In re Estate of McCormick

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
317 Nebraska Reports
IN RE ESTATE OF McCORMICK
Cite as 317 Neb. 960
In re Estate of Brent L. McCormick, deceased.
Tracy McCormick, Temporary Personal Representative
of the Estate of Brent L. McCormick, appellant,
v. Beth Roberts, appellee.
___ N.W.3d ___
Filed October 31, 2024. 	No. S-23-726.
1. Decedents’ Estates: Appeal and Error. Appeals of matters arising
under the Nebraska Probate Code are reviewed for error on the record.
2. Judgments: Statutes: Appeal and Error. When an appeal calls for
statutory interpretation or presents questions of law, an appellate court
must reach an independent, correct conclusion irrespective of the deter-
mination made by the court below.
3. Statutes: Legislature: Intent. The fundamental objective of statutory
interpretation is to ascertain and carry out the Legislature’s intent.
4. Statutes. Statutory interpretation begins with the text, and the text is to
be given its plain and ordinary meaning.
5. ____. It is not within the province of a court to read a meaning into
a statute that is not warranted by the language; neither is it within the
province of a court to read anything plain, direct, or unambiguous out of
a statute.
6. Statutes: Legislature: Intent. In construing a statute, the legislative
intention is to be determined from a general consideration of the whole
act with reference to the subject matter to which it applies and the
particular topic under which the language in question is found, and the
intent as deduced from the whole will prevail over that of a particular
part considered separately.
7. Statutes. Statutes pertaining to the same subject matter should be con-
strued together; such statutes, being in pari materia, must be construed
as if they were one law, and effect must be given to every provision.
8. ____. To give effect to all parts of a statute, a court will attempt to rec-
oncile different provisions so they are consistent, harmonious, and sen-
sible and will avoid rejecting as superfluous or meaningless any word,
clause, or sentence.
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
10/14/2026 08:23 AM CDT

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
317 Nebraska Reports
IN RE ESTATE OF McCORMICK
Cite as 317 Neb. 960
9. Legislature: Intent. The intent of the Legislature is expressed by omis-
sion as well as by inclusion.
Appeal from the County Court for Washington County,
Francis W. Barron III, Judge. Affirmed.
Kathleen S. Pallesen, of Spethman Pallesen Law Offices,
L.L.C., for appellant.
Michael J. Tasset, of Johnson & Mock, P.C., L.L.O., for
appellee.
Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke,
Papik, and Freudenberg, JJ.
Miller-Lerman, J.
NATURE OF CASE
Tracy McCormick, the temporary personal representative
of the estate of Brent L. McCormick, appeals the order of the
county court for Washington County in which the court deter-
mined that Brent’s biological daughter, Beth Roberts (Beth),
was entitled to inherit from him under the intestate statutes,
despite the termination of Brent’s parental rights. Tracy claims
that under the relevant statutes, the termination of Brent’s
parental rights extinguished Beth’s right to inherit from him.
We determine that Beth’s right to inherit was not extinguished,
and therefore, we affirm the order of the county court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Brent died intestate on May 6, 2023. Brent’s domicile at the
time was in Arlington, Nebraska. On June 16, Brent’s sister-
in-law, Tracy, filed in the county court a petition for formal
probate, in which she, inter alia, requested to be appointed as
personal representative. In the petition, Tracy listed Brent’s
father, mother, and brother as the only known heirs and inter-
ested parties.
On June 28, 2023, Beth filed a demand for notice of all
filings in the probate case, and she alleged that she was the

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
317 Nebraska Reports
IN RE ESTATE OF McCORMICK
Cite as 317 Neb. 960
natural daughter and lawful heir of Brent. Beth later filed an
objection to Tracy’s petition on the basis that it failed to list
Beth as a child or heir. Beth alleged in the objection that she
was the only child and sole heir of Brent.
The county court held a hearing on July 20, 2023, on both
Tracy’s petition and Beth’s objection. At the end of the hearing,
the court appointed Tracy as temporary personal representative
of Brent’s estate, and it granted a motion for briefing regarding
Beth’s objection. Following briefing, the county court filed an
order on August 29 in which it determined that Beth was per-
mitted to inherit from Brent.
In its order, the county court set forth the following undis-
puted facts. Beth is the biological daughter of Brent, and
Brent’s paternity was established during his lifetime by the
district court for Washington County on August 7, 1991. The
district court terminated Brent’s parental rights on July 10,
1992. Beth spent a “very minimal” amount of time with Brent
after his parental rights were terminated. Beth was not adopted
by anyone after Brent’s parental rights were terminated. Brent
was not married and had no other children when he died
intestate.
The county court began its analysis by determining that
for purposes of the Nebraska Probate Code, see Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 30-2309 (Reissue 2016) (generally concerning intes-
tate succession as applied to parents and children), Brent’s
paternity as to Beth had been established by an adjudication
as reflected by the district court’s order of August 7, 1991.
The court noted, however, that § 30-2309 made “no mention
of the effect of a termination of parental rights” on the right
of a child to inherit from the terminated parent. The court
stated instead that the effect of termination of parental rights
was addressed in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-2312.02 (Cum. Supp.
2022). The court noted that § 30-2312.02 “only discusses the
parent not being able to inherit from the child” but is “silent
as to whether a child may inherit after the parental rights have
been terminate[d].”

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
317 Nebraska Reports
IN RE ESTATE OF McCORMICK
Cite as 317 Neb. 960
The court then looked at statutes regarding family law. Neb.
Rev. Stat. § 43-106.01 (Reissue 2016) relates to relinquishment
of parental rights and provides in part, “Nothing contained in
this section shall impair the right of such child to inherit.” The
court stated that § 30-2312.02 and § 43-106.01 were “similar
in the fact that the end result[] is that the rights of the parent
to the child are extinguished” and both statutes “do not allow
the Parent to inherit from the child.” The court recognized that
§ 43-106.01 specifically states that it does not impair the right
of the child to inherit, while § 30-2312.02 does not specifically
state as such. But the court reasoned that it was “difficult to
believe that the Legislature would allow the child to inherit if
there was a relinquishment of parental rights but not a termina-
tion of parental rights.”
The county court rejected Tracy’s citation of In re Estate
of Luckey. Bailey v. Luckey, 206 Neb. 53, 291 N.W.2d 235
(1980), in support of her argument that Beth was not allowed
to inherit from Brent. In Luckey, this court held that under
§ 30-2309, “a twice-adopted child may not inherit under the
laws of intestacy from its first adoptive parent who has there-
after consented to the second adoption and relinquished all
rights of a parent as to the child.” 206 Neb. at 58, 291 N.W.2d
at 238. The county court stated that it did not find Luckey per-
suasive and distinguished the case on the basis that the child in
that case was adopted, whereas Beth was never adopted.
Based on its review of the statutes set forth above, the
county court determined that “a biological child is allowed to
inherit when parental rights are terminated.” The court there-
fore concluded that Beth was permitted to inherit from Brent.
Tracy appeals the county court’s order in which it deter-
mined that Beth was entitled to inherit from Brent.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
Tracy claims that the county court erred when it concluded
that a biological child is allowed to inherit from a parent whose
parental rights have been terminated.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
317 Nebraska Reports
IN RE ESTATE OF McCORMICK
Cite as 317 Neb. 960
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
[1,2] Appeals of matters arising under the Nebraska Probate
Code are reviewed for error on the record. In re Estate of
Walker, 315 Neb. 510, 997 N.W.2d 595 (2023). When an
appeal calls for statutory interpretation or presents questions
of law, an appellate court must reach an independent, correct
conclusion irrespective of the determination made by the court
below. Konsul v. Asensio, 316 Neb. 874, 7 N.W.3d 619 (2024).
ANALYSIS
[3-8] The issue in this appeal involves a matter of statutory
interpretation: whether a biological child may inherit under
the intestate statutes from a parent whose parental rights have
been terminated. We therefore review rules of statutory con-
struction. The fundamental objective of statutory interpreta-
tion is to ascertain and carry out the Legislature’s intent. Dirt
Road Development v. Hirschman, 316 Neb. 757, 7 N.W.3d 438
(2024). Statutory interpretation begins with the text, and the
text is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning. Id. It is not
within the province of a court to read a meaning into a statute
that is not warranted by the language; neither is it within the
province of a court to read anything plain, direct, or unambig-
uous out of a statute. Id. In construing a statute, the legislative
intention is to be determined from a general consideration of
the whole act with reference to the subject matter to which it
applies and the particular topic under which the language in
question is found, and the intent as deduced from the whole
will prevail over that of a particular part considered separately.
Id. Statutes pertaining to the same subject matter should be
construed together; such statutes, being in pari materia, must
be construed as if they were one law, and effect must be given
to every provision. Id. To give effect to all parts of a stat-
ute, a court will attempt to reconcile different provisions so
they are consistent, harmonious, and sensible and will avoid
rejecting as superfluous or meaningless any word, clause, or
sentence. Id.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
317 Nebraska Reports
IN RE ESTATE OF McCORMICK
Cite as 317 Neb. 960
The ultimate question in this case is whether Beth is entitled
to inherit from Brent. It is undisputed that Brent died intestate,
and therefore, we look to the section of the Nebraska Probate
Code governing intestate succession. It is also undisputed
that Brent was not married at the time of his death and that
therefore, there is no surviving spouse. The disposition of
Brent’s intestate estate therefore is governed by Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 30-2303 (Reissue 2016), which provides in relevant part
that “the entire intestate estate if there is no surviving spouse,
passes [first] to the issue of the decedent.” Section 30-2303
further provides for division of the intestate estate if the issue
of the decedent includes more than one person. It is undisputed
that Brent had no children other than Beth.
We therefore look to other provisions of the Nebraska
Probate Code to determine whether Beth qualifies as “the issue
of” Brent entitled to inherit from him pursuant to § 30-2303(1).
We look first to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-2209(23) (Reissue 2016),
which defines “[i]ssue of a person” to include “all his or her
lineal descendants of all generations, with the relationship
of parent and child at each generation being determined by
the definitions of child and parent contained in the Nebraska
Probate Code.” Within the Nebraska Probate Code, § 30-2309
defines the relationship of parent and child for the specific
purpose of intestate succession. Section 30-2309 provides in
relevant part:
If, for purposes of intestate succession, a relationship
of parent and child must be established to determine suc-
cession by, through, or from a person,
. . . .
(2) . . . a person born out of wedlock is a child of the
mother. That person is also a child of the father, if:
. . . .
(ii) the paternity is established by an adjudication
before the death of the father or is established thereafter
by strict, clear and convincing proof. The open cohabita-
tion of the mother and alleged father during the period

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
317 Nebraska Reports
IN RE ESTATE OF McCORMICK
Cite as 317 Neb. 960
of conception shall be admissible as evidence of pater-
nity. The paternity established under this subparagraph
(ii) is ineffective to qualify the father or his kindred to
inherit from or through the child unless the father has
openly treated the child as his, and has not refused to
support the child.
It is undisputed in this case that Beth is the biological
daughter of Brent and that Brent’s paternity was established by
an adjudication in the district court in 1991. Therefore, under
§ 30-2309, a relationship of parent and child between Brent
and Beth was established for purposes of intestate succession,
and under the definition of “[i]ssue” set forth in § 30-2209(23),
a relationship of parent and child between Brent and Beth was
established pursuant to the relevant statute “contained in the
Nebraska Probate Code.”
While it is therefore clear that after the paternity adjudi-
cation in 1991, a relationship of parent and child had been
established between Brent and Beth, it is also undisputed in
this case that Brent’s parental rights to Beth were terminated
in 1992. The next question then is what effect, if any, the ter-
mination of Brent’s parental rights had on the relationship of
parent and child for purposes of the statutes governing intes-
tate succession. As the county court noted, § 30-2309 makes
no mention of what effect a termination of parental rights has
with respect to the relationship of parent and child established
thereunder. Section 30-2309(2)(ii) specifies that the estab-
lishment of a relationship of parent and child thereunder “is
ineffective to qualify the father . . . to inherit from or through
the child” unless the father meets certain requirements, and it
appears that a father whose parental rights have been termi-
nated would ordinarily not meet such requirements. Section
30-2309, however, imposes no additional requirements for a
child to be qualified to inherit from or through the father.
The Legislature specifically addressed termination of paren-
tal rights in § 30-2312.02, which provides:

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
317 Nebraska Reports
IN RE ESTATE OF McCORMICK
Cite as 317 Neb. 960
(a) A parent is barred from inheriting from or through
a child of the parent if the parent’s parental rights were
terminated and the parent-child relationship was not judi-
cially reestablished.
(b) For the purpose of intestate succession from or
through the deceased child, a parent who is barred from
inheriting under this section is treated as if the parent pre-
deceased the child.
Like § 30-2309(2)(ii), which imposes additional require-
ments for a father to inherit but does not impose additional
requirements for a child to inherit, § 30-2312.02 specifies the
effect of a termination of parental rights on the parent’s right
to inherit from or through the child, but it does not specify the
effect of such termination on the child’s right to inherit from
the parent whose parental rights have been terminated.
Thus, the probate statutes reflect a clear intent to limit or
extinguish the right of a parent to inherit from a child under
the circumstances set forth but do not reflect an intent to limit
or extinguish the right of a child to inherit from the parent
under the same circumstances. This treatment aligns with stat-
utes outside the Nebraska Probate Code. For example, Neb.
Rev. Stat. § 43-293 (Reissue 2016) addresses termination of
parental rights and provides in relevant part, “An order termi-
nating the parent-juvenile relationship shall divest the parent
and juvenile of all legal rights, privileges, duties, and obliga-
tions with respect to each other and the parents shall have no
rights of inheritance with respect to such juvenile.” Section
43-293 shows a clear intent that a parent whose parental rights
have been terminated may not inherit from the child, but it
expresses no intent that the child, or juvenile, similarly has no
right to inherit from the parent.
Tracy contends that under § 43-293, an order terminat-
ing parental rights divests both the parent and the child of
“all legal rights,” including the right of inheritance from the
other. We reject this contention. Because § 43-293 specifically
provides that the parent shall have no rights of inheritance

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
317 Nebraska Reports
IN RE ESTATE OF McCORMICK
Cite as 317 Neb. 960
with respect to the juvenile, we interpret the statute as not
including rights of inheritance within the “legal rights, privi-
leges, duties, and obligations” of which both the parent and
juvenile are divested. To give effect to all parts of a statute,
a court will attempt to reconcile different provisions so they
are consistent, harmonious, and sensible and will avoid reject-
ing as superfluous or meaningless any word, clause, or sen-
tence. Dirt Road Development v. Hirschman, 316 Neb. 757,
7 N.W.3d 438 (2024). It would be superfluous to separately
address inheritance rights of parents if inheritance rights were
included in the rights addressed in the first part of the same
sentence regarding both parents and juveniles. We therefore
do not read § 43-293 to divest the juvenile, or child, of the
right to inherit from a parent whose parental rights have been
terminated.
In another statute outside the Nebraska Probate Code, a clear
intent was expressed regarding the right of a child to inherit.
The county court cited § 43-106.01, which provides:
When a child shall have been relinquished by written
instrument, as provided by sections 43-104 and 43-106,
to the Department of Health and Human Services or to a
licensed child placement agency and the agency has, in
writing, accepted full responsibility for the child, the per-
son so relinquishing shall be relieved of all parental duties
toward and all responsibilities for such child and have no
rights over such child. Nothing contained in this section
shall impair the right of such child to inherit.
[9] Tracy argues in part that if the Legislature had intended
that a child’s right to inherit would not be impaired by termi-
nation of a parent’s parental rights, it would have explicitly
stated so, as it did in § 43-106.01. However, we have stated
that the intent of the Legislature is expressed by omission as
well as by inclusion. In re Estate of Giventer, 310 Neb. 39,
964 N.W.2d 234 (2021). As relevant to the question in this
case, we note that when the Legislature enacted § 30-2312.02
to provide that a parent whose parental rights have been

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
317 Nebraska Reports
IN RE ESTATE OF McCORMICK
Cite as 317 Neb. 960
terminated is barred from inheriting from or through the child,
it did not include a provision that the child was similarly
barred from inheriting from the parent.
We finally note that § 30-2309(1) provides that “an adopted
person is the child of an adopting parent and not of the natural
parents.” In § 30-2309(1), the Legislature expressed an intent
that adoption is an event that ends the adopted child’s status
as the child of a natural parent for purposes of intestate suc-
cession. Unlike adoption, the Legislature does not appear to
have expressed an intent that termination of a natural parent’s
parental rights is an event that ends the child’s status as “issue”
of that parent for purposes of taking under intestate succes-
sion. Regarding the present case, it is undisputed that Beth was
not adopted after Brent’s paternity was established or after his
parental rights were terminated and, obviously, that she is not
barred from inheriting under § 30-2309(1).
In summary, § 30-2303(1) provides for an intestate dece-
dent’s estate to pass to “issue,” § 30-2209(23) defines “[i]ssue”
based in part on the relationship of parent and child as deter-
mined under the Nebraska Probate Code, and § 30-2309(2)(ii)
of the Nebraska Probate Code provides that for purposes
of intestate succession, a relationship of parent and child is
established by a paternity adjudication for a child born out
of wedlock. Although probate statutes and other statutes spe-
cifically provide that termination of parental rights divests a
parent of inheritance rights with respect to a child, no statute
specifically provides that termination of a parent’s parental
rights extinguishes the inheritance rights of the child as to
that parent. Reading these statutes together, we agree with the
county court’s determination that under the Nebraska Probate
Code, as applied to the undisputed facts of this case, Beth was
“issue” of Brent and therefore eligible to inherit from him pur-
suant to the statutes governing intestate succession.
CONCLUSION
We conclude that under the probate statutes, Beth was
Brent’s issue and therefore entitled to inherit from him under

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
317 Nebraska Reports
IN RE ESTATE OF McCORMICK
Cite as 317 Neb. 960
the intestate statutes. We find nothing in the probate statutes
that provides that such right of inheritance was extinguished
when Brent’s parental rights were terminated. The county
court therefore did not err when it determined that Beth was
entitled to inherit from Brent. We affirm the order of the
county court.
Affirmed.