Woodsonia Hwy 281 v. American Multi-Cinema

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
318 Nebraska Reports
WOODSONIA HWY 281 v. AMERICAN MULTI-CINEMA
Cite as 318 Neb. 592
Woodsonia Hwy 281, LLC, appellee, v.
American Multi-Cinema, Inc., appellant.
___ N.W.3d ___
Filed March 14, 2025. 	No. S-24-004.
1. Motions to Dismiss: Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. Subject matter
jurisdiction is a question of law. In reviewing a trial court’s decision on
a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, an appellate
court employs a de novo standard of review.
2. Forcible Entry and Detainer: Jurisdiction: Legislature. Because a
court’s jurisdiction over forcible entry and detainer actions arises out of
a legislative grant, it is inherently limited by that grant.
3. Forcible Entry and Detainer: Legislature. In Nebraska, the Legislature
has limited the scope of forcible entry and detainer actions to two cir-
cumstances: (1) complaints of unlawful and forcible entry into lands
and tenements and the detention of the same and (2) complaints against
those who, having a lawful and peaceable entry into lands or tenements,
unlawfully and by force hold the same.
4. Forcible Entry and Detainer: Words and Phrases. Forcible entry
and detainer actions are special statutory proceedings designed to pro-
vide a speedy and summary method by which the owner of real estate
might regain possession of it from one who had unlawfully and forcibly
entered into and detained possession thereof, or one who, having law-
fully entered, then unlawfully and forcibly detained possession.
5. Forcible Entry and Detainer: Courts: Jurisdiction. Given the limited
scope of forcible entry and detainer, when a court hears such an action,
it sits as a special statutory tribunal to summarily decide the issues
authorized by the statute and does not have the power to hear and deter-
mine other issues.
6. Forcible Entry and Detainer. Forcible entry and detainer actions
prevent protracted litigation by limiting the scope of the proceeding so
collateral issues not connected with the question of possession do not
burden or delay the proceeding.
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
10/14/2026 08:16 AM CDT

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
318 Nebraska Reports
WOODSONIA HWY 281 v. AMERICAN MULTI-CINEMA
Cite as 318 Neb. 592
7. ____. In an action for forcible entry and detainer, the contest is limited
to the naked right of possession of the premises.
8. Forcible Entry and Detainer: Title. Because a forcible entry and
detainer action is merely possessory, the question of title to real estate
cannot be either tried or determined in the case.
9. Forcible Entry and Detainer: Title: Jurisdiction. A forcible entry and
detainer action does not try the question of title, but only the immedi-
ate right of possession. Thus, when a party attempts to interject a title
dispute into a forcible entry and detainer action, thereby transforming
the proceedings into an action to determine title, the court is divested
of jurisdiction.
10. ____: ____: ____. Where the right to possession in a forcible entry and
detainer action involves a title dispute, resort must be had not only to
another tribunal, but also to a different form of action.
11. Forcible Entry and Detainer: Title: Jurisdiction: Dismissal and
Nonsuit. If the court in a forcible entry and detainer action can find and
determine the right of possession without at the same time determining
the rights of the parties, legal or equitable, in the property itself, it can-
not be said that the title is drawn into question. But if the claimant’s
right of possession depends on resolving some right of the defendant,
whether legal or equitable, in the property itself, the court must dismiss
the forcible entry and detainer action for want of jurisdiction.
12. Forcible Entry and Detainer. The purpose of a forcible entry and
detainer action is not to determine either the actual ownership of the
property or the legal right to its possession.
13. Forcible Entry and Detainer: Title: Jurisdiction. In a forcible entry
and detainer action, the defendant’s mere assertion that a title claim
exists is not enough to deprive a court of jurisdiction. Instead, a court
may proceed until the evidence discloses that the question involved is
one of title.
14. Title: Leases. Whether an owner’s title to property is encumbered by a
lease is a question bearing on title.
15. Forcible Entry and Detainer: Landlord and Tenant: Contracts. A
forcible entry and detainer action is not the proper action to resolve a
contract dispute between a landlord and tenant.
Appeal from the District Court for Hall County, Andrew
C. Butler, Judge, on appeal thereto from the County Court
for Hall County, Alfred E. Corey III, Judge. Judgment of
District Court vacated, and cause remanded with directions.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
318 Nebraska Reports
WOODSONIA HWY 281 v. AMERICAN MULTI-CINEMA
Cite as 318 Neb. 592
Daniel L. Lindstrom and Nicole J. Luhm, of Jacobsen Orr,
Lindstrom & Holbrook, P.C., L.L.O., for appellant.
Gregory C. Scaglione and Emily M. Coffey, of Koley Jessen,
P.C., L.L.O., for appellee.
Funke, C.J., Cassel, Stacy, Papik, and Freudenberg, JJ.
Stacy, J.
In this forcible entry and detainer action, 1 an evicted com-
mercial tenant appeals from a writ of restitution entered by the
county court and affirmed by the district court. 2 A threshold
issue on appeal is whether the evidence in this case presented
a “title dispute” that deprived the county court of subject mat-
ter jurisdiction. 3 For reasons we will explain, we hold this case
presented a title dispute and therefore the county court should
have dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction. We vacate the judg-
ment of the district court and remand the cause with directions
to vacate the county court’s judgment and further remand the
cause to the county court with directions to dismiss.
I. BACKGROUND
1. Parties
Conestoga Mall 2022, LLC (Conestoga), owned and operated
a retail shopping mall in Grand Island, Nebraska. Beginning
in 2003, Conestoga leased approximately 17,000 square feet
1 See Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 25-21,219 to 25-21,235 (Reissue 2016 & Cum.
Supp. 2024).
2 See § 25-21,233 and Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 25-2728 (Cum. Supp. 2024) and
25-2733 (Reissue 2016).
3 See, e.g., Federal Nat. Mortgage Assn. v. Marcuzzo, 289 Neb. 301, 303,
854 N.W.2d 774, 777 (2014) (holding “[o]ur case law requires a court to
dismiss a forcible entry and detainer action upon receiving evidence of the
existence of a title dispute”); Cummins Mgmt. v. Gilroy, 266 Neb. 635,
638, 667 N.W.2d 538, 542 (2003) (“a court cannot determine a question
of title in a forcible entry and detainer action[, and] if the resolution of the
case would require the court to determine a title dispute, it must dismiss
the case for lack of jurisdiction”).

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
318 Nebraska Reports
WOODSONIA HWY 281 v. AMERICAN MULTI-CINEMA
Cite as 318 Neb. 592
of space in the shopping mall to Dickinson Theatres, Inc.
(Dickinson), pursuant to a long-term lease described in more
detail below. In 2015, Dickinson was acquired by American
Multi-Cinema, Inc. (AMC). AMC assumed the commercial
lease and continued to operate the movie theater in the shop-
ping mall.
In 2022, Conestoga agreed to sell the shopping mall to
Woodsonia Hwy 281, LLC (Woodsonia). Woodsonia planned
to redevelop the shopping mall property using tax increment
financing. 4
2. Lease
The terms of the commercial lease between Conestoga and
Dickinson, executed in 2003, are relevant to the issues on
appeal, so we describe them in some detail. The lease had an
initial term of 15 years with the option to extend the lease for
two additional 5-year terms. AMC assumed Dickinson’s lease-
hold interest when it acquired Dickinson in 2015. In 2018,
AMC exercised its option to extend the lease for an additional
5-year term, through December 31, 2023. The record on appeal
is silent as to any additional extensions, but no party argues
that the lease expired at any point in this litigation. Instead,
Woodsonia argues that the lease was terminated pursuant to
the eminent domain provisions, which we describe next.
Article 15 of the lease is titled “Eminent Domain,” and it
is central to the parties’ dispute. We quote the relevant provi-
sions of article 15 now and discuss the provisions in more
detail later:
15.1 Taking. If the Demised Premises, or a substantial
part thereof, shall be taken in eminent domain, or con-
veyed under threat of condemnation proceedings, then
this Lease shall forthwith terminate and end upon the tak-
ing thereof as if the original term provided in said Lease
expired at the time of such taking . . . .
4 See Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 18-2101 to 18-2157 (Reissue 2022 & Cum. Supp.
2024) (Community Development Law).

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
318 Nebraska Reports
WOODSONIA HWY 281 v. AMERICAN MULTI-CINEMA
Cite as 318 Neb. 592
. . . .
15.3 No Claim Against Landlord. It is understood and
agreed that in the event of the termination of this Lease
as provided under this Article, Tenant shall have no claim
against Landlord for the value of any unexpired term of
this Lease and no right or claim to any part of the award
[to the Landlord] made on account thereof, except as
specifically provided in this Article.
. . . .
15.5 Transfer of Landlord’s Interest to Condemnor.
Landlord may, without any obligation or liability to
Tenant, agree to sell and/or convey to the condemnor the
Demised Premises, the Shopping Center or any portion
thereof, sought by the condemnor, free from this Lease
and the rights of Tenant hereunder, without first requiring
that any action or proceeding be instituted or, if instituted,
pursued to a judgment. In such event, this Lease shall be
deemed terminated effective on the date of such transfer.
3. Redevelopment Proposal and Approval
Woodsonia 	commissioned 	a 	blight 	study 	of 	the 	shop-
ping mall property, and in September 2022, it presented the
study and a redevelopment proposal to the Grand Island City
Council. 5 Thereafter, the city council engaged in a review
under 	the 	Community 	Development 	Law 6 and 	ultimately
approved Woodsonia’s redevelopment plan and its request
for tax increment financing. AMC argues there were various
irregularities in the redevelopment approval process. We do
not elaborate on those arguments in this appeal, except to
note that AMC generally contends the irregularities rendered
any threat of condemnation pretextual and thus insufficient to
trigger the eminent domain provisions of the lease.
Following the city council’s approval of the redevelop-
ment plan, Conestoga formally conveyed to Woodsonia, on
5 See § 18-2101.02(2).
6 See §§ 18-2101 to 18-2157.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
318 Nebraska Reports
WOODSONIA HWY 281 v. AMERICAN MULTI-CINEMA
Cite as 318 Neb. 592
March 1, 2023, all of Conestoga’s “right, title, and interest in
and to” the shopping mall. On March 3, Woodsonia recorded
the redevelopment contract and a special warranty deed recit-
ing that the shopping mall property was conveyed “free from
encumbrances, except those Permitted Exceptions set forth
on Exhibit A attached hereto and incorporated herein by this
reference.” As relevant here, one such permitted exception
was “[t]he rights or interest of tenants in possession, as ten-
ants only, pursuant to unrecorded or recorded eases, contracts,
and/or verbal agreements . . . .”
4. Woodsonia Takes Steps
to Terminate Leases
In furtherance of the redevelopment project, Woodsonia
successfully negotiated the termination of most of the leases
in the shopping mall, with the exception of AMC and a few
other tenants. Because Woodsonia had been unable to negoti-
ate termination of AMC’s lease, it took steps to terminate the
lease pursuant to the “Eminent Domain” provisions. AMC
contends that none of the steps taken by Woodsonia were suf-
ficient to trigger the eminent domain provisions of the lease or
to terminate the lease.
As relevant to the issues on appeal, those steps included a
March 8, 2023, letter from Woodsonia to AMC, a March 15
Resolution by the city of Grand Island’s community redevelop-
ment authority (CRA), and a March 31 letter from the CRA to
AMC. We summarize each in the sections that follow.
(a) March 8, 2023, Letter
On March 8, 2023, Woodsonia’s attorney sent a letter to
AMC, stating that if “a mutual and amicable termination of
AMC’s Lease” could not be reached, then “government agen-
cies will exercise eminent domain powers to take AMC’s
entire leasehold interest in exchange for fair compensation as
defined and provided by the Nebraska Constitution and laws.”
The March 8 letter also advised AMC as follows:

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
318 Nebraska Reports
WOODSONIA HWY 281 v. AMERICAN MULTI-CINEMA
Cite as 318 Neb. 592
• “Woodsonia plans to convey AMC’s Leasehold interest to the
condemnor if and when the [CRA] threatens to take and end
the AMC’s entire leasehold interest.”
• The letter was Woodsonia’s “final pre-suit effort to negotiate a
mutual and amicable termination of AMC’s Lease, as time is
of the utmost essence.”
• Woodsonia believed that if an amicable and reasonable settle-
ment were not reached quickly, “the governmental authorities
will be disappointed and will then have to pursue a total taking
of AMC’s leasehold interest in exchange for fair compensa-
tion,” which compensation would be distributed to Woodsonia
under the terms of the lease.
The March 8, 2023, letter did not include a specific settle-
ment offer, but it “request[ed] a telephonic conference the
week of March 13, 2023,” to discuss “the mutual termination
of AMC’s Lease.” There is no indication in the record of any
further communication between Woodsonia and AMC regard-
ing the March 8 letter.
(b) March 15, 2023, Resolution
On March 15, 2023, the CRA adopted resolution No. 430,
which resolved:
If Woodsonia is unable to reach a workout regarding
the termination of the Leases [(including AMC’s lease)]
by March 17, 2023, the [CRA] shall begin the nego-
tiations and the process of exercising its eminent domain
powers (a) to take and terminate the Leasehold Interests
and not to transfer those Leasehold Interests, consistent
with Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-710.04(3); and (b) to pay or
deposit (i) the fair market value of the remainder of the
term of the Leases (cost of renting) minus the rent tenant
would have had to pay, together with (ii) relocation cost
reimbursement and any other compensation required by
Nebraska law.
If [the CRA’s] forthcoming good faith negotiations
. . . and reasonable attempts to induce settlement with

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
318 Nebraska Reports
WOODSONIA HWY 281 v. AMERICAN MULTI-CINEMA
Cite as 318 Neb. 592
the tenants holding the Leasehold Interests fail, [the
CRA] shall proceed with such takings which will not be
for the primary purpose of economic development, but
will be instead for the primary purpose(s) set forth in
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-710.04(3). 7
The resolution also stated that the CRA “shall” engage the
same attorney who was representing Woodsonia in the rede-
velopment project, which it did.
(c) March 31, 2023, Letter
On 	March 	31, 	2023, 	the 	CRA, 	now 	represented 	by
Woodsonia’s attorney, sent a settlement letter to AMC via
certified mail with a copy by email. This letter informed AMC
as follows:
• The CRA had “decided to exercise its eminent domain powers
to take AMC’s entire leasehold interest in exchange for fair
compensation.”
• The appraised value of the leasehold interest was $0, but “for
settlement purposes and for a quick resolution of this matter,”
the CRA offered to pay AMC $185,000 for a mutual termina-
tion of the lease and AMC’s agreement to fully surrender and
vacate the premises. That offer would “remain open until April
7, 2023, at which time it will become null and void.”
• If a negotiated resolution could not be reached by the deadline,
the CRA would “have no alternative but to turn the acquisition
process over to [its counsel] for legal action to secure AMC’s
leasehold interest in the Premises under the AMC Lease.”
The record does not indicate any further communication
between the parties regarding the March 31, 2023, settlement
letter.
7 But see § 18-2122 (CRA has right to acquire property by eminent domain
“which it may deem necessary for a redevelopment project” after adoption
of resolution).

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
318 Nebraska Reports
WOODSONIA HWY 281 v. AMERICAN MULTI-CINEMA
Cite as 318 Neb. 592
(d) Woodsonia Executes Transfer
of AMC’s Lease
Also on March 31, 2023, Woodsonia and the CRA executed
what was titled a “Transfer and Termination of AMC Lease
Dated Effective March 31, 2023.” That document provided in
relevant part:
In light of the CRA’s threat of condemnation proceed-
ings, Woodsonia hereby transfers, assigns and conveys to
the CRA AMC’s entire leasehold interest in the Premises
under the AMC Lease, and the CRA (as the new lessee)
and Woodsonia (as the lessor) hereby mutually terminate
the AMC Lease dated effective March 31, 2023.
AMC challenges the validity of this transfer and argues
the lease was not terminated by the actions of Woodsonia and
the CRA.
5. Forcible Entry and Detainer Action
On April 4, 2023, Woodsonia notified AMC that its lease-
hold interest had been transferred to the CRA and terminated
effective March 31, 2023. Woodsonia served a 3-day notice to
quit, 8 and on April 14, it filed this forcible entry and detainer
action in the Hall County Court. The same day, Woodsonia
served AMC with summons and a copy of the complaint. Trial
was set for April 27.
Woodsonia’s 415-page complaint alleged facts as gener-
ally set forth above and attached numerous supporting exhib-
its, including the subject lease and related assignments; the
recorded warranty deed and redevelopment contract; several
of the resolutions relating to the redevelopment project; the
March 8 and March 31, 2023, letters to AMC; the March 31
“transfer and termination” agreement; and the 3-day notice
to quit.
Two days before trial, Woodsonia submitted a brief, argu-
ing that the evidence would show it was entitled to immediate
possession because (1) under the eminent domain provisions
8 See § 25-21,221.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
318 Nebraska Reports
WOODSONIA HWY 281 v. AMERICAN MULTI-CINEMA
Cite as 318 Neb. 592
of the lease, Woodsonia had the right to convey AMC’s lease-
hold interest to the CRA under threat of condemnation and
thereby terminate the lease; (2) Woodsonia exercised that
right; (3) such lease provisions were valid and enforceable;
and (4) the condemnation decisions of the CRA were not ille-
gal, arbitrary, unreasonable, or clearly wrong. 9
The day of trial, AMC moved to dismiss the action for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Citing the settled proposi-
tion that courts do not have jurisdiction to try title disputes
in forcible entry and detainer actions, 10 AMC argued that
Woodsonia’s complaint presented a title dispute because “[i]n
order to decide the issues in this case, [the] Court must first
resolve a . . . dispute between the parties over title to the lease-
hold estate.” AMC claimed that it was still legally entitled to
possess the demised premises because the conditions precedent
to termination under eminent domain provisions of the lease
had not been met. In other words, it was AMC’s position that
because there was a dispute about whether the lease had been
terminated or was still in full force and effect, the case pre-
sented a “title dispute” that could not be resolved in a forcible
entry and detainer action.
The county court took up the motion to dismiss simul-
taneously with trial on the merits of the forcible entry and
detainer action. No evidence was adduced on the motion to
dismiss, but during trial, several affidavits were offered to
9 See, § 18-2122 (“[a]n authority shall have the right to acquire by the
exercise of the power of eminent domain any real property . . . after the
adoption by it of a resolution declaring that the acquisition of the real
property described therein is necessary[, and] the resolution shall be
conclusive evidence that the acquisition of such real property is necessary
for the purposes described therein”); Fitzke v. City of Hastings, 255 Neb.
46, 56, 582 N.W.2d 301, 309 (1998) (“a district court may disturb the
decision of a CRA only if it determines that the decision was illegal or
is not supported by the evidence and is thus arbitrary, unreasonable, or
clearly wrong”).
10 See, e.g., Cummins Mgmt. v. Gilroy, supra note 3.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
318 Nebraska Reports
WOODSONIA HWY 281 v. AMERICAN MULTI-CINEMA
Cite as 318 Neb. 592
prove service of the 3-day notice to quit 11 and to authenticate
the various documents Woodsonia relied upon to establish its
claim that AMC’s leasehold interest had been terminated.
At the conclusion of the evidence, the county court announced
its ruling from the bench. It overruled AMC’s motion to dis-
miss, reasoning the legal issues presented for review did not
amount to a title dispute and, therefore, it had jurisdiction to
decide the forcible entry and detainer. On the merits of the
forcible entry and detainer, the court expressly found that the
lease contained express termination provisions conditioned on
a threat of condemnation, that the lease terms were unambigu-
ous, and that the evidence showed the termination provisions
had been satisfied. It therefore concluded the lease had been
terminated and Woodsonia was entitled to restitution of the
leased premises.
After the court pronounced its judgment of restitution, AMC
asked the court to make specific findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law. 12 Consistent with that request, the county court
entered a written order on May 8, 2023, overruling the motion
to dismiss and finding that “Woodsonia met its burden of
proof” in the forcible entry and detainer action. That order
included an express finding that Woodsonia had proved the
lease was terminated “under both conditions 15.1 and 15.5”
when Woodsonia “conveyed a portion of the premises, namely
AMC’s lease, to the CRA . . . without any obligation or liabil-
ity to AMC and free of any [of] AMC’s rights.” The same day,
the county court issued a writ of restitution.
6. Appeal to District Court
AMC timely appealed, and the district court, sitting as an
appellate court, affirmed. AMC identified 17 separate errors
before the district court, but we address only those that are
11 See § 25-21,223 (“person making the service shall file with the court an
affidavit stating with particularity the manner in which he or she made the
service”).
12 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1127 (Reissue 2016).

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
318 Nebraska Reports
WOODSONIA HWY 281 v. AMERICAN MULTI-CINEMA
Cite as 318 Neb. 592
relevant to the assignments of error raised on further appeal to
this court.
The district court first addressed AMC’s jurisdictional argu-
ment that the forcible entry and detainer action presented a
“title dispute” that deprived the county court of subject mat-
ter jurisdiction. The district court found no case directly on
point but reasoned that “Nebraska case law strongly suggests
that where a lease expressly provides for termination . . .
due to certain events, a forcible entry and detainer action is
available to determine possession.” Applying that reasoning,
the district court found that sections 15.1 and 15.5 of the
lease were unambiguous and that such provisions expressly
“allowed Woodsonia to transfer AMC’s leasehold interest”
under threat of condemnation. The court further found, based
on the evidence, that Woodsonia had shown that AMC’s lease
was “terminated upon such transfer” and that Woodsonia was
therefore entitled to possession of the property. It affirmed the
judgment of the county court.
AMC filed this timely appeal, which we moved to our
docket. 13
II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
AMC assigns, restated, that the district court erred in (1)
concluding it had jurisdiction over the forcible entry and
detainer action because it did not involve a “title dispute” and
(2) construing the condemnation provisions in the lease to
authorize Woodsonia to convey AMC’s leasehold interest in
the demised premises without also conveying any portion of
Woodsonia’s own fee interest in the demised premises.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1] Subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law. 14 In
reviewing a trial court’s decision on a motion to dismiss for
13 See, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-1106(3) (Cum. Supp. 2024); Neb. Ct. R. App. P.
§ 2-102(C) (rev. 2022).
14 Joshua M. v. State, 316 Neb. 446, 5 N.W.3d 454 (2024).

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WOODSONIA HWY 281 v. AMERICAN MULTI-CINEMA
Cite as 318 Neb. 592
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, an appellate court employs
a de novo standard of review. 15
IV. ANALYSIS
Before the county court, and again on appeal to the district
court and to this court, AMC has argued this forcible entry and
detainer case should be dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction because it presents a title dispute. AMC’s jurisdic-
tional argument relies on an established proposition of law in
our forcible entry and detainer jurisprudence:
For well over a century, we have held that a court can-
not determine a question of title in a forcible entry and
detainer action; if the resolution of the case would require
the court to determine a title dispute, it must dismiss the
case for lack of jurisdiction. 16
The parties disagree about whether Woodsonia’s forcible
entry and detainer action presented a title dispute. AMC
contends it did, reasoning that the county court could not
determine whether Woodsonia was entitled to immediate pos-
session of the demised premises without first resolving a title
dispute over “who owns the leasehold estate.” 17 Woodsonia,
on the other hand, contends that AMC has not raised a “legiti-
mate title issue,” 18 reasoning that “the issue of possession
was entirely presented and resolved based on undisputed
facts and unambiguous contractual provisions, not based on a
title dispute.” 19
The jurisdictional question presented in this appeal is one
that our published opinions have not directly addressed: In
15 See Muller v. Weeder, 313 Neb. 639, 986 N.W.2d 38 (2023).
16 Cummins Mgmt. v. Gilroy, supra note 3, 266 Neb. at 638, 667 N.W.2d at
542.
17 Brief for appellant at 18.
18 Brief for appellee at 19.
19 Id.

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WOODSONIA HWY 281 v. AMERICAN MULTI-CINEMA
Cite as 318 Neb. 592
a forcible entry and detainer action, is a question of title
presented if the landlord and tenant dispute whether the ten-
ant’s leasehold interest was validly terminated? To answer this
question, we begin by reviewing the limited scope of forcible
entry and detainer actions under Nebraska law. We then focus
more specifically on cases explaining why forcible entry and
detainer actions must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction
when a title dispute is presented. Finally, we apply that prec-
edent to decide whether this forcible entry and detainer action
presents a title dispute.
1. Forcible Entry and Detainer Actions
[2] A forcible entry and detainer action is a creature of
the Legislature and did not exist at common law. 20 We have
recognized that because a court’s jurisdiction over forcible
entry and detainer actions arises out of a legislative grant, it is
inherently limited by that grant. 21
[3] In Nebraska, the Legislature has limited the scope of
forcible entry and detainer actions to two circumstances: (1)
“complaints of unlawful and forcible entry into lands and
tenements and the detention of the same” and (2) “complaints
against those who, having a lawful and peaceable entry into
lands or tenements, unlawfully and by force hold the same.” 22
The latter category of cases includes those where (1) tenants
are deemed to be holding over their term because they have
failed to pay rent when it became due 23; (2) tenants have
“threatened the health or safety” of other tenants, the landlord,
or the landlord’s agents and employees 24; (3) there has been
20 See Armstrong v. Mayer, 60 Neb. 423, 83 N.W. 401 (1900).
21 See Cummins Mgmt. v. Gilroy, supra note 3.
22 § 25-21,219. See, also, Federal Nat. Mortgage Assn. v. Marcuzzo, supra
note 3; Stuthman v. Stuthman, 245 Neb. 846, 515 N.W.2d 781 (1994).
23 § 25-21,220(1).
24 § 25-21,220(2).

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WOODSONIA HWY 281 v. AMERICAN MULTI-CINEMA
Cite as 318 Neb. 592
a sale of the property pursuant to a “judgment or decree” and
the judgment debtor was in possession of the property when
the sale was made 25; (4) there has been a sale on partition
or a sale by executors, administrators, or guardians, and the
sale has been “examined by the proper court” and “adjudged
legal” 26; and (5) the defendant is occupying the land or tene-
ment “without color of title” and the “complainant has the right
of possession.” 27
In this forcible entry and detainer action, Woodsonia relied
exclusively on the last of these five statutory categories and
specifically alleged that because AMC’s “entire leasehold
interest” had been conveyed to the CRA and then terminated,
AMC was “occupying the [demised premises] without color
of title” and “in violation of Woodsonia’s right to possess” the
premises.
By statute, trial of an action for forcible entry and detainer
must be “held not less than ten nor more than fourteen days”
after summons is issued. 28 And after hearing the evidence,
restitution of the premises must be ordered if the court or
jury finds that “an unlawful and forcible entry has been made
and that the same lands or tenements are held by force” 29 or
that “after a lawful entry, [the lands or tenements] are held
unlawfully.” 30
[4,5] Based on this statutory framework, we have described
forcible 	entry 	and 	detainer 	actions 	as 	“special 	statutory
proceeding[s] designed to provide a speedy and summary
25 § 25-21,220(3).
26 § 25-21,220(4).
27 § 25-21,220(5).
28 § 25-21,223.
29 § 25-21,219.
30 Id. See, also, §§ 25-21,226 (judgment upon trial to court) and 25-21,227
(trial by jury).

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method by which the owner of real estate might regain pos-
session of it from one who had unlawfully and forcibly
entered into and detained possession thereof, or one who,
having lawfully entered, then unlawfully and forcibly detained
possession.” 31 Given the limited scope of forcible entry and
detainer, we have said that when a court hears such an action,
it “‘sits as a special statutory tribunal to summarily decide
the issues authorized by the statute’” and does not have the
“‘power to hear and determine other issues.’” 32
[6-8] Forcible entry and detainer actions prevent protracted
litigation by limiting the scope of the proceeding so collateral
issues not connected with the question of possession do not
burden or delay the proceeding. 33 In an action for forcible
entry and detainer, the contest is limited to the naked right
of possession of the premises. 34 Because the action is merely
possessory, the question of title to real estate cannot be either
tried or determined in the case. 35
31 Cummins Mgmt. v. Gilroy, supra note 3, 266 Neb. at 639, 667 N.W.2d
at 542 (internal quotation marks omitted). See Estabrook v. Hateroth, 22
Neb. 281, 34 N.W. 634 (1887). See, also, § 25-21,219. See, generally,
Wells v. Cox, 84 Neb. 26, 120 N.W. 433 (1909) (discussing forcible entry
and detainer origin and Nebraska statutes).
32 See Cummins Mgmt. v. Gilroy, supra note 3, 266 Neb. at 640, 667 N.W.2d
at 543.
33 Federal Nat. Mortgage Assn. v. Marcuzzo, supra note 3.
34 Dawson v. Dawson, 17 Neb. 671, 24 N.W. 339 (1885). Accord, Jones v.
Schmidt, 163 Neb. 508, 80 N.W.2d 289 (1957); Gregory v. Pribbeno, 143
Neb. 379, 9 N.W.2d 485 (1943); Van Sant v. Beuder, 101 Neb. 680, 164
N.W. 711 (1917); Knapp v. Reed, 88 Neb. 754, 130 N.W. 430 (1911). See
§ 25-21,220.
35 See, Brennan v. Brennan, 214 Neb. 125, 332 N.W.2d 696 (1983); Hogan
v. Pelton, 210 Neb. 530, 315 N.W.2d 644 (1982). See, also, Cummins
Mgmt. v. Gilroy, supra note 3; Jones v. Schmidt, supra note 34; Towles v.
Hamilton, 94 Neb. 588, 143 N.W. 935 (1913); Tarpenning v. King, 60 Neb.
213, 82 N.W. 621 (1900).

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2. Title Disputes in
Forcible Entry and Detainer
[9,10] A forcible entry and detainer action does not try
the question of title, but only the immediate right of posses-
sion. 36 Thus, when a party attempts to interject a title dispute
into a forcible entry and detainer action, thereby transforming
the proceedings into an action to determine title, the court is
divested of jurisdiction. 37 Where the right to possession in
a forcible entry and detainer action involves a title dispute,
“‘resort must be had not only to another tribunal but also to a
different form of action.’” 38
[11,12] As a general matter, if the court in a forcible entry
and detainer action “can find and determine the right of pos-
session without at the same time determining the rights of the
parties, legal or equitable, in the property itself, it cannot be
said that the title is drawn in question.” 39 But if the claim-
ant’s right of possession depends on resolving “some right
of [the] defendant, whether legal or equitable, in the prop-
erty itself,” 40 the court must dismiss the forcible entry and
detainer action for want of jurisdiction. 41 That is so because
the purpose of a forcible entry and detainer action is not to
36 Federal Nat. Mortgage Assn. v. Marcuzzo, supra note 3; Cummins Mgmt.
v. Gilroy, supra note 3.
37 See, Cummins Mgmt. v. Gilroy, supra note 3; Pettit v. Black, 13 Neb. 142,
12 N.W. 841 (1882).
38 Cummins Mgmt. v. Gilroy, supra note 3, 266 Neb. at 639, 667 N.W.2d at
543 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Pence v. Uhl, 11 Neb. 320, 9 N.W. 40
(1881)).
39 Gregory v. Pribbeno, supra note 34, 143 Neb. at 383, 9 N.W.2d at 488.
See, also, Kouma v. Murphy, 129 Neb. 892, 263 N.W. 211 (1935); Stone v.
Blanchard, 87 Neb. 1, 126 N.W. 766 (1910).
40 Jones v. Schmidt, supra note 34, 163 Neb. at 517, 80 N.W.2d at 294.
41 See Jones v. Schmidt, supra note 34. Accord, Stone v. Blanchard, supra
note 39; Dawson v. Dawson, supra note 34.

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determine either the actual ownership of the property or the
legal right to its possession. 42
[13] That said, in a forcible entry and detainer action,
the defendant’s mere assertion that a title claim exists is not
enough to deprive a court of jurisdiction. 43 Instead, a court
may “proceed until the evidence discloses that the question
involved is one of title.” 44
Our forcible entry and detainer cases have found title dis-
putes sufficient to deprive a court of jurisdiction when the evi-
dence showed the defendant had a claim to the lawful posses-
sion of the premises. For example, when a defendant adduced
evidence that the parties never negotiated an oral lease and the
defendant occupied the land in controversy for 28 years, we
held there was a genuine issue as to title that the parties were
“entitled to have adjudicated.” 45 Similarly, when a plaintiff
asserted that the defendant defaulted on a contract of sale,
we held that a title question was presented because the truth
of the assertion needed to “be fully adjudicated” in a proper
proceeding. 46 And as particularly relevant here, more than a
century ago, we held that because the evidence showed a dis-
pute about “[w]hether the contract under which the defendants
hold possession is valid or not,” a title dispute was presented
and the court should have dismissed the forcible entry and
detainer action. 47
42 See, Miller v. Maust, 128 Neb. 453, 259 N.W. 181 (1935); Tarpenning v.
King, supra note 35.
43 See, e.g., Federal Nat. Mortgage Assn. v. Marcuzzo, supra note 3; Cummins
Mgmt. v. Gilroy, supra note 3; Pettit v. Black, supra note 37.
44 Cummins Mgmt. v. Gilroy, supra note 3, 266 Neb. at 640, 667 N.W.2d at
543. See Pettit v. Black, supra note 37.
45 Jones v. Schmidt, supra note 34, 163 Neb. at 517, 80 N.W.2d at 294.
46 C., B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. Skupa, 16 Neb. 341, 346, 20 N.W. 393, 395
(1884). See Lipp v. Hunt, 25 Neb. 91, 41 N.W. 143 (1888).
47 Dawson v. Dawson, supra note 34, 17 Neb. at 672, 24 N.W. at 340.

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With this established precedent in mind, we turn to whether
the evidence in this case presented a title dispute. We conclude
it did.
3. Dispute Over Termination of Leasehold Interest
Presents “Title Dispute” That Cannot Be
Determined in Forcible Entry
and Detainer Action
As stated, AMC contends this case presented a title question
because the court could not determine if Woodsonia had an
immediate right to possess the property unless it first resolved
the parties’ dispute over whether the lease had been validly
terminated or was still in full force and effect. Our prior forc-
ible entry and detainer cases have not considered a factual
situation identical to the one presented here. But on this record,
and in light of our precedent, we have no difficulty conclud-
ing that Woodsonia’s forcible entry and detainer presents a
title question.
First, as foreshadowed by Woodsonia’s 415-page complaint,
and as established by the evidence adduced at trial and the
arguments of the parties, for the court to determine whether
Woodsonia was entitled to immediate possession, it would first
need to decide whether AMC’s leasehold interest had been
validly terminated, which in turn would require the court to
decide whether certain automatic termination provisions in the
lease were both triggered and satisfied.
The lower courts appear to have concluded there was no
title dispute because, after reviewing the evidence, those courts
believed Woodsonia had sufficiently proved its allegation that
under the eminent domain provisions of the lease, AMC’s
leasehold interest was validly conveyed by Woodsonia to the
CRA and thereby terminated. But it is immaterial whether a
court thinks the evidence is sufficient to resolve a title dispute
in a forcible entry and detainer action, because it plainly lacks
jurisdiction to do so.
[14] We understand Woodsonia to advance two reasons why
this case did not present a title dispute. First, it argues there

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was no title dispute because the evidence showed Woodsonia
was the “fee simple owner” 48 of the property. But evidence
showing that Woodsonia was the owner of the demised prop-
erty has no bearing on the title dispute here, which is over
the validity of AMC’s leasehold interest. We have long recog-
nized that a lease and possession constitute an interest in real
estate 49 and that a tenant has a “possessory title while his [or
her] lease remains in force.” 50 AMC asserted, and the evidence
supported, that there was a dispute about whether that lease
remained in force or had been validly terminated. Whether an
owner’s title to property is encumbered by a lease is a question
bearing on title. 51 To the extent Woodsonia argues otherwise, it
is mistaken.
[15] Second, Woodsonia argues that the parties’ dispute
only “involve[d] a simple contractual claim based on unam-
biguous contractual terms and uncontroverted facts” and,
therefore, did not present a title dispute. 52 We understand
48 Brief for appellee at 19.
49 Knapp v. Reed, supra note 34. See, also, Wilson v. Fieldgrove, 280 Neb.
548, 787 N.W.2d 707 (2010); Kirby v. Holland, 210 Neb. 711, 316 N.W.2d
746 (1982); Statler v. Watson, 160 Neb. 1, 68 N.W.2d 604 (1955); Towle
v. Morrell, 129 Neb. 398, 261 N.W. 827 (1935); Parsons v. Prudential
Real Estate Co., 86 Neb. 271, 125 N.W. 521 (1910); Weaver v. Coumbe,
15 Neb. 167, 17 N.W. 357 (1883) (stating lease provides right, title, and
interest to lessee).
50 Lausman v. Drahos, 10 Neb. 172, 176, 4 N.W. 956, 959 (1880). See, e.g.,
Zitting v. Facka, 123 Neb. 159, 161, 242 N.W. 373, 374 (1932) (stating
tenant held “title to the leases”); Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Neville,
102 Neb. 817, 170 N.W. 176 (1918) (title quieted under lease to lessee);
Nebraska Mortgage Loan Co. v. Van Kloster, 42 Neb. 746, 749, 60 N.W.
1016, 1017 (1894) (trustee could not assert “title to the lease”); McDonald
v. Early, 24 Neb. 818, 40 N.W. 410 (1888) (title quieted under lease to
lessee).
51 See, Kresha v. Kresha, 220 Neb. 598, 371 N.W.2d 280 (1985) (analyzing
whether co-owner’s title was encumbered by existing lease); Omaha
Country Club v. Douglas Cty. Bd. of Equal., 11 Neb. App. 171, 645
N.W.2d 821 (2002) (recognizing that title to fee simple estate can be
encumbered by any other severed estate).
52 Brief for appellee at 20.

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Woodsonia to be suggesting there was no title dispute because
it had adduced all the evidence the county court needed to
determine whether the lease had been validly terminated.
But as we already explained, it is immaterial whether a court
thinks it is able to resolve a title dispute based on the evidence
offered in a forcible entry, because it lacks jurisdiction to do
so as a matter of law. A forcible entry and detainer action is
not the proper action to resolve a contract dispute between a
landlord and tenant—even one that is “simple.” 53
We conclude, based on the evidence adduced at trial, that
Woodsonia’s forcible entry and detainer complaint necessarily
required judicial resolution of a title dispute concerning the
continued validity of AMC’s leasehold interest. The county
court, therefore, lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the
action, and it erred in failing to dismiss the action. And when
a lower court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the
merits of a claim, issue, or question, an appellate court also
lacks the power to determine the merits of the claim, issue, or
question presented to the lower court. 54
V. CONCLUSION
This forcible entry and detainer action presented a title
dispute, and the county court, therefore, lacked subject matter
jurisdiction and was required to dismiss the action. Because
both the county court and the district court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction, so do we. 55 We must, therefore, vacate
the judgment of the district court and remand the cause to the
district court with directions to vacate the judgment of the
county court and remand the cause with directions to dismiss
the action.
Judgment vacated, and cause
remanded with directions.
Miller-Lerman, J., not participating.
53 See id.
54 In re Estate of Weeder, ante p. 393, 16 N.W.3d 137 (2025).
55 See Cummins Mgmt. v. Gilroy, supra note 3.