Thomas Baldosaro v. Board of Education of the Township of Washington, Gloucester County, 6/23/25 (#316-25)

316-25
OAL Dkt. No. 08516-25
Agency Dkt. No. 133-5/25
New Jersey Commissioner of Education
Final Decision
Thomas Baldosaro,
Petitioner,
v.
Board 	of 	Education 	of 	the 	Township 	of
Washington, Gloucester County,
Respondent.
The record of this matter and the Order on Motion for Emergent Relief of the Office of
Administrative Law (OAL) have been reviewed and considered.1
Upon review, the Commissioner concurs with the ALJ that petitioner has failed to
demonstrate entitlement to emergent relief pursuant to the standards enunciated in Crowe v.
DeGioia, 90 N.J. 126, 132-34 (1982) and codified at N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.6. 	Accordingly, the
recommended Order denying petitioner’s application for emergent relief is adopted for the
reasons stated therein.
Additionally, the Commissioner agrees with the ALJ that dismissal of this matter is
appropriate, as petitioner lacks standing to pursue the claims raised in his petition.
1 Upon review of the Order entered in this matter, the Commissioner determined that it was fully
dispositive of all issues in the case, and should therefore be treated as an Initial Decision, pursuant to
N.J.A.C. 1:1-18.1(b). The Office of Controversies and Disputes notified the parties of this determination,
advised the parties that they would be permitted to file exceptions, and provided instructions for same.
The parties did not file any exceptions.

2
Accordingly, the petition of appeal is hereby dismissed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.2
COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION
Date of Decision: 	June 23, 2025
Date of Mailing: 	June 23, 2025
2 This decision may be appealed to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:6-
9.1. Under N.J.Ct.R. 2:4-1(b), a notice of appeal must be filed with the Appellate Division within 45 days
from the date of mailing of this decision.

ORDER ON MOTION FOR
EMERGENT RELIEF
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 08516-20
AGENCY DKT. NO. 13-5/25
THOMAS BALDOSARO,
Petitioner,
v.
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE TOWNSHIP
OF WASHINGTON, GLOUCESTER COUNTY,
Respondent.
_______________________________________
Thomas Baldosaro, pro se
Jodi S. Howlett, Esq., for respondent (Machado Law Group, attorneys)
BEFORE CARL V. BUCK, III, ALJ:
This matter having come before the Office of Administrative Law by Jodi S.
Howlett, Esq., attorney for the Board of Education of the Township of Washington,
Gloucester County (Respondent or Board) on a Motion to Dismiss. A petition of appeal
and request for emergent relief was filed by petitioner with the Office of Administrative
Law on May 6, 2025. 	On or about May 19, 2025, respondent filed its opposition to the
petition and request for emergent relief and included a Motion to Dismiss in lieu of answer.
Petitioner filed an opposition to the motion on May 20, 2025. Respondent replied with a
State of New Jersey
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

OAL DOCKET NO.: EDU 08516-25
supplemental brief in support of the motion to dismiss on May 20, 2025. 	A Zoom
conference was held with the parties on Monday, May 19, 2025. The hearing was held
at the Atlantic City Office of Administrative Law on Tuesday, May 20, 2025, and a decision
on the Motion to Dismiss and Emergent Relief request was given by me from the bench.
This 	document 	memorializes 	the 	salient 	terms 	and 	conditions 	of 	that 	decision.
Supplemental 	information 	is 	contained 	in 	the 	decision 	from 	the 	bench 	which 	is
incorporated herein by reference.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioner’s request for Emergent Relief challenged the Board’s action at its
meeting on March 18, 2025, wherein the Board voted to place the superintendent of
schools, Dr. Eric Hibbs, on administrative leave. 	Petitioner avers, among other things,
that the Board improperly invoked the Doctrine of Necessity in order to accumulate
enough affirmative votes to support suspension of Dr. Hibbs.
Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the petition and request for emergent relief
and, for the reasons discussed below, that motion is GRANTED.
Respondent argues that petitioner lacks standing to bring the current action
against the Board. 	Petitioner alleges that, as a resident and taxpayer, he is entitled to
challenge the determinations of the local school district.
N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.2 defines an interested person as “a person(s) who will be
substantially, specifically, and directly affected by the outcome of a controversy before the
Commissioner.” There must be more than just a speculative impact on the complainant:
Consequently, 	petitioners 	must 	show 	that 	they 	will 	“be
affected by the outcome in a direct and meaningful way”
before they may proceed in a contested case. U.K. & G.K. ex
rel D.K. v. Clifton Bd. of Educ., 93 N.J.A.R.2d (EDU) 71;
Kenwood v. Montclair Bd. of Educ., EDU 8858-81, Initial
Decision, (Apr. 23, 1982), adopted, Comm'r (June 14, 1982)).

OAL DOCKET NO.: EDU 08516-25
Thus, 	to 	have 	standing, 	a 	complaining 	party 	must
demonstrate “some measurable amount of detrimental impact
on the complaining party’s personal rights.” S.J. v. Mountain
Lakes Bd. of Educ., EDU 7081-03, Initial Decision, (Oct. 7,
2003) (citing, Salorio v. Glaser, 82 N.J. 482, 491 (1998)).
A deficiency in standing is fatal to a petition such as the one
at issue here. 	“The dismissal of cases brought by litigants
who will not be effected by the outcome in a direct and
meaningful way is required by this regulation.” 	See S.J. v.
Mountain Lakes Bd. of Educ., EDU 7081-03, Initial Decision,
(Oct. 7, 2003) (citing S.R. and E.D.R. o/b/o E.D.R., Jr. v.
Montague Bd. of Educ., EDU 5300-03, 201 AGEN LEXIS 583
(Oct. 3, 2001)).
See Cantatore v. Carlstadt-East Rutherford Reg’l High Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 2023 N.J.
AGEN LEXIS 221, *9, Initial Decision (Apr. 26, 2023), adopted, Comm’r (May 25, 2023),
https://www.nj.gov/education/legal/commissioner/2023/153-23.pdf.
Additionally, Green, et al. v. Bd. Of Educ. of the Twp. of Ocean, Monmouth Cty.,
2016 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 774, *12, Initial Decision (Sept. 8, 2016), provides that standing
is “a threshold justiciability determination whether the litigant is entitled to initiate and
maintain an action before a court or other tribunal.” In re Six-Month Extension of N.J.A.C.
5:91-1 et seq., 372 N.J. Super. 61, 85 (App. Div. 2004), certif. denied, 182 N.J. 630 (2005).
In New Jersey, there exists a rather liberal approach to questions of standing. Crescent
Park 	Tenants 	Ass'n 	v. 	Realty 	Equity 	Corp. 	of 	N.Y., 	58 	N.J. 	98, 	101, 	107-11
(1971). Standing is nonetheless limited to "situations where the litigant's concern with the
subject matter evidence[s] a sufficient stake and real adverseness." Id. at 107. These
requirements are designed to prevent litigation by those who are "merely interlopers or
strangers to the dispute." Ibid.
I CONCLUDE that petitioner has filed to demonstrate that he has more than a
slight interest that is required to establish standing as required by N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.2.

OAL DOCKET NO.: EDU 08516-25
Respondent further argues that Petitioner’s claim that the Board improperly utilized
the Doctrine of Necessity is not subject to the jurisdiction of the Commissioner of
Education and should be brought before the School Ethics Commission. 	Petitioner
argues that the petition presents a matter of “governance” and not an ethical complaint.
I CONCLUDE that claims related to the invocation of the Doctrine of Necessity rest with
the 	School 	Ethics 	Commission 	and 	that 	the 	Commissioner 	lacks 	subject 	matter
jurisdiction over the petition and request for emergent relief.
Pursuant 	to 	N.J.A.C. 	6A:3-1.6(b), 	a 	motion 	for 	emergent 	relief 	must 	be
accompanied by a letter brief addressing the standard under Crowe v. DeGioia, 90 N.J.
126 (1982):
1. 	The petition will suffer irreparable harm if the requested relief if not granted;
2. 	The legal right underlying the petitioner’s claim is settled;
3. 	The petitioner has a likelihood of success on the merits of the underlying claim;
and
4. 	When the equities and interests of the parties are balanced, the petitioner will suffer
greater harm than the respondent will suffer if the requested relief is not granted.
The burden is on the petitioner, the party seeking temporary injunctive relief, to
demonstrate each of the above factors clearly and convincingly. See Guaman v. Velez,
421 N.J. Super. 239 (App.Div. 2011). I CONCLUDE that, irrespective of petitioner’s failure
to demonstrate standing and this Court’s lack of jurisdiction, petitioner has not met his
burden to satisfy the criteria under Crowe.
As no notice of a companion Due Process hearing request was indicated on the
transmittal of this Emergent Action, there are no more issues to decide as to this
application for emergency relief.
ORDER

OAL DOCKET NO.: EDU 08516-25
Based upon the foregoing, respondent’s motion to dismiss the action filed by
petitioner is GRANTED. It is ORDERED that petitioner’s request for Emergent Relief is
DENIED and his appeal is DISMISSED.
This order on application for emergency relief may be adopted, modified or
rejected by COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, who/which by
law is authorized to make a final decision in this matter. The final decision shall be issued
without undue delay, but no later than forty-five days following the entry of this order. If
Commissioner of the Department of Education does not adopt, modify or reject this order
within forty-five days, this recommended order shall become a final decision on the issue
of emergent relief in accordance with N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10.
May 21, 2025
DATE 	CARL V. BUCK III, ALJ
Date Received at Agency:
Date Mailed to Parties:
CSV/tat

OAL DOCKET NO.: EDU 08516-25
APPENDIX
EXHIBITS
For Petitioner
P-A 	March 18, 2025 Doctrine of Necessity
P-B 	March 18, 2025 Board meeting minutes
P-C 	Board meeting clip – 5/13/25
P-D 	Carol Chila Advisory Opinion
P-E 	Elayne Clancy Advisory Opinion
P-F 	Rob Scardino, union leader, video clip
P-G 	Policy 0163 Quorum
P-H 	Board waiving policy 0176
For Respondent
R-1 	May 19, 2025 	Submission
R-2 	May 20, 2025 	Submission