Hastreiter v. Foltz Bros.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
321 Nebraska Reports
HASTREITER v. FOLTZ BROS.
Cite as 321 Neb. 469
Kristine Hastreiter, appellant, v. Foltz Brothers,
Inc., and Farm Bureau Property & Casualty
Insurance Company, its workers’
compensation insurer, appellees.
___ N.W.3d ___
Filed May 22, 2026. 	No. S-25-515.
1. Workers’ Compensation: Appeal and Error. An appellate court may
modify, reverse, or set aside a Workers’ Compensation Court decision
only when (1) the compensation court acted without or in excess of its
powers; (2) the judgment, order, or award was procured by fraud; (3)
there is not sufficient competent evidence in the record to warrant the
making of the order, judgment, or award; or (4) the findings of fact by
the compensation court do not support the order or award.
2. ____: ____. On appellate review, the factual findings made by the trial
judge of the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Court have the effect of
a jury verdict and will not be disturbed unless clearly wrong.
3. Workers’ Compensation: Judgments: Appeal and Error. In testing
the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings of fact in a work-
ers’ compensation case, an appellate court considers the evidence in the
light most favorable to the successful party, every controverted fact must
be resolved in favor of the successful party, and the appellate court gives
the successful party the benefit of every inference reasonably deducible
from the evidence.
4. Workers’ Compensation: Proof. For an award based on an employee’s
death, a claimant must establish, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that the employment proximately caused an injury which resulted in
death compensable under the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Act.
5. Workers’ Compensation: Expert Witnesses. Although a claimant’s
medical expert does not have to couch his or her opinion in the magic
words “reasonable medical certainty” or “reasonable probability,” the
opinion must be sufficient to establish the crucial causal link between
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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
321 Nebraska Reports
HASTREITER v. FOLTZ BROS.
Cite as 321 Neb. 469
the claimant’s injuries and the accident occurring in the course and
scope of the claimant’s employment.
6. Workers’ Compensation: Evidence: Expert Witnesses. Expert medi-
cal testimony based upon “could,” “may,” or “possibly” lacks the defi-
niteness required to support an award from the Workers’ Compensation
Court.
7. Trial: Proximate Cause. The determination of causation is ordinarily a
matter for the trier of fact.
8. Workers’ Compensation: Expert Witnesses. It is the role of the
Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Court as the trier of fact to determine
which, if any, expert witnesses to believe.
Appeal from the Workers’ Compensation Court: Julie A.
Martin, Judge. Affirmed.
Jennifer L. Sturm and Raymond P. Atwood, Jr., of Atwood
Law, P.C., L.L.O., for appellant.
Joel D. Nelson and Tindra C. Norris, of Keating, O’Gara,
Nedved & Peter, P.C., L.L.O., for appellees.
Funke, 	C.J., 	Cassel, 	Stacy, 	Papik, 	Freudenberg,
Bergevin, and Vaughn, JJ.
Papik, J.
After being diagnosed with cancer, Thomas Hastreiter con-
tinued to work. One day, while at work, he suffered a hip
injury. The hip injury required surgery. Complications followed
and prevented Thomas from receiving recommended immuno-
therapy treatments for cancer. Months later, Thomas died. His
widow, Kristine Hastreiter, subsequently sought death benefits
in the Workers’ Compensation Court. Although the evidence
was undisputed that Thomas died from cancer, Kristine took
the position that she was entitled to death benefits because
Thomas’ work injury prevented him from receiving cancer
treatments that would have extended his life. The compensa-
tion court found Kristine was not entitled to death benefits. She
appeals. Because we find no reversible error on the part of the
compensation court, we affirm.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
321 Nebraska Reports
HASTREITER v. FOLTZ BROS.
Cite as 321 Neb. 469
I. BACKGROUND
1. Thomas’ Cancer Diagnosis,
Injury, and Death
In December 2021, Thomas was diagnosed with urothelial
carcinoma, a type of cancer. After his cancer diagnosis, he
continued to work for his employer, Foltz Brothers, Inc., as a
truckdriver and farm laborer.
On September 26, 2022, Thomas fell at work and injured
his left hip. On September 29, while Thomas was hospital-
ized for the hip injury, his oncologist informed him that his
cancer had spread. The oncologist described this metastatic
cancer as “incurable but treatable” and recommended a form
of immunotherapy treatment after Thomas recuperated from
the hip injury.
Thomas was never able to receive the recommended can-
cer treatment. He underwent hip surgery and later developed
an infection related to the surgery. He died on December 14,
2022. His death certificate listed progressive metastatic cancer
as the “immediate cause” of death. In a section for conditions
contributing to death, the death certificate stated that complica-
tions and infection from Thomas’ hip injury delayed treatment,
“resulting in progression of cancer.”
2. Workers’ Compensation Action
After Thomas’ death, Kristine filed a petition in the com-
pensation court against Foltz Brothers and its insurer. Among
other things, Kristine sought statutory death benefits pursu-
ant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-122 (Reissue 2021). The parties
stipulated that Thomas sustained a hip injury that arose out of
and in the course of his employment. Relevant to this appeal,
the parties disputed the allegation in Kristine’s petition that
Thomas’ hip injury combined with the preexisting cancer
to cause Thomas’ death. The matter proceeded to trial on
that issue.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
321 Nebraska Reports
HASTREITER v. FOLTZ BROS.
Cite as 321 Neb. 469
3. Expert Evidence
Consistent with workers’ compensation court rules of pro-
cedure, the parties submitted several letters from experts that
were solicited in lieu of the experts’ personal testimony. See
Workers’ Comp. Ct. R. of Proc. 10(A) (2024). The compensa-
tion court received these letters, which addressed the cause of
Thomas’ death. Because the letters are central to our resolution
of this appeal, we describe them in some detail.
(a) Dr. Samer Renno
The compensation court received a letter from Thomas’
oncologist, Dr. Samer Renno. Dr. Renno wrote that he had
recommended a form of immunotherapy to manage Thomas’
urothelial cancer but that the immunotherapy was delayed as
a result of complications from Thomas’ hip injury. Dr. Renno
stated that if the immunotherapy treatment had been initi-
ated earlier, “this may have made a difference in prolonging
[Thomas’] life (assuming that immunotherapy was effective).”
(b) Dr. Benjamin Teply
Foltz Brothers and its insurer offered a letter containing the
opinions of Dr. Benjamin Teply, an oncologist. In Dr. Teply’s
opinion, Thomas died from the “natural progression” of his
urothelial cancer. Dr. Teply submitted that neither the hip
injury nor the infection caused the cancer to grow or spread.
Dr. Teply did acknowledge that the hip injury and result-
ing infection affected Thomas’ ability to receive the recom-
mended treatment for his urothelial cancer. Additionally, he
stated that there were studies showing the recommended
treatment for Thomas’ urothelial cancer “can prolong sur-
vival” and that therefore, Thomas “may have lived longer on
the basis of benefit from anticancer therapy if he had not had
the left hip injury, surgery, and infection.”
In his letter, Dr. Teply responded to a question from coun-
sel for Foltz Brothers and its insurer. The question, quoted in
Dr. Teply’s letter, stated:

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
321 Nebraska Reports
HASTREITER v. FOLTZ BROS.
Cite as 321 Neb. 469
It is my understanding that, in your experience and based
on the studies you reviewed, had [Thomas’] cancer doc-
tors been able to start the [recommended] immunotherapy
soon after the metastatic urothelial cancer was diagnosed
in mid-September 2022, he might have been expected
to live another 3.8 - 4.8 months, perhaps as long as 6
months, versus the roughly 3 months he actually lived
between the September 19, 2022 pathology report and
his death on December 14, 2022. It is further my under-
standing that the 3.8 - 6 months ranges are based on
studies and statistical averages assuming a median result.
Is my understanding correct? Please explain.
Dr. Teply responded to this question by first stating, “Correct.
The prognosis for [Thomas’] cancer was unfortunately guarded
when the metastatic disease was identified.” Dr. Teply then
went on to discuss statistical models that have been devel-
oped to estimate the prognosis for cancer patients receiving
treatments. Dr. Teply stated that if one model were applied to
Thomas, “his median survival would be estimated to be 3.8
[months].” Discussing another model that he described as “the
most applicable” for Thomas, Dr. Teply stated that Thomas’
“median survival would be estimated to be 4.8 [months] with
the receipt of [the recommended treatment].” “Therefore,” Dr.
Teply concluded, “I would have estimated his survival to be
3-6 months from his cancer with treatment at the time that
metastatic disease was diagnosed in September of 2022.”
Dr. Teply stated in his letter that all his opinions were
expressed to a reasonable degree of medical certainty based
upon his education, training, and experience.
(c) Dr. Morgan LaHolt
Kristine also offered a letter addressed to Kristine’s counsel
from Dr. Morgan LaHolt, a physiatrist. Dr. LaHolt stated that it
was not his opinion that Thomas’ fall “accelerated his cancer.”
Dr. LaHolt stated that, instead, Thomas’ hip injury prevented

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
321 Nebraska Reports
HASTREITER v. FOLTZ BROS.
Cite as 321 Neb. 469
him from receiving the recommended cancer treatment. He
also addressed Dr. Teply’s opinions, stating the following:
Dr. Teply does indicate that [Thomas] “missed out on the
opportunity for this further cancer therapy as a result of
the injury, surgery and infection.” [Dr. Teply] goes on to
state that “[Thomas] may have lived longer on the basis
of benefit from anticancer therapy if he had not had the
left hip injury, surgery and infection.” These statements
are[,] in essence, a restating of my opinion as it relates to
[Thomas]. It remains my opinion that the inability to par-
ticipate in cancer treatment combined with his hip infec-
tion resulted in a shortening of [Thomas’] life expectancy.
4. Compensation Court Denies
Death Benefits
The compensation court denied Kristine’s claim for workers’
compensation death benefits. In its written award, the compen-
sation court explained that Kristine claimed that Thomas’ hip
injury contributed to his death because it prevented him from
receiving treatment that would have extended his life. The
compensation court explained that, in order to recover, Kristine
was obligated to prove “by a preponderance of the evidence”
that an accident arising out of and in the course of Thomas’
employment caused his death.
The compensation court understood the viability of Kristine’s
theory to be an issue of first impression in Nebraska. The com-
pensation court discussed cases cited in a workers’ compensa-
tion treatise, in which courts have found that work injuries that
cause cancer to grow or spread and thereby “hasten” death are
compensable. See 1 Arthur Larson et al., Larson’s Workers’
Compensation Law § 9.02 (2025). But the compensation court
distinguished those cases because there was no evidence here
that the hip injury caused Thomas’ preexisting cancer to grow
or spread. The compensation court further concluded that the
hip injury did not “hasten” Thomas’ death. The compensation
court explained that it viewed “hastening” death as distinct

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
321 Nebraska Reports
HASTREITER v. FOLTZ BROS.
Cite as 321 Neb. 469
from a lost opportunity to “prolong[] [Thomas’] life, which is
what treatment may possibly have done.”
The compensation court also found shortcomings in the evi-
dence that the recommended treatment would have extended
Thomas’ life. On that topic, it stated the following:
Nor was there any guarantee the therapy would extend
[Thomas’] life especially since the cancer had already
spread to other organs before the accident. [Dr. Renno]
hedged his opinions in more ways than one, expressing
it was “possible” if therapy had been started early it
“may” have prolonged [Thomas’] life “assuming” it was
even effective. . . . The only other expert specializing in
the treatment and diagnosis of cancer, Dr. Teply, stated
[Thomas] “may” have lived maybe three to six months
longer had he had treatment, but he opined with certainty
the work injury did not cause, aggravate, or accelerate the
cancer’s growth . . . . Expert medical testimony based upon
“may,” “possibly,” or “appears” lacks the definiteness
required to support [a workers’ compensation] award
. . . . Edmonds [v. IBP, inc., 239 Neb. 899, 479 N.W.2d
754 (1992)].
The compensation court concluded its analysis of Kristine’s
claim for death benefits by stating:
[T]he evidence does not support a finding that [Thomas’]
death was a result of the work accident and injury to his
hip. The fact is he died as a result of his pre-existing
cancer. For all the foregoing reasons, the Court denies
[Kristine’s] prayer to find [Thomas’] cancer was related
to his work injury occurring on or about September
26, 2022.
5. Compensation Court Awards Temporary
Total Disability Benefits, Associated
Expenses, and Fees
The compensation court awarded Kristine compensation for
Thomas’ temporary total disability for September 27, through

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
321 Nebraska Reports
HASTREITER v. FOLTZ BROS.
Cite as 321 Neb. 469
December 14, 2022, the period during which Thomas’ hip
injury made him unable to work, “regardless of the cancer.”
The compensation court also awarded medical bills, mileage,
waiting-time penalties, interest, attorney fees in the amount of
$10,000, and other fees associated with Thomas’ hip injury.
Kristine appeals.
II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Kristine assigns several errors on appeal. She assigns, con-
densed and restated, that the compensation court erred (1) by
not awarding her death benefits and (2) by not awarding her
sufficient waiting-time penalties and attorney fees. Kristine’s
brief, however, fails to make any argument about waiting-time
penalties or attorney fees. Accordingly, we will not address
that assignment. See City of Omaha v. Professional Firefighters
Assn., 309 Neb. 918, 963 N.W.2d 1 (2021) (errors that are
assigned but not argued will not be addressed).
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1] An appellate court may modify, reverse, or set aside
a Workers’ Compensation Court decision only when (1) the
compensation court acted without or in excess of its powers;
(2) the judgment, order, or award was procured by fraud; (3)
there is not sufficient competent evidence in the record to
warrant the making of the order, judgment, or award; or (4)
the findings of fact by the compensation court do not support
the order or award. Prinz v. Omaha Operations, 317 Neb. 744,
11 N.W.3d 641 (2024). See, also, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-185
(Reissue 2021).
[2,3] On appellate review, the factual findings made by the
trial judge of the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Court have
the effect of a jury verdict and will not be disturbed unless
clearly wrong. Prinz, supra. In testing the sufficiency of the
evidence to support the findings of fact in a workers’ com-
pensation case, an appellate court considers the evidence in
the light most favorable to the successful party, every contro-
verted fact must be resolved in favor of the successful party,

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
321 Nebraska Reports
HASTREITER v. FOLTZ BROS.
Cite as 321 Neb. 469
and the appellate court gives the successful party the benefit
of every inference reasonably deducible from the evidence. Id.
IV. ANALYSIS
Kristine challenges the compensation court’s determination
that she was not entitled to death benefits. We understand
the compensation court to have determined that she was not
entitled to death benefits for two reasons. First, the compensa-
tion court determined that Kristine’s theory of recovery—that
Thomas’ hip injury contributed to his death because it pre-
vented him from receiving treatment that would have extended
his life—was not a valid theory of recovery under Nebraska
workers’ compensation law. We understand the compensation
court to have alternatively concluded that even if Kristine’s
theory of recovery was valid, she failed to adequately estab-
lish causation. Specifically, we understand the compensation
court to have found that Kristine failed to prove that Thomas’
life would have been extended had he received the recom-
mended immunotherapy treatment, given how far his cancer
had already spread before the work accident.
For purposes of this opinion, it is not necessary for us to
determine whether Kristine’s theory of recovery is valid. Even
if we assume that the theory of recovery is valid in a workers’
compensation case, we conclude the compensation court did
not err in concluding Kristine failed to prove that the work
injury proximately caused Thomas’ death. We explain why
below. We first discuss the legal principles governing proof of
causation in workers’ compensation cases. We then apply those
principles to the facts before us.
1. Legal Principles Governing
Proof of Causation
[4] For an award based on an employee’s death, a claimant
must establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
employment proximately caused an injury which resulted in
death compensable under the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation
Act. Rosemann v. County of Sarpy, 237 Neb. 252, 466 N.W.2d

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
321 Nebraska Reports
HASTREITER v. FOLTZ BROS.
Cite as 321 Neb. 469
59 (1991). A claimant must generally prove proximate causa-
tion through expert medical testimony. See Prinz v. Omaha
Operations, 317 Neb. 744, 755, 11 N.W.3d 641, 651 (2024)
(“[i]f the nature and effect of a claimant’s injury are not
plainly apparent, then the claimant must provide expert medi-
cal testimony showing a causal connection between the injury
and the claimed disability”).
[5,6] Expert medical causation testimony in workers’ com-
pensation cases must also meet certain standards. Although a
claimant’s medical expert does not have to couch his or her
opinion in the magic words “reasonable medical certainty”
or “reasonable probability,” the opinion must be sufficient
to establish the crucial causal link between the claimant’s
injuries and the accident occurring in the course and scope
of the claimant’s employment. Prinz, supra. Expert medical
testimony based upon “could,” “may,” or “possibly” lacks the
definiteness required to support an award from the Workers’
Compensation Court. Id.
[7,8] The determination of causation is ordinarily a matter
for the trier of fact. Id. Moreover, it is the role of the Nebraska
Workers’ Compensation Court as the trier of fact to determine
which, if any, expert witness to believe. Id.
2. Causation Principles Applied
Before the compensation court and before us on appeal,
Kristine argues that Thomas’ work injury proximately caused
his death because it prevented him from receiving the recom-
mended cancer treatment and that, had he received the treat-
ment, he would have lived longer than he did. Assuming that is
a valid basis for a claim for death benefits, Kristine would be
obligated to offer expert medical testimony to substantiate her
assertion that Thomas would have lived longer had he received
the recommended cancer treatment. The compensation court
concluded she failed to establish that fact. We find no error in
that determination for reasons we will explain below.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
321 Nebraska Reports
HASTREITER v. FOLTZ BROS.
Cite as 321 Neb. 469
(a) Compensation Court Did Not
Apply Incorrect Standard
Before discussing the specific expert testimony offered, we
address an argument made by Kristine that the compensation
court applied a heightened and incorrect causation standard.
On this point, Kristine draws our attention to the compensa-
tion court’s statement that there was no “guarantee” that the
recommended treatment would extend Thomas’ life. She cor-
rectly asserts that a workers’ compensation claimant need
not prove causation with “absolute certainty.” See Welke v.
City of Ainsworth, 179 Neb. 496, 502, 138 N.W.2d 808, 812
(1965). Rather, a claimant must establish by a preponderance
of the evidence that the employment proximately caused an
injury which resulted in death compensable under the Nebraska
Workers’ Compensation Act. See Rosemann, supra.
We do not, however, understand the compensation court
to have applied a heightened causation standard. Although
the compensation court did say there was no “guarantee” the
recommended treatment would extend Thomas’ life, we read
that as merely a colloquial, introductory sentence. Earlier in its
award, the compensation court recited the correct preponder-
ance of the evidence standard. In addition, the rest of the para-
graph does not purport to apply a requirement that the expert
medical testimony must establish with absolute certainty that
Thomas would have lived longer with the recommended treat-
ment. It instead considered whether the opinions of Drs. Renno
and Teply were sufficiently definite, an appropriate consider-
ation for the compensation court. See Edmonds v. IBP, inc., 239
Neb. 899, 479 N.W.2d 754 (1992).
In the subsections below, we discuss the expert testimony
received by the compensation court and explain why the com-
pensation court did not err by concluding that Kristine failed to
establish that Thomas would have lived longer had he received
the recommended treatment.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
321 Nebraska Reports
HASTREITER v. FOLTZ BROS.
Cite as 321 Neb. 469
(b) Dr. Renno
The compensation court concluded that Dr. Renno did not
provide a sufficiently definite opinion because he stated that
Thomas “may” have lived longer had he received the recom-
mended treatment. There is no question that the opinion of
Dr. Renno was insufficiently definite. The compensation court
was correct when it observed that he “hedged his opinions in
more ways than one,” by stating that it was “possible” that
the treatment “may” have prolonged Thomas’ life, “assuming
that [the treatment] was effective.” This statement was based
upon “may” and “possibly” and thus lacked the definiteness
required to support an award from the Workers’ Compensation
Court. See Prinz v. Omaha Operations, 317 Neb. 744, 11
N.W.3d 641 (2024).
(c) Dr. Teply
Dr. Teply’s letter requires more discussion. As the compen-
sation court observed, Dr. Teply stated that Thomas “may have
lived longer” had he received the recommended treatment. This
statement, standing alone, is no more definite than the opinion
of Dr. Renno; therefore, the compensation court was correct to
conclude that it was not sufficiently definite. As Kristine points
out, though, Dr. Teply’s letter also referenced survival models
and stated that he “would have estimated [Thomas’] survival
to be 3-6 months” if he had received the treatment when it was
first recommended. Kristine adds that Thomas died less than 3
months after the treatment was recommended.
But, even considering Dr. Teply’s other statements, it is not
obvious to us that he offered a sufficiently definite causation
opinion. Dr. Teply’s statements must be viewed in context.
His statements about survival models and what he “would
have estimated” Thomas’ survival to be were in response
to a question in which he was asked to confirm whether he
believed Thomas “might” have been expected to live another
3 to 6 months based upon the survival models. Dr. Teply
answered, “Correct.” But a statement that Thomas “might”

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
321 Nebraska Reports
HASTREITER v. FOLTZ BROS.
Cite as 321 Neb. 469
have lived another 3 to 6 months is, in substance, no differ-
ent than a statement that he “may” have lived another 3 to
6 months. Even Dr. Teply’s statement that he “would have
estimated” Thomas to live another 3 to 6 months appears
to carefully stop short of expressing that it was, in fact, Dr.
Teply’s opinion to a reasonable degree of medical certainty or
reasonable degree of medical probability that Thomas would
have lived 3 to 6 months longer had he received the recom-
mended treatment.
As it turns out, however, we need not determine whether
Dr. Teply provided a sufficiently definite expert opinion that
Thomas would have lived longer had he received the recom-
mended treatment. Even assuming he did, when the com-
pensation court determined that Kristine did not prove that
Thomas would have lived longer with the recommended treat-
ment, it impliedly declined to credit Dr. Teply’s survival esti-
mate. And the compensation court was not obligated to credit
such testimony.
We have said that “it is the role of the Nebraska Workers’
Compensation Court as the trier of fact to determine which,
if any, expert witnesses to believe.” Id. at 756, 11 N.W.3d at
651 (emphasis supplied). It is thus within the compensation
court’s authority to decline to credit even undisputed expert
medical testimony. Consider, for example, this court’s opinion
in Yager v. Bellco Midwest, 236 Neb. 888, 464 N.W.2d 335
(1991). In that case, the compensation court declined to credit
unrefuted expert testimony that a back injury was work related.
We found no error. We stated that the compensation court
apparently “chose not to believe the undisputed testimony of
plaintiff’s medical witness,” id. at 897-98, 464 N.W.2d at 341,
but that it was “not bound by the testimony of an expert,” nor
was it for this court “to determine the weight and credibility of
such evidence,” id. at 897, 464 N.W.2d at 341.
Kristine argues that under this court’s opinion in Spangler
v. State, 233 Neb. 790, 448 N.W.2d 145 (1989), the compensa-
tion court was bound to credit Dr. Teply’s testimony because

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
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HASTREITER v. FOLTZ BROS.
Cite as 321 Neb. 469
it was undisputed. But in Spangler, this court affirmed the
compensation court’s order when it declined to credit expert
medical testimony and stated that the compensation court is
“not required to take the opinion of an expert in regard to the
causal connection between the alleged accident or exertion and
the resulting disability as binding upon it.” 233 Neb. at 798,
448 N.W.2d at 151.
Our opinion in Spangler did cite an earlier case, Mann v.
City of Omaha, 211 Neb. 583, 593, 319 N.W.2d 454, 459
(1982), in which we held that the compensation court clearly
erred by failing to rely on expert medical testimony that
“[was] based on firsthand knowledge, [was] credible, and
[had] no demonstrable weaknesses or failure of foundation.”
But Mann, read in light of Spangler, identifies, at most, a
very narrow set of circumstances in which the compensation
court is bound to credit expert medical testimony, i.e., when
undisputed medical expert testimony is not only undisputed,
but so unassailable that the compensation court clearly errs by
failing to credit it.
But Dr. Teply’s testimony does not clear this high bar. For
the reasons we have discussed, it was not clear that Dr. Teply
opined to a reasonable degree of medical certainty or probabil-
ity that Thomas would have lived longer had he received the
recommended treatment. And even if he did, the main focus
of his testimony appeared to be that Thomas was unlikely to
live very long. His testimony did not require the compensation
court to conclude that Thomas would have lived longer than
he did had he received the recommended treatment.
(d) Dr. LaHolt
Kristine also argues that the compensation court erred by
not relying on the expert opinion of Dr. LaHolt. She argues
that Dr. LaHolt’s opinion—that Thomas’ inability to receive
the recommended treatment shortened his life expectancy—
was both sufficiently definite and not controverted by any
other expert opinion. We disagree.

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HASTREITER v. FOLTZ BROS.
Cite as 321 Neb. 469
For essentially the same reasons discussed above with
respect to Dr. Teply’s testimony, the compensation court was
not bound to accept the opinions of Dr. LaHolt. Dr. LaHolt
provided almost no independent explanation for his conclusion
that Thomas’ inability to receive the recommended treatment
shortened his life expectancy. He said that he agreed with Dr.
Teply’s opinion that Thomas “may have lived longer” had he
received the recommended treatment, but, as we have dis-
cussed, that statement was itself insufficiently definite.
(e) Summary of Causation Evidence
As we have discussed, some of the expert opinions as to
whether Thomas would have lived longer had he received
the recommended treatment were insufficiently definite. And
the compensation court was not obligated to credit other
expert testimony on that subject. Accordingly, there is no basis
to conclude that the compensation court was clearly wrong
when it found that Kristine had not established that Thomas
would have lived longer had he received the recommended
treatment. See Prinz v. Omaha Operations, 317 Neb. 744, 11
N.W.3d 641 (2024) (factual findings of compensation court
have effect of jury verdict and are not reversible unless clearly
wrong). Thus, even assuming that Kristine’s theory of recov-
ery was valid, the compensation court did not err in denying
her claim for death benefits.
V. CONCLUSION
Because we find that the compensation court did not err in
denying Kristine’s claim for death benefits, we affirm.
Affirmed.