Malcolm X. Outlaw v. Board of Education of the Township of Willingboro, Burlington County, 10/13/26 (#405-26R)

405-26R
OAL Dkt. Nos. EDU 00463-26, 00464-26, 00465-26, 00466-26 (consolidated)
Agency Dkt. Nos. 427-12/25, 428-12/25, 429-12/25, 430-12/25
New Jersey Commissioner of Education
Decision
Malcolm X. Outlaw,
Petitioner,
v.
Board 	of 	Education 	of 	the 	Township 	of
Willingboro, Burlington County,
Respondent.
The record of this matter and the Initial Decision of the Office of Administrative Law (OAL)
have been reviewed and considered. The parties did not file exceptions.
This matter arises out of the Willingboro Board of Education’s (Board) decision to
indemnify Board member April Henley and Business Administrator Steven Lewis for the costs of
defending against complaints filed against them with the School Ethics Commission (SEC). The
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) granted the Board’s motion for summary decision, finding that
the Board’s resolution approving the payment of legal fees and costs was an action arising out
and in the course of performing their duties as board members.
In support of her conclusion, the ALJ cited to Errington v. Mansfield Twp. Bd. of Educ., 100
N.J. Super. 130, 137 (App. Div. Mar. 27, 1968), in which the Appellate Division held that board
members adopting an indemnification resolution were performing an act which arose out of and
in the course of performing their duties as board members. 	However, the ALJ’s conclusion
conflates two different issues that were before the Appellate Division in Errington, which

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involved a complicated series of facts. 	In summary, board member Harsha published a letter
about Errington; Errington filed a libel suit against her (Suit #1). 	The board then passed a
resolution indemnifying Harsha for her legal fees and costs incurred in Suit #1. The passage of
the resolution resulted in Errington filing a new libel suit against the board members who had
voted in favor of it (Suit #2). A dispute arose regarding whether the board members were entitled
to indemnification for their costs in Suit #2. In its decision, the Appellate Division addressed two
questions: 1) whether the resolution indemnifying Harsha for the costs of Suit #1 was valid, and
2) whether the board members were entitled to indemnification for the costs of Suit #2. The
Appellate Division found that the board members were entitled to indemnification, because
passing a resolution – the action that led to Suit #2 – is an action that arose out of and in the
course of performing the board members’ duties. However, the Appellate Division also indicated
that the resolution indemnifying Harsha, who had taken a “personal and unauthorized act” by
publishing the letter, was “invalid for want of authority to spend the public funds for the
designated purpose. . . The expenditure may be enjoined and the resolution may be judicially set
aside . . .”. Id. at 137. In other words, because Harsha’s actions in publishing the letter that led
to Suit #1 did not arise out of and in the course of performing her duties, the board was incorrect
in indemnifying her for the costs of Suit #1, and its resolution was invalid.
Here, the Board is not seeking indemnification for a legal action filed against its members
for passing the resolutions indemnifying Henley and Lewis. Instead, petitioner is challenging the
validity of the Board’s resolutions themselves. The question presented, therefore, is not whether
the Board’s resolutions arose out of and in the course of performing their duties, but rather

3
whether the Board acted in an arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable manner in determining that
Henley and Lewis were entitled to indemnification under N.J.S.A. 18A:16-6.
Upon review, the Commissioner concludes that there are disputed issues of material fact
that preclude summary decision at this stage of the proceedings. The Board argued in its motion
for summary decision that the only issue in this matter is a purely legal one: whether the Board
possessed lawful authority to approve indemnification resolutions under N.J.S.A. 18A:16-6 and
Board Policy 8750. 	The Commissioner disagrees. 	The Board clearly has authority to pass
indemnification resolutions in a general sense. 	However, whether the Board acted in an
arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable manner in passing the specific indemnification resolutions
at issue in this matter depends partly on facts related to whether Henley’s and Lewis’s actions
arose out of and in the course of performing their duties. Those facts are disputed by petitioner,
and they require further development of the record to resolve.
The Commissioner notes that this remand is not an opportunity for petitioner to relitigate
the ethics complaints filed against Henley and Lewis; the SEC has exclusive jurisdiction over ethics
complaints and has already issued its decisions finding no probable cause that either Henley or
Lewis violated the School Ethics Act. The issue on remand is not whether Henley’s and Lewis’s
actions were appropriate under the school ethics laws or any other law or policy, but whether
those actions arose out of and in the course of performing their duties as a board member and
school business administrator. The Commissioner further notes that the Board’s decision that
Henley’s and Lewis’s actions did arise out of and in the course of performing their duties, and
that indemnification was appropriate, is entitled to deference and should not be overturned

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unless it was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.1 Moreover, in determining whether Henley’s
and Lewis’s actions arose out of and in the course of performing their duties, the relevant inquiry
is whether the actions were taken “in furtherance of their prescribed duties. Those duties are
prescribed by statute, by the rules and regulations of the board itself and of those who supervise
its activities, and by resolutions authorizing specific action to be taken.” Errington, supra, at 138.
A board member’s (or business administrator’s) actions can be invalid – as was the resolution the
board 	members 	passed 	indemnifying 	Harsha 	in 	Errington 	– 	but 	still 	be 	entitled 	to
indemnification.2
Accordingly, this matter is remanded to the Office of Administrative Law for further
proceedings consistent with this decision.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION
Date of Decision: 	October 13, 2026
Date of Mailing: 	October 13, 2026
1 Petitioner argues in his opposition to the Board’s motion for summary decision that neither Henley nor
Lewis has carried the burden of proving that their actions fall within their official duty performance.
Initially, neither Henley nor Lewis is a party to this matter. However, even if this argument was intended
to address the Board’s burden, the Board does not have the burden of demonstrating that Henley’s and
Lewis’s actions fell within their official duties. Petitioner has the burden of demonstrating that the Board’s
decision was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.
2 Indeed, even conduct that has been found to violate the School Ethics Act can be indemnified when that
conduct arose out of and in the course of performing the board member’s duties. See, e.g., Skowronski
v. Bd. of Ed. Of the Twp. of E. Greenwich, Commissioner Decision No. 127-22 (June 16, 2022).

New Jersey is an Equal Opportunity Employer
State of New Jersey
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
INITIAL DECISION
OAL DKT. NOS. EDU 00463-26;
EDU 00464-26; EDU 00465-26
EDU 00466-26
AGENCY DKT. NOS. 430-12/25;
429-12/25; 428-12/25;
(CONSOLIDATED)
MALCOLM X. OUTLAW,
Petitioner,
v.
TOWNSHIP OF WILLINGBORO BOARD
OF EDUCATION, BURLINGTON COUNTY,
Respondents.
Malcolm X. Outlaw, petitioner, pro se
Jeffrey R. Merlino, Esq., appearing for respondent
Record Closed: July 27, 2026 	Decided: August 10, 2026
BEFORE KIM C. BELIN, ALJ:
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 00463-26; 00464-26; 00465-26 and 00466-26
2
Petitioner, Malcolm X. Outlaw, (petitioner or Outlaw) challenges the Willingboro
Township Board of Education’s decision, (respondent or Board) to indemnify the school
business administrator (SBA) and a school board member for legal fees and costs
associated with two school ethics complaints. Are there genuine issues of material fact
sufficient to warrant an evidentiary hearing? 	No, case law states that a board voting to
use its funds to indemnify members is an act arising out of and in the course of the
performance of its duties as a board.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Petitioner filed four petitions dated December 9, 2025, seeking the Commissioner of
Education (Commissioner) to find that respondent’s decision to indemnify the SBA and a
school board member was contrary to New Jersey law and Board policy and direct that any
funds expended be recouped. Respondent filed its answers on December 30, 2025.
The 	Department 	of 	Education 	transmitted 	the 	appeals 	to 	the 	Office 	of
Administrative Law (OAL), where they were filed on January 6, 2026, as contested cases
under N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1 to –15; N.J.S.A. 52:14F-1 to –13. 	The four petitions were
assigned the following OAL docket numbers: 00463-26, 00464-26, 00465-26, and 00466-26.
With respondent’s consent, petitioner requested that the matters be consolidated
on April 6, 2026. 	Accordingly, by Order dated April 15, 2026, the matters were
consolidated with an OAL docket number of EDU 00463-26.
On May 12, 2026, respondent filed a motion for summary decision. Petitioner filed
his opposition on May 22, 2026.
FACTUAL DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS
Based upon the documents filed in this matter, I FIND the following as FACTS:
On October 13, 2025, Petitioner filed ethics charges against the SBA, Dr. Steven
Lewis and school board member April Henley (Henley). 	(Exhs. B and C, Petitioner’s

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 00463-26; 00464-26; 00465-26 and 00466-26
3
Opposition.) These charges were deemed deficient, and petitioner filed amended ethics
charges on October 31, 2025, and October 29, 2025, respectively. (Ibid.)
In decisions dated April 28, 2026, the School Ethics Commission (SEC) found no
probable cause for both cases on the basis that there were insufficient facts and
circumstances contained in the complaints to lead a reasonable person to believe that
the School Ethics Act had been violated. (Exhs. C and E, Petitioner’s Opposition.)
By Board resolutions, dated November 24, 2025, and December 5, 2025, the
Board approved indemnification of legal costs for Dr. Lewis and Henley. (Exh. 1 of EDU
00463, and Exh. A of EDU 00464, 00465, 00466.)
On December 9, 2025, Outlaw filed four petitions with the Commissioner against
the respondent challenging its decision to indemnify the SBA and Henley. Specifically:
• 	EDU 00463 challenged the Board’s decision to indemnify
the SBA against allegations that he violated the School
Ethics Act by hiring a now former board member as his
real estate agent in the purchase of a home.
• 	EDU 00464 challenged the Board’s decision to indemnify
Henley for legal costs associated with allegations that she
used 	district 	resources 	for 	a 	private 	event 	for 	the
Willingboro Education Fund (WEF).
• 	EDU 00465 challenged the Board’s decision to indemnify
the SBA for legal costs associated with allegations that he
improperly authorized the use of district resources for the
WEF without proper approval from the Superintendent and
the SBA used his official position to secure unwarranted
privileges and advantages for the WEF.
• 	EDU 00466 challenged the Board’s decision to indemnify
the SBA for legal costs associated with allegations that he
used district resources for his personal businesses.
By order, dated April 15, 2026, the four matters were consolidated and assigned
OAL Docket Number EDU 00463.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 00463-26; 00464-26; 00465-26 and 00466-26
4
Board policy 8750 allows for employee indemnification for conduct arising out of
and in the course of the performance of the employee’s duties. 	(Exh. A, Respondent’s
MSD.)
In an email dated October 4, 2024, the SBA requested that the technology
manager create an email for foundation@wboe.net. (Exh. M, Petitioner’s Opposition.) A
copy of the request was sent to Henley, who responded with “Yay! (smile emoji) thanks.”
(Ibid.)
ARGUMENTS ON THE MOTION
Respondent asserts that petitioner’s claims fail as a matter of law because: 1)
petitioner lacks standing to contest the Board’s discretionary indemnification decisions;
2) 	respondent 	acted 	within 	its 	statutory 	authority 	under 	N.J.S.A. 	18A:16-6; 	3)
respondent’s actions were not arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable; and 4) there are no
genuine issues of material fact that require an evidentiary hearing.
Conversely, petitioner asserts that as the current superintendent, he has standing
to bring the claims; there are genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the SBA
was acting in accordance with his duties when he used district resources to print materials
for an outside nonprofit organization and for his personal business; and the Board’s
decision to indemnify its own members and officials and put the superintendent on
administrative leave is a conflict of interest and presents an appearance of impropriety
that runs afoul of the School Ethics Act.
LEGAL ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
A motion for summary decision may be granted if the papers and discovery
presented, as well as any affidavits which may have been filed with the application, show
that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to prevail
as a matter of law. N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.5(b). If the motion is sufficiently supported, the non-
moving party must demonstrate by affidavit that there is a genuine issue of fact which can
only be determined in an evidentiary proceeding, in order to prevail in such an application.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 00463-26; 00464-26; 00465-26 and 00466-26
5
Ibid. These provisions mirror the summary judgment language of R. 4:46-2(c) of the New
Jersey Court Rules.
The 	motion 	judge 	must 	“consider 	whether 	competent 	evidential 	materials
presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party . . . are
sufficient to permit a rational fact finder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of
the non-moving party.” Brill v. Guardian Life Insurance Company of American, 142 N.J.
520, 523 (1995). And even if the non-moving party comes forward with some evidence,
this forum must grant summary decision if the evidence is “so one-sided that [the moving
party] must prevail as a matter of law.” Id. at 536.
The threshold issue is standing. Respondent asserts that Outlaw does not have
sufficient stake in the outcome. New Jersey’s Administrative Procedures Act permits any
“interested persons” to initiate challenges before the Commissioner. N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.2
defines an interested person as “a person(s) who will be substantially, specifically, and
directly affected by the outcome of a controversy before the Commissioner.” However,
there must be more than just a speculative impact on the complainant:
Consequently, 	petitioners 	must 	show 	that 	they 	will 	“be
affected by the outcome in a direct and meaningful way”
before they may proceed in a contested case. U.K. & G.K. ex
rel D.K. v. Clifton Bd. of Educ., 93 N.J.A.R.2d (EDU) 71;
Kenwood v. Montclair Bd. of Educ., EDU 8858-81, Initial
Decision, (Apr. 23, 1982), adopted, Comm'r (June 14, 1982)).
Thus, 	to 	have 	standing, 	a 	complaining 	party 	must
demonstrate “some measurable amount of detrimental impact
on the complaining party’s personal rights.” S.J. v. Mountain
Lakes Bd. of Educ., EDU 7081-03, Initial Decision, (Oct. 7,
2003) (citing, Salorio v. Glaser, 82 N.J. 482, 491 (1998)).
A deficiency in standing is fatal to a petition such as the one
at issue here. 	“The dismissal of cases brought by litigants
who will not be effected by the outcome in a direct and
meaningful way is required by this regulation.” 	See S.J. v.
Mountain Lakes Bd. of Educ., EDU 7081-03, Initial Decision,
(Oct. 7, 2003) (citing S.R. and E.D.R. o/b/o E.D.R., Jr. v.
Montague Bd. of Educ., EDU 5300-03, 201 AGEN LEXIS 583
(Oct. 3, 2001)).

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 00463-26; 00464-26; 00465-26 and 00466-26
6
See Cantatore v. Carlstadt-East Rutherford Reg’l High Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ.,
2023 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 221, *9, Initial Decision (Apr. 26, 2023), adopted, Comm’r (May
25, 2023), https://www.nj.gov/education/legal/commissioner/2023/153-23.pdf.
Additionally, Green, et al. v. Bd. Of Educ. of the Twp. of Ocean, Monmouth Cty.,
2016 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 774, *12, Initial Decision (Sept. 8, 2016), provides that standing
is “a threshold justiciability determination whether the litigant is entitled to initiate and
maintain an action before a court or other tribunal.” In re Six-Month Extension of N.J.A.C.
5:91-1 et seq., 372 N.J. Super. 61, 85 (App. Div. 2004), certif. denied, 182 N.J. 630 (2005).
In New Jersey, there exists a rather liberal approach to questions of standing. Crescent
Park 	Tenants 	Ass'n 	v. 	Realty 	Equity 	Corp. 	of 	N.Y., 	58 	N.J. 	98, 	101, 	107-11
(1971). Standing is nonetheless limited to "situations where the litigant's concern with the
subject matter evidence[s] a sufficient stake and real adverseness." Id. at 107. These
requirements are designed to prevent litigation by those who are "merely interlopers or
strangers to the dispute." Ibid.
Outlaw contends that he has standing as the superintendent of schools charged
with oversight of district resources and as a taxpayer. As the superintendent, Outlaw was
“the chief executive and administrative officer of the board . . . employing him and [had]
general supervision over all aspects, including the fiscal operations and instructional
programs, of the schools of the district....” N.J.S.A. 18A:17-20b. Accordingly, use of district
resources was within his scope of responsibilities. In addition, taxpayers of a school
district have been found to have standing if they have a “‘slight private interest, added to
and harmonizing with the general public interest.’” Medford Investor Associates, LLC v.
Bd. of Ed. of the Township of Medford, 2013 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 271 at *5. (September 16,
2013) quoting Hudson Bergen Cnty. Retail Liquor Stores Assn. v. Bd. of Comm’rs, City of
Hoboken, 135 N.J.L. 502, 510 (E. & A. 1947). Outlaw’s address as listed on the original
petitions indicate that he resides in Newark, New Jersey and thus, absent proof of
residence in Willingboro, he is not a taxpayer of the Willingboro school district. However,
notwithstanding this uncertainty, the Appellate Division granted standing to two tenured
part-time supplemental teachers by virtue of their professional status and involvement
who challenged a newly adopted board policy. Ridgewood Educ. Assn v. Ridgewood Bd.,

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 00463-26; 00464-26; 00465-26 and 00466-26
7
284 N.J. Super 427 (N.J. Super. 1995). Accordingly, I CONCLUDE that petitioner’s
professional status sufficiently establishes his standing as required by N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.2.
N.J.S.A. 18A:16-6, the statute at issue, provides in relevant part:
Whenever any civil or administrative action or other legal
proceeding has been or shall be brought against any person
holding 	any 	office, 	position 	or 	employment 	under 	the
jurisdiction of any board of education, including any student
teacher or person assigned to other professional pre-teaching
field experience, for any act or omission arising out of and in
the course of the performance of the duties of such office,
position, employment or student teaching or other assignment
to professional field experience, the board shall defray all
costs of defending such action, including reasonable counsel
fees and expenses, together with costs of appeal, if any, and
shall 	save 	harmless 	and 	protect 	such 	person 	from 	any
financial loss resulting therefrom; . . . (Emphasis added.)
Outlaw also cites to N.J.S.A. 18A:12-20 which provides indemnification specifically
for school board members, who must defend against any civil, administrative or other
legal proceeding “for any act or omission arising out of and in the course of the
performance of his duties as a member of a board of education.” Outlaw contends that
neither Dr. Lewis nor Ms. Henley qualify for indemnification under either statute because
their actions did not arise out of or were in the course of the performance of their duties
as the SBA or a school board member respectively. The actions of these two individuals,
however, are not at issue in the present controversy. Those issues were addressed by
the School Ethics Commission who issued no probable cause decisions. Instead, the
issue before this tribunal is whether the Board’s decision to indemnify these two
individuals complied with these statutes.
This nuanced issue was addressed in Errington v. Mansfield Twp. Bd. of Ed., 100
N.J. Super. 130 (App. Div. 1968)1. The president of the school board, without consulting
with a majority of the board, published a letter in a local newspaper that the plaintiff
alleged was defamatory. The plaintiff filed a libel suit against the president, and almost a
year later, the board adopted a resolution supporting the president stating that she had
1 This case involved an earlier version of N.J.S.A. 18A:12-20 and 18A:16-6.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 00463-26; 00464-26; 00465-26 and 00466-26
8
acted on the board’s behalf. The board authorized payment for her legal defense. The
plaintiff then filed a libel suit against those board members, and the board adopted a
resolution authorizing payment for their defense of the libel suit.
The Law Division granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment concluding that
the defamatory letter did not arise out of or was in the course of the performance of the
president’s duties and the Appellate Division affirmed. 81 N.J. Super. 414 (1963).
However, the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a full record of the
libel actions. 42 N.J. 320 (1964). On remand, the Appellate Division maintained its
conclusion that the resolution approving the defense of the board president was
unauthorized because she had not written it in the course of her duties as the board
president. However, with regard to the board’s decision to indemnify itself, the Appellate
Division ruled that although the resolution was faulty and invalid, the board had acted in
the performance of their duties and therefore the board was entitled to be defended in the
second libel action. Specifically, the Appellate Division stated:
When 	the 	board 	members, 	in 	a 	proper 	meeting 	duly
assembled, vote upon a resolution relating to the expenditure
of the board’s funds, their act in doing so ‘arises out of and in
the course of the performance of their duties as members of
the board.’ The resolution may be invalid for want of authority
to spend the public funds for the designated purpose, as here.
The expenditure may be enjoined and the resolution may be
judicially 	set 	aside, as 	in 	the 	instant 	case. 	The 	board
members may have been legally mistaken in their belief that
the resolution could be validly adopted. 	But the conclusion
still 	persists 	that 	the 	board 	members, 	in 	adopting 	the
resolution to engage counsel to defend a board member sued
for libel and thereby authorizing the expenditure of public
funds, were performing an act which arose out of and during
the course of 	the performance of their duties as board
members.
[100 N.J. Super. at *137.]
To further his position, petitioner relies upon Bower v. Bd. of Educ. 149 N.J. 416
(1997) which cites to the Errington decision; however, in Bower, the state Supreme Court
considered the criminal and civil indemnification statutes N.J.S.A. 18A:16-6, and 18A:16-

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 00463-26; 00464-26; 00465-26 and 00466-26
9
6.1, to determine whether the board must indemnify a teacher for legal expenses incurred
after criminal charges that he sexually assaulted students in school were dismissed. The
criminal statute is not in issue here.
Applying 	the 	Errington 	analysis 	to 	the 	current 	controversy, 	I 	am 	constrained 	to
CONCLUDE that regardless of whether the SBA and Henley’s actions were appropriate
under the law, the respondent’s action in adopting resolutions to indemnify the SBA and
Henley were acts performed in the course of the performance of their duties as board
members. Finally, the issue of whether there is a conflict of interest for the Board to
indemnify its members and officials and put the superintendent on administrative leave
was not included in the original four petitions and thus, will not be addressed herein.
Based upon 	the applicable 	law referenced 	above, 	I CONCLUDE 	summary
decision is warranted in this matter. The record does not contain any genuine issues of
material facts sufficient to warrant an evidentiary hearing.
ORDER
For 	the 	foregoing 	reasons, 	I 	hereby 	ORDER 	that 	respondent, 	Willingboro
Township Board of Education’s motion for summary decision is hereby GRANTED and
the petitioner’s petition is DISMISSED.
I 	hereby 	FILE 	this 	initial 	decision 	with 	the 	COMMISSIONER 	OF 	THE
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION for consideration.
This recommended decision may be adopted, modified, or rejected by the
COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, who by law is authorized
to make a final decision in this matter. 	If the Commissioner of the Department of
Education does not adopt, modify, or reject this decision within forty-five days and unless
such time limit is otherwise extended, this recommended decision shall become a final
decision in accordance with N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 00463-26; 00464-26; 00465-26 and 00466-26
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Within thirteen days from the date on which this recommended decision was
mailed to the parties, any party may file written exceptions with the COMMISSIONER OF
THE 	DEPARTMENT 	OF 	EDUCATION. 	Exceptions 	may 	be 	filed 	by 	email 	to
ControversiesDisputesFilings@doe.nj.gov or by mail to Office of Controversies
and Disputes, 100 Riverview Plaza, 4th Floor, PO Box 500, Trenton, New Jersey
08625-0500. 	A copy of any exceptions must be sent to the judge and to the other parties.
,August 10, 2026
DATE 	KIM C. BELIN, ALJ
Date Received at Agency: 	August 10, 2026________________
Date Mailed to Parties: 	August 10, 2026
KCB/gd