconduct in New York. At issue is whether New York’s official misconduct
offense, a Class A misdemeanor crime codified at N.Y.P.L. 195.00, is substantially equivalent to
New Jersey’s official misconduct offense, a second-degree crime codified at N.J.S.A. 2C:30-2.
N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7.1 provides, in relevant part:
A facility, center, school, or school system under the
supervision of the Department of Education and board of education
which cares for, or is involved in the education of children under the
age of 18 shall not employ for pay or contract for the paid services of
any teaching staff member . . . or any other person serving in a
position which involves regular contact with pupils unless the
employer has first determined consistent with the requirements and
256-23

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standards of this act, that no criminal history record information exists
. . . which would disqualify that individual from being employed or
utilized in such capacity or position. . . .
The statute mandates that, absent limited exceptions not applicable here, individuals
convicted of “any crime of the first or second degree” are “permanently disqualified from
employment or service.” Ibid. Moreover, “[f]or the purposes of this section, a conviction exists if the
individual has at any time been convicted under the laws of this State or under any similar statutes
of the United States or any other state for a substantially equivalent crime or other offense.” N.J.S.A.
18A:6-7.1(d). Under New York law, misdemeanors are considered crimes. See N.Y.P.L. § 10.00(6).
The relevant facts are undisputed. In 2013, petitioner was convicted of official misconduct
pursuant to N.Y.P.L. 195.00 while employed by the New York City Police Department (NYPD) as a
detective. According to petitioner, he was authorized to purchase equipment related to surveillance
and wiretap activities with his own money and would receive reimbursement for same upon
submission of receipts. During an audit, he was unable to account for equipment for which he had
received reimbursement and was subsequently charged with official misconduct. He pled guilty,
served no jail time, received a conditional discharge after one-year, paid restitution in the amount of
$5,811, and was barred from future employment as a public official.1
In 2021, petitioner, now employed as an electrician and data technician in New Jersey with
NetQ Multimedia Company, was assigned to work on a project at a public school building in Toms
River and underwent a criminal background check. Upon learning of petitioner’s official misconduct
1 In 2015, the State of New York issued petitioner a “certificate of relief from disabilities” which relieves him “of all
disabilities and bars to employment, excluding the right to be eligible for public office” based upon his conviction.
However, the certificate states that it “shall NOT prevent any judicial, administrative, licensing, or other body, board,
or authority from relying upon the conviction specified . . . as the basis for the exercise of its discretionary power to
suspend, revoke, refuse to issue or renew any license, permit or other authority or privilege.” See also In re Winston,
438 N.J. Super. 1, 8 (App. Div. 2014) (“A New York certificate of relief from disabilities does not alter or affect the
criminal conviction to which it relates.”).

3
conviction, respondent barred petitioner from employment at public school facilities pursuant to
N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7.1. Respondent reasoned that New York’s official misconduct offense was
substantially equivalent to New Jersey’s official misconduct offense, a second-degree crime.
Consequently, since N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7.1 provides that all convictions for first- and second-degree
crimes are disqualifying offenses, respondent determined that petitioner was therefore permanently
disqualified.
Petitioner appealed, and the matter was transmitted to the Office of Administrative Law
(OAL). Respondent initially moved to dismiss the petition as untimely, but later withdrew the motion.
Because none of the material facts were disputed, the parties moved for summary decision. The
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) granted petitioner’s cross-motion for summary decision upon
concluding that N.Y.P.L. 195.00 and N.J.S.A. 2C:30-2 were not substantially equivalent offenses.
Although the ALJ found that “[b]oth statutes use the same language,” he reasoned that the offenses
were not substantially equivalent because they subject the offender to different penalties.
Initial Decision at 5. Specifically, the ALJ determined that the maximum term of imprisonment for a
Class A misdemeanor in New York is 364 days, while the maximum term of imprisonment for a
second-degree offense in New Jersey is ten years. Ibid.
In its exceptions, respondent argues that the ALJ erroneously focused his analysis on the
penalties that courts may impose at sentencing for each offense instead of the nearly identical
statutory language defining the elements of each offense. Respondent maintains that because
N.Y.P.L. 195.00 and N.J.S.A. 2C:30-2 are substantially equivalent crimes, petitioner is permanently
disqualified from working at public school facilities pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7.1. Respondent also
contends that the ALJ went beyond the four corners of N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7.1 when he found that

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petitioner’s conviction did not reflect the level of dishonesty “required for disqualification under
N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7.1 suggested by the enumerated crimes.” Initial Decision at 5.
In his reply, petitioner requests that the Commissioner adopt the ALJ’s Initial Decision. He
maintains that a comparative analysis of the two crimes reveals that they are not substantially
equivalent and that the ALJ had the discretion to consider, as part of his analysis, that the sentences
imposed for each crime differ. Furthermore, petitioner disagrees with respondent that the ALJ went
beyond the four corners of N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7.1 when he found that “the record of deceit in petitioner’s
conviction is lacking” and that petitioner simply “failed to account” for money. Initial Decision at 5.
Finally, although this issue was neither addressed by the ALJ nor discussed in respondent’s
exceptions, petitioner contends that his misdemeanor conviction “cannot be considered a prior
conviction for comparative analysis and disqualification purposes” because N.J.S.A. 2C:44-4(c), a
statute governing the sentencing of criminal offenders, states that “[a] conviction in another
jurisdiction shall constitute a prior conviction of a crime if a sentence of imprisonment in excess of
one year was authorized under the law of the other jurisdiction.”2
Upon review, the Commissioner rejects the Initial Decision of the OAL. First, although this
issue was not addressed by the ALJ, the Commissioner finds and concludes that petitioner’s appeal
was untimely. N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.3(i) provides that petitions must be filed “no later than the 90th day
from the date of receipt of the notice of a final order, ruling, or other action” by an agency. “The
“ninety-day limitation period” is a “reasonable procedural requirement” that “provides finality in
education matters” while affording litigants a “meaningful opportunity to file [a] petition.” Kaprow
v. Bd. of Educ. of Berkeley Twp., 131 N.J. 572, 583 (1993).
2 N.J.A.C. 1:1-18.4(d) provides that replies “may address the issues raised in the exceptions filed by the other party.”

5
Respondent issued its determination on September 13, 2021. As such, petitioner should have
filed his petition on or before December 13, 2021. However, his petition was not received by the
Office of Controversies and Disputes (Office) until April 26, 2022. Even if the Office had received
petitioner’s purported email submissions of January 19 and February 25, 2022, they would have been
untimely as well. While the record reflects that an employee of respondent mistakenly told petitioner
via email on September 22, 2022, that there was no timeline for the filing of an appeal, the limitation
period is established by regulation and applies regardless of any statement to the contrary by an
employee. Moreover, the employee also provided petitioner with the Office’s email address. The
onus was on petitioner to inquire with the Office, which is responsible for the processing of petitions,
if he had questions. For these reasons, petitioner’s appeal should be dismissed as untimely.
But even assuming his petition was timely filed, petitioner’s position—adopted by the ALJ—
that N.Y.P.L. 195.00 and N.J.S.A. 2C:30-2 are not substantially equivalent because the penalties
imposed for each offense differ, is unavailing. Instead, the Commissioner finds and concludes that
N.Y.P.L. 195.00 and N.J.S.A. 2C:30-2 are substantially equivalent crimes and that, consequently,
petitioner is permanently disqualified from employment on public school projects pursuant to
N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7.1.
At the outset, the Appellate Division has determined that “N.J.S.A. 2C:30-2 is based upon
New York Penal Law § 195.00.” State v. Brady, 452 N.J. Super. 143, 162 (App. Div. 2017). That finding
is bolstered by a comparative review of the statutes’ plain language. As illustrated below, the
elements of each offense are nearly identical.
N.Y.P.L. 195.00, Official Misconduct, states:
A public servant is guilty of official misconduct when, with intent to
obtain a benefit or deprive another person of a benefit:

6
1. He commits an act relating to his office but constituting an
unauthorized exercise of his official functions, knowing that such
act is unauthorized; or
2. He knowingly refrains from performing a duty which is imposed
upon him by law or is clearly inherent in the nature of his office.
Official misconduct is a class A misdemeanor.
By comparison, N.J.S.A. 2C:30-2 states:
A public servant is guilty of official misconduct when, with purpose to
obtain a benefit for himself or another or to injure or to deprive
another of a benefit:
a. He commits an act relating to his office but constituting an
unauthorized exercise of his official functions, knowing that such
act is unauthorized or he is committing such act in an
unauthorized manner; or
b. He knowingly refrains from performing a duty which is imposed
upon him by law or is clearly inherent in the nature of his office.
Official misconduct is a crime of the second degree. If the benefit
obtained or sought to be obtained, or of which another is deprived or
sought to be deprived, is of a value of $200.00 or less, the offense of
official misconduct is a crime of the third degree.
The Commissioner rejects the ALJ’s attempt to distinguish the two offenses by relying on the
penalties associated with them. When construing a statute, the best indicator of legislative intent is
a statute’s plain language. In re Ridgefield Pk. Bd. of Educ., 244 N.J. 1, 18 (2020). A plain language
reading of N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7.1(d) makes clear that the appropriate inquiry is whether the crimes or
offenses are substantially equivalent, not whether the penalties associated with them are
substantially equivalent. See N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7.1(d) (“[A] conviction exists if the individual has at any
time been convicted under the laws of this State or under any similar statutes of the United States or
any other state for a substantially equivalent crime or other offense.”) (emphasis added). The

7
penalties associated with each crime are neither dispositive nor relevant when determining whether
the two crimes are substantially equivalent to one another under N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7.1(d).
Furthermore, the ALJ’s approach in this matter runs contrary to precedent. See Kelly v.
New Jersey State Department of Education, Criminal History Review Unit, Commissioner Decision No.
396-18R (December 18, 2018) (holding that because the petitioner’s conviction under Pennsylvania
law Pa.C.S.A. § 907 for the first-degree misdemeanor of possessing instruments of a crime was
substantially equivalent to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a), a second-degree crime, he was permanently
disqualified from employment pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7.1). In Kelly, the ALJ’s analysis, adopted by
the Commissioner, centered around the statutory elements of each crime and not their degree or the
penalties associated with them. Kelly v. New Jersey State Department of Education, Criminal History
Review Unit, OAL Dkt. No. EDU 12761-16 (EDU 5753-12 on remand), Initial Decision (November 16,
2018), at 7-13, aff’d, Commissioner Decision No. 396-18R (December 18, 2018). In the end, the
different penalties imposed in Pennsylvania and New Jersey had no bearing upon the comparative
analysis of the statutory elements of each crime for purposes of determining whether they were
substantially equivalent to one another.
In addition, the ALJ’s finding that petitioner’s conviction did not reflect the level of dishonesty
“required for disqualification under N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7.1 suggested by the enumerated crimes,”
Initial Decision at 5, is misplaced. Respondent did not permanently disqualify petitioner based upon
a conviction of one of the enumerated crimes at N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7.1(a), (b), or (c). On the contrary,
respondent’s determination was based upon the plain language of N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7.1, which
mandates that individuals convicted of any first- or second-degree crime “shall be permanently
disqualified from employment or service.” As written, the statute does not allow for consideration
of the level of dishonesty involved in the commission of the offense. Neither the ALJ nor the

8
Commissioner is permitted to “rewrite a statute or add language that the Legislature omitted.” State
v. Munafo, 222 N.J. 480, 488 (2015).
Finally, petitioner’s reliance on N.J.S.A. 2C:44-4(c) is unavailing because that statute governs
the sentencing of criminal offenders and is inapplicable to the present civil matter. As noted,
N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7.1(d) expressly provides that “[f]or the purposes of this section, a conviction exists if
the individual has at any time been convicted under the laws of this State or under any other similar
statutes of the United States or any other state for a substantially equivalent crime or other offense.”
By its plain language, subsection (d) clearly establishes the definition of conviction to be utilized for
purposes of N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7.1. To instead apply the definition of conviction found at N.J.S.A. 2C:44-
4(c), which specifically pertains to criminal sentencing, would ignore the plain language of subsection
(d) and undermine the Legislature’s intent. See generally Aronberg v. Tolbert, 207 N.J. 587, 605 (2011)
(holding that one “cannot ignore the relevant statutory language to reach a more sympathetic result
for [petitioner]”).
Accordingly, respondent’s motion for summary decision is granted, petitioner’s cross-motion
for summary decision is denied, and the petition of appeal is hereby dismissed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.3
ACTING COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION4
Date of Decision:
Date of Mailing:
3 This decision may be appealed to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:6-
9.1. Under N.Y.C. 2:4-1(b), a notice of appeal must be filed with the Appellate Division within 45 days from the date
of mailing of this decision.
August 29, 2023
August 30, 2023
4 Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:4-34, this matter has been delegated to Kathleen Ehling.

New Jersey is an Equal Opportunity Employer
INITIAL DECISION
GRANTING SUMMARY
DECISION
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 05310-22
AGENCY DKT. NO. 92-4/22
MICHAEL BAZERMAN,
Petitioner,
v.
NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
OFFICE OF STUDENT PROTECTION,
Respondent.
Michael Bazerman, petitioner, pro se
David L. Kalisky, Deputy Attorney General, for respondent (Matthew J. Platkin,
Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney)
Record Closed: June 2, 2023 Decided: July 17, 2023
BEFORE: EDWARD J. DELANOY, JR., Deputy Director and ALAJ:
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioner Michael Bazerman (Bazerman) appeals the New Jersey Department of
Education (“respondent” or “DOE”) determination that petitioner’s New York conviction is
State of New Jersey
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 05310-22
2
“substantially equivalent” to a first- or second-degree crime in New Jersey, thereby
barring petitioner from employment in New Jersey schools.
Petitioner and respondent have filed cross motions for summary decision. The
respondent argues that petitioner’s conviction for official misconduct in New York
disqualifies him from working in New Jersey schools pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7.1. In
response, petitioner argues that his New York conviction is not “substantially equivalent”
to those crimes that bar employment under 18A:6-7.1.
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Petitioner is a low voltage electrician and data technician. Resp. Brief p. 2. On
August 18, 2021, petitioner applied for an installation job in one of the Toms River School
District’s school buildings, requiring him to submit fingerprints for a criminal background
check. Ibid.
On September 13, 2021, petitioner was notified that under N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7.1,
individuals convicted of first- or second-degree crimes in New Jersey or “substantially
equivalent” crimes in other jurisdictions are permanently barred from employment, and,
due to his violation of N.Y.P.L 195.00 in 2013, petitioner would be barred from
employment. Id. at 3.
Petitioner was convicted of “Official Misconduct: Public Servant Performing Illegal
Function,” N.Y.P.L. 195.00, because he could not account for $5,811 that the New York
Police Department reimbursed him for buying equipment while working for the
Department in 2013. Id. at 4. Respondent found that N.Y.P.L. 195 is “substantially
equivalent” to N.J.S.A. 2C:30-2, “Official Misconduct.” Both statutes use the same
language. N.Y.P.L. 195.00 provides:
A public servant is guilty of official misconduct when, with
intent to obtain a benefit or deprive another person of a
benefit:

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 05310-22
3
1. He commits an act relating to his office but
constituting an unauthorized exercise of his official
functions, knowing that such act is unathorized; or
2. He knowingly refrains from performing a duty which
is imposed upon him by law or is clearly inherent in the
nature of his office.
Official misconduct is a class A misdemeanor.
N.J.S.A. 2D:30-2 provides:
A public servant is guilty of official misconduct when, with
purpose to obtain a benefit for himself or another or to injure
or to deprive another of a benefit:
a. He commits an act relating to his office but
constituting an unauthorized exercise of his official
functions, knowing that such act is unauthorized or he
is committing such act in an unauthorized manner; or
b. He knowingly refrains from performing a duty which
is imposed upon him by law or is clearly inherent in the
nature of his office.
Official misconduct is a crime of the second degree. If the benefit obtained or
sought to be obtained, or of which another is deprived or sought to be deprived, is of a
value of $200 or less, the offense of official misconduct is a crime of the third degree.
On April 8, 2022, petitioner filed a petition appealing respondent’s decision to bar
him from employment. Resp. Brief p. 3.
On March 21, 2023, respondent filed a Motion for Summary Decision, and on April
11, 2023, petitioner filed a Cross Motion for Summary Decision. The last pleading was
received on June 2, 2023, and the record closed on that day.
The issue is whether N.Y.P.L. 195 is “substantially equivalent” to N.J.S.A. 2C:30-
2.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 05310-22
4
LEGAL ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
I. Standard for Summary Decision
Under the Uniform Administrative Procedure Rules, N.J.A.C. 1:1-1.1 to -21.6, “[a]
party may move for summary decision upon all or any of the substantive issues in a
contested case.” N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.5(a). Such motion “shall be served with briefs and with
or without supporting affidavits” and “[t]he decision sought may be rendered if the papers
and discovery which have been filed, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled
to prevail as a matter of law.” N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.5(b). When the motion “is made and
supported, an adverse party in order to prevail must by responding affidavit set forth
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue which can only be determined in an
evidentiary proceeding.” Ibid.
N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7.1 creates a bar to employment for individuals whose “criminal
history record check reveals a record of conviction for any crime of the first or second
degree” or for specific enumerated crimes. See Id. N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7.1 elaborates that
“[f]or the purposes of [the] section, a conviction exists if the individual has at any time
been convicted under the law of this State or under any similar statutes of the United
States or any other state for a substantially equivalent crime or other offense.” Id.
Most of the enumerated crimes involve actions that place others in physical danger
or the threat of harm. See N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7.1(c) (listing “recklessly endangering another
person,” “burglary,” and “threat and other improper influence” among the disqualifying
crimes). Indeed, the majority of cases where convictions in other states were deemed
“substantially equivalent” fall into this category. See e.g., David Kelly v. New Jersey State
Board of Education, EDU 12761-16, initial decision, (Nov. 16, 2018), adopted, (Dec. 18,
2018), https://njlaw.rutgers.edu/collections/oal/html/initial/edu12761-16_1.html (man who
recklessly endangered children in PA barred from employment).
In John Caucino v. Department of Education, EDU 6213-04, initial decision, (Feb.
10, 2005), adopted, (March 11, 2005),

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 05310-22
5
https://njlaw.rutgers.edu/collections/oal/html/initial/edu06213-04_1.html., a
schoolteacher was found to have defrauded a bank of more than $150,000. Id. N.J.S.A.
18A:6-7.1 also lists perjury among the enumerated crimes, a crime of dishonesty, but also
a rather severe one.
Here, petitioner was not convicted of a violent crime. Nor does the level of
dishonesty rise to the level required for disqualification under N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7.1
suggested by the enumerated crimes. The benefit petitioner received, approximately
$5,000, does not approach that of the more than $150,000 gained in Caucino. Moreover,
the record of deceit in petitioner’s conviction is lacking. It is simply stated that he “failed
to account” for the money, not that he defrauded the NYPD, or perjured himself under
oath.
Notably, respondent does not seek petitioner’s disqualification based on one of the
enumerated crimes, but rather the more general bar of individuals who have been
convicted for “any crime of the first or second degree.” Resp. Brief p. 13. The more
relevant inquiry, therefore, is not whether the elements of the New York crime are
comparable to one of the enumerated offenses, but rather whether the class of crime for
which petitioner was convicted is “substantially equivalent” to that of the class of first or
second-degree crimes in New Jersey.
Petitioner was convicted of a Class A misdemeanor in New York, a classification
that carries with it imprisonment that “shall not exceed three hundred sixty-four days.”
N.Y.P.L. 70.15.1. In contrast, a second-degree crime in New Jersey carries with it a
prison term “between five years and ten years.” A New York Class A misdemeanor,
therefore, is clearly not “substantially equivalent” to a second-degree crime in New
Jersey.
To create the substantial equivalence, respondent is essentially arguing that, due
to the similarity of the language between N.Y.P.L. 195.00 and N.J.S.A. 2C:30-2, it can be
inferred that petitioner would have been convicted under N.J.S.A. 2C:30-2 had he been
tried for the same actions in New Jersey. Such an argument, however, ignores the
actualities of sentencing in different jurisdictions. Similar language may lead to two very

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 05310-22
6
different legal standards in application. Moreover, petitioner plead guilty to the charge of
official misconduct based on the penalty the charge holds. Resp. Brief Ex. F. Had
petitioner been facing five to ten years under N.J.S.A. 2C:30-2, the result may have been
very different.
The only reliable comparison that can be drawn, therefore, is based on the
classification of the crimes. N.Y.P.L. 195.00 is not a crime that involves “the use of force
or the threat of force” like those enumerated under N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7.1, and respondent
does not argue that N.Y.P.L. 195.00 is equivalent to one of these enumerated crimes.
Instead, respondent argues petitioner’s crime is “substantially equivalent” to the general
category of first-and second-degree crimes in New Jersey. These categories are defined
not by the elements of crimes, but by the sentences they carry. Thus, the proper
comparison is not the elements of the crimes but the sentence classifications. Here, we
have a Class A Misdemeanor in New York which, based upon classification, is a much
less serious crime than a first- or second-degree crime in New Jersey.
CONCLUSION
I CONCLUDE that based on the undisputed facts and the documents presented
by the parties, N.Y.P.L. 195.00 is not “substantially equivalent” to N.J.S.A. 2C:30-2, and
petitioner’s Cross Motion for Summary Decision should be granted.
ORDER
I hereby ORDER that the petitioner’s motion for summary decision is GRANTED,
and respondent’s motion for summary decision is DISMISSED.
I hereby FILE my initial decision with the COMMISSIONER OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION for consideration.
This recommended decision may be adopted, modified, or rejected by the
COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, who by law is authorized
to make a final decision in this matter. If the Commissioner of the Department of

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 05310-22
7
Education does not adopt, modify, or reject this decision within forty-five days and unless
such time limit is otherwise extended, this recommended decision shall become a final
decision in accordance with N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10.
Within thirteen days from the date on which this recommended decision was
mailed to the parties, any party may file written exceptions with the COMMISSIONER OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, ATTN: BUREAU OF CONTROVERSIES AND
DISPUTES, 100 Riverview Plaza, 4th Floor, PO Box 500, Trenton, New Jersey 08625-
0500, marked “Attention: Exceptions.” A copy of any exceptions must be sent to the
judge and to the other parties.
July 17, 2023
DATE EDWARD J. DELANOY, JR.,
Deputy Director and ALAJ
Date Received at Agency:
Date Mailed to Parties:
EJD/cb

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 05310-22
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APPENDIX
EXHIBITS
For petitioner
• Response to Motion for Summary Decision, dated April 9, 2023
• Response to May 30, 2023, Reply, dated May 15, 2023
For respondent
• Letter Brief and Certification in Support of Motion for Summary Decision,
dated March 20, 2023
• Reply Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Decision, dated May 8, 2023