State v. Rieker

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
318 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. RIEKER
Cite as 318 Neb. 238
State of Nebraska, appellee, v.
Benjamin D. Rieker, appellant.
___ N.W.3d ___
Filed January 3, 2025. 	No. S-23-818.
1. Motions to Suppress: Confessions: Constitutional Law: Appeal and
Error. In reviewing a motion to suppress based on the claimed invol-
untariness of a statement, an appellate court applies a two-part standard
of review. With regard to historical facts, an appellate court reviews the
trial court’s findings for clear error. Whether those facts suffice to meet
the constitutional standards, however, is a question of law, which an
appellate court reviews independently of the trial court’s determination.
2. Criminal Law: Courts: Appeal and Error. In an appeal of a criminal
case from the county court, the district court sits as an intermediate
court of appeals.
3. Courts: Appeal and Error. Both the district court and a higher appel-
late court generally review appeals from the county court for error
appearing on the record.
4. Judgments: Appeal and Error. When reviewing a judgment for errors
appearing on the record, an appellate court’s inquiry is whether the deci-
sion conforms to the law, is supported by competent evidence, and is
neither arbitrary, capricious, nor unreasonable.
5. Evidence: Appeal and Error. In considering a claim of insufficient evi-
dence, an appellate court will not resolve conflicts in the evidence, pass
on the credibility of witnesses, or reweigh the evidence. Such matters
are for the finder of fact.
6. Convictions: Evidence: Appeal and Error. Absent prejudicial error, a
conviction will generally be affirmed so long as the evidence admitted
at trial, viewed and construed most favorably to the State, is sufficient
to support the elements of conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.
7. Self-Defense. To justify the use of force under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-1411
(Reissue 2016), a defendant must have a reasonable and good faith
belief in the necessity of using force and the force used in defense must
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
318 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. RIEKER
Cite as 318 Neb. 238
be immediately necessary and justified under the circumstances. It is not
enough that the defendant subjectively believed in the need to use force;
the defendant must produce evidence that this subjective belief was also
objectively reasonable.
8. Criminal Law: Trial: Evidence: Proof. In the absence of a statute
placing the burden of proving an affirmative defense on the defendant
in a criminal case, the nature of an affirmative defense is such that the
defendant has the initial burden of going forward with evidence of the
defense, and once the defendant has produced sufficient evidence to
raise the defense, the issue becomes one which the State must disprove.
9. Trial: Evidence: Proof. The evidence necessary to raise an affirmative
defense may be adduced either by the defendant’s witnesses or in the
State’s case in chief without the necessity of the defendant’s present-
ing evidence.
10. ____: ____: ____. A defendant need only adduce a slight amount of
evidence to satisfy the initial burden of raising an affirmative defense.
Once an affirmative defense has been successfully raised, disproving
that affirmative defense becomes the last element the State is required to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt.
11. Criminal Law: Trial: Judges: Presumptions. A trial judge sitting
without a jury is not required to articulate findings of fact or conclusions
of law in criminal cases. Instead, it is presumed in a criminal bench trial
that the judge is familiar with and applied the proper rules of law, unless
it clearly appears otherwise.
12. Trial: Convictions: Evidence: Appeal and Error. An appellate court
will sustain a conviction in a bench trial of a criminal case if the prop-
erly admitted evidence, viewed and construed most favorably to the
State, is sufficient to support that conviction.
13. Self-Defense. Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-1411 (Reissue 2016), a
defendant is justified in using force to protect property if the defendant
(1) reasonably believed the property was in the defendant’s possession
or in the possession of another for whose protection the defendant was
acting; (2) reasonably believed that the force used against the victim
was immediately necessary to prevent or terminate an unlawful entry or
trespass on the property; (3) first asked the victim to desist from interfer-
ing with the property, unless the defendant had a reasonable belief that
asking first would be useless, dangerous, or result in substantial property
damage; and (4) did not know that using force to exclude the victim
would expose the victim to a substantial danger of bodily harm.
14. Criminal Law: False Reporting: Intent: Proof. Under Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 28-907(1)(a) (Reissue 2016), the elements the State must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt to convict a defendant of false reporting are:

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
318 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. RIEKER
Cite as 318 Neb. 238
(1) The defendant furnished material information to a peace officer or
other official, (2) the defendant did so knowing the information to be
false, and (3) the defendant did so with the intent to either (a) instigate
the investigation of an alleged criminal matter or (b) impede the investi-
gation of an actual criminal matter.
15. Criminal Law: Police Officers and Sheriffs: False Reporting. The
purpose of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-907(1)(a) (Reissue 2016) is to pre-
vent the public from willfully furnishing erroneous information to
law enforcement officers and thus interfering with the performance of
their duties.
16. Evidence: Words and Phrases. Generally, the materiality of evidence
depends upon the relationship between the proposition for which it is
being considered and the issues presented; evidence related to a matter
not in issue is immaterial.
17. Criminal Law: Evidence. For purposes of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-907(1)(a)
(Reissue 2016), information is material if it has a natural tendency to
influence, or is capable of influencing, any proper matter of inquiry in a
criminal investigation.
18. Testimony: Oaths and Affirmations: Proof. It is up to the jury to
decide whether the defendant believed in the truth of his or her testi-
mony when uttered. The knowledge of falsity may be inferred by the
trier of fact from the surrounding circumstances, and such an infer-
ence may be derived from several sources: the objective falsity itself,
a motive to lie, or facts tending to show generally that defendant knew
his or her affirmation was false. Objective falsity as proof of knowledge
arises when actual falsity is established and defendant’s awareness of it
is inescapable and self-evident. Proof of the falsity of a response may
circumstantially imply knowledge that such was untrue when uttered.
19. Criminal Law: Police Officers and Sheriffs: False Reporting: Words
and Phrases. The phrase “the investigation of an actual criminal matter”
as used in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-907(1)(a) (Reissue 2016) requires that
there be a legitimate and valid investigation of facts that could constitute
a predicate criminal offense.
20. ____: ____: ____: ____. The word “actual” in Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 28-907(1)(a) (Reissue 2016) adds an element of objectivity to ensure
that before a person is questioned concerning a criminal matter, the
police must be able to point to particular facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonable person to believe that criminal activity
was afoot.
21. Criminal Law: Evidence: False Reporting: Intent. The requisite
intent to impede an investigation under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-907(1)(a)
(Reissue 2016) can be proved through circumstantial evidence, and the

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
318 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. RIEKER
Cite as 318 Neb. 238
intent with which an act is done is inferable from the act itself and from
the facts and circumstances surrounding it. But as long as an actual
criminal matter is at issue, one need not actually impede the criminal
investigation into that matter to be guilty of false reporting.
22. Trial: Convictions: Evidence. In a criminal case, the improper admis-
sion of evidence is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt when the evi-
dence is cumulative and there is other competent evidence to support the
conviction.
23. Trial: Evidence: Proof: Appeal and Error. In a bench trial of a
criminal action, if the properly admitted evidence supports the convic-
tion, an appellate court will affirm unless the appellant shows the trial
court actually resolved a factual issue based upon improperly admitted
evidence.
Appeal from the District Court for Lancaster County, Kevin
R. McManaman, Judge, on appeal thereto from the County
Court for Lancaster County, Matthew L. Acton, Judge.
Judgment of District Court affirmed.
Carlos A. Monzón, of Monzón, Guerra & Chipman, and
Gerald L. Soucie for appellant.
Michael 	T. 	Hilgers, Attorney 	General, 	and 	Melissa 	R.
Vincent for appellee.
Miller-Lerman, 	Cassel, 	Stacy, 	Funke, 	Papik, 	and
Freudenberg, JJ.
Stacy, J.
After a bench trial in the county court, Benjamin D. Rieker
was convicted of one count of third degree assault and one
count of false reporting, both Class I misdemeanors. He was
sentenced to 18 months’ probation on each conviction, with
the sentences to be served concurrently. On direct appeal
to the district court, both convictions were affirmed. Rieker
appeals again, assigning error to an evidentiary ruling and
challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support his con-
victions. We affirm.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
318 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. RIEKER
Cite as 318 Neb. 238
I. BACKGROUND
In 2020, Rieker was an officer with the Lincoln Police
Department (LPD). He also worked off duty for a private firm
that provided security for a hospital in Lincoln, Nebraska. It
is undisputed that while working for the private security firm,
Rieker wore his LPD uniform, carried his LPD-issued gun, and
was required to follow all LPD policies.
1. Events of October 31, 2020
On October 31, 2020, at approximately 8 p.m., Rieker was
working a private security shift at the hospital when Jan Noch
arrived in the emergency department via ambulance. Noch had
an infection in his foot and went to the hospital seeking pain
medication. This was the second time that day Noch had been
transported by ambulance to the hospital.
During Noch’s earlier visit to the hospital on October 31,
2020, he became upset when he did not receive the pain medi-
cation he wanted. Hospital staff arranged for a taxi to pick up
Noch, and while he was waiting in the main lobby of the
emergency room (main lobby) for the taxi to arrive, there was
evidence that Noch was disruptive.
When Noch arrived at the hospital later that day, ambu-
lance personnel alerted hospital staff that extra security might
be needed because Noch was angry and yelling. While being
taken to a treatment room, Noch yelled and cursed at hospital
security personnel and stated that he “hate[d] cops.” When
Rieker went into Noch’s treatment room to calm him down,
Noch cursed and yelled at him. Rieker left the room to deesca-
late the situation and stood outside the room for a time before
being called to another area of the hospital for a different secu-
rity matter.
Approximately 20 minutes later, Noch decided to leave the
hospital against medical advice and after being told, again, that
he would not receive the pain medication he wanted. Hospital
staff contacted Rieker and reported that Noch had threatened
nursing staff and was heading toward the main lobby area.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
318 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. RIEKER
Cite as 318 Neb. 238
Rieker encountered Noch in a hallway located near the
main lobby. Noch was walking toward the main lobby exit in
his stocking feet; he did not have on a coat or shoes. There
were two exits nearby—one in the main lobby leading outside
to the area where Noch had gotten into the taxi earlier in the
day and another leading outside through the ambulance bay.
Two hospital security cameras captured video of the encoun-
ter between Noch and Rieker in the hallway, but neither camera
recorded audio. During a 3-day bench trial, the security video
was received into evidence. In addition, various eyewitnesses
testified about the encounter between Noch and Rieker in the
hallway. As relevant to the issues on appeal, we summarize
their testimony.
(a) Rieker’s Testimony
Rieker testified that he was familiar with Noch before the
events of October 31, 2020, and had heard from other LPD
officers that Noch could be violent and might “fight officers
for their guns.” In addition, Rieker had prior encounters with
Noch, during which Noch was “abusive” and “belligerent.”
During Rieker’s hospital shift on October 31, he was aware
that Noch had been to the emergency room earlier that day, had
threatened and argued with hospital staff, and had been disrup-
tive in the main lobby while waiting for a taxi.
Rieker admitted that Noch was leaving the hospital vol-
untarily when Rieker stopped him in the hallway. Rieker
described that he and Noch were standing approximately 1
to 2 feet apart, facing one another. The main lobby exit was
approximately 5 feet behind where Rieker was standing, and
the ambulance bay exit was generally behind where Noch was
standing. Rieker asked Noch to leave through the ambulance
bay doors, rather than the main lobby exit, because he did
not want Noch to cause a disturbance in the main lobby area.
Noch refused, stating, “Make me . . . . I’m going out [the] front
door.” Rieker instructed Noch to leave through the ambulance
bay doors approximately seven times, and Noch refused to use
that exit. Throughout the encounter, Rieker observed Noch

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
318 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. RIEKER
Cite as 318 Neb. 238
shifting his head and stance, and Rieker believed that Noch
was staring at Rieker’s Taser and gun. Rieker testified that
when Noch threatened to “punch [him] in the teeth,” Rieker
moved forward to “escort[]” Noch out “[with his] elbows . . .
bent [at] 45 degrees, and both hands . . . open palmed.” As
Rieker did so, he saw Noch bring his shoulders back slightly
and clench his fists. Rieker thought Noch was going to punch
him, so he “pushed” Noch with his left arm while keeping his
right arm “bladed” over his gun. Rieker said that after that
push, Noch “slipped” backward and fell.
Rieker testified that once Noch was handcuffed and escorted
outside, Noch “apologized” to him and “said that he shouldn’t
have been squaring up on me, shouldn’t have been staring at
my gun.”
(b) Noch’s Testimony
Noch testified that he was angry when he encountered
Rieker in the hallway, and he admitted being “pretty rude” and
cursing when Rieker instructed him to leave through the ambu-
lance bay exit. Noch said he refused those requests because
he wanted to leave through the main lobby exit instead so he
could “have them call me a cab” to get home. Noch denied
raising his hand or clenching his fists at any point during the
encounter with Rieker. But he testified that in an effort to calm
himself down, he was counting his fingers by quickly pressing
them one by one against his thumb. Noch admitted he was rude
to Rieker throughout the encounter, but he denied making any
threats to “punch” him. Noch also denied slipping and falling
during the encounter, and instead testified that Rieker “decked”
him and “knocked me off my feet and bounced my head off
the linoleum.” Noch testified he saw “stars” and felt like he
was “getting hit in the head with a baseball bat.” After the fall,
Noch was handcuffed and escorted off the premises by Rieker
and other officers. Noch testified that once they were outside
of the hospital, Rieker attempted to explain the push by “tell-
ing me things that I was doing wrong.” According to Noch,
Rieker said, “Well, you were posturing. I said, No, I wasn’t.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
318 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. RIEKER
Cite as 318 Neb. 238
Well, you were looking at my gun. No, I wasn’t. Well, you
were threatening. No, I wasn’t. He kept making stuff up every
time I said no.”
(c) Security Officer’s Testimony
Hospital security officer Austin Gehrig testified that he
followed Noch as he left the treatment room and that he was
standing about 10 feet behind Noch when Noch encountered
Rieker in the hallway. Gehrig heard Noch repeatedly say that
he just wanted to leave, and he heard Rieker repeatedly direct
Noch to leave through the ambulance bay exit. Gehrig heard
Noch insulting Rieker, but he did not hear him threaten to
punch or hit Rieker. Gehrig thought Noch was “jittery” during
the encounter, but he never saw Noch make a fist or raise his
arms in a threatening manner. After Gehrig heard Rieker tell
Noch that he was “getting real tired” of him, he saw Rieker
perform an “open palm strike” to Noch’s chest with both hands.
Gehrig thought Noch may have “stepped up on [Rieker] a little
bit” just before Rieker struck him, but Gehrig described being
“shook” by Rieker’s response because he was not expecting
the contact and it “was such a hard strike.” Gehrig testified that
Noch fell straight back after the strike by Rieker.
(d) LPD Officer’s Testimony
Another off-duty LPD officer, Robert Brenner, also wit-
nessed the hallway encounter. He was standing about 10 to 15
feet behind Noch and did not hear Noch “say anything about
punching” Rieker. Brenner saw Rieker point toward Brenner
and say, “I’m not the only one here.” Brenner turned to see
who else was present, and just as he turned back around, he
saw Rieker use a “two-hand push . . . stepping one step for-
ward and pushing [Noch] with both hands.” Brenner described
this as “launch[ing]” Noch. Brenner did not see Noch looking
at Rieker’s gun and described Noch’s hands as “balled up” but
“down at his side” during the encounter. He said Noch was in
a “slumped stance” and was otherwise “just standing there.”

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
318 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. RIEKER
Cite as 318 Neb. 238
(e) Security Supervisor’s Testimony
The supervisor of hospital security also witnessed the
encounter between Noch and Rieker. The supervisor was
standing about 12 to 14 feet away, near Gehrig and Brenner,
and did not hear everything that was said. According to the
supervisor, Rieker seemed agitated during the encounter and
Noch seemed frustrated. The supervisor thought he heard
Rieker say he was “tired” of Noch, and he heard Noch call
Rieker a “pig” and say that he did not have to do what Rieker
told him to do. The supervisor saw Noch’s hands fidgeting as
he was standing square to Rieker, and then he heard Rieker
say something and observed him push Noch in the chest with
both palms. The supervisor testified that he could not “believe
what had just happened” and that he did not see any reason
for Rieker to “go hands-on.”
(f) Hospital Security Video
Security video of the encounter between Noch and Rieker
depicted 8 frames per second, with the feed coming from two
separate cameras, and a forensic expert testified that view-
ing the two feeds together resulted in 16 frames per second.
According to the expert, human movement is not typically
missed at that speed.
The video does not depict Noch raising his hands, clench-
ing his fists, or moving toward Rieker at any point prior to
the physical contact from Rieker. Instead, the video depicts
Noch and Rieker facing one another and standing a few feet
apart, when Rieker suddenly steps forward and makes contact
with Noch by extending both hands directly into Noch’s chest,
knocking him forcefully to the ground. The video does not
show that Rieker’s right arm was “bladed” to protect his gun
at any point.
2. Subsequent Investigations
During the bench trial, the State presented evidence that
investigations 	into 	the 	October 	31, 	2020, 	incident 	were
conducted 	by 	the 	hospital 	and 	by 	law 	enforcement. 	In

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
318 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. RIEKER
Cite as 318 Neb. 238
connection with those investigations, Rieker prepared written
reports describing the incident and was interviewed by law
enforcement.
(a) Written Reports
During Rieker’s next LPD shift, he told his supervisor about
the off-duty incident with Noch. The supervisor told Rieker
that because the incident involved the use of force, LPD
policy required him to complete two standard LPD forms: a
“Use of Control” form (also referred to as “Use of Force”
form) and an “Additional Case Information” form (ACI form).
The use of control form is completed by an LPD sergeant who
sits with the involved officer and asks questions about the use
of force. The ACI form is a narrative report completed by the
involved officer that details the use of force.
Rieker started filling out the ACI form on November 1,
2020, and completed it on November 5. In it, Rieker furnished
the following information about the events of October 31:
I asked [Noch] if he was leaving. [He] said he was going
to walk out the “front fucking door.” Due to having dealt
with [Noch] previously . . . I did not want [him] to walk
through the main ER Lobby and continue to create a dis-
turbance or threaten anyone else. I informed [Noch] he
needed to leave out the ambulance bay doors which were
directly behind him.
[Noch] squared his shoulders back and began clenching
his fists while swearing and making statements similar to
“make me motherfucker” and “I’ll fucking hit you. I’m
going to walk out the front door.”
[Noch] made the comment “I’ll fight you” as I again
told [him] he needed to turn around and leave out the
ambulance bay doors. [Noch] began opening and clench-
ing his fists and I observed his breathing to increase as he
began staring at my gun. . . .
I began to walk towards [Noch] and was going to
escort him out through the ambulance bay doors when
he clenched his fists again and started to bring his right

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STATE v. RIEKER
Cite as 318 Neb. 238
hand upwards in a rapid manner. I perceived [Noch] to
be bringing his fist upwards to punch me based off of
[Noch’s] posture, breathing, and his prior statements. I
stepped forward towards [Noch] and used my left arm
to “stiff arm” [Noch] away from me with an open palm,
while keeping my right arm extended and bladed to keep
[Noch] from accessing my gun he was fixated on.
[Noch] was pushed back and took several steps back
from my “stiff arm” and slipped on the tile, as he was
only wearing socks. [Noch] fell to the ground and he first
impacted the ground with his buttocks and braced his fall
with both hands. [Noch] hit the back of his head as he
continued to fall backwards.
The ACI form also stated that once Noch had been cuffed
and escorted outside, “[Noch] apologized multiple times to
me” and said that “he did not mean to threaten nurses or any-
one else at the hospital.”
The use of control form contained a similar description of
the incident.
(b) Law Enforcement Interview
On November 2, 2020, the hospital’s security consultant
reviewed internal reports of the incident involving Noch and
Rieker and reviewed the hospital’s security video. After doing
so, the consultant started an internal investigation into whether
Rieker’s use of force was appropriate under the hospital’s use
of force policy.
On November 10, 2020, the private security firm contacted
the LPD’s chief of police and reported concerns about Rieker’s
use of force. The chief of police initially referred the matter to
LPD’s internal affairs division, but after viewing the security
video, the chief of police paused the internal affairs investiga-
tion and asked the Lancaster County Sheriff’s Department to
conduct a criminal investigation. On November 18, Deputy
Sheriff Jeremy Schwarz was tasked with overseeing the crimi-
nal investigation.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
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STATE v. RIEKER
Cite as 318 Neb. 238
Schwarz interviewed Rieker on December 4, 2020. At the
beginning of the interview, Schwarz explained that he was
investigating Rieker’s use of force against Noch. During the
interview, Schwarz often referred to statements contained in
the ACI form that Rieker completed and, in responding to
Schwarz’ questions, Rieker generally described events the
same way he had when completing the ACI form. In addition,
Rieker explained that it was his plan on October 31 to escort
Noch out the ambulance bay doors by “herding” him using
open hands. But when he saw Noch bring his right fist up,
Rieker responded by stepping forward and using a “stiff arm”
to push Noch back. Rieker described the contact as a “shove”
backward and “not an open palm strike to the sternum.” Rieker
said his intent in shoving Noch was to “create space” so Noch
could not punch him. After commenting that he assumed
Schwarz had “seen the video,” Rieker said that although he
“used two hands” to push Noch, “the power was from the left
arm, the other arm was sort of just out.” Rieker also com-
mented that although he had been “second-guessing” himself,
it was his perception that Noch raised his arm up “maybe 1 to
4 inches” and that movement, combined with Noch’s threats,
made Rieker think that Noch was going to punch him. Schwarz
asked Rieker if there was anything in his ACI form that was
“misleading” or “not truthful,” and he replied, “No.”
3. Criminal Charges and
Motion to Suppress
On February 3, 2021, the State filed a complaint in the
county court for Lancaster County charging Rieker with two
misdemeanors: assault in the third degree 1 and false report-
ing. 2 The complaint alleged the assault occurred on or about
October 31, 2020, and the false reporting occurred between
October 31 and December 4. Rieker entered pleas of not guilty.
1 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-310(1) (Reissue 2016).
2 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-907(1) (Reissue 2016).

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STATE v. RIEKER
Cite as 318 Neb. 238
Thereafter, Rieker moved to suppress the ACI form he
completed on November 5, 2020, and the statements he made
to Schwarz in his December 4 interview. The legal basis of
the suppression motion was a claim that Rieker’s statements
were involuntary under Garrity v. New Jersey. 3 In that case,
the U.S. Supreme Court held that an employee cannot be
coerced into waiving the right to self-incrimination by the
threat of termination. 4 We addressed the Garrity rule in State
v. Weichman 5 and adopted a two-part test that has both a sub-
jective and objective component:
[T]he defendant [must] have a subjective belief that he
or she was compelled to give a statement on threat of
the loss of his or her job and . . . the defendant’s belief
[must] be objectively reasonable. A subjective belief that
Garrity applies will not be considered objectively rea-
sonable if the state has played no role in creating the
impression that the refusal to give the statement will be
met with termination of employment. The existence of a
statute, rule, regulation, or policy subjecting an employee
to termination for the failure to provide a statement is
highly relevant, though not usually dispositive, in deter-
mining whether a subjective belief is objectively reason-
able. Under this test, a court examines the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the statement.
The county court initially suppressed the ACI form under
Garrity and Weichman. 6 But the State filed an interlocu-
tory appeal of that suppression ruling, 7 and the district court
3 Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 87 S. Ct. 616, 17 L. Ed. 2d 562
(1967).
4 See, id.; Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 88 S. Ct. 1913, 20 L. Ed. 2d
1082 (1968). See, also, Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 97 S. Ct.
2132, 53 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1977); Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 94 S. Ct.
316, 38 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1973).
5 State v. Weichman, 292 Neb. 227, 234, 871 N.W.2d 768, 774-75 (2015).
6 See, Garrity, supra note 3; Weichman, supra note 5.
7 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-824(3) (Reissue 2016).

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STATE v. RIEKER
Cite as 318 Neb. 238
reversed the ruling. In doing so, the district court concluded
Rieker had not met his burden of proof under Weichman, and
it cited various cases from other jurisdictions holding that
Garrity did not apply under similar circumstances. 8
4. Bench Trial and Affirmative Defenses
The matter proceeded to a bench trial, and the evidence
described above was adduced. When the ACI form and the
interview with Schwarz were offered by the State, Rieker
renewed his objections under Garrity; the county court over-
ruled the objections and received the exhibits.
At trial, Rieker did not deny causing bodily injury to Noch
on October 31, 2020, but he raised the affirmative defense
that his use of force was justified because he was acting
either in self-defense, 9 in defense of others, 10 or in defense of
property. 11
After the State rested its case in chief, Rieker moved for a
judgment of acquittal on both counts. In support of acquittal
on the assault charge, Rieker argued the State had not met its
burden of disproving that his use of force was justified. And
in support of acquittal on the false reporting charge, Rieker
argued that because he furnished the ACI form to LPD before
the criminal investigation was opened, any false information
in the ACI form could not have impeded the investigation
8 See, U.S. v. Smith, 821 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2016); U.S. v. Cook, 526 F.
Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2007); Watson v. County of Riverside, 976 F. Supp.
951 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
9 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-1409 (Reissue 2016) (use of force is justifiable
when actor believes it is immediately necessary to protect actor from use
of unlawful force by other).
10 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-1410 (Reissue 2016) (use of force is justifiable
to protect third person when actor would be justified in using such force
to protect actor against injury he or she believes to be threatened to third
person).
11 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-1411 (Reissue 2016) (use of force is justifiable
if actor believes it is “immediately necessary . . . [t]o prevent or terminate
an unlawful entry or other trespass upon land”).

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of an actual criminal matter. The county court overruled the
motion for judgment of acquittal, and the defense put on evi-
dence. At the close of all the evidence, the court heard argu-
ments and took the matter under advisement.
On November 8, 2022, the county court entered an order
finding Rieker guilty of third degree assault and false report-
ing. The order did not include any express factual findings or
credibility determinations. The court requested the preparation
of a presentence investigation report and set the matter for
sentencing.
5. Motion for New Trial
and Sentencing
Rieker filed a timely motion for new trial, generally assert-
ing that neither conviction was supported by the evidence.
The county court overruled the motion and proceeded with
sentencing.
Rieker was sentenced to concurrent terms of 18 months’
probation for each conviction. He timely appealed to the dis-
trict court.
6. District Court Affirms
As relevant to the instant appeal, Rieker assigned and argued
in the district court that (1) the evidence was insufficient to
support his convictions and (2) his motion to suppress the
ACI form should have been granted. The district court found
no merit to either assignment and affirmed his convictions
and sentences.
Rieker filed this timely appeal, and we granted his petition
to bypass the Nebraska Court of Appeals.
II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Rieker assigns, restated and consolidated, that the district
court erred in (1) affirming the denial of his motion to suppress
the ACI form and (2) finding there was sufficient evidence to
support his convictions.

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III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1] In reviewing a motion to suppress based on the claimed
involuntariness of a statement, an appellate court applies a
two-part standard of review. 12 With regard to historical facts,
we review the trial court’s findings for clear error. 13 Whether
those facts suffice to meet the constitutional standards, how-
ever, is a question of law, which we review independently of
the trial court’s determination. 14
[2-4] In an appeal of a criminal case from the county court,
the district court sits as an intermediate court of appeals. 15
Both the district court and a higher appellate court generally
review appeals from the county court for error appearing on the
record. 16 When reviewing a judgment for errors appearing on
the record, an appellate court’s inquiry is whether the decision
conforms to the law, is supported by competent evidence, and
is neither arbitrary, capricious, nor unreasonable. 17
[5,6] In considering a claim of insufficient evidence, an
appellate court will not resolve conflicts in the evidence, pass
on the credibility of witnesses, or reweigh the evidence. 18 Such
matters are for the finder of fact. 19 Absent prejudicial error, a
conviction will generally be affirmed so long as the evidence
admitted at trial, viewed and construed most favorably to
the State, is sufficient to support the elements of conviction
beyond a reasonable doubt. 20
12 See Weichman, supra note 5.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 State v. Grant, 310 Neb. 700, 968 N.W.2d 837 (2022).
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id.

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IV. ANALYSIS
We address Rieker’s second assignment of error first because
we find it is dispositive. In his second assignment, Rieker
argues that neither conviction was supported by sufficient
evidence. We address each conviction in turn, and ultimately
conclude this assignment of error has no merit.
1. Third Degree Assault
Third degree assault occurs when a person “[i]ntention-
ally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another
person.” 21 At trial, Rieker did not dispute that he intention-
ally caused bodily injury to Noch, but he argued that his
actions were justified by either self-defense, defense of oth-
ers, or defense of property. On appeal to this court, he no
longer asserts that his actions were justified by self-defense or
defense of others. Instead, he relies exclusively on the affirma-
tive defense of defense of property under § 28-1411, and he
argues the evidence was insufficient to disprove that affirma-
tive defense. We limit our analysis accordingly.
Section 28-1411 provides, in relevant part:
(1) . . . [T]he use of force upon or toward the person
of another is justifiable when the actor believes that such
force is immediately necessary:
(a) To prevent or terminate an unlawful entry or other
trespass upon land . . . ; Provided, that such land . . . is,
or is believed by the actor to be, in his possession or in
the possession of another person for whose protection
he acts[;]
. . . .
(3) The use of force is justifiable under this section
only if the actor first requests the person against whom
such force is used to desist from his interference with the
property, unless the actor believes that:
(a) Such request would be useless;
21 § 28-310(1)(a).

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(b) It would be dangerous to himself or another person
to make the request; or
(c) Substantial harm will be done to the physical con-
dition of the property which is sought to be protected
before the request can effectively be made.
(4) The use of force to prevent or terminate a trespass
is not justifiable under this section if the actor knows that
the exclusion of the trespasser will expose him to substan-
tial danger of serious bodily harm.
[7] In construing similar language in another criminal statute
justifying the use of force, we have consistently held that a
defendant “must have a reasonable and good faith belief in the
necessity of using force and the force used in defense must be
immediately necessary and justified under the circumstances.” 22
It is not enough that the defendant subjectively believed in the
need to use force; the defendant must produce evidence that
this subjective belief was also objectively reasonable. 23 We
hold it is appropriate to apply these same principles to justifi-
cation claims under § 28-1411.
[8-10] On appeal, Rieker argues the evidence was insuf-
ficient to support his conviction for third degree assault
because the State failed to disprove his affirmative defense of
defense of property. Nebraska has adopted the rule that in the
absence of a statute placing the burden of proving an affirma-
tive defense on the defendant in a criminal case, the nature
of an affirmative defense is such that the defendant has the
initial burden of going forward with evidence of the defense,
and once the defendant has produced sufficient evidence to
raise the defense, the issue becomes one which the State
22 State v. Johnson, 314 Neb. 20, 42-43, 988 N.W.2d 159, 176 (2023)
(construing § 28-1409). Accord State v. Allen, 314 Neb. 663, 681, 992
N.W.2d 712, 727 (2023) (“[w]e have repeatedly stated that to successfully
assert the claim of self-defense [under § 28-1409], one must have a
reasonable and good faith belief in the necessity of using force”), modified
on denial of rehearing 315 Neb. 255, 995 N.W.2d 446.
23 See Johnson, supra note 22.

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must disprove. 24 The evidence necessary to raise an affirma-
tive defense may be adduced either by the defendant’s wit-
nesses or in the State’s case in chief without the necessity of
the defendant’s presenting evidence. 25 A defendant need only
adduce a slight amount of evidence to satisfy the initial bur-
den of raising an affirmative defense. 26 Once an affirmative
defense has been successfully raised, disproving that affirma-
tive defense becomes the last element the State is required to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt. 27
The State does not dispute that Rieker satisfied his initial
burden to raise the affirmative defense of defense of property,
and we therefore do not address that issue. Instead, we focus
on whether the evidence at trial was sufficient to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that Rieker’s use of force was not justified
under § 28-1411.
[11,12] To the extent Rieker’s briefing on appeal can be
read to suggest that the county court should have made an
express finding on this justification defense, we disagree.
The county court’s rejection of the justification defense was
implicit in its conclusion that Rieker was guilty of third
degree assault, and although the county court did not make
express factual findings as to any of the essential elements,
it did not need to do so. A trial judge sitting without a jury
is not required to articulate findings of fact or conclusions of
law in criminal cases. 28 Instead, it is presumed in a criminal
bench trial that the judge is familiar with and applied the
24 See State v. Grutell, 305 Neb. 843, 943 N.W.2d 258 (2020).
25 See id.
26 Id.
27 See State v. Warren, 9 Neb. App. 60, 608 N.W.2d 617 (2000) (holding
when affirmative defense has been raised, disproof of such must be listed
as final element in jury instruction listing elements state must prove
beyond reasonable doubt). Accord NJI2d Crim. 7.5, comment (“[w]hen
defense of property is at issue, the last element of the elements instruction
will be ‘that the defendant did not act in defense of his property’”).
28 State v. Vanderford, 312 Neb. 580, 980 N.W.2d 397 (2022).

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proper rules of law, unless it clearly appears otherwise. 29 And
an appellate court will sustain a conviction in a bench trial of
a criminal case if the properly admitted evidence, viewed and
construed most favorably to the State, is sufficient to support
that conviction. 30
[13] Under § 28-1411, Rieker would have been justified in
using force to protect property if he (1) reasonably believed
the property was in his possession or in the possession of
another for whose protection he was acting; (2) reasonably
believed that the force used against Noch was immediately
necessary to prevent or terminate an unlawful entry or trespass
on the property; (3) first asked Noch to desist from interfering
with the property, unless Rieker had a reasonable belief that
asking first would be useless, dangerous, or result in substan-
tial property damage; and (4) did not know that using force to
exclude Noch would expose Noch to a substantial danger of
bodily harm. 31 All four elements must be established for the
defense to apply. 32 As such, the State could meet its burden of
disproving this affirmative defense by disproving one or more
of the material elements.
Without expressing an opinion on whether the other three
elements of defense of property were established or disproved
on this record, we focus on the second element: whether
Rieker reasonably believed the force used was immediately
necessary 	to 	prevent 	a 	trespass. 	Regarding 	this 	element,
Rieker’s appellate brief seems to suggest that because Noch
was refusing Rieker’s requests to leave the hospital through
the ambulance bay exit, Noch was a trespasser, and Rieker
29 See State v. Cowan, 204 Neb. 708, 285 N.W.2d 113 (1979).
30 State v. Dap, 315 Neb. 466, 997 N.W.2d 363 (2023).
31 See NJI2d Crim. 7.5. See, also, State v. Cole, 231 Neb. 420, 436 N.W.2d
209 (1989) (holding trial court properly refused defense of property
instruction where evidence showed that force was not immediately
necessary and no request was made to desist before force was used).
32 See id.

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was therefore justified in using any nonlethal force against
him. But under § 28-1411(1)(a), a defendant must reasonably
believe that the force used against the victim was “immedi-
ately necessary” to “prevent or terminate an unlawful entry or
other trespass upon land.”
The evidence adduced at trial, viewed in the light most
favorable to the State, supports a finding that Rieker could not
have reasonably believed that the force he used was immedi-
ately necessary to prevent or terminate a trespass. We express
no opinion on whether Noch could be considered a trespasser
on these facts, but instead observe that Rieker did not testify
that he believed Noch to be trespassing at any point during
the encounter. To the contrary, Rieker admitted that when he
encountered Noch in the hallway, Noch was “leaving volun-
tarily” and “wasn’t being removed from the property.” The
security video and eyewitness testimony support a finding that
Noch was in the process of leaving the hospital through the
main lobby exit when Rieker stopped him and directed him
to use a different exit. As such, although it is undisputed that
Noch refused to leave through the specific exit that Rieker
directed him to use, Noch was not refusing to leave the hos-
pital altogether and instead was demanding to leave through
a different, nearby exit. A rational fact finder could conclude
from this evidence that Rieker could not have reasonably
believed it was immediately necessary to use force against
Noch to either prevent or terminate a trespass.
On this record, there is no merit to Rieker’s argument that
the evidence was insufficient to find that the State met its bur-
den to disprove the affirmative defense of defense of property.
His arguments to the contrary are without merit.
2. False Reporting
Rieker also argues on appeal that the evidence was insuf-
ficient to support his conviction for making a false report. To
analyze his arguments, we first review the essential elements of
the crime of false reporting under § 28-907(1)(a).

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In the 1985 case State v. Ewing, 33 we stated that a conviction
for false reporting under § 28-907(1)(a) (Cum. Supp. 1984)
has three elements: (1) the defendant must have made a false
statement to a peace officer, (2) the false statement must have
been made with the intent to impede an investigation, and (3)
the investigation must be of an actual criminal matter. Since
Ewing, some appellate opinions have repeated these three
elements, 34 while others have recited the specific statutory lan-
guage of § 28-907. 35
We take this opportunity to clarify any inconsistency in
our case law as to the essential elements of § 28-907(1)(a).
In doing so, we note that the statute has been amended since
our decision in Ewing, 36 and it currently provides that a
person commits the offense of false reporting if he or she
“[f]urnishes material information he or she knows to be
false to any peace officer or other official with the intent to
instigate an investigation of an alleged criminal matter or to
impede the investigation of an actual criminal matter.” 37 The
1994 amendment added the requirement that the information
furnished must be “material,” and the elements described in
Ewing did not account for that language.
[14] We 	now 	clarify, 	based 	on 	the 	plain 	language 	of
§ 28-907(1)(a), that the elements the State must prove beyond
a reasonable doubt to convict a defendant of false reporting
33 State v. Ewing, 221 Neb. 462, 378 N.W.2d 158 (1985).
34 See, State v. Hird, 239 Neb. 331, 476 N.W.2d 229 (1991); State v.
Gonzales, 224 Neb. 659, 399 N.W.2d 832 (1987).
35 See, State v. Covey, 290 Neb. 257, 859 N.W.2d 558 (2015); In re Interest
of McManaman, 222 Neb. 263, 383 N.W.2d 45 (1986), disapproved on
other grounds, In re Interest of K.M., 299 Neb. 636, 910 N.W.2d 82
(2018); State v. Halligan, 20 Neb. App. 87, 818 N.W.2d 650 (2012); In re
Interest of Genevieve C., 13 Neb. App. 665, 698 N.W.2d 462 (2005).
36 See 1994 Neb. Laws, L.B. 907. See, also, § 28-907(1)(a) (Cum. Supp.
1994).
37 § 28-907(1)(a) (Reissue 2016).

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are: (1) The defendant furnished material information to a
peace officer or other official, (2) the defendant did so knowing
the information to be false, and (3) the defendant did so with
the intent to either (a) instigate the investigation of an alleged
criminal matter or (b) impede the investigation of an actual
criminal matter. 38
[15] Our cases have repeatedly emphasized that “the pur-
pose of § 28-907(1)(a) is to prevent the public from willfully
furnishing erroneous information to law enforcement officers
and thus interfering with the performance of their duties.” 39
With this purpose and the material elements of the crime in
mind, we examine the evidence in the light most favorable
to the State to determine whether it was sufficient to support
Rieker’s conviction for false reporting. But first, we identify
the information that the State claimed was false.
At trial, the State generally relied on two exhibits as the
source of the false information: the ACI form that Rieker
completed in early November 2020 and statements that Rieker
made to Schwarz during the December 4, 2020, interview.
In both the ACI form and the subsequent interview with
Schwarz, Rieker generally characterized Noch as the ini-
tial aggressor, characterized his use of force against Noch
as merely a “‘stiff arm,’” and indicated Noch fell because
he slipped on the tile. More specifically, Rieker stated that
during the encounter, Noch stated, “‘I’ll fucking hit you’”
and “‘I’ll fight you’” and that Noch “clenched his fists” and
“started to bring his right hand upwards in a rapid manner,”
leading Rieker to believe Noch was going to punch him. In
response, Rieker stated he “used my left arm to ‘stiff arm’
[Noch] away from me with an open palm, while keeping my
38 See Halligan, supra note 35.
39 Nebraska Legislature on behalf of State v. Hergert, 271 Neb. 976, 1007,
720 N.W.2d 372, 397 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). See, In re
Interest of McManaman, supra note 35; Ewing, supra note 33.

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right arm extended and bladed to keep [Noch] from accessing
my gun.” And Rieker stated the “‘stiff arm’” caused Noch to
take “several steps back” and then “slip[] on the tile, as he
was only wearing socks.”
In affirming Rieker’s conviction for false reporting, we
understand the district court to have focused on the information
described above, and the parties do not dispute that this is the
information we should consider when analyzing the sufficiency
of the evidence to support the false reporting conviction.
The State generally argues that the video evidence and
the testimony of eyewitnesses proved that Rieker knew this
information was false, that the information was material to the
use of force investigation, and that Rieker furnished the false
information to law enforcement with the intent to impede the
investigation of an actual criminal matter. On appeal to this
court, no one contests that the information in both the ACI
form and the Schwarz interview was furnished to a peace
officer, so, in the sections that follow, we address whether the
evidence was sufficient to prove that (1) the information was
material, (2) Rieker knew the information to be false, and (3)
Rieker’s intent was to impede the investigation of an actual
criminal matter.
(a) Material Information
[16,17] We have not directly addressed the proper inter-
pretation of the term “material” as used in § 28-907(1)(a).
Generally, the “materiality” of evidence depends upon the
relationship between the proposition for which it is being con-
sidered and the issues presented; evidence related to a matter
not in issue is immaterial. 40 When interpreting a similar stat-
ute, the U.S. Supreme Court has defined a “material” fact as
one that has a “‘natural tendency to influence, or [be] capable
of influencing, the decision of the decisionmaking body to
40 See, e.g., State v. Bell, 242 Neb. 138, 493 N.W.2d 339 (1992) (discussing
concepts of materiality and probative value in relation to relevant
evidence).

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which it was addressed.’” 41 Similarly, the Eighth Circuit, in
the context of perjury charges, has held that a statement is
considered material if it is “‘material to any proper matter
of inquiry’” and “‘“tend[s] to impede or hamper the course
of the investigation.”’” 42 For many years, Nebraska appellate
courts have applied similar definitions and principles when
the question presented was the materiality of a statement. 43
We now hold that for purposes of § 28-907(1)(a), informa-
tion is material if it has a natural tendency to influence, or
is capable of influencing, any proper matter of inquiry in a
criminal investigation.
Based on these principles, a reasonable finder of fact could
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the information fur-
nished by Rieker in the ACI form and the Schwarz interview
was material. This is so because both at the time the ACI form
was completed and at the time of the interview, the underlying
issue was whether Rieker’s use of force was justified and/or
excessive, and the information furnished by Rieker directly
related to how much force he used and why. As such, there is
sufficient evidence in the record to support a finding that the
allegedly false information furnished in both the ACI form and
the Schwarz interview was material.
41 United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509, 115 S. Ct. 2310, 132 L. Ed.
2d 444 (1995) (interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2018) that criminalizes
knowingly and willfully falsifying, concealing, or covering up “a material
fact” in any matter within jurisdiction of department or agency of United
States).
42 U.S. v. Blanton, 281 F.3d 771, 775 (8th Cir. 2002) (interpreting 18 U.S.C.
§ 1623(a) (2018) that criminalizes making of “false material declaration”
under oath).
43 See, State v. Childs, 309 Neb. 427, 960 N.W.2d 585 (2021) (finding
declarant’s statements that she and husband did not dig trench in ditch
were material when made at trial where husband charged with injury
to public road); Shevalier v. State, 85 Neb. 366, 123 N.W. 424 (1909)
(finding false statements about contents of estate not material when
only issue before court was setting of time and place for proving will of
deceased).

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(b) Information Known to Be False
To prove the crime of false reporting under § 28-907(1)(a),
the State must prove that the information was “know[n by the
defendant] to be false.” 44 On appeal to this court, we do not
understand Rieker to dispute that this element was established
beyond a reasonable doubt, but to the extent he does, we find
that the evidence was sufficient.
[18] 	Our 	prior 	false 	reporting 	cases 	have 	not 	directly
addressed how this element may be proved, but we find guid-
ance in our case law analyzing similar statutes. Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 28-915.01 (Cum. Supp. 2024) prohibits making a “false
statement under oath” when the declarant “does not believe the
statement to be true.” In State v. McCaslin, 45 we explained:
It is up to the jury to decide whether the defendant
believed in the truth of his or her testimony when uttered.
The knowledge of falsity may be inferred by the trier
of fact from the surrounding circumstances, and such
an inference may be derived from several sources: the
objective falsity itself, a motive to lie, or facts tending to
show generally that defendant knew his or her affirma-
tion was false. Objective falsity as proof of knowledge
arises when actual falsity is established and defendant’s
awareness of it is inescapable and self-evident. . . . Proof
of the falsity of a response may circumstantially imply
knowledge that such was untrue when uttered.
Applying similar reasoning here, we conclude that a reason-
able trier of fact could infer from the objective video evidence,
and from eyewitness testimony about the circumstances sur-
rounding the use of force, that Rieker knew he was providing
false information about why he used force against Noch and
the nature of the force he used. This includes evidence that
immediately after the assault, Rieker attempted, unsuccess-
fully, to persuade Noch to agree with Rieker’s characterization
44 § 28-907(1)(a).
45 State v. McCaslin, 240 Neb. 482, 489-90, 482 N.W.2d 558, 564 (1992).

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of events. Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, this
evidence was sufficient to show that Rieker knew the informa-
tion he was providing law enforcement was false.
(c) Intent to Impede Investigation
of Actual Criminal Matter
[19,20] We have held that the phrase “the investigation of an
actual criminal matter” as used in § 28-907(1)(a) requires that
there be a legitimate and valid investigation of facts that could
constitute a predicate criminal offense. 46 The word “actual,”
we have explained, adds “an element of objectivity to ensure
that before a person is questioned concerning a criminal mat-
ter, the police must be able to point to particular facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonable person to believe
that criminal activity was afoot.” 47 But we have also explained
that for § 28-907(1)(a) to apply, there need not be “an actual
crime committed.” 48
[21] The requisite intent to impede an investigation under
§ 28-907(1)(a) can be proved through circumstantial evidence,
and the intent with which an act is done is inferable from the
act itself and from the facts and circumstances surrounding it. 49
But so long as an actual criminal matter is at issue, one need
not actually impede the criminal investigation into that matter
to be guilty of false reporting. 50
In arguing the State failed to prove that he acted with
the intent to impede an investigation into an actual criminal
matter, Rieker does not dispute there was a criminal assault
investigation underway by the time he was interviewed by
Schwarz on December 4, 2020. But he contends that when he
completed the ACI form in November, there was no criminal
46 Ewing, supra note 33.
47 Id. at 468, 378 N.W.2d at 162-63.
48 Id. at 468, 378 N.W.2d at 162.
49 See Ewing, supra note 33.
50 See Gonzales, supra note 34.

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investigation, and that the ACI form was “an internal law
enforcement document used to formally memorialize informa-
tion that may, or may not, relate to criminal activity.” 51 He thus
argues that any false information furnished in the ACI form
cannot be relied upon to satisfy the element that he intended to
impede the investigation of an actual criminal matter.
Rieker made a similar argument on appeal before the dis-
trict court, and the district court concluded it was unnecessary
to decide whether statements in the ACI form were intended
to impede the investigation of an actual criminal matter. That
was so, the district court reasoned, because Rieker furnished
nearly identical information to Schwarz during the criminal
investigation and such information was sufficient, on its own,
to satisfy this element. We agree, and likewise find it unneces-
sary, in this case, to address whether false statements furnished
in the ACI form can support a conviction for false reporting
under § 28-907(1)(a). Moreover, we agree with the district
court that, even if we consider only the false information fur-
nished in the December 4, 2020, interview with Schwarz, the
record still contains ample evidence that Rieker’s intent was to
impede the investigation of an actual criminal matter.
In that regard, it is undisputed that when Rieker repeated
his false statements to Schwarz, there was an ongoing criminal
assault investigation focused on Rieker’s use of force against
Noch. And we find sufficient evidence in the record to support
a finding that Rieker, motivated by a desire to avoid criminal
charges, furnished false information to Schwarz during that
interview with the intent to impede the criminal investigation
by mischaracterizing Noch as the aggressor and mischaracter-
izing Rieker’s use of force as both minimal and justified.
(d) Summary
Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the record
in this case is sufficient to establish that during his interview
with Schwarz, Rieker furnished material information to a
51 Brief for appellant at 35.

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peace officer or other official, that he did so knowing the
information to be false, and that he did so with the intent
to impede the investigation of an actual criminal matter. We
therefore affirm Rieker’s conviction for false reporting.
3. Motion to Suppress
Rieker also assigns and argues that the district court erred
on interlocutory appeal when it reversed the county court’s
initial order suppressing the ACI form, and he further argues
the district court erred on direct appeal when it found no error
in the trial court’s admission of the ACI form at trial. We con-
clude it is not necessary to analyze this assignment of error, 52
because even assuming without deciding that the ACI form
was inadmissible, such error was harmless on this record.
[22,23] It is well-settled that in a criminal case, the improper
admission of evidence is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt
when the evidence is cumulative and there is other competent
evidence to support the conviction. 53 Here, the false informa-
tion Rieker provided in the ACI form was nearly identical
to the false information Rieker furnished to Schwarz during
the interview on December 4, 2020. Rieker makes no argu-
ment on appeal that evidence of the Schwarz interview was
improperly admitted. And in a bench trial of a criminal action,
if the properly admitted evidence supports the conviction, an
appellate court will affirm unless the appellant shows the trial
court actually resolved a factual issue based upon improperly
admitted evidence. 54 No such showing can be made here, and
52 See, e.g., Ronnfeldt Farms v. Arp, 317 Neb. 690, 11 N.W.3d 371 (2024)
(appellate court not obligated to engage in analysis not necessary to
adjudicate case before it).
53 See State v. Matteson, 313 Neb. 435, 985 N.W.2d 1 (2023). Accord
State v. Grant, 293 Neb. 163, 876 N.W.2d 639 (2016) (where evidence
is cumulative and conviction is supported by other competent evidence,
improper admission or exclusion of evidence is harmless beyond reasonable
doubt).
54 See State v. Lara, 258 Neb. 996, 607 N.W.2d 487 (2000).

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
318 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. RIEKER
Cite as 318 Neb. 238
there is thus no need to resolve Rieker’s assignment challeng-
ing the ruling on his motion to suppress the ACI form. 55
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Rieker’s convictions
and sentences.
Affirmed.
Heavican, C.J., not participating.
55 See Ronnfeldt Farms, supra note 52.