Laura Richards v. Board of Education of the Township of Livingston, Essex County, 12/4/25 (#546-25)

546-25
OAL Dkt. No. EDU 02294-24
Agency Dkt. No. 24-1/24
New Jersey Commissioner of Education
Final Decision
Laura Richards,
Petitioner,
v.
Board 	of 	Education 	of 	the 	Township 	of
Livingston, Essex County,
Respondent.
The record of this matter, the Initial Decision of the Office of Administrative Law (OAL),
the exceptions filed by petitioner pursuant to N.J.A.C. 1:1-18.4, and the Livingston Board of
Education’s (Livingston) reply thereto, have been reviewed and considered.
Petitioner was employed by Livingston as a teacher pursuant to a contract dated August
16, 2023, and effective August 30, 2023, through June 30, 2024. The contract provided that it
could be terminated by either party by giving 60 days’ notice in writing to the other party. On
October 16, 2023, the Warren Township Board of Education (Warren) approved petitioner’s
employment for the period of January 2, 2024, through June 30, 2024; the start date was
subsequently changed to January 4, 2024. On November 2, 2024, Livingston’s Director of Human
Resources, Susan Burman, sent an email to petitioner, indicating that she had become aware that
petitioner had accepted employment in Warren and that petitioner’s last day with Livingston
would be December 15, 2023, which was 60 days after Warren voted to approve petitioner’s

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employment. Burman offered to allow petitioner to work until December 22, 203. Petitioner
replied on the same day, indicating that she would like to work until December 22, 2023. On
November 6, 2023, petitioner again emailed Burman, attaching a resignation letter dated
November 3, 2023, which stated that petitioner’s last day with Livingston would be January 3,
2024. On November 14, 2023, Livingston voted to accept petitioner’s resignation, with her last
day of employment being December 22, 2023. 	Petitioner appealed, alleging that she was
improperly terminated before the end of her 60-day notice period.
Following cross-motions for summary decision, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found
that petitioner agreed to end her employment with Livingston on December 22, 2023, and that
Livingston was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable in accepting that date.
In her exceptions, petitioner argues that the ALJ erroneously concluded that she was
bound by her initial response to Burman. Petitioner notes that Livingston had not yet acted to
accept her resignation when she submitted her 60 days’ notice of resignation on November 6,
2023, and contends that a tendered resignation is not legally binding until it is accepted by a
board of education. 	According to petitioner, Burman did not have the authority to set
petitioner’s resignation date, and petitioner’s response – made out of fear of losing her income
– to Burman’s alternatives of December 15 or December 22 did not preclude her from providing
her resignation notice at a later date, with a full 60 days’ pay thereafter due and owing to her.
In response, Livingston argues that its action on November 14 accepted and confirmed
the mutually agreed upon resignation date that petitioner had submitted in writing on November
2. 	According to Livingston, the November 6 email from petitioner was neither a notice of
resignation nor a rescission of the prior notice, and petitioner’s November 2 notice of resignation

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effective December 22 was never rescinded, such that it was not arbitrary, capricious, or
unreasonable for Livingston to accept it.
Upon review, the Commissioner finds that petitioner agreed to end her employment in
Livingston as of December 22, 2023, and that Livingston did not act in an arbitrary, capricious, or
unreasonable manner in accepting her resignation as of that date.
The employment contract between petitioner and Livingston provides that it may “be
terminated by either party giving to the other sixty (60) days’ notice in writing of intention to
terminate the same.” Livingston argues that petitioner’s appointment by Warren operates by
law as notice and commences the 60-day period, but the Commissioner disagrees. Warren’s vote
– which the Commissioner acknowledges was public, and which might serve as sufficient notice
for the commencement of certain types of actions – simply does not meet the notice
requirements as contained in the contract, because it was not written notice given by petitioner
to Livingston. As such, it cannot function as the start date for petitioner’s 60-day notice period.
The Commissioner also disagrees with petitioner’s position that the date of her notice
was November 3 or November 6. Initially, the Commissioner notes although petitioner’s letter
was dated November 3, it was not emailed to Burman until November 6. There is no basis to use
November 3 as the operative date of this notice simply because petitioner typed that date at the
top of the letter. Allowing an employee to pre-date a notice of resignation on a date before it
was actually submitted to the district would run contrary to the intent of a contract’s notice
provisions and N.J.S.A. 18A:26-10, which, in part, allow a district sufficient time to hire

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replacement staff. 	If an employee could circumvent the 60-day notice provision by dating a
resignation notice before it was submitted, these provisions would be rendered ineffective.1
The Commissioner concurs with the ALJ that petitioner resigned on November 2, 2023.
Having become aware of Warren’s vote to appoint petitioner to a position, Burman emailed
petitioner to discuss her last day of employment with Livingston, and petitioner responded by
indicating that she would like to work until December 22. This response, which petitioner sent
on November 2, does meet the terms of her employment contract, as it was in writing, from
petitioner to Livingston, and conveyed an intention to terminate her employment. 	The
Commissioner does not find the fact that petitioner did not use the words “terminate” or “resign”
to be dispositive, as the meaning of petitioner’s email was clear even in the absence of that
terminology, given that it set a specific end date for her employment with Livingston.
The 	November 	2 	correspondence 	set 	December 	22 	as 	petitioner’s 	last 	day 	of
employment, making the notice period shorter than 60 days. However, nothing in the applicable
law or petitioner’s employment contract precludes the parties from agreeing to a shorter time
period. 	The question then becomes whether petitioner was bound by her November 2
agreement to the December 22 date or could revoke her consent through her November 6 email
and, if so, whether she did so.
The Commissioner concludes that petitioner was not bound by her November 2
agreement to have her last day of work be December 22, and that she could revoke her consent
1 The Commissioner further notes that the 60 days’ notice provision applies to both parties to the contract.
If the Commissioner accepted petitioner’s argument that the November 2 email was not a notice of
resignation and used the November 6 date instead, the 60-day notice period would not expire until
January 5, 2024, after petitioner was scheduled to begin work in Warren.

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prior to the Board’s vote to accept her resignation with December 22 as the effective date. A
resignation is “legally binding upon acceptance by a district board of education. Cutro v. Bd. of
Educ. of the Twp. of Hazlet, State Board of Education (decided July 2, 1997). Prior to the Board’s
acceptance, petitioner was free to revoke her consent to the December 22 date for her last day
of employment.
Despite petitioner’s ability to revoke her consent to an earlier date, the Commissioner
finds, based on the record, that she did not. 	Petitioner’s certification states, “I sent the
November 6, 2023 e-mail because I did not believe that Livingston could unilaterally set my
resignation date or prevent me from receiving my full 60 day’s pay.” However, the email itself
indicates no such thing, stating only, “Attached please find the resignation letter that I was
planning to send prior to your email last week.” While the resignation letter lists petitioner’s last
day as January 3, the email does not state, or even suggest, that petitioner was attempting to
change her last day of work from the December 22 date previously agreed on. 	Burman
responded to petitioner, stating, “I am not sure what to do with this letter. This does not change
the contents of my email to you last week – your last day of work and pay will be 12/22/23. Was
there a reason you sent it at this point?” If petitioner, as she indicates in her certification, no
longer agreed to her last day being December 22, Burman’s email gave her the opportunity to
explain that and to make clear that she expected to be paid through January 3, but petitioner did
not respond to Burman’s email. Moreover, at that time, as far as Burman was aware, petitioner’s
start date in Warren was January 2, such that the January 3 end date for her employment in

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Livingston would not have been possible. 2 	In light of petitioner’s written agreement to end her
employment in Livingston on December 22, and in the absence of any statement that she had
changed her mind about that date, the Commissioner finds that it was not arbitrary, capricious,
or unreasonable, or in violation of petitioner’s rights, for the Board to accept her resignation
effective December 22.
Accordingly, the Initial Decision is adopted as the final decision in this matter, and the
petition of appeal is hereby dismissed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.3
COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION
Date of Decision: 	December 4, 2025
Date of Mailing: 	December 4, 2025
2 Petitioner corresponded with Warren about changing her start date from January 2 to January 4 on
November 1, but there is no evidence that Livingston was aware of that; Livingston staff were not included
on petitioner’s emails with Warren, and Warren’s agenda listed a start date of January 2.
3 This decision may be appealed to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:6-
9.1. Under N.J.Ct.R. 2:4-1(b), a notice of appeal must be filed with the Appellate Division within 45 days
from the date of mailing of this decision.

NEW JERSEY IS AN EQUAL OPPORTUNITY EMPLOYER
State of New Jersey
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
INITIAL DECISION ON
MOTION SUMMARY DECISON
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 02294-24
AGENCY DKT. NO. 24-1/24
LAURA RICHARDS,
Petitioner,
v.
TOWNSHIP OF LIVINGSTON,
BOARD OF EDUCATION
Respondent.
__________________________
Albert J. Leonardo, Esq (Zazzali, P.C., attorneys),for petitioner, Laura Richards
Arzen Zartarian, Esq., (Cleary, Giacobbe, Alfieri, Jacobs, LLC, attorneys), for
respondent, Township of Livingston, Board of Education
Record Closed: October 1, 2025 	Decided: October 20, 2025
BEFORE JULIO C. MOREJON, ALJ:
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioner, Laura Ricahards, files a Petition of Appeal against Respondent,
Township 	of 	Livingston, 	Board 	of 	Education, 	challenging 	Respondent’s 	decision
terminating Petitioner prior to her resignation date.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 02294-24
2
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On January 31, 2024, petitioner, Laura Richards (Richards or Petitioner) filed a
Petition of Appeal (Petition) with the Commissioner of the Department of Education
(Commissioner), disputing the decision by respondent, Township of Livingston, Board of
Education (the Board), terminating prior to her date of resignation in violation of N.J.S.A.
18A:26-10.
The Board filed its answer on February 16, 2024. 	The matter was transferred to
the Office of Administrative Law (OAL) and filed at the OAL on February 20, 2024, as a
contested matter.1
On May 10, 2024, the Board filed a motion for summary decision. On July 1, 2024,
Richards filed her opposition to the Board’s motion, and a cross-motion for summary
decision. On July 9, 2024, the Board filed a reply to Richards’ cross-motion. I closed the
record on October 1, 2025.
FINDINGS
Upon reviewing the moving papers, certifications and exhibits submitted by
Richards and the Board, I FIND the following as FACT herein:
On or about August 16, 2023, Richards executed a staff employment contract
(Employment Contract) 	to teach High School Family Consumer Science in the Board
school district, for the school year August 30, 2023 through June 30, 2024. (Certification
of Richards (Richards Certification), Exhibit A, and Certification of Susan Burman
(Burman Certification) Exhibit A).
1 This matter was originally assigned to an Administrative Law Judge on February 23, 2024, and then re-
assigned to the undersigned on July 17, 2024.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 02294-24
3
The Employment Contract provided that it could be terminated during its term by
either party upon sixty (60) days’ notice to the other party. Specifically, the Employment
Contract provides:
It is hereby agreed by the parties hereto that this contract may
at any time be terminated by either party giving to the other
sixty (60) days' notice in writing of intention to terminate the
same, but that in the absence of any provision herein for a
definite number of days' notice, the contract shall run for the
full term named above.
[emphasis provided]
Id.
On October 16, 2023, at a public board of education meeting of the Warren
Township Schools (Warren Township), Warren Township approved Richards to teach
Family and Consumer Science Teacher, effective January 2, 2024 through June 30,
2024..(Burman Certification, Exhibit B).
On November 1, 2023, Richards requested that Warren Township change her start
date from January 3, 2024, to January 4, 2024, which Warren Township agreed to on
on November 2, 2023 Richards Certification, Exhibits B and C).
On November 2, 2023, Richards received an e-mail from Susan Burman (Burman),
Director of Human Resources for the Board, stating the following:
I have been advised by multiple individuals that you accepted a position in Warren
Township and were appointed by their Board of Education to that position on
October 16, 2023 (see attached WTBOE agenda). I spoke with our Board attorney,
and he advised me that since you have accepted a position with another district,
and have been Board approved, I am able to use that date as the commencement
of your 60 days notice [sic]. Therefore, based upon your appointment date of
October 16, 2023, 60 days notice [sic] 	makes your last day with the LBOE
December 15, 2023. If you would like, the district would be willing to allow you to
work until December 22, 2023. Please notify me no later than noon on November
7, 2023 if you would like to work until that date, otherwise, your last date of
employment will be listed as December 15, 2023 on the November 14,
(Richards Certification, Exhibit D and Burman Certification, Exhibit C).

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 02294-24
4
Burman states in her mail that the Board was going to consider the October 16,
2023, date of the Warren Township vote approving Richards teaching employment, as
the “commencement” date of Richards’ “60 days notice” [sic] which would be December
15, 2023, but the Board “would be willing to allow” Richards to work until December 22,
2023. Id.
Burman further informed Richards that she was to notify Burman by November 7,
2023, if Ricards agreed to the Board’s offer to work until December 22, 2023, otherwise
her last day of employment would be December 15, 2023. Id. 	On November 2, 2023,
Richards emailed Burman to let her know that she “would like to work until December 22,
2023”, as it would allow her time to transition the students. (Burman Certification, Exhibit
D).
Thereafter, on November 6, 2023, Richards emailed Burman that she was
attaching her 	“resignation letter” dated November 3, 2023, which she was “planning to
send (to Burman] prior to your email last week.” 	(Richards Certification, Exhibit E and
Burman Certification, Exhibit F). 	Attached to Ricards’ email to Burman was a letter dated
November 3, 2023, stating: “Please accept this as my formal resignation from Livingston
Public Schools. My last day will be January 3, 2024.” Id.
Burman responded to Richards’ email that Burman “was not sure what to do with”
Richards’ letter, as it “does not change the contents of my email to you last week-your
last day of work and pay will be 12/22/23. Was there a reason you sent it at this point?”
(Burman Certification, Exhibit G). Richards did not respond to Burman’s email.
On November 14, 2023, 	the Board voted to accept Richards’ resignation with a
last day of employment as December 22, 2023 (Burman Certification Exhibit E).
Arguments
The Board argues two main points in its motion for summary decision. First, that
the Warren Township Board of Education public meeting of October 16, 2023, vote to hire

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 02294-24
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Richards effective January 2, 2024, serves as “notice to the world” that Richards was
appointed as a teaching staff member in another district via a public resolution.
Second, the Board argues that Richards gave voluntary notice of resignation
effective December 22, 2023, which was not rescinded and was accepted by the Board
at its meeting on November 14, 2023. The Board disregards Richards’ email of November
6, 2023, containing a “resignation letter” dated November 3, 2023, as the Board argues
that Richards tendered her resignation on November 2, 2023, when she emailed Burman
that her last day of employment would be December 22, 2025.
Richards argues that the Board failed and refused to comply with the requirements
and mandates of the law 	governing resignations 	(N.J.S.A. 	18A:26-10) 	and acted
arbitrarily, capriciously and unreasonably in not accepting Richards’ letter of resignation
with an effective date of January 3, 2024. 	Richards argues that she duly provided the
Board with notice of her resignation, effective November 3, 2023, which triggered the
Employment Contract’s 60-day notice period, and not October 16, 2023, the date Warren
Township accepted her for employment effective January 3, 2024.
ISSUE
The issue to be addressed is whether Richards’ email to Burman on November 2,
2023, that she would work until December 22, 2023,consituties compliance with the
Employment Contract’s requirement that either party provide a sixty day notice prior to
termination of the contract?
LEGAL ANAYALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
A Motion for Summary Decision shall be granted “if the papers and discovery which
have been filed, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to prevail as a
matter of law.” 	N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.5(a). 	If “a Motion for Summary Decision is made and
supported, an adverse party in order to prevail, must by responding affidavit set forth
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue which can only be determined in an
evidentiary proceeding.” Ibid.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 02294-24
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A Motion for Summary Decision before the OAL must be analyzed, “in accordance
with the principles set forth by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Brill v. Guardian Life
Insurance Company of America, 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995).” Nat’l Transfer v. New Jersey
Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 347 N.J. Super. 401, 408 (App. Div. 2002). 	A determination that
there is a genuine issue of material fact requires the motion judge to consider whether
the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to
the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged
disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party. Brill, 142 N.J. at 540-41.
In order to defeat the motion, the opposing party must establish the existence of
genuine disputes of material fact relevant to the case. 	The facts upon which the party
opposing the motion relies to defeat the motion must be something more than “facts which
are immaterial or of an insubstantial nature, a mere scintilla, ‘fanciful, frivolous, gauzy or
merely suspicious.’” Brill. at 529 (citations omitted).
In this matter both parties have filed a motion for summary decision, requiring the
same analysis under Brill for both as moving parties. For the reasons discussed below,
this matter is ripe for Summary Decision on behalf of the Board, inasmuch as the Board’s
moving papers indicate that the facts show there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact challenged by Richards and the Board’s motion is GRANTED.
The facts as presented in the moving papers filed by Richards and the Board
establishes that by email dated November 2, 2023, Richards agreed to end her
employment with the Board on December 22, 2023. Richards’ email was in response to
Burman’s email of same date, setting the sixty day start date on October 16, 2023, which
would end on December 15, 2023, which the Board extend to December 22, 2023.
Burman’s email allowed Richards until November 7, 2023, to decide which date would be
her termination end date.
The fact that Richards did not initiate the request for termination on December 22,
2023, as her email was in response to Burman’s request for a response, or that she had
prepared a letter that she was “planning” to send to Burman the week prior, which letter
was a “formal resignation” from her employment effective January 3, 2024,

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 02294-24
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is of no consequence and irrelevant for several reasons. It is also not relevant to
determine if the Board was correct to conclude that the 60 day notice provision was
triggered on October 16, 2023, when Warren Township voted to hire Richards as a
teacher with a commencement date of January 3, 2024.
First, the Employment Contract provides no required language or form to submit
that triggers the sixty day notice requirement. The Employment Contract simply states:
“It is hereby agreed by the parties hereto that this contract may at any time be terminated
by either party giving to the other sixty (60) days' notice in writing of intention to terminate
the 	same,” 	[emphasis 	provided] 	(Richards 	Certification, 	Exhibit 	A 	and 	Burman
Certification, Exhibit A).
Second, there is no dispute that on November 2, 2023, Richards responded to
Burman’s email agreeing to accept December 22, 2023, and not December 16, 2023, as
her last day of employment.
Finally, Richards had until “November 7, 2023” to let Burman know which date,
(December 16 or December 22, 2023) would be her last day of employment. November
7, 2023, the date after Richards emailed Burman on November 6, 2023, with a “formal
letter of resignation” dated November 3, 2023, with a last day of work January 3, 2024.
Clearly, on November 2, 2023, when Burman emailed Richards concerning her
last day of employment, Richards had sufficient time until November 7, 2023, to respond
to Burman’s email that she disagreed with either December 15 or December 22 2023.
Instead, Richards chose to respond on November 2, 2023, and informed Burman that
December 22, 2023, would be her last day of employment. 	She then sought to correct
her decision by emailing Burman on November 6, 2023, with a letter of resignation dated
November 3, 2023. Unfortunately for Richards her decision had been made on November
2, 2023, agreeing to end her employment with the Board on December 22, 2023.
Richards argues in her Petition that the Board acted in an arbitrary and capricious
manner when it violated N.J.S.A. 18A:26-10, in refusing to accept her termination letter
of November 3, 2023, ending her employment with the Board on January 3, 2023.
N.J.S.A. 18A:26-10 provides in part:

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 02294-24
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Any teaching staff member employed by a board of education
…, who shall, without the consent of the board … the board
of directors of the school, cease to perform his duties before
the expiration of the term of his employment, shall be deemed
guilty of unprofessional conduct,…
The record is clear that on November 2, 2023, Richards elected December 22,
2023, as her last employment date, which date the Board accepted by resolution dated
November 14, 2023. The agreed upon date of last employment predates the expiration
of the terms of employment, requiring the consent of both parties, which occurred herein.
I CONCLUDE that the Board is not in violation of N.J.S.A. 18A:26-10, as the record
reflects that the Board provided Richards with the required consent to end her termination
on December 22, 2023, before the expiration of her Employment Contract on June 30,
2024. Consequently, I CONCLUDE the Board did not act in an arbitrary and capricious
manner as they were in compliance with N.J.S.A. 18A:26-10.
I CONCLUDE that the Board is entitled to summary decision as the motion papers
they submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and
that the Board as moving party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law.” 	N.J.A.C. 1:1-
12.5(a), and their motion is GRANTED herein.
I CONCLUDE that 	Richards is not entitled to summary decision in accordance
with N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.5(a), and her motion is DENIED.
ORDER
IT IS hereby ORDERED that for the reasons set forth herein, the Board’s motion
for summary decision is GRANTED and Richards’ Petition is DISMISSED.
IT IS hereby ORDERED that for the reasons set forth herein, Richards’ cross
motion for summary decision is DENIED.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 02294-24
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I 	hereby 	FILE 	this 	initial 	decision 	with 	the 	COMMISSIONER 	OF 	THE
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION for consideration.
This recommended decision may be adopted, modified, or rejected by the
COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, who by law is authorized
to make a final decision in this matter. 	If the Commissioner of the Department of
Education does not adopt, modify, or reject this decision within forty-five days and unless
such time limit is otherwise extended, this recommended decision shall become a final
decision in accordance with N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10.
Within thirteen days from the date on which this recommended decision was
mailed to the parties, any party may file written exceptions with the COMMISSIONER OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, ATTN: 	BUREAU OF CONTROVERSIES AND
DISPUTES, 100 Riverview Plaza, 4th Floor, PO Box 500, Trenton, New Jersey 08625-
0500, marked “Attention: 	Exceptions.” 	A copy of any exceptions must be sent to the
judge and to the other parties.
October 20, 2025
DATE 	JULIO C. MOREJON, ALJ
Date Received at Agency: 	October 20, 2025
Date E-Mailed to Parties: 	October 20, 2025
lr