State v. Dolinar

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
319 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. DOLINAR
Cite as 319 Neb. 565
State of Nebraska, appellee, v.
Jacob Edward Dolinar, appellant.
___ N.W.3d ___
Filed July 25, 2025. 	No. S-24-603.
1. Speedy Trial: Appeal and Error. When reviewing a trial court’s
computation of the time a criminal defendant must be brought to trial
under Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 29-1207 and 29-1208 (Reissue 2016), an
appellate court reviews the trial court’s factual determinations and
supporting specific findings pertaining to the exceptions listed in
§ 29-1207(4)(a) through (f) for clear error. However, the proper inter-
pretation of § 29-1207(4) and its application to the undisputed historical
facts of a case are questions of law.
2. Judgments: Statutes: Appeal and Error. When an appeal calls for
statutory interpretation or presents questions of law, an appellate court
must reach an independent, correct conclusion irrespective of the deter-
mination made by the court below.
3. Speedy Trial: Appeal and Error. “[T]ried again,” as used in Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 29-1207(3) (Reissue 2016), does not refer to a defendant who has
yet to be brought to trial a first time and whose trial has been delayed
because of the defendant’s interlocutory appeal.
4. Speedy Trial: Waiver: Motions for Continuance. Under Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 29-1207(4)(b) (Reissue 2016), if a defendant requests a con-
tinuance that moves a trial date which has been set within the statutory
6-month period to a date that is outside the 6-month period, that request
constitutes a permanent waiver of the statutory speedy trial right.
5. ____: ____: ____. A defendant permanently waives his or her statutory
speedy trial rights under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207(4)(b) (Reissue 2016)
when an ultimately unsuccessful motion for discharge results in the con-
tinuance of a timely trial to a date outside the statutory 6-month period,
as calculated on the date the motion for discharge was filed.
6. Judicial Notice: Records. Judicial notice of an adjudicative fact is
proper when the adjudicative fact is not subject to reasonable dispute
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
10/14/2026 08:00 AM CDT

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
319 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. DOLINAR
Cite as 319 Neb. 565
and capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to the files
and records of the court.
7. Judgments: Words and Phrases. A fact is adjudicative if the fact
affects the determination of a controverted issue in litigation.
8. Speedy Trial: Records: Judicial Notice. In determining “excludable
periods” under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207 (Reissue 2016), the trial court
may take judicial notice of the files and records of the court.
9. ____: ____: ____. When the trial court’s files and records provide the
information necessary to calculate the speedy trial deadline, the taking
of judicial notice is sufficient evidence to support the court’s findings as
to statutorily excludable periods.
10. Speedy Trial: Proof. When a defendant claims that he or she is entitled
to absolute discharge under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1208 (Reissue 2016),
the State bears the burden to show, by a preponderance of the evidence,
the applicability of one or more of the excluded time periods under Neb.
Rev. Stat. § 29-1207(4) (Reissue 2016).
11. Speedy Trial: Records: Judicial Notice. In satisfying its burden, even
when the files and records of the case are judicially noticed, the State
should identify and advise the court of each period of delay it asserts is
excludable under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207(4) (Reissue 2016), includ-
ing the date and nature of the proceedings, circumstances, or rulings
that initiated and concluded each excludable period; the number of days
composing each excludable period; and the number of days remaining
in which the defendant may be brought to trial after taking into consid-
eration all excludable periods.
12. Speedy Trial: Complaints: Indictments and Informations. For cases
commenced with a complaint in county court but thereafter bound over
to district court, the 6-month statutory speedy trial period does not com-
mence until the filing of the information in district court.
13. Speedy Trial. The 6-month period within which an accused is to be
brought to trial refers to a period of 6 calendar months, not 180 days.
14. ____. To calculate the time for speedy trial purposes, a court must
exclude the day the period commenced, count forward 6 months,
back up 1 day, and then add any time excluded under Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 29-1207(4) (Reissue 2016) to determine the last day the defendant
can be tried. The excluded periods are likewise computed by excluding
the day of the act, event, or default after which the designated period of
time begins to run.
Appeal from the District Court for Buffalo County: John H.
Marsh, Judge. Affirmed.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
319 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. DOLINAR
Cite as 319 Neb. 565
Renee L. Mathias, of Shapiro Riha, L.L.P., for appellant.
Michael T. Hilgers, Attorney General, and Erin E. Tangeman
for appellee.
Funke, 	C.J., 	Miller-Lerman, 	Cassel, 	Stacy, 	Papik,
Freudenberg, and Bergevin, JJ.
Bergevin, J.
INTRODUCTION
Jacob Edward Dolinar appeals from the district court’s
order overruling his motion to discharge under Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 29-1208 (Reissue 2016). Dolinar argues that the State failed
to satisfy its burden to show sufficient excludable time periods
under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207 (Reissue 2016) and that he is
entitled to an absolute discharge. On the facts of this case, we
conclude that the State satisfied its burden and affirm the order
of the court.
BACKGROUND
The State filed a criminal complaint in the county court
against Dolinar that alleged he committed various drug charges.
The case was bound over to the district court, and the State
filed an information against Dolinar on November 16, 2021.
Dolinar waived his right to be arraigned and entered a written
plea of not guilty, and the case proceeded.
Interlocutory Appeal
Dolinar later withdrew his plea and filed a plea in bar. The
district court overruled his plea in bar. Dolinar appealed. On
appeal, we affirmed the order of the district court, 1 issuing our
opinion on September 15, 2023. We issued our mandate on
October 16, setting forth that the district court “shall, without
delay, proceed to enter judgment in conformity” with our judg-
ment and opinion.
1 See State v. Dolinar, 315 Neb. 257, 995 N.W.2d 18 (2023).

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
319 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. DOLINAR
Cite as 319 Neb. 565
On Remand
The district court entered its judgment on the mandate on
January 31, 2024, and the case proceeded in the district court.
On April 9, after a couple of continuances, Dolinar again
pleaded not guilty to the information, and the court set the case
for trial to occur on June 24. On June 17, Dolinar filed the
instant motion for absolute discharge.
Motion for Absolute Discharge
At the hearing on Dolinar’s motion for discharge, Dolinar
introduced, and the court received without objection, (1) a cer-
tified copy of the information filed on November 16, 2021; (2)
this court’s mandate following Dolinar’s interlocutory appeal,
issued on October 16, 2023; and (3) a certified copy of the
district court’s judgment on the mandate, entered on January
31, 2024. Dolinar also requested the court “to take judicial
notice of all the pleadings and orders” in the case. The court
did so.
The State offered no evidence. After Dolinar took issue
with the State’s submitting argument without introducing any
evidence, the State asked the court to “take judicial notice
of the pleadings in the file, specifically the Judgment on the
Mandate,” which was already received into evidence.
The State then argued that the period to bring Dolinar to
trial had not run when he filed his motion for absolute dis-
charge on June 17, 2024, because it contended that pursuant to
§ 29-1207(3), a new statutory 6-month period commenced to
run when the district court entered its judgment on the mandate
on January 31, following Dolinar’s plea in bar. In response,
Dolinar argued that the State misread § 29-1207(3) and that it
does not apply to interlocutory appeals.
In a written order, the court agreed with Dolinar that
§ 29-1207(3) did not apply to Dolinar’s case. The court then
considered the periods of delay resulting from other proceed-
ings concerning Dolinar, which are excluded in the compu-
tation of the time for trial pursuant to § 29-1207(4)(a). The

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
319 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. DOLINAR
Cite as 319 Neb. 565
court identified the various proceedings, the dates on which
each of those proceedings began and concluded, and the
court’s calculation of the number of days within each period.
The court found that a total of 715 days were excluded under
§ 29-1207(4)(a) and that those exclusions “extend[ed] the
last day for trial beyond” the statutory 6-month period. The
court stated, without context, that prior to filing a plea in
bar, Dolinar “had already continued the matter outside of
the statutory six months.” The court found that Dolinar was
“deemed to have waived his right to speedy trial pursuant to
[§] 29-1207 (4)(b),” because Dolinar’s appeal concerning his
plea in bar “carr[ied] an implicit request to continue the trial to
the extent necessary to resolve [it],” citing State v. Mortensen. 2
The court overruled Dolinar’s motion for absolute discharge.
Dolinar filed a timely appeal, and we moved this appeal to
our docket on our own motion. 3
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
Dolinar assigns, restated, that the district court erred in
denying his motion for absolute discharge under § 29-1208
because the State failed to meet its burden of proof to show
sufficient excludable time under § 29-1207.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1,2] When reviewing a trial court’s computation of the
time a criminal defendant must be brought to trial under
§§ 29-1207 and 29-1208, an appellate court reviews the trial
court’s factual determinations and supporting specific find-
ings pertaining to the exceptions listed in § 29-1207(4)(a)
through (f) for clear error. 4 However, the proper interpretation
2 State v. Mortensen, 287 Neb. 158, 841 N.W.2d 393 (2014) (filing of
motion to discharge deemed to be waiver of speedy trial where resolution
results in continuance of timely trial date beyond 6-month period).
3 See, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-1106(3) (Cum. Supp. 2024); Neb. Ct. R. App. P.
§ 2-102(C) (rev. 2022).
4 See State v. Nelson, 313 Neb. 464, 984 N.W.2d 620 (2023).

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
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STATE v. DOLINAR
Cite as 319 Neb. 565
of § 29-1207(4) and its application to the undisputed histori-
cal facts of a case are questions of law. 5 When an appeal calls
for statutory interpretation or presents questions of law, an
appellate court must reach an independent, correct conclusion
irrespective of the determination made by the court below. 6
ANALYSIS
Dolinar makes three arguments in support of his assigned
error. First, he argues that the State’s sole argument that
he was not entitled to discharge relied on a misreading of
§ 29-1207(3). Second, Dolinar argues that the court was incor-
rect to apply our holding in Mortensen concerning a motion
for absolute discharge to his plea in bar. Finally, Dolinar’s
third argument is that after rejecting the State’s sole argument
concerning § 29-1207(3), the court “assumed the role of the
witness in computing the excludable days contained in the
transcript” 7 and in finding that he was deemed to have waived
his right to a speedy trial under § 29-1207(4)(b).
We discuss each of Dolinar’s arguments in turn before deter-
mining whether the time to bring him to trial had run on the
date he filed his motion for absolute discharge.
§ 29-1207(3)
In its appellate brief, the State did not address the argument
advanced below that the 6-month period to bring Dolinar to
trial provided by § 29-1207(1) refreshed after his interlocutory
appeal and commenced to run from the date of our mandate
on remand under § 29-1207(3). However, at oral argument,
the State took the position that Dolinar’s argument was correct
and that § 29-1207(3) was inapplicable in this case. As noted
above, the district court agreed with the State’s position on
appeal. So do we.
5 Id.
6 Boone River, LLC v. Miles, 318 Neb. 760, 18 N.W.3d 802 (2025).
7 Brief for appellant at 9.

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STATE v. DOLINAR
Cite as 319 Neb. 565
[3] Section 29-1207(3) provides: “If a defendant is to be
tried again following a mistrial, an order for a new trial, or an
appeal or collateral attack, such period shall commence to run
from the date of the mistrial, order granting a new trial, or the
mandate on remand.” As we have previously held:
[T]he key words in § 29-1207(3) are “tried again.” Given
their ordinary meaning, they can only refer to a defendant
who has previously been put on trial. “[T]ried again,” as
used in § 29-1207(3), does not refer to a defendant who
has yet to be brought to trial a first time and whose trial
has been delayed because of the defendant’s interlocutory
appeal. To conclude otherwise would require us to ignore
the plain language of § 29-1207(3). 8
Because Dolinar has not yet been brought to trial, § 29-1207(3)
did not apply to his motion for absolute discharge.
§ 29-1207(4) and Mortensen
Dolinar next argues that the district court erroneously applied
and extended our decision in Mortensen to his plea in bar and
determined that he was “deemed to have waived” his right to
a speedy trial under § 29-1207(4)(b). The State contends that
the district court’s application of our holding in Mortensen to
Dolinar’s plea in bar presents an unanswered question of law
that we need not address in this case. Based on our review of
the record, we agree with the State.
Mortensen presented our first opportunity to address the then-
recent amendment to § 29-1207(4)(b), specifically the newly
enacted waiver provision. 9 The amendment to § 29-1207(4)(b)
reads, in pertinent part: “A defendant is deemed to have waived
his or her right to speedy trial when the period of delay result-
ing from a continuance granted at the request of the defend-
ant or his or her counsel extends the trial date beyond the
statutory six-month period.” We interpreted this provision and
8 State v. Baker, 264 Neb. 867, 871, 652 N.W.2d 612, 616 (2002).
9 See 2010 Neb. Laws, L.B. 712, § 15.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
319 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. DOLINAR
Cite as 319 Neb. 565
went on to consider whether a motion for absolute discharge
was a request for a motion for a continuance as described in
the amendment to § 29-1207(4)(b). We noted that the legis-
lative history showed that the amendment was intended to
address not only delays caused by traditional continuances, but
also delays resulting from the filings of motions to discharge.
We concluded that “[a] motion to discharge is a request for a
continuance” under § 29-1207(4)(b). 10
[4,5] In the years since Mortensen, we have addressed
§ 29-1207(4)(b) and its waiver provision a number of times. 11
We have recognized that the word “continuance,” as it is used
in § 29-1207(4)(b), refers to the circumstance where a court
proceeding set for one date is postponed to a future date. 12
Under § 29-1207(4)(b), “‘if a defendant requests a continuance
that moves a trial date which has been set within the statutory
6-month period to a date that is outside the 6-month period,
that request constitutes a permanent waiver of the statutory
speedy trial right.’” 13 Mortensen and its progeny hold that a
defendant permanently waives his or her statutory speedy trial
rights under § 29-1207(4)(b) when an ultimately unsuccessful
motion for discharge results in the continuance of a timely trial
to a date outside the statutory 6-month period, as calculated on
the date the motion for discharge was filed. 14
10 State v. Mortensen, supra note 2, 287 Neb. at 165, 841 N.W.2d at 400.
But see State v. Baker, supra note 8 (decided prior to 2010 amendment of
§ 29-1207(4)(b)).
11 See, e.g., State v. Lear, 316 Neb. 14, 2 N.W.3d 632 (2024); State v. Miller,
315 Neb. 951, 2 N.W.3d 345 (2024); State v. Space, 312 Neb. 456, 980
N.W.2d 1 (2022); State v. Riessland, 310 Neb. 262, 965 N.W.2d 13 (2021);
State v. Gill, 297 Neb. 852, 901 N.W.2d 679 (2017); State v. Vela-Montes,
287 Neb. 679, 844 N.W.2d 286 (2014).
12 See State v. Space, supra note 11.
13 State v. Miller, supra note 11, 315 Neb. at 973, 2 N.W.3d at 363 (emphasis
in original) (quoting State v. Mortensen, supra note 2). See, also, State v.
Lear, supra note 11 (recognizing difference in language between general
rule and waiver provision).
14 State v. Riessland, supra note 11. See State v. Vela-Montes, supra note 11.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
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STATE v. DOLINAR
Cite as 319 Neb. 565
However, we have only applied the waiver provision of
§ 29-1207(4)(b) to defendants’ requests for continuances and
motions for absolute discharge, and we have not expressly con-
sidered whether all “other proceedings concerning the defend-
ant” under § 29-1207(4)(a) are also subject to the waiver
provision of § 29-1207(4)(b). 15 But based on our review of the
record in this case, we need not do so here for the reasons set
forth below.
Proof and Evidence of
Excludable Periods
Dolinar’s final argument is that the trial court improperly
considered and calculated excludable time from the judicially
noticed files and records of the case. He asserts that the rel-
evant motions and rulings in his case needed to be individu-
ally marked and introduced into evidence to be considered.
Dolinar asserts that “no evidence was incorporated into the
Bill of Exceptions through Judicial Notice” 16 and that the
State “should have marked, identified, and made a part of
the record the papers requested to be judicially noticed.” 17
Citing In re Estate of Radford, 18 he contends the court erred
when it “did not identify what it considered to be the ‘record’
by marking and introducing each document that it consid-
ered to be relevant and competent.” 19 Dolinar’s reliance on
In re Estate of Radford is misplaced, and there is no merit to
this argument.
[6,7] Even though we determined that judicial notice was
improper in In re Estate of Radford, we recognized that judicial
notice of an adjudicative fact is proper when the adjudicative
15 Compare State v. Riessland, supra note 11, with State v. Bixby, 311 Neb.
110, 971 N.W.2d 120 (2022).
16 Reply brief for appellant at 7.
17 Id. at 8.
18 In re Estate of Radford, 297 Neb. 748, 901 N.W.2d 261 (2017).
19 Reply brief for appellant at 8.

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STATE v. DOLINAR
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fact is not subject to reasonable dispute and capable of accu-
rate and ready determination by resort to the files and records
of the court. 20 A fact is adjudicative if the fact affects the deter-
mination of a controverted issue in litigation. 21
[8] A claimed denial of statutory speedy trial rights involves
a relatively simple mathematical computation of whether the
6-month speedy trial clock, as extended by statutorily exclud-
able periods, has expired prior to the commencement of trial. 22
[W]hen ruling on a motion for absolute discharge pursuant
to § 29-1208, the trial court shall make specific findings
of each period of delay excludable under § 29-1207(4)(a)
to (e), in addition to the findings under § 29-1207(4)(f)
. . . . Such findings shall include the date and nature of
the proceedings, circumstances, or rulings which initiated
and concluded each excludable period; the number of
days composing each excludable period; and the number
of days remaining in which the defendant may be brought
to trial after taking into consideration all excludable
periods. 23
We have long held that in determining “excludable periods”
under § 29-1207, the trial court may take judicial notice of the
files and records of the court. 24
[9] Here, both Dolinar and the State requested that the
court take judicial notice of the files and records in this case.
The timeline was uncontroverted, and neither party disputed
the accuracy of the relevant facts—nor do they on appeal. In
20 See In re Estate of Radford, supra note 18. See, also, Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 27-201 (Reissue 2016).
21 In re Interest of Lilly S. & Vincent S., 298 Neb. 306, 903 N.W.2d 651
(2017); State v. McBride, 250 Neb. 636, 550 N.W.2d 659 (1996).
22 See Dugan v. State, 297 Neb. 444, 900 N.W.2d 528 (2017).
23 State v. Williams, 277 Neb. 133, 143-44, 761 N.W.2d 514, 524 (2009). See
State v. Nelson, supra note 4. See, also, State v. Alvarez, 189 Neb. 281,
202 N.W.2d 604 (1972) (requiring specific findings of existence of good
cause under § 29-1207(4)(f)).
24 State v. McKenna, 228 Neb. 29, 421 N.W.2d 19 (1988).

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STATE v. DOLINAR
Cite as 319 Neb. 565
its order, the court identified the relevant facts from its files
and records that it noticed in making its specific findings of
the statutorily excluded periods in this case. When the trial
court’s files and records provide the information necessary to
calculate the speedy trial deadline, the taking of judicial notice
is sufficient evidence to support the court’s findings as to
statutorily excludable periods. 25 The court did not err in taking
judicial notice of the filings and its orders in this case.
However, we have long recognized that the State has the
primary burden of bringing an accused person to trial within
the time provided by law. 26 The legislative mandate to do so
not only concerns the right of the accused to a speedy trial,
but equally important is the interest of the public in the prompt
disposition of criminal cases. 27 The Legislature has made it
the duty of the county attorney to “advise the court of facts”
relevant to the running of the time for trial. 28 This affirmative
duty is as absolute as a defendant’s entitlement to discharge
should the State fail to timely bring him or her to trial. 29
[10,11] When a defendant claims that he or she is entitled
to absolute discharge under § 29-1208, the State bears the
burden to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, the
applicability of one or more of the excluded time periods
under § 29-1207(4). 30 In satisfying its burden, even when the
files and records of the case are judicially noticed, the State
should identify and advise the court of each period of delay
it asserts is excludable under § 29-1207(4), including the date
25 See id. See, also, State v. Nelson, supra note 4; State v. Williams, supra
note 23. Cf., State v. Rashad, 316 Neb. 101, 3 N.W.3d 325 (2024); State v.
Space, supra note 11.
26 See, State v. Space, supra note 11; State v. Alvarez, supra note 23.
27 See, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1205 (Reissue 2016); State v. Alvarez, supra note
23.
28 § 29-1205. See, also, State v. Space, supra note 11.
29 See § 29-1208.
30 See, State v. Nelson, supra note 4; State v. Alvarez, supra note 23.

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STATE v. DOLINAR
Cite as 319 Neb. 565
and nature of the proceedings, circumstances, or rulings that
initiated and concluded each excludable period; the number
of days composing each excludable period; and the number of
days remaining in which the defendant may be brought to trial
after taking into consideration all excludable periods.
Calculation of Time to Be
Brought to Trial
Finally, we must determine whether Dolinar is entitled to
absolute discharge under § 29-1208. On appeal, Dolinar makes
no argument concerning the computation of the time in which
he was statutorily required to be brought to trial. For its part,
although the State did not do so below, the State argues that
Dolinar permanently waived his statutory right to a speedy
trial, but on grounds different than those relied upon by the dis-
trict court. We also note that in its order overruling Dolinar’s
motion, the court stated, without context, that prior to filing a
plea in bar, Dolinar “had already continued the matter outside
of the statutory six months.”
Factual determinations pertaining to the exceptions listed
in § 29-1207(4)(a) through (f) must be supported by specific
findings, which we review for clear error. 31 However, the
proper interpretation of § 29-1207(4) and its application to
the undisputed historical facts of a case are questions of law. 32
Here, the timeline is uncontroverted. Therefore, the computa-
tion of the time Dolinar was to be brought to trial is a question
of law that we determine de novo.
[12-14] “Every person indicted or informed against for
any offense shall be brought to trial within six months.” 33
For cases commenced with a complaint in county court but
thereafter bound over to district court, the 6-month statutory
speedy trial period does not commence until the filing of the
31 State v. Nelson, supra note 4.
32 Id.
33 § 29-1207(1).

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information in district court. 34 The 6-month period within
which an accused is to be brought to trial refers to a period of
6 calendar months, not 180 days. 35 To calculate the time for
speedy trial purposes, a court must exclude the day the period
commenced, count forward 6 months, back up 1 day, and then
add any time excluded under § 29-1207(4) to determine the
last day the defendant can be tried. 36 The excluded periods are
likewise computed by “‘excluding the day of the act, event,
or default after which the designated period of time begins
to run.’” 37
Turning to the record on appeal, the transcript shows the fol-
lowing events relevant to Dolinar’s motion:
• The State filed a complaint in the county court on October
25, 2021, and the matter was later bound over to the district
court. The State filed the information in the district court on
November 16. Under § 29-1207(1), on the date the informa-
tion was filed, Dolinar must have been brought to trial on or
before May 16, 2022.
• Dolinar filed a motion for discovery on January 6, 2022,
which the court sustained on January 11, resulting in 5
34 State v. Hettle, 288 Neb. 288, 848 N.W.2d 582 (2014).
35 State v. Coomes, 309 Neb. 749, 962 N.W.2d 510 (2021). See, Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 49-801 (Reissue 2021); State v. Jones, 208 Neb. 641, 305 N.W.2d
355 (1981).
36 See, e.g., State v. Lebeau, 280 Neb. 238, 784 N.W.2d 921 (2010) (day
complaint filed); State v. Baker, supra note 8; (day information filed);
State v. Boslau, 258 Neb. 39, 601 N.W.2d 769 (1999) (day information
deemed filed). See, also, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-2221 (Cum. Supp. 2024);
State v. Jones, supra note 35. Cf. State v. Miller, supra note 11.
37 State v. Jones, supra note 35, 208 Neb. at 645, 305 N.W.2d at 358
(quoting § 25-2221). See State v. Oldfield, 236 Neb. 433, 461 N.W.2d 554
(1990) (formally affirming the State v. Jones, supra note 35, method of
computing time under § 29-1207). See, also, e.g., State v. Billingsley, 309
Neb. 616, 961 N.W.2d 539 (2021) (method applied to § 29-1207(4)(a));
State v. Lovvorn, 303 Neb. 844, 932 N.W.2d 64 (2019) (method applied to
§ 29-1207(4)(b)).

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excludable days under § 29-1207(4)(a) and extending the time
to bring Dolinar to trial to May 21.
• On February 14, 2022, the court set the matter for jury trial
on April 4.
• Dolinar filed a motion to continue a pretrial hearing on January
19, 2022, which the court sustained on January 20, resulting
in 1 excludable day under § 29-1207(4)(a). The hearing was
set for January 21 and continued to February 14, resulting in
24 excludable days under § 29-1207(4)(b). In total, the time
to bring Dolinar to trial was extended to June 15.
• Dolinar filed a motion to dismiss on March 24, 2022, which
was taken up at the pretrial hearing on March 25, resulting
in 1 excludable day under § 29-1207(4)(a) and extending the
time to bring Dolinar to trial to June 16. The court entered a
written order overruling the motion on April 1, resulting in 7
excludable days under § 29-1207(4)(a) and extending the time
to bring Dolinar to trial to June 23.
• A journal entry entered on April 1, 2022, shows that at the
March 25 pretrial hearing, Dolinar requested a continuance to
allow for further discovery. The journal entry reflects that the
court continued the jury trial to June 27.
No further events are relevant to our analysis.
At the time of the March 25, 2022, hearing, the statutory
6-month period required that Dolinar be brought to trial by
June 16. At the March 25 pretrial hearing, Dolinar requested
a continuance that extended the trial date to June 27—a date
beyond June 16. Under § 29-1207(4)(b), Dolinar was deemed
to have waived his right to a speedy trial by requesting a
continuance that extended the trial date beyond the statutory
6-month period.
Even though the State did not argue below Dolinar’s deemed
waiver under § 29-1207(4)(b) and the court did not make any
specific findings as to the statute’s applicability to Dolinar’s
March 25, 2022, request for a continuance, we have an obliga-
tion to come to a conclusion independent of the district court

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STATE v. DOLINAR
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concerning its applicability. 38 Accordingly, when Dolinar filed
his motion for absolute discharge, he had no statutory speedy
trial rights to assert, and the district court did not err in over-
ruling it despite its lack of specific findings to support the
conclusion that Dolinar had already continued the matter out-
side of the statutory 6 months prior to filing the plea in bar. A
correct result will not be set aside merely because the lower
court applied the wrong reasoning in reaching that result. 39
For completeness, we note that we have long required:
When the district court sets a date for trial, which date
is later than the statutory time allowed by section 29-1207
. . . the court shall:
(1) Advise the defendant of his statutory right to a
speedy trial and the effect of his [request or] consent to
a period of delay, and
(2) Ascertain of record whether the defendant does or
does not waive his right to a speedy trial and consent to
the trial date set. 40
The bill of exceptions in our appellate record contains the
verbatim transcript of the March 25, 2022, proceeding. It
shows that when Dolinar requested a continuance through his
counsel, the court proceeded to advise Dolinar that he had a
right to have the matter resolved within 6 months after the
filing of the information and that if his requested continuance
extended the trial date beyond the 6-month period, that right
would be waived. The court then asked Dolinar if he agreed to
waive his right to a speedy trial, to which Dolinar answered in
the affirmative. Upon further questioning, the court expressly
found that Dolinar voluntarily waived his statutory right to
a speedy trial. It then set the trial date on a date beyond the
statutory period.
38 See State v. Nelson, supra note 4.
39 Id.
40 State v. Alvarez, supra note 23, 189 Neb. at 293, 202 N.W.2d at 611.

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STATE v. DOLINAR
Cite as 319 Neb. 565
The actions taken by the court in scheduling a trial date
fully followed our longstanding requisite procedure. The court
ensured Dolinar knew of his right and the consequences of
waiving it, that he was intelligent as to the information pre-
sented to him and the implications of his decision, and that he
was voluntarily waiving his statutory right.
At the hearing on Dolinar’s motion for discharge, the State
did not introduce any evidence of Dolinar’s express waiver
or identify any excludable periods. Nevertheless, the judi-
cially noticed files and records of the case show that Dolinar
was deemed to have waived his right to a speedy trial under
§ 29-1207(4)(b) by his request for a continuance on March
25, 2022.
CONCLUSION
The district court did not err in overruling Dolinar’s motion
for absolute discharge under § 29-1208 because pursuant to
§ 29-1207(4)(b), Dolinar was deemed to have waived his
right to speedy trial when the period of delay resulting from
the continuance granted at his request extended the trial date
beyond the statutory 6-month period. We affirm the order of
the district court.
Affirmed.