Jaksha v. Jaksha

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
319 Nebraska Reports
JAKSHA v. JAKSHA
Cite as 319 Neb. 308
Matthew M. Jaksha, appellee, v.
Jessica L. Jaksha, appellant.
___ N.W.3d ___
Filed June 27, 2025. 	No. S-24-700.
1. Divorce: Appeal and Error. In a marital dissolution action, an appellate
court reviews the case de novo on the record to determine whether there
has been an abuse of discretion by the trial judge.
2. Judges: Words and Phrases. A judicial abuse of discretion exists when
the reasons or rulings of a trial judge are clearly untenable, unfairly
depriving a litigant of a substantial right and denying just results in mat-
ters submitted for disposition.
3. Motions to Vacate: Time: Appeal and Error. A district court has
inherent power to vacate or modify its own judgments at any time dur-
ing the term in which those judgments are pronounced, and a decision to
modify will be reversed only if the district court abused its discretion.
4. Motions to Vacate: Proof: Appeal and Error. An appellate court will
reverse a decision on a motion to vacate or modify a judgment under
the statutory grounds listed in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-2001 (Reissue 2016)
only if the litigant shows that the district court abused its discretion.
5. Equity: Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. A trial court’s decision to
vacate or modify based on its equitable jurisdiction is reviewed de novo
on the record.
6. Motions to Vacate: Time. As a general rule, interlocutory orders can be
vacated or modified at any time prior to the entry of a final judgment or
final order.
7. ____: ____. Although Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-2001 (Reissue 2016) governs
a district court’s power to vacate or modify its judgments or orders after
the end of the term, it does not bar the reconsideration of interlocutory
orders entered in a prior term.
8. Courts: Jurisdiction: Motions to Vacate: Time. Courts of general
jurisdiction possess the inherent power to vacate and modify their own
judgments at any time during the term at which they were pronounced.
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
10/14/2026 08:08 AM CDT

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
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JAKSHA v. JAKSHA
Cite as 319 Neb. 308
9. Equity: Jurisdiction: Motions to Vacate. A district court’s equity juris-
diction to vacate or modify a judgment or order is not dependent upon
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-2001 (Reissue 2016); rather, § 25-2001 is concur-
rent with an independent equity jurisdiction.
10. Equity: Jurisdiction: Proof. As a general rule, for a district court to
exercise its equitable jurisdiction, there must be a showing that there is
no adequate remedy at law.
11. Appeal and Error. An appellate court will not consider an argument or
theory raised for the first time on appeal.
Appeal from the District Court for Douglas County: James
M. Masteller, Judge. Affirmed.
John A. Kinney, of Kinney Mason, P.C., L.L.O., for appellant.
Matthew P. Saathoff and Jacob A. Acers, of Saathoff Law
Group, P.C., L.L.O., for appellee.
Funke, 	C.J., 	Miller-Lerman, 	Cassel, 	Stacy, 	Papik,
Freudenberg, and Bergevin, JJ.
Stacy, J.
This is an appeal from a 2024 order that denied a request
to vacate or modify a 2021 order of modification entered in a
dissolution action. Finding no merit to the assignments of error,
we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
1. 2017 Dissolution Decree
The marriage of Matthew M. Jaksha and Jessica L. Jaksha
was dissolved in September 2017. In a stipulated decree, the
court awarded the parties joint legal and physical custody of
their minor child, born in 2014. Matthew was ordered to pay
monthly child support. The decree incorporated a detailed
parenting plan that gave each party nearly equal parenting
time and addressed regular parenting time, holidays, and vaca-
tions. The parenting plan included Jessica’s agreement that
she would not exercise her parenting time if she was “under
the influence of intoxicating substances.” The parties agreed

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JAKSHA v. JAKSHA
Cite as 319 Neb. 308
that if Jessica violated this agreement, Matthew could proceed
with a complaint to modify legal and physical custody.
2. First Modification (May 2020)
In July 2019, Jessica filed a complaint to modify, seeking
sole legal custody and the ability to decide where the child
attended school. Matthew filed a counterclaim also seeking
sole legal custody and alleging the parties could no longer
make joint decisions.
On May 29, 2020, the court entered what was captioned
an “Order of Modification (By Stipulation).” This stipulated
modification order retained joint physical custody but awarded
Matthew sole legal custody of their minor child, except that
Jessica was given “authority and decision making” over the
child’s religious upbringing. The modification order prohib-
ited Jessica from being under the influence of any alcohol or
drugs during her parenting time, except as prescribed by her
treating physician. The order provided that in the event Jessica
violated these sobriety requirements, her regular parenting
time would be suspended and replaced by “telephone/facetime
contact” or supervised parenting time until she “regain[ed] a
level of sustained sobriety and recovery,” at which time her
regular parenting time schedule would resume.
3. Second Modification (October 2021)
In December 2020, Matthew filed a complaint to mod-
ify, seeking an award of sole physical custody of the minor
child, a decrease in Jessica’s parenting time, and a modifica-
tion of the parties’ financial responsibilities. The complaint
alleged that since the May 2020 modification order, Jessica
had used intoxicating substances, had been in residential treat-
ment, and had missed a significant amount of parenting time.
Jessica’s February 2021 answer generally denied the com-
plaint’s allegations.
In July 2021, the parties appeared with their attorneys and
advised the court they had reached an agreement, which they

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JAKSHA v. JAKSHA
Cite as 319 Neb. 308
recited on the record in open court. Among other things, they
agreed that
• Matthew should be awarded sole legal and physical custody
of their minor child, subject to Jessica’s parenting time pursu-
ant to a transitional plan with three tiers.
• Under the first tier, Jessica’s parenting time would be super-
vised for a period of 120 days. Under the second tier,
her parenting time would be “semi-supervised” for another
120-day period. And under the third tier, Jessica would
have unsupervised parenting time every other weekend from
Friday night through Monday morning, and two dinners per
week with the minor child.
• If Jessica were to relapse on drugs or alcohol, her parenting
time would revert to the first tier and proceed through the
transitional plan again.
• Jessica would not owe any child support, and a downward
deviation was appropriate.
• Jessica would enroll in family therapy with the minor child at
her own expense.
• Jessica would continue to pay for and use a “SoberLink”
device and provide reports to a “designated person” for the
remainder of the minor child’s minority. She would also pay
for installation and use of an ignition interlock device in her
vehicle before being allowed to transport the minor child in
that vehicle.
Both parties testified under oath that this was their agree-
ment, and the attorneys represented that a stipulated order of
modification would be provided to the court reflecting that
agreement and resolving all issues raised in the modification
proceeding. The court explained to the parties that “when I
sign this final order of modification, the orders therein are not
suggestions. They’re actually orders, and I do expect everyone
to comply with those orders.”
On October 7, 2021, the court entered what was again cap-
tioned an “Order of Modification (By Stipulation).” The 2021
modification order was approved as to form and content by

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JAKSHA v. JAKSHA
Cite as 319 Neb. 308
the notarized signatures of both Matthew and Jessica, each
of whom stated, “I respectfully request the Court to enter
the above Order of Modification.” The order also contained
a provision certifying that the parties entered into the stipu-
lated modification “upon mature consideration and after ample
opportunity to seek the advice of separate counsel [and] that
consent to the execution of this Order of Modification has not
been obtained by duress, fraud, or undue influence.”
The provisions of the 2021 modification order were con-
sistent with the stipulated agreement recited on the record.
The order also included express findings that there had been a
material change in circumstances since the prior modification
order, that the modified provisions of custody and parenting
time were in the best interests of the minor child, and that the
downward deviation in child support was appropriate, in the
best interests of the child, and approved. Finally, in the decre-
tal portion of the modification order, the court “ORDERED,
ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that unless modified herein,
the Decree of Dissolution of Marriage dated September 26,
2017 and Order of Modification dated May 29, 2020 shall
remain in full force and effect.”
4. Jessica’s Complaint for
Third Modification Denied
On August 8, 2023, Jessica filed another complaint to mod-
ify. She alleged there had been a material change in circum-
stances because she had maintained her sobriety for a period
of 28 months. She asked to be awarded joint legal and physi-
cal custody of the minor child and additional parenting time.
Matthew responded with what he titled a “Motion for Judgment
on the Pleadings and Motion to Dismiss.” His motion asserted
that Jessica’s complaint to modify failed to allege a material
change in circumstances that was not contemplated when the
October 2021 modification order was entered.
After a hearing, the district court granted Matthew’s motion
and dismissed the complaint to modify. In an order entered

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
319 Nebraska Reports
JAKSHA v. JAKSHA
Cite as 319 Neb. 308
February 2, 2024, the court found that Jessica’s allegation of
sustained sobriety was not a material change in circumstances
because it was contemplated by the parties at the time of the
prior modification and was addressed in the tiered parenting
plan outlined in the October 2021 modification order.
Jessica did not appeal from the February 2024 order dis-
missing her complaint to modify. Instead, approximately 6
weeks later, she filed a motion to vacate or amend the October
2021 modification order.
5. Jessica Seeks to Vacate or Amend
2021 Modification Order
On March 18, 2024, Jessica filed a motion, which she later
restyled as a complaint, 1 asking the court to vacate or amend
the October 2021 modification order or, in the alternative, to
allow the parties to relitigate the 2021 modification proceed-
ing. Jessica’s complaint did not cite to any common-law rule or
statutory authority for the request to vacate or amend, nor did
it ask the court to exercise its equitable jurisdiction. Instead,
the complaint broadly alleged that the October 2021 modifica-
tion order was not a “final order,” and therefore, Jessica asked
that the parties be allowed to relitigate the merits of the modi-
fication pleadings on which the October 2021 modification
order was based.
The court held a hearing on Jessica’s complaint to vacate
or amend. Both parties offered evidence generally consisting
of the pleadings and court records detailed above, and each
presented argument.
As relevant to the issues on appeal, Jessica argued that the
October 2021 modification order was not a final order and
therefore remained subject to modification. She asked that
the matter “move forward . . . on the pleadings that were a
lead-up to October 7, 2021,” reasoning that “[t]hose pleadings
1 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-2002 (Reissue 2016) (proceedings to vacate or
modify judgments on grounds mentioned in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-2001(4)
(Reissue 2016) “shall be by complaint”).

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JAKSHA v. JAKSHA
Cite as 319 Neb. 308
were never resolved.” She also generally argued the 2021
modification order should be vacated because it limited her
parenting time and was “archaic,” “punitive,” and “not . . .
equitable.” Matthew disagreed and argued the 2021 modi-
fication order was a final order that resolved all the issues
presented in the second modification proceeding. He also
generally argued that the district court lacked authority to
vacate or modify the 2021 modification order. The district
court took judicial notice of all court filings in the dissolu-
tion matter and took the matter under advisement subject to
additional briefing.
In an order entered August 21, 2024, the district court denied
Jessica’s complaint and all relief requested therein. The court
rejected Jessica’s contention that the October 2021 modifica-
tion order was not final. Instead, the court expressly found that
because that order finally disposed of Matthew’s December
2020 complaint to modify and left nothing for further consid-
eration, it was a final order.
Having concluded the 2021 modification order was final,
the court focused on whether it had the authority to vacate
or modify it. The court addressed its inherent authority to
vacate or modify an order or judgment during the court term in
which the order or judgment was entered, 2 as well as its statu-
tory authority to vacate or modify a judgment or order under
§ 25-2001(2) and its equitable power to set aside an order or
judgment. 3 It concluded that none of these grounds applied on
the facts of this case.
The court concluded it could no longer exercise its inher-
ent authority to vacate or modify within its term, because
Jessica’s complaint was filed years after the end of the term
2 See, e.g., Eicher v. Mid America Fin. Invest. Corp., 275 Neb. 462, 748
N.W.2d 1 (2008) (recognizing district court has virtually unlimited ability
to modify orders during same term).
3 See Hornig v. Martel Lift Systems, 258 Neb. 764, 606 N.W.2d 764 (2000)
(holding § 25-2001 is not exclusive remedy for vacating judgment after
term; statute is concurrent with independent equity jurisdiction).

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JAKSHA v. JAKSHA
Cite as 319 Neb. 308
in which the October 2021 order was entered. 4 And although
the court acknowledged that § 25-2001(1) extends a district
court’s inherent power to vacate or modify when a motion
is filed within 6 months after the entry of the judgment or
order, it found that the extended statutory time period had
expired too.
The court also declined to vacate or modify the October
2021 modification order under the statutory authority con-
ferred by § 25-2001(4), reasoning that Jessica’s complaint
did not cite to or rely upon § 25-2001(4) and that she failed
to adduce evidence supporting any of the grounds specified
therein. 5 Finally, although the court acknowledged its equi-
table power to set aside an order or judgment under some
circumstances, 6 it declined to exercise that power on the facts
of this case.
The district court therefore denied Jessica’s complaint and
all relief requested therein. Jessica filed this timely appeal,
which we moved to our docket on our own motion.
II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Jessica assigns that the district court erred in (1) determin-
ing that the October 2021 modification order was a final order,
(2) failing to vacate the October 2021 modification order, and
(3) failing to determine the October 2021 modification order
violated Nebraska public policy and was therefore void.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1,2] In a marital dissolution action, an appellate court
reviews the case de novo on the record to determine whether
there has been an abuse of discretion by the trial judge. 7 A
4 See Rules of Dist. Ct. of Fourth Jud. Dist. 4-1(C) (rev. 2022) (term of
court for district court for Douglas County begins July 1 of each calendar
year and ends June 30 of following calendar year).
5 See § 25-2001(4)(a) to (g).
6 See, § 25-2001(2); Hornig, supra note 3.
7 Hawk v. Hawk, ante p. 120, ___ N.W.3d ___ (2025).

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JAKSHA v. JAKSHA
Cite as 319 Neb. 308
judicial abuse of discretion exists when the reasons or rulings
of a trial judge are clearly untenable, unfairly depriving a liti-
gant of a substantial right and denying just results in matters
submitted for disposition. 8
[3] A district court has inherent power to vacate or modify
its own judgments at any time during the term in which those
judgments are pronounced, and a decision to modify will be
reversed only if the district court abused its discretion. 9
[4] An appellate court will reverse a decision on a motion to
vacate or modify a judgment under the statutory grounds listed
in § 25-2001 only if the litigant shows that the district court
abused its discretion. 10
[5] A trial court’s decision to vacate or modify based on its
equitable jurisdiction is reviewed de novo on the record. 11
IV. ANALYSIS
1. October 2021 Modification
Order Was Final
Before the district court and on appeal, Jessica’s primary
reason for asking to vacate or amend the October 2021 modifi-
cation order was her contention that it “was never a final order
and [therefore] is subject to being modified or amended.” 12
According to Jessica, the 2021 modification order was inter-
locutory in nature because it did not resolve all the issues
raised in the modification pleadings and it “contain[ed] no
parenting plan” and “no child support calculation.” 13 Based on
these contentions, Jessica asks us to “treat that Order as lack-
ing finality and allow additional evidence, mediation, a revised
8 Id.
9 See id.
10 Nielsen v. Nielsen, 275 Neb. 810, 749 N.W.2d 485 (2008); Nye v. Fire
Group Partnership, 263 Neb. 735, 642 N.W.2d 149 (2002).
11 See Hornig, supra note 3.
12 Brief for appellant at 12.
13 Id. at 9.

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JAKSHA v. JAKSHA
Cite as 319 Neb. 308
parenting plan and/or a trial related to the pleadings.” 14 The
district court rejected Jessica’s contention that the 2021 modi-
fication order lacked finality, and so do we.
[6,7] As a general rule, interlocutory orders can be vacated
or modified at any time prior to the entry of a final judgment
or final order. 15 And we have recognized, as a general prin-
ciple, that although § 25-2001 governs a district court’s power
to vacate or modify its judgments or orders after the end of
the term, it “does not bar the reconsideration of interlocutory
orders” 16 entered in a prior term. Assuming without deciding
that interlocutory orders in postdecree custody modification
cases are subject to the same general principle, we agree with
the district court that the October 2021 order of modification
was not interlocutory. The order resolved all disputed issues
of custody, parenting time, and child support raised in the rel-
evant modification pleadings, and it did so in accordance with
the stipulated agreement of the parties made in open court on
the record and subsequently approved by the court as being
in the minor child’s best interests. The 10-page modification
order left no controverted issue unresolved, and it specified
clearly the relief granted and orders made, 17 including the spe-
cific ways in which the previous custody, parenting plan, and
14 Id. at 8.
15 See Millard Gutter Co. v. American Family Ins. Co., 300 Neb. 466,
915 N.W.2d 58 (2018) (recognizing that order granting partial summary
judgment is interlocutory and therefore could be revised or vacated at any
time prior to entry of final judgment).
16 Whalen v. U S West Communications, 253 Neb. 334, 349, 570 N.W.2d
531, 542 (1997) (holding that provisions of § 25-2001 do not apply
to prevent courts from reconsidering interlocutory orders), disapproved
on other grounds, Gaytan v. Wal-Mart, 289 Neb. 49, 853 N.W.2d 181
(2014). Accord, Godfrey v. Cummingham, 77 Neb. 462, 465, 109 N.W.
765, 766 (1906) (holding that “an interlocutory order may be vacated
at a subsequent term by the same court, without compliance with the
provisions of” statute authorizing courts to vacate or modify judgments or
orders after end of term).
17 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1318 (Cum. Supp. 2024).

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JAKSHA v. JAKSHA
Cite as 319 Neb. 308
child support orders were being modified. Finally, the decretal
portion of the 2021 modification order made clear that “unless
modified herein, the Decree of Dissolution of Marriage dated
September 26, 2017 and Order of Modification dated May 29,
2020 shall remain in full force and effect.”
We are puzzled by Jessica’s contention that the 2021 modi-
fication order did not contain a parenting plan, particularly
since it is the parenting plan provisions of that order which
she seeks to vacate or modify. The original 2017 dissolution
decree included a court-approved parenting plan that remains
in full force and effect, as modified by the 2020 and 2021
modification orders. In connection with the 2021 modification,
either the parties or the court could have elected to prepare an
updated parenting plan document that combined all the pro-
visions then in effect into a single document, but the failure
to do so did not affect the finality of the modification order.
Similarly, on this record, the finality of the modification order
was not affected by the failure to attach a child support “work-
sheet 5,” 18 reflecting the court-approved downward deviation
under which neither party owed support.
The district court did not err in refusing to characterize the
2021 modification order as interlocutory in nature or in refus-
ing Jessica’s request to vacate or modify the order on that basis.
2. District Court Properly
Refused to Vacate
In her second assignment, Jessica broadly contends the
district court erred in refusing to vacate the October 2021
modification order. She generally argues that the order was
“so replete with errors and vagueness that it should not be
allowed to stand,” 19 but she does not mention or discuss the
18 See, e.g., Neb. Ct. R. § 4-203 (rev. 2020) (“[i]n the event of a deviation,
the reason for the deviation shall be contained in the findings portion of
the decree or order, or worksheet 5 should be completed by the court and
filed in the court file”).
19 Brief for appellant at 13.

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JAKSHA v. JAKSHA
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sources of a district court’s legal authority to vacate or modify
a prior judgment or order. We begin our analysis there.
First, we observe that in the instant proceeding, Jessica was
not seeking to modify the custody or parenting time provi-
sions of the 2021 order based on allegations of a material
change in circumstances affecting the child’s best interests
since the last modification. 20 Instead of relying on the modi-
fication procedures in the divorce statutes and the Parenting
Act, 21 Jessica asked the district court to vacate or modify the
2021 order using its other sources of authority.
As we recently noted in Hawk v. Hawk, 22 a district court gen-
erally has four sources of authority to vacate or modify a judg-
ment or final order: one founded purely on the court’s inherent
powers, 23 two having statutory bases, 24 and one grounded in
the power of a court of equity. 25 In the sections that follow, we
review all these sources of authority and ultimately conclude
the district court did not err in refusing to vacate or modify the
October 2021 order.
(a) Court’s Inherent Authority
[8] Since at least 1899, Nebraska has recognized that courts
of general jurisdiction possess the inherent power to vacate
and modify their own judgments at any time during the term
at which they were pronounced. 26 This inherent power is
20 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-364(6) (Cum. Supp. 2024). See, also, Lindblad
v. Lindblad, 309 Neb. 776, 962 N.W.2d 545 (2021) (orders of custody and
parenting time will not be modified absent proof of material change in
circumstances since last modification that affects child’s best interests).
21 Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 43-2920 to 43-2943 (Reissue 2016 & Cum. Supp.
2024).
22 Hawk, supra note 7.
23 See Johnson v. Antoniutti, 318 Neb. 465, 16 N.W.3d 864 (2025).
24 See § 25-2001(1) and (4).
25 See, e.g., Hornig, supra note 3; Joyce v. Joyce, 229 Neb. 831, 429 N.W.2d
355 (1988).
26 See Bradley v. Slater, 58 Neb. 554, 78 N.W. 1069 (1899).

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derived from the common law, and it exists entirely inde-
pendent of any statute. 27 While this power is broad, it is well
settled that it ends at the conclusion of the court term in which
the judgment or order is entered. 28
As a court of general jurisdiction, the district court plainly
possessed the inherent power to modify within its term. 29 But
the court term within which the October 2021 modification
order was entered ended long before Jessica filed her com-
plaint to vacate. 30 The district court therefore correctly deter-
mined that it could no longer exercise the inherent authority to
vacate that order.
(b) Statutory Authority
Section 25-2001 also addresses a court’s authority to vacate
or modify it judgments and orders, and it provides in rel-
evant part:
(1) The inherent power of a district court to vacate
or modify its judgments or orders during term may also
be exercised after the end of the term, upon the same
grounds, upon a motion filed within six months after the
entry of the judgment or order.
(2) The power of a district court under its equity juris-
diction to set aside a judgment or an order as an equitable
remedy is not limited by this section.
. . . .
(4) A district court may vacate or modify its own judg-
ments or orders after the term at which such judgments
27 See id.
28 See, e.g., Hawk, supra note 7; Eicher, supra note 2; Bradley, supra
note 26. See, also, Ballheim v. Settles, 318 Neb. 873, 19 N.W.3d 748
(2025) (recognizing general rule that judgment is not open to amendment,
revision, modification, or correction after term at which it was rendered).
29 See Hawk, supra note 7.
30 See Rules of Dist. Ct. of Fourth Jud. Dist. 4-1(C) (term of court for district
court for Douglas County begins July 1 of each calendar year and ends
June 30 of following calendar year).

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or orders were made (a) for mistake, neglect, or omission
of the clerk, or irregularity in obtaining a judgment or
order; (b) for fraud practiced by the successful party in
obtaining the judgment or order; (c) for newly discovered
material evidence which could neither have been discov-
ered with reasonable diligence before trial nor have been
discovered with reasonable diligence in time to move
for a new trial; (d) for erroneous proceedings against
an infant or person of unsound mind if the condition of
such defendant does not appear in the record of the pro-
ceedings; (e) for the death of one of the parties before
the judgment in the action; (f) for unavoidable casualty
or misfortune, preventing the party from prosecuting or
defending; and (g) for taking judgments upon warrants of
attorney for more than was due to the plaintiff when the
defendant was not summoned or otherwise legally noti-
fied of the time and place of taking such judgment.
To the extent § 25-2001(1) extends the court’s inherent
power to vacate or modify beyond the end of a court term
where the party’s motion is filed within 6 months after the
entry of the judgment or order at issue, the district court cor-
rectly determined that such time period had expired long before
Jessica filed her motion/complaint in this case.
Section 25-2001(4) authorizes a district court to vacate
or modify a judgment or order after the conclusion of the
court term for any of seven different reasons. But here, the
district court declined to exercise that authority, reasoning
that Jessica’s complaint did not expressly cite to or rely upon
§ 25-2001(4), and, in any event, she failed to adduce evidence
supporting any ground specified therein. 31 We see no abuse of
discretion in this ruling, but point out there is an additional
reason that the court correctly declined to exercise authority
under § 25-2001(4).
31 See § 25-2001(4)(a) to (g).

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Although not addressed by the parties or the district court,
there is a statutory time limit on requests to vacate or modify
judgments or orders under § 25-2001(4). Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 25-2008 (Reissue 2016) states that proceedings to vacate
or modify a judgment or order under § 25-2001(4) “must be
commenced no later than two years after the entry of the judg-
ment or order unless the party entitled thereto is an infant or
person of unsound mind, and then no later than two years after
removal of such disability.”
Here, there was no claim or evidence that Jessica was a
person of unsound mind at any point in these proceedings.
And by the time she filed her complaint to vacate or modify
in 2024, more than 2 years had passed since the entry of the
October 2021 modification order. Because the 2021 modifica-
tion order was no longer subject to being vacated or modified
on any of the grounds specified in § 25-2001(4), the district
court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to exercise
authority under § 25-2001(4).
(c) Court’s Equitable Power
[9] The final source of a district court’s power to modify
or vacate a judgment or order is its equitable jurisdiction. 32
Although § 25-2001(2) expressly recognizes this equitable
authority, our cases have long held that a court’s equity juris-
diction to vacate or modify is not dependent upon § 25-2001;
rather, § 25-2001 “‘is concurrent with an independent equity
jurisdiction.’” 33
[10] As a general rule, for a district court to exercise its
equitable jurisdiction, there must be a showing that there is no
32 See, Hawk, supra note 7; Hornig, supra note 3.
33 Hornig, supra note 3, 258 Neb. at 772, 606 N.W.2d at 771 (quoting Emry
v. American Honda Motor Co., 215 Neb. 435, 334 N.W.2d 786 (1983)).
See Joyce, supra note 25. See, also, § 25-2001(2) (stating “[t]he power
of a district court under its equity jurisdiction to set aside a judgment or
an order as an equitable remedy is not limited to this section”); John P.
Lenich, Nebraska Civil Procedure § 35:15 (2025).

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JAKSHA v. JAKSHA
Cite as 319 Neb. 308
adequate remedy at law. 34 In Hornig v. Martel Lift Systems, 35
we observed the maxim that “equity aids the vigilant and the
diligent, not those who sleep on their rights,” and we ques-
tioned whether a party could make the requisite showing that
no adequate remedy at law exists if the evidence showed that
the party either failed to institute proceedings under § 25-2001
within the statutory limitation period or that the party could
have proceeded under § 25-2001 but did not do so “because
of fault or laches.” 36
Here, Jessica failed to institute proceedings under § 25-2001
within the applicable 2-year limitation period in § 25-2008,
and that is a factor we consider in our independent de novo
review of whether Jessica was entitled to have the 2021 modi-
fication order vacated or modified under the district court’s
independent equitable jurisdiction. But in addition to this
delay, our de novo review of the record leads us to the same
conclusion reached by the district court: Equity does not sup-
port Jessica’s request to vacate or modify the 2021 modifica-
tion order.
Jessica was represented by counsel when she agreed to
resolve the modification proceedings by agreement, and the
terms of that agreement were recited on the record in open
court and affirmed by the parties under oath. The stipulated
agreement included modifications to the legal and physical
custody of the parties’ minor child, modifications to Jessica’s
parenting time, and modifications to child support. The 2021
order of modification reflected the parties’ stipulated agree-
ment, and both the form and content of the order was approved
by Jessica, who expressly asked the court to enter the order
and certified that it “has not been obtained by duress, fraud, or
undue influence.”
34 See Hornig, supra note 3.
35 Id., 258 Neb. at 770, 606 N.W.2d at 770.
36 Id. at 773, 606 N.W.2d at 771.

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JAKSHA v. JAKSHA
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On this record, Jessica failed to establish any basis for the
district court to exercise its equity jurisdiction to vacate or
modify the 2021 modification order.
(d) Summary
In sum, by the time Jessica filed her complaint to vacate the
2021 modification order, the district court’s inherent power to
vacate the order had expired, as had any statutory extension
of inherent authority extended by § 25-2001(1). Moreover,
the 2-year limitation period had expired for seeking to vacate
or modify the order under § 25-2001(4), and Jessica failed to
establish any reason for the district court to exercise its equity
jurisdiction to vacate or modify the 2021 modification order.
There is no merit to Jessica’s assignment that the district
court erred by failing to vacate or modify the 2021 modifica-
tion order.
3. Voidness Not Raised Below
In her third assignment, Jessica argues that the district
court erred in failing to vacate the 2021 modification order on
grounds it was “void.” 37 Importantly, Jessica does not contend
the order was void because the district court lacked juris-
diction over the parties or the subject matter. 38 Instead, she
argues the order was void because it “should be determined to
violate Nebraska public policy” 39 for several reasons, includ-
ing that it “severely limited her parenting time.” 40
[11] Matthew responds that we need not address this issue
because Jessica is raising it for the first time on appeal. We
agree. Jessica’s complaint to vacate or modify contained
no allegation that the 2021 modification order was void as
37 Brief for appellant at 13.
38 See Parish v. Parish, 314 Neb. 370, 991 N.W.2d 1 (2023) (judgment
entered by court that lacked jurisdiction over either parties or subject
matter is void and can be attacked at any time).
39 Brief for appellant at 13.
40 Id. at 14.

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JAKSHA v. JAKSHA
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against public policy, and she presented no such argument
before the district court. Because an appellate court will not
consider an argument or theory raised for the first time on
appeal, 41 we do not further address this assignment.
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the dis-
trict court.
Affirmed.
41 Saylor v. State, 315 Neb. 285, 995 N.W.2d 192 (2023).