In re Estate of Meyers

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
320 Nebraska Reports
IN RE ESTATE OF MEYERS
Cite as 320 Neb. 871
In re Estate of Theresa A. Meyers, deceased.
Claire Weides et al., appellees, v. Shirley
Clouse et al., appellants.
In re Theresa A. Meyers Revocable Trust.
Claire Weides et al., appellees, v. Shirley
Clouse et al., appellants.
___ N.W.3d ___
Filed February 27, 2026. 	Nos. S-24-625, S-24-626.
1. Decedents’ Estates: Attorney Fees: Appeal and Error. In review-
ing the award of attorney fees in cases arising under Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 30-2482 (Reissue 2016), the standard of review in the district courts
and appellate courts is for error appearing on the record.
2. Judgments: Appeal and Error. When reviewing a judgment for errors
on the record, the inquiry is whether the decision conforms to the law,
is supported by competent evidence, and is neither arbitrary, capricious,
nor unreasonable.
3. Appeal and Error. Absent plain error, an appellate court can consider
only errors both specifically assigned and specifically argued in the par-
ties’ initial brief.
4. ____. When reviewing for plain error, an appellate court is concerned
with error that is plainly evident from the record and of such a nature
that to leave it uncorrected would result in damage to the integrity, repu-
tation, or fairness of the judicial process.
5. ____. Generally, an appellate court will find plain error only when a
miscarriage of justice would otherwise occur.
6. ____. Under the party presentation principle, absent plain error, courts
are neutral arbiters of matters the parties present.
7. Penalties and Forfeitures. Forfeiture is the failure to make the timely
assertion of a right.
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
10/18/2026 12:54 AM CDT

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
320 Nebraska Reports
IN RE ESTATE OF MEYERS
Cite as 320 Neb. 871
Petition for further review from the Court of Appeals,
Riedmann, Chief Judge, and Bishop and Welch, Judges, on
appeal thereto from the County Court for Douglas County,
Jeffrey L. Marcuzzo, Judge. Judgment of Court of Appeals
reversed and remanded with direction.
Claude E. Berreckman, Jr., of Berreckman & Bazata, P.C.,
L.L.O., 	and 	Elizabeth 	J. 	Klingelhoefer, 	of 	Jacobsen, 	Orr,
Lindstrom & Holbrook, for appellants.
Matthew Wurstner, of Carlson & Blakeman, L.L.P., for
appellee Carlson & Blakeman, LLP.
Funke, 	C.J., 	Cassel, 	Stacy, 	Papik, 	Freudenberg,
Bergevin, and Vaughn JJ.
Bergevin, J.
INTRODUCTION
These consolidated cases concerning the reasonableness of
attorney fees charged to an estate and revocable trust come
before us on further review from the Nebraska Court of
Appeals. The county court found that the charged hourly attor-
ney fees were reasonable. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
found that the parties’ hourly fee agreement was ineffective.
The Court of Appeals then reviewed the reasonableness of the
attorney fees as it calculated them under the parties’ previous
fee agreement. The primary issue on further review is whether
the Court of Appeals properly considered the effectiveness of
the parties’ hourly fee agreement. We conclude that it did not.
Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals
and remand the cause with direction.
BACKGROUND
Fee Agreements
In 1995, Theresa A. Meyers created and funded a revocable
trust and executed a pour-over will, whereby her remaining
estate at her death would transfer to the trust. In 2017, Meyers

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
320 Nebraska Reports
IN RE ESTATE OF MEYERS
Cite as 320 Neb. 871
executed a superseding will, which did not contain a pour-
over provision. Meyers died in 2022.
The personal representative named in Meyers’ 2017 will
hired Darren Carlson and his law firm, Carlson & Blakeman,
LLP (the firm), to represent him in his fiduciary capacity for
Meyers’ estate. Shortly thereafter, Carlson discovered the exis-
tence of the revocable trust, which had been unknown to all
interested parties.
The trust named three cotrustees. One of the three cotrustees
subsequently resigned, leaving two cotrustees to administer the
trust. Carlson began representing these two cotrustees in their
fiduciary capacities.
Initially, all three fiduciaries orally agreed that the firm’s
attorney fees would be charged at a rate of 2 percent of the
gross assets of the estate and trust. Thereafter, Carlson discov-
ered at least $8 million in additional stock owned by the trust.
As a result, Carlson and the three fiduciaries orally agreed to
reduce the firm’s fee from 2 percent to 1 percent.
In January 2023, one of the two cotrustees retained separate
counsel to represent him in his fiduciary capacity. In March,
after several beneficiaries filed a petition in county court to
remove the personal representative and appoint a successor,
Carlson sent a written modified fee agreement to the personal
representative and the cotrustee whom he was still represent-
ing. The agreement notified the personal representative and
the cotrustee that, given the likelihood of litigation, the firm’s
fee would be based on hourly billing instead of 1 percent of
the gross estate and trust assets. The personal representative
and the cotrustee still represented by the firm both signed the
written agreement. The cotrustee who had retained separate
counsel was not a party to this agreement.
In April 2023, the personal representative resigned from
his fiduciary role. The firm withdrew as counsel for the
personal representative and the cotrustee it had continued to
represent. In total, the firm charged $171,340 in hourly fees:
$90,020 for 314.3 hours worked in the estate matter, $76,320

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
320 Nebraska Reports
IN RE ESTATE OF MEYERS
Cite as 320 Neb. 871
for 245.8 hours worked in the trust matter, and a $5,000 flat
fee for managing the sale of Meyers’ home.
In January 2024, some of the beneficiaries of the trust and
devisees of the estate (Appellants) filed petitions in county
court for review of the firm’s compensation under Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 30-2482 (Reissue 2016) in both the estate case and the
trust case, alleging that the charged fees were excessive. In
addition, the successor personal representative of the estate
filed a motion in the estate case to set an evidentiary hearing
over the reasonableness of fees.
County Court
A consolidated hearing was held on Appellants’ petitions
and the successor personal representative’s motion. The hear-
ing focused on two issues: (1) whether the firm’s charged
fees were reasonable and (2) whether Carlson’s concurrent
representation of the personal representative of the estate and
cotrustees of the trust constituted a conflict of interest, such
that the firm should receive none of its charged fees.
At the hearing, the county court received evidence in the
form of expert testimony and a written report from two estate
planning attorneys, who both gave their opinion on the rea-
sonableness of the firm’s fees. Additionally, the county court
heard testimony from Carlson and one of his law partners, the
attorney for the second cotrustee who did not sign the writ-
ten fee agreement, and the attorney who helped draft Meyers’
original will and trust.
The county court found that “the attorney fees charged by
and paid to [the firm] were fair, reasonable, necessary, and
not excessive.” The county court based this finding upon
the totality of the evidence, which included the complexity
of the estate, the length of time spent by the firm, the time
and expertise necessary to handle the tax issues, the work
involved in dealing with banking and investment entities,
the time spent dealing with contentious parties, and the large
number of beneficiaries involved. Additionally, the county

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
320 Nebraska Reports
IN RE ESTATE OF MEYERS
Cite as 320 Neb. 871
court found that the firm did not have a conflict of interest.
The county court did not address whether the parties’ written
fee agreement was effective.
The Appellants timely appealed.
Court of Appeals
On appeal, Appellants assigned that the county court erred
in (1) “failing to address the unclear nature of Carlson’s fee
agreement with the fiduciaries of the estate and the trust”; (2)
“failing to consider the results obtained by Carlson in repre-
senting the personal representative and co-trustees in deter-
mining the reasonableness of the fee”; (3) “finding that the
attorney fees charged and collected by Carlson were fair,
reasonable, necessary, and not excessive”; and (4) “failing to
determine that Carlson had a conflict of interest in representing
both the personal representative of the . . . estate and the co-
trustees” of the trust.
The Court of Appeals first addressed Appellants’ assignment
that the county court erred by failing to determine Carlson
had a conflict of interest in representing both the personal
representative and the cotrustees. Appellants contended that
Carlson violated the Nebraska Rules of Professional Conduct
and that he was barred from receiving payment for any ser-
vices rendered to the trust or estate. Specifically, Appellants
argued that Carlson’s percentage-based fee agreement was
a contingency fee and that his failure to reduce it to writ-
ing for 10 months was a violation of the professional rules.
Appellants also argued that Carlson’s written modification
to the fee agreement in March 2023 was not communicated
to the fiduciaries within a reasonable time after commenc-
ing the representation. The Court of Appeals determined that
Carlson’s representation of the personal representative and the
cotrustees did not create a conflict of interest.
The Court of Appeals next considered Appellants’ assign-
ment that the county court erred in failing to address the
unclear nature of Carlson’s fee agreement with the fiduciaries

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
320 Nebraska Reports
IN RE ESTATE OF MEYERS
Cite as 320 Neb. 871
of the estate and trust. In the introduction to its opinion, the
Court of Appeals characterized this assignment of error as a
“conten[tion] that the [county] court erred in failing to address
the enforceability of the written fee agreement.” 1 The Court
of Appeals determined that the effectiveness of the written
fee agreement was governed by the Nebraska Uniform Trust
Code and the language of the trust, which required cotrustees
to act with majority consent in matters of trust administra-
tion. The Court of Appeals reasoned that because only one
of the two cotrustees signed the written fee modification, the
cotrustees did not have majority consent; therefore, the trust
was not bound to the fee agreement.
The Court of Appeals found that the parties’ initial fee
agreement was a three-party agreement between Carlson,
the personal representative for the estate, and the trust’s two
cotrustees. The Court of Appeals determined that without the
second cotrustee’s consent, there was no three-party agree-
ment for the firm’s attorney fees to be billed hourly; only
Carlson and the personal representative consented to the
modification. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals found that
the modification of the initial fee agreement was ineffective
and concluded that the county court erred by analyzing the
firm’s fees based on an hourly rate.
Finally, the Court of Appeals turned to Appellants’ assign-
ments of error related to the reasonableness of the firm’s
attorney fees. After determining that the parties’ previous fee
agreement, at 1 percent of the combined estate, was the effec-
tive fee agreement, the Court of Appeals found that 1 percent
of the combined estate was $112,902.42 and that this fee was
reasonable for the amount of work the firm performed.
The firm timely filed a petition for further review, which
we granted. 2
1 In re Estate of Meyers, Nos. A-24-625, A-24-626, 2025 WL 1872057 at *1
(Neb. App. July 8, 2025) (selected for posting to court website).
2 See, generally, Neb. Ct. R. App. P. § 2-102(F) to (H) (rev. 2022).

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
320 Nebraska Reports
IN RE ESTATE OF MEYERS
Cite as 320 Neb. 871
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
The firm assigns, restated, that the Court of Appeals erred by
(1) considering, sua sponte, whether, under the language of a
trust, a cotrustee’s consent was necessary for another cotrustee
to enter into a fee agreement with their chosen attorney and (2)
concluding such consent was necessary.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1,2] In reviewing the award of attorney fees in cases
arising under § 30-2482, the standard of review in the dis-
trict courts and appellate courts is for error appearing on the
record. 3 When reviewing a judgment for errors on the record,
the inquiry is whether the decision conforms to the law, is sup-
ported by competent evidence, and is neither arbitrary, capri-
cious, nor unreasonable. 4
ANALYSIS
We first address the issue of whether the Court of Appeals
erred by considering the effectiveness of the written fee
agreement. Because we conclude that it did, we do not
address the firm’s second assignment of error. We express no
opinion on the Court of Appeals’ analysis or resolution of that
assignment.
On further review, the firm assigns that the Court of Appeals
erred by considering, sua sponte, whether, under the lan-
guage of a trust, the consent of a cotrustee was necessary for
another cotrustee to enter into a fee agreement with the firm.
We agree. Before addressing this assignment, we note that
Appellants could have presented their assignment of error
about the unclear nature of the fee agreement more precisely.
[3-5] As stated above, the standard of review when review-
ing the award of attorney fees in cases arising under § 30-2482
is for error appearing on the record. 5 Absent plain error,
3 In re Estate of Nicholson, 241 Neb. 447, 488 N.W.2d 554 (1992).
4 In re Estate of Walker, ante p. 139, 26 N.W.3d 316 (2025).
5 In re Estate of Nicholson, supra note 3.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
320 Nebraska Reports
IN RE ESTATE OF MEYERS
Cite as 320 Neb. 871
an appellate court can consider only errors both specifically
assigned and specifically argued in the parties’ initial brief. 6
When reviewing for plain error, an appellate court is concerned
with error that is plainly evident from the record and of such
a nature that to leave it uncorrected would result in damage
to the integrity, reputation, or fairness of the judicial process. 7
Generally, an appellate court will find plain error only when a
miscarriage of justice would otherwise occur. 8
[6] Under the party presentation principle, absent plain
error, courts are neutral arbiters of matters the parties present. 9
Thus, we have explained that our requirement that appellants
specifically assign and specifically argue any alleged error
of the lower court is not to impede appellate review but to
facilitate it by preventing the parties from shifting to appellate
courts the critical tasks of searching the record for relevant
facts, identifying possible trial error, and articulating a legal
rationale that supports the assigned error. 10 This ensures that
appellees have notice of what matters must be answered,
that precedent is not established with inadequate briefing, and
that appellate courts do not inadvertently act as advocates
instead of arbiters. 11
[7] The firm argues that the issue of whether consent of
both cotrustees was necessary to bind the trust to the written
fee agreement was raised sua sponte by the Court of Appeals
and violated the party presentation principle. The firm con-
tends that the issue has been waived because Appellants never
raised this issue on appeal. This argument conflates waiver
and forfeiture. Forfeiture is the failure to make the timely
6 See White v. White, ante p. 256, 26 N.W.3d 924 (2025).
7 Kellogg v. Mathiesen, ante p. 223, 26 N.W.3d 651 (2025).
8 Id.
9 White v. White, supra note 6.
10 Id.
11 Id.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
320 Nebraska Reports
IN RE ESTATE OF MEYERS
Cite as 320 Neb. 871
assertion of a right. 12 Here, Appellants forfeited the issue of
the effectiveness of the written fee agreement by not raising it
on appeal.
When discussing Appellants’ assignment that the county
court erred in “failing to address the unclear nature of [the] fee
agreement,” the Court of Appeals’ characterized that assign-
ment as a contention that the county court erred in “failing
to address the enforceability of the written fee agreement.” 13
But that is not what Appellants argued before the Court of
Appeals. Instead, Appellants argued in their brief that, con-
trary to the Nebraska Rules of Professional Conduct, after
commencing representation, Carlson did not reduce his fee
agreements to writing or communicate to the three fiduciaries
about changes in the basis of the fee within a reasonable
time. 14 Appellants contended in their brief that these alleged
ethical violations barred Carlson from recovering attorney
fees. However, these arguments did not raise the issue of
whether the written fee agreement was effective as a matter
of contract.
To ensure parties are notified of what matters to address,
and to facilitate the appellate process, appellants must spe-
cifically assign and specifically argue any alleged error of
the lower court. 15 On appeal, Appellants did not specifically
assign or specifically argue the effectiveness of the written
fee agreement. To the extent Appellants may have raised the
issue below, the county court did not plainly err by not find-
ing that the written fee agreement was ineffective. Therefore,
we conclude that the Court of Appeals erred in considering
the effectiveness of the written fee agreement on appeal.
12 E.g., State v. Bret, 318 Neb. 995, 20 N.W.3d 364 (2025). See State v.
Hagens, ante p. 65, 26 N.W.3d 174 (2025).
13 In re Estate of Meyers, supra note 1, 2025 WL 1872057 at *1.
14 See Neb. Ct. R. of Prof. Cond. § 3-501.5(b) and (c).
15 See, § 2-102(F)(3) and (G); Neb. Ct. R. App. P. § 2-109(D)(1)(e) (rev.
2025). See, also, White v. White, supra note 6.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
320 Nebraska Reports
IN RE ESTATE OF MEYERS
Cite as 320 Neb. 871
We next address the county court’s finding that the firm’s
hourly fees were reasonable to determine whether that finding
conforms to the law, is supported by competent evidence, and
is neither arbitrary, capricious, nor unreasonable. 16
(2) Factors to be considered as guides in determining
the reasonableness of a fee include the following:
(a) The time and labor required, the novelty and
difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite
to perform the service properly;
(b) 	The 	likelihood, 	if 	apparent 	to 	the 	personal
representative, 	that 	the 	acceptance 	of 	the 	particular
employment will preclude the person employed from
other employment;
(c) The fee customarily charged in the locality for
similar services;
(d) The amount involved and the results obtained;
(e) The time limitations imposed by the personal
representative or by the circumstances;
(f) The nature and length of the relationship between
the personal representative and the person performing the
services; and
(g) The experience, reputation, and ability of the person
performing the services. 17
We find no error appearing on the record after reviewing
the county court’s finding that the firm’s attorney fees were
reasonable. At the consolidated hearing, the county court
heard expert testimony on attorney fees in trust and estate
matters. It also heard a detailed account of the work per-
formed by the firm. In its order, the county court referenced
many of the factors listed above, such as the complexity of
the estate, the time and expertise necessary to handle the tax
issues, and the large number of beneficiaries involved. We
find nothing in the record to suggest that the county court’s
16 In re Estate of Walker, supra note 4.
17 § 30-2482.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
320 Nebraska Reports
IN RE ESTATE OF MEYERS
Cite as 320 Neb. 871
finding was unsupported by competent evidence or that its
finding was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.
CONCLUSION
Appellants forfeited the issue of the written fee agreement’s
effectiveness because they did not specifically assign or spe-
cifically argue that issue on appeal. The county court did not
plainly err by not finding that the written fee agreement was
ineffective. Under the party presentation principle, the Court of
Appeals erred by considering the effectiveness of that agree-
ment. We find no error in the county court’s finding that the
firm’s fees were reasonable. Accordingly, we reverse the deci-
sion of the Court of Appeals and remand the cause to that court
with direction to affirm the order of the county court.
Reversed and remanded with direction.