Syring v. Archdiocese of Omaha

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
317 Nebraska Reports
SYRING v. ARCHDIOCESE OF OMAHA
Cite as 317 Neb. 195
Andrew J. Syring, appellant, v.
The Archdiocese of Omaha, appellee.
___ N.W.3d ___
Filed July 26, 2024. 	No. S-23-417.
1. Summary Judgment: Appeal and Error. An appellate court reviews
a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.
2. Motions to Dismiss: Appeal and Error. A district court’s grant of a
motion to dismiss is reviewed de novo.
3. Appeal and Error. In a de novo review, an appellate court reaches a
conclusion independent of the trial court.
4. Summary Judgment: Appeal and Error. An appellate court affirms a
lower court’s grant of summary judgment if the pleadings and admitted
evidence show that there is no genuine issue as to any material facts or
as to the ultimate inferences that may be drawn from the facts and that
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
5. ____: ____. In reviewing a summary judgment, an appellate court views
the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the
judgment was granted, and gives that party the benefit of all reasonable
inferences deducible from the evidence.
6. Limitations of Actions. If the facts in a case are undisputed, the issue
as to when the statute of limitations begins to run is a question of law.
7. Statutes. Statutory interpretation presents a question of law.
8. Judgments: Appeal and Error. An appellate court independently
reviews questions of law decided by a lower court.
9. Limitations of Actions: Libel and Slander. The limitations period in
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-208 (Reissue 2016) commences upon the publica-
tion of the defamatory matter which forms the basis of the action.
10. Actions: Libel and Slander: Time: Damages. Under Nebraska’s single
publication rule, there is just one cause of action for tort damages
founded upon a single publication, and that cause of action accrues at
the moment of the initial publication.
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
10/14/2026 08:26 AM CDT

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
317 Nebraska Reports
SYRING v. ARCHDIOCESE OF OMAHA
Cite as 317 Neb. 195
11. Libel and Slander. Nebraska’s single publication rule, as codified in
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 20-209 (Reissue 2022), applies to internet postings
and publications.
12. Statutes: Appeal and Error. Statutory language is to be given its plain
and ordinary meaning, and an appellate court will not resort to inter-
pretation to ascertain the meaning of statutory words which are plain,
direct, and unambiguous.
13. Statutes. It is not within the province of the courts to read a meaning
into a statute that is not there or to read anything direct and plain out of
a statute.
14. Libel and Slander: Words and Phrases. There is an implicit distinc-
tion in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 20-209 (Reissue 2022) between single and
separate publications.
15. Libel and Slander. Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 20-209 (Reissue 2022), a
subsequent issue, presentation, broadcast, or exhibition, communicating
the same defamatory statement, is a separate publication giving rise to a
separate cause of action.
16. ____. Generally, the single publication rule does not include separate
aggregate publications on different occasions.
17. Libel and Slander: Liability. One who repeats or otherwise republishes
defamatory matter is subject to liability as if he or she originally pub-
lished it.
18. Actions: Mental Distress: Proof. To recover for intentional infliction
of emotional distress, a plaintiff must prove (1) intentional or reckless
conduct (2) that was so outrageous in character and so extreme in degree
as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency and is to be regarded as
atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community and (3) that
the conduct caused emotional distress so severe that no reasonable per-
son should be expected to endure it.
19. Mental Distress. Whether conduct is extreme and outrageous is judged
on an objective standard based on all the facts and circumstances of
the particular case. The facts must be such that when heard, an aver-
age member of the community would resent the actor and exclaim
“Outrageous!” Mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty
oppressions, or other trivialities that result from living in society do not
rise to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct.
20. Judgments: Appeal and Error. An appellate court may affirm a lower
court’s ruling that reaches the correct result, albeit based on different
reasoning.
21. Motions to Dismiss: Pleadings: Appeal and Error. When reviewing
an order dismissing a complaint, the appellate court accepts as true
all facts which are well pled and the proper and reasonable inferences

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SYRING v. ARCHDIOCESE OF OMAHA
Cite as 317 Neb. 195
of law and fact which may be drawn therefrom, but not the plaintiff’s
conclusion.
22. Employer and Employee. The ministerial exception prevents the courts
from interfering with the employment relationship between a religious
institution and its ministers.
Appeal from the District Court for Cuming County, Mark
A. Johnson, Judge. Affirmed.
Lyle Joseph Koenig, of Koenig Law Firm, and James R.
Welsh, of Welsh & Welsch, P.C., L.L.O., for appellant.
William N. Beerman and Patrick M. Flood, of Pansing,
Hogan, Ernst & Buser, L.L.P., for appellee.
Heavican, 	C.J., 	Cassel, 	Stacy, 	Funke, 	Papik, 	and
Freudenberg, JJ.
Cassel, J.
I. INTRODUCTION
A Catholic priest appeals from a judgment in favor of his
former employer dismissing his claims, which stemmed from
a list published on a website that named church personnel
against whom there had been “substantiated claims of clergy
sexual abuse of or sexual misconduct with a minor” and from
a telephone conversation regarding his potential service as a
chaplain. One novel issue is whether that conversation was
a republication of the list. It was not. Another novel issue
is whether the ministerial exception shields the church from
liability regarding the telephone conversation. It does. We
therefore affirm.
II. BACKGROUND
Andrew J. Syring is a Catholic priest who actively served
the Archdiocese of Omaha (Archdiocese) from 2011 to 2018.
Syring’s allegations in this case were largely premised on
three events: the Archdiocese’s initial publication of the list
on November 30, 2018; an update to the list in 2020; and a
subsequent telephone conversation between a church official

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SYRING v. ARCHDIOCESE OF OMAHA
Cite as 317 Neb. 195
and a chief executive officer of a hospital operated and con-
trolled by a Catholic religious order regarding Syring’s fitness
to serve as a chaplain.
We begin by setting forth, in broad strokes, an overview of
this case with a focus on the procedural history. We will pro-
vide additional background later in the opinion.
1. Syring’s Complaint
On October 19, 2020, Syring sued the Archdiocese. He
later filed amended complaints, alleging that the Archdiocese
was 	liable 	for 	“Defamation,” 	“Tortious 	Interference 	With
Prospective 	Employment 	Opportunity 	and 	Defamation,”
“Slander-Per Se,” “Breach of Fiduciary Duty,” “Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress,” and other claims. He sought
damages, attorney fees, and costs.
The Archdiocese filed answers and affirmative defenses,
which are not at issue. The answers alleged, in part, that
Syring’s claims were barred by (1) the applicable statute of
limitations, (2) a lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the
ecclesiastical abstention doctrine and the ministerial excep-
tion, and (3) a failure to allege sufficient facts entitling him to
relief. The Archdiocese made similar arguments in dispositive
motions, which ultimately led to the dismissal of all claims.
2. Archdiocese’s Dispositive Motions
and District Court’s Rulings
In this section, we summarize the Archdiocese’s dispositive
motions and the district court’s rulings to the extent necessary
to address the assignments of error on appeal.
(a) Motion for Summary Judgment
on First Amended Complaint
First, the Archdiocese moved for summary judgment on all
claims set forth in Syring’s first amended complaint. The dis-
trict court’s journal entry and a written order indicated that it
held a hearing on the motion and received evidence from the
Archdiocese only, without objection from Syring.

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317 Nebraska Reports
SYRING v. ARCHDIOCESE OF OMAHA
Cite as 317 Neb. 195
As 	relevant 	here, 	the 	district 	court 	agreed 	with 	the
Archdiocese that Syring’s “Defamation” claim was barred by
Nebraska’s 1-year statute of limitations 1 and thus granted sum-
mary judgment on that claim. It found that the evidence was
undisputed that the list was initially published on November
30, 2018, and that Syring filed the action more than 1 year
later, on October 19, 2020. The court rejected Syring’s argu-
ment that new limitations periods were triggered by “republi-
cations” of the list in 2020.
Syring later moved for leave to file a second amended com-
plaint, which the district court granted.
(b) Motion to Dismiss Certain Claims
in Second Amended Complaint
Next, the Archdiocese moved to dismiss certain claims in
Syring’s second amended complaint for lack of subject mat-
ter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted. The district court’s written order stated that
it held a hearing, during which it took judicial notice of the
second amended complaint and its previous order on summary
judgment. There is no indication in the order that the court
received evidence.
The Archdiocese argued that Syring’s claims for “Tortious
Interference With Prospective Employment Opportunity and
Defamation,” “Slander-Per Se,” and “Breach of Fiduciary
Duty” were constitutionally barred, because they “implicate[d]
religious doctrine and church personnel decisions.” Relying
on U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence, the court agreed and
sustained the motion to dismiss as to those claims.
(c) Motion for Summary Judgment
on Remaining Claims
Finally, the Archdiocese moved for summary judgment on
the remaining causes of action—two claims for intentional
infliction of emotional distress. The district court’s order
1 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-208 (Reissue 2016).

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SYRING v. ARCHDIOCESE OF OMAHA
Cite as 317 Neb. 195
stated that it held a hearing on the motion for summary judg-
ment. The order suggests that the court received as evidence
the first and second amended complaints, affidavits regarding
the telephone conversation, and transcripts of the depositions
of the archbishop of the Archdiocese and Syring, with accom-
panying exhibits.
The district court granted the motion for summary judgment,
reasoning that Syring had “failed to demonstrate any medi-
cal opinion to establish the cause and extent of any alleged
emotional distress.” In particular, it highlighted an excerpt
from Syring’s deposition, in which Syring testified that he had
not sought out any medical care or treatment, or any other
form of care, regarding his alleged injuries. Having concluded
that Syring failed to meet his burden to show a genuine issue
of material fact existed, the court declined to address the
Archdiocese’s alternative theories for dismissal.
Syring filed a motion to alter or amend the order, which the
district court overruled. He then filed a timely appeal, which
we moved to our docket. 2
III. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Syring assigns, restated, consolidated, and reordered, that
the district court erred in (1) dismissing his libel claims on
the ground that the statute of limitations had run; (2) dis-
missing his intentional infliction of emotional distress claims
for lack of a medical causation opinion; and (3) dismiss-
ing his claims for “Tortious Interference With Prospective
Employment Opportunity and Defamation,” “Slander-Per Se,”
and “Breach of Fiduciary Duty” based upon the “ecclesiasti-
cal abstention doctrine.”
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1-3] An appellate court reviews a district court’s grant of
summary judgment de novo. 3 Likewise, a district court’s grant
2 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-1106(3) (Cum. Supp. 2022).
3 Puncochar v. Rudolf, 315 Neb. 650, 999 N.W.2d 127 (2024).

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SYRING v. ARCHDIOCESE OF OMAHA
Cite as 317 Neb. 195
of a motion to dismiss is reviewed de novo. 4 In a de novo
review, an appellate court reaches a conclusion independent
of the trial court. 5 Additional standards of review will be set
forth in the analysis.
V. ANALYSIS
We first discuss Syring’s assignments of error pertaining to
summary judgment and then those pertaining to the motion
to dismiss.
1. Assigned Errors Relating
to Summary Judgment
Syring contends that the district court erred in entering sum-
mary judgment for the Archdiocese on his libel and intentional
infliction of emotional distress claims.
(a) Standard of Review
[4,5] An appellate court affirms a lower court’s grant of
summary judgment if the pleadings and admitted evidence
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material facts
or as to the ultimate inferences that may be drawn from the
facts and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. 6 In reviewing a summary judgment, an appel-
late court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the
party against whom the judgment was granted, and gives that
party the benefit of all reasonable inferences deducible from
the evidence. 7
[6-8] If the facts in a case are undisputed, the issue as to
when the statute of limitations begins to run is a question of
law. 8 Likewise, statutory interpretation presents a question
4 Williams v. Frakes, 315 Neb. 379, 996 N.W.2d 498 (2023).
5 In re Guardianship of Patrick W., 316 Neb. 381, 4 N.W.3d 833 (2024).
6 In re Eileen Ryan Revocable Trust, 316 Neb. 524, 5 N.W.3d 442 (2024).
7 Id.
8 Timothy L. Ashford, PC LLO v. Roses, 313 Neb. 302, 984 N.W.2d 596
(2023).

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SYRING v. ARCHDIOCESE OF OMAHA
Cite as 317 Neb. 195
of law. 9 An appellate court independently reviews questions
of law decided by a lower court. 10
(b) Additional Facts
The following facts appear to be undisputed. On November
30, 2018, the Archdiocese published on its website a “List of
Substantiated Claims of Clergy Sexual Abuse of or Sexual
Misconduct with a Minor” stemming from a review of church
personnel files from 1978 to 2018. The goals of the publication
were to provide victim outreach and transparency. Syring’s
name appeared on the list. The same day, the Archdiocese
published a press release with a reference to its website. The
press release was sent to media outlets, including a newspaper
that published its own article using information gleaned from
the Archdiocese’s website and the list. The Archdiocese also
published the list in an Archdiocesan-operated newspaper, and
it submitted the personnel records of those on the list to the
Attorney General.
The list was updated quarterly by the Archdiocese, if neces-
sary. On October 2, 2020, the Archdiocese updated the list by
adding one or more names to it. There were no changes per-
taining to Syring.
On October 6, 2020, Scott Hastings, the vicar for clergy
and judicial vicar for the Archdiocese, spoke over the tele-
phone with Tyler Toline, the chief executive officer of the
hospital. Toline asked whether the Archdiocese would approve
of Syring’s serving as a chaplain at the hospital. Hastings
responded that Syring was still a priest but was not a priest
in “good standing.” Further, Hastings told Toline that the
Archdiocese would not trust or assign Syring to the position
because it would “involve a reasonable possibility of inter-
action with minors” and referred Toline to the list. Hastings
9 Fountain II v. Douglas Cty. Bd. of Equal., 315 Neb. 633, 999 N.W.2d 135
(2024).
10 In re Hessler Living Trust, 316 Neb. 600, 5 N.W.3d 723 (2024).

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SYRING v. ARCHDIOCESE OF OMAHA
Cite as 317 Neb. 195
stated that he “could not direct [the hospital] on what to do,
but the Archdiocese would not give any permission for . . .
Syring to serve in this capacity and would forbid . . . Syring
from being a [c]haplain there.” Toline did not communicate
directly with Syring about the position, and Syring never
applied for it.
Syring did not, at any point, receive medical care or
treatment for the alleged emotional distress caused by the
Archdiocese’s conduct.
(c) Resolution
(i) Libel Claims
a. Parties’ Arguments
[9] Syring argues that the district court erred in finding
his libel claims were barred by the 1-year limitations period
in § 25-208. Our cases hold that the limitations period in
§ 25-208 commences upon the publication of the defamatory
matter which forms the basis of the action. 11
Syring does not dispute that the Archdiocese originally
posted the list on its website in November 2018. Nor does he
disagree that this action was commenced more than 1 year
later, in October 2020.
Instead, Syring argues there were two “republications” that
triggered new limitations periods: first, the Archdiocese’s
update to the list on October 2, 2020, and second, Hastings’
reference to the list during the telephone conversation with
Toline on October 6. The Archdiocese relies upon Nebraska’s
single publication rule 12 and disputes that there was a “repub-
lication.” We agree with the Archdiocese.
b. Single Publication Rule Applies
[10] In actions for libel or slander, Nebraska applies a single
publication rule. Section 20-209 provides:
11 Timothy L. Ashford, PC LLO v. Roses, supra note 8.
12 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 20-209 (Reissue 2022).

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SYRING v. ARCHDIOCESE OF OMAHA
Cite as 317 Neb. 195
No person shall have more than one cause of action
for damages for libel or slander or invasion of privacy
or any other tort founded upon any single publication,
exhibition, or utterance, such as any one issue of a news-
paper or book or magazine or any one presentation to an
audience or any one broadcast over radio or television or
any one exhibition of a motion picture. Recovery in any
action shall include all damages for any such tort suffered
by the plaintiff in all jurisdictions.
We have said that under Nebraska’s single publication rule,
there is just one cause of action for tort damages founded
upon a single publication, and that cause of action accrues at
the moment of the initial publication. 13
[11] In Timothy L. Ashford, PC LLO v. Roses, 14 we recently
held that Nebraska’s single publication rule, as codified in
§ 20-209, applies to internet postings and publications. There,
an attorney filed suits alleging that he and his law firm were
defamed by a negative review posted on the law firm’s Google
business page. 15 The attorney argued that the unfavorable
Google review should be treated as a “‘continuing tort,’”
with a new limitations period accruing each day the review
remained posted on the internet. 16 In rejecting that argu-
ment, we concluded the unfavorable Google review was a
single publication under § 20-209 and, thus, the attorney had
a single cause of action that accrued on the date when the
Google review was first posted. Because the attorney failed
to file his defamation action within 1 year of that date, it was
time barred.
Our decision in Roses was released after the district court
entered its order disposing of Syring’s libel claims but before
13 Timothy L. Ashford, PC LLO v. Roses, supra note 8.
14 Id.
15 See id.
16 Id. at 322, 984 N.W.2d at 612.

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SYRING v. ARCHDIOCESE OF OMAHA
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Syring filed the instant appeal. Syring does not dispute that
Roses applies here.
On this record, we conclude that the list posted on the
Archdiocese’s website on November 30, 2018, was a single
publication under § 20-209, regardless of how many days
Syring’s name remained on the list. Thus, Syring could not
allege “more than one cause of action for damages for libel
or slander or invasion of privacy or any other tort” 17 founded
upon that single publication. Because Syring failed to file
this action within 1 year of the initial publication, any claim
founded upon it is time barred. The question becomes whether
Syring could allege additional causes of action founded upon
“republications.”
c. Alleged Republications
This case presents our first opportunity to consider the appli-
cation of Nebraska’s single publication rule where a defendant
purportedly republished defamatory matter previously pub-
lished on its website.
[12,13] Familiar principles of statutory interpretation guide
our analysis. Statutory language is to be given its plain and
ordinary meaning, and an appellate court will not resort to
interpretation to ascertain the meaning of statutory words
which are plain, direct, and unambiguous. 18 It is not within
the province of the courts to read a meaning into a statute
that is not there or to read anything direct and plain out of
a statute. 19
[14,15] Section 20-209 does not explicitly refer to “repub-
lications,” but there is an implicit distinction in the statute
between “single” and separate publications. Section 20-209
applies as a bar to multiple suits founded on any “single
17 § 20-209.
18 In re Change of Name of Druckenmiller, 316 Neb. 807, 7 N.W.3d 199
(2024).
19 Saint James Apt. Partners v. Universal Surety Co., 316 Neb. 419, 5
N.W.3d 179 (2024).

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publication,” including, but not limited to, “any one issue of a
newspaper or book or magazine,” “any one presentation to an
audience,” “any one broadcast over radio or television,” and
“any one exhibition of a motion picture.” (Emphasis supplied.)
It follows that under § 20-209, a subsequent issue, pres-
entation, broadcast, or exhibition, communicating the same
defamatory statement, is a separate publication giving rise to
a separate cause of action.
[16] The Restatement (Second) of Torts elaborates on the
distinction. It states that, generally, the single publication rule
does not include “separate aggregate publications on different
occasions.” 20 For example, “if the same defamatory statement
is published in the morning and evening editions of a news-
paper, each edition is a separate single publication and there
are two causes of action.” 21 In that situation, “the publication
reaches a new group and the repetition justifies a new cause
of action.” 22 According to the Restatement, the most common
justification for this conclusion is that “the second publication
is intended to and does reach a new group.” 23
Syring points to two instances of purported republications.
The first one was the addition of one or more other names to
the list. The second was the reference made to the list during
the telephone conversation.
Regarding the first instance involving the Archdiocese’s
update to its website, New York’s high court considered
the application of the single publication rule in a similar
20 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 577A, comment d. at 210 (1977).
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id. See, e.g., Nunes v. Lizza, 12 F.4th 890 (8th Cir. 2021); Nationwide
Bi-Weekly Admin., Inc. v. Belo Corp., 512 F.3d 137 (5th Cir. 2007); Cusano
v. Klein, 264 F.3d 936 (9th Cir. 2001); Clark v. Viacom Intern. Inc., 617
Fed. Appx. 495 (6th Cir. 2015); Ciolino v. Simon, 2021 IL 126024, 455
Ill. Dec. 750, 192 N.E.3d 579 (2021); Firth v. State, 98 N.Y.2d 365, 775
N.E.2d 463, 747 N.Y.S.2d 69 (2002).

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situation. 24 There, the court held as a matter of law that an
unrelated modification to the defendant’s website did not con-
stitute a republication of allegedly defamatory matter previ-
ously published on the same website. The court explained:
The mere addition of unrelated information to a Web
site cannot be equated with the repetition of defamatory
matter in a separately published edition of a book or
newspaper . . . . The justification for the republication
exception has no application at all to the addition of
unrelated material on a Web site, for it is not reason-
ably inferable that the addition was made either with
the intent or the result of communicating the earlier and
separate defamatory information to a new audience. 25
Other courts have reached a similar conclusion. 26
We agree with the New York court’s reasoning and conclude
Syring has failed to show that the Archdiocese’s addition of
one or more other names to the list was intended to and did
reach a new audience. The list constituted one continuous
presentation of the online publication to a global audience.
On these facts, we cannot conclude there was a separate
publication triggering a new limitations period for Syring’s
libel claims.
[17] We also reject Syring’s argument that Hastings’ ref-
erence to the list during the telephone conversation was a
republication. We have previously recognized that one who
repeats or otherwise republishes defamatory matter is sub-
ject to liability as if he or she originally published it. 27 But
courts have held that merely “linking to previously published
24 See Firth v. State, supra note 23.
25 Id. at 371, 775 N.E.2d at 466, 747 N.Y.S.2d at 72.
26 See, e.g., Kiebala v. Boris, 928 F.3d 680 (7th Cir. 2019); Yeager v. Bowlin,
693 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2012); Atkinson v. McLaughlin, 462 F. Supp. 2d
1038 (D.N.D. 2006); Clark v. Viacom Intern. Inc., supra note 23.
27 McCune v. Neitzel, 235 Neb. 754, 457 N.W.2d 803 (1990).

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material” 28 or a “mere reference to an article,” 29 without more,
is not a republication of the original defamatory statement.
Here, Hastings’ mere reference to the list did not repeat or
otherwise “republish” its substantive content.
The pleadings and admitted evidence show there is no
genuine issue as to any material facts. Thus, the district court
did not err in entering summary judgment for the Archdiocese
on the libel claims.
(ii) Intentional Infliction of
Emotional Distress Claims
a. Parties’ Arguments
Syring argues the district court erred in concluding that his
intentional infliction of emotional distress claims failed for
lack of a medical causation opinion. The Archdiocese contends
that the court appropriately applied the law to these facts. It
also argues that Syring’s claims fail on alternative grounds,
including a lack of extreme and outrageous conduct.
b. Elements
[18] To recover for intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress, a plaintiff must prove (1) intentional or reckless con-
duct (2) that was so outrageous in character and so extreme
in degree as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency
and is to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in
a civilized community and (3) that the conduct caused emo-
tional distress so severe that no reasonable person should be
28 In re Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC, 690 F.3d 161, 174 (3d Cir. 2012)
(listing cases). See, also, Lokhova v. Halper, 995 F.3d 134 (4th Cir. 2021);
Penrose Hill, Ltd. v. Mabray, 479 F. Supp. 3d 840 (N.D. Cal. 2020); U.S.
ex rel. Klein v. Omeros Corp., 897 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (W.D. Wash. 2012).
29 In re Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC, supra note 28, 690 F.3d at 175. See,
also, Penrose Hill, Ltd. v. Mabray, supra note 28; U.S. ex rel. Klein v.
Omeros Corp., supra note 28; Salyer v. Southern Poverty Law Center, Inc.,
701 F. Supp. 2d 912 (W.D. Ky. 2009).

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expected to endure it. 30 In this instance, we need not address
all of these elements because our decision on the second one
resolves Syring’s claims.
c. No Extreme and Outrageous Conduct
[19] We recall the standard for extreme and outrageous con-
duct. Whether conduct is extreme and outrageous is judged on
an objective standard based on all the facts and circumstances
of the particular case. The facts must be such that when heard,
an average member of the community would resent the actor
and exclaim “Outrageous!” Mere insults, indignities, threats,
annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities that result
from living in society do not rise to the level of extreme and
outrageous conduct. 31
We have said that “it is for the court to determine, in the first
instance, whether the defendant’s conduct may reasonably be
regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to permit recovery or
whether it is necessarily so.” 32 “Only if reasonable minds may
differ does the fact finder then determine whether the conduct
in a particular case is sufficiently extreme and outrageous as to
result in liability.” 33
Our prior cases illustrate the high bar that a plaintiff must
reach. In one case, 34 we found actionable extreme and out-
rageous conduct where the plaintiff’s uncle had sexually
abused her on numerous occasions when she was a child,
threatening her in order to secure her silence; the uncle again
reached out to her, 30 years later, by telephone and repeated
the same threats; and then the uncle sent her multiple letters
30 Roth v. Wiese, 271 Neb. 750, 716 N.W.2d 419 (2006).
31 Id.
32 Brandon v. County of Richardson, 261 Neb. 636, 657, 624 N.W.2d 604,
621 (2001).
33 Id.
34 See Roth v. Wiese, supra note 30.

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and offensive messages. In another case, 35 we determined as a
matter of law that a sheriff’s use of crude and dehumanizing
language when interviewing a victim of a sexual assault was
actionable extreme and outrageous conduct. Further, we found
actionable conduct when a person who had left a seriously
injured passenger to die following a motor vehicle accident
called the passenger’s mother and falsely reported to her that
her daughter had stolen his vehicle. 36
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Syring,
and giving him the benefit of all reasonable inferences deduc-
ible from the evidence, we conclude that the Archdiocese
was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Syring’s
intentional infliction of emotional distress claims. This situa-
tion revolving around the list and the telephone conversation
simply does not meet the “high hurdle for establishing outra-
geous conduct.” 37
[20] An appellate court may affirm a lower court’s ruling
that reaches the correct result, albeit based on different rea-
soning. 38 Addressing the district court’s reasoning based on
the third element, Syring contends that the court improperly
relied upon cases 39 involving negligent, rather than inten-
tional, infliction of emotional distress. His argument suggests
that this court can infer severe emotional distress from the
extreme and outrageous conduct and thus there was no need
for medical opinion testimony. Having concluded that Syring’s
claims failed on the second element, we need not address
whether the district court applied an incorrect standard to the
third element.
35 See Brandon v. County of Richardson, supra note 32.
36 See Nichols v. Busse, 243 Neb. 811, 503 N.W.2d 173 (1993).
37 Heitzman v. Thompson, 270 Neb. 600, 605, 705 N.W.2d 426, 431 (2005).
38 White v. White, 316 Neb. 616, 6 N.W.3d 204 (2024).
39 See, Sell v. Mary Lanning Memorial Hosp., 243 Neb. 266, 498 N.W.2d
522 (1993); Schleich v. Archbishop Bergan Mercy Hosp., 241 Neb. 765,
491 N.W.2d 307 (1992).

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2. Assigned Errors Relating
to Motion to Dismiss
Syring contends that the district court erred in partially
sustaining the motion to dismiss on the ground that certain
claims were barred by the “ecclesiastical abstention doctrine.”
The doctrine to which he refers is rooted in the U.S. Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence. We provide an overview of it before
addressing Syring’s specific arguments.
(a) Standard of Review
[21] When reviewing an order dismissing a complaint, the
appellate court accepts as true all facts which are well pled
and the proper and reasonable inferences of law and fact which
may be drawn therefrom, but not the plaintiff’s conclusion. 40
(b) Overview of U.S. Supreme Court Jurisprudence
The refusal of courts to become involved in internal church
disputes is firmly entrenched in the U.S. Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence. Historically, the Court has applied an absten-
tion doctrine where the subject matter of a dispute is “strictly
and purely ecclesiastical in its character”—for example, mat-
ters concerning “theological controversy, church discipline,
ecclesiastical government, or the conformity of the members
of the church to the standard of morals required of them.” 41
For more than a century, the Court has adhered to the follow-
ing rule:
[W]henever the questions of discipline, or of faith, or
ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law have been decided by
the highest . . . church judicatories to which the matter
has been carried, the legal tribunals must accept such
decisions as final, and as binding on them, in their appli-
cation to the case before them. 42
40 MacFarlane v. Sarpy Cty. Sch. Dist. 77-0037, 316 Neb. 705, 6 N.W.3d 527
(2024).
41 Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 733, 20 L. Ed. 666 (1871).
42 Id., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 727.

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Although the case first articulating this rule 43 was decided
before the First Amendment was incorporated against the
states, 44 its analysis has been invoked in subsequent First
Amendment decisions. 45 The Court has since articulated:
For where resolution of the disputes cannot be made
without extensive inquiry by civil courts into religious
law and polity, the First and Fourteenth Amendments
mandate that civil courts shall not disturb the decisions
of the highest ecclesiastical tribunal within a church of
hierarchical polity, but must accept such decisions as
binding on them, in their application to the religious
issues of doctrine or polity before them. 46
In light of these principles, the Court has abstained from
resolving disputes over church property, 47 the qualifications of
a chaplain, 48 and the defrocking and removal of a bishop. 49 It
has also rejected the notion that a state legislature, by statute,
may attempt to decide such controversies. 50
43 See id.
44 See, Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 67 S. Ct. 504, 91 L.
Ed. 711 (1947) (guarantee against establishment of religion); Cantwell
v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 60 S. Ct. 900, 84 L. Ed. 1213 (1940) (free
exercise of religion); Hamilton v. Regents, 293 U.S. 245, 55 S. Ct. 197, 79
L. Ed. 343 (1934) (same).
45 See Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, 393 U.S. 440, 89 S. Ct. 601, 21
L. Ed. 2d 658 (1969) (discussing cases).
46 Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 709, 96 S. Ct.
2372, 49 L. Ed. 2d 151 (1976).
47 See, Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 99 S. Ct. 3020, 61 L. Ed. 2d 775 (1979);
Md. & Va. Churches v. Sharpsburg Ch., 396 U.S. 367, 90 S. Ct. 499, 24
L. Ed. 2d 582 (1970); Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, supra note 45;
Watson v. Jones, supra note 41.
48 See Gonzalez v. Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1, 50 S. Ct. 5, 74 L. Ed. 131 (1929),
abrogated on other grounds, Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich,
supra note 46.
49 See Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, supra note 46.
50 See Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 73 S. Ct. 143, 97 L.
Ed. 120 (1952).

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[22] The lower courts built upon the Court’s abstention
doctrine to develop the “‘ministerial exception.’” 51 Generally
speaking, the ministerial exception prevents the courts from
interfering with “the employment relationship between a reli-
gious institution and its ministers.” 52
In Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School
v. EEOC, 53 the Court explicitly adopted the ministerial excep-
tion and held that it barred an employment discrimination
suit brought on behalf of a minister to challenge her church’s
decision to fire her. The Court reasoned, in pertinent part:
The members of a religious group put their faith in the
hands of their ministers. Requiring a church to accept
or retain an unwanted minister, or punishing a church
for failing to do so, intrudes upon more than a mere
employment decision. Such action interferes with the
internal governance of the church, depriving the church
of control over the selection of those who will personify
its beliefs. By imposing an unwanted minister, the state
infringes the Free Exercise Clause, which protects a
religious group’s right to shape its own faith and mis-
sion through its appointments. According the state the
power to determine which individuals will minister to
the faithful also violates the Establishment Clause, which
prohibits government involvement in such ecclesiasti-
cal decisions. 54
The Court has since adhered to these principles. 55
51 See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC,
565 U.S. 171, 188, 132 S. Ct. 694, 181 L. Ed. 2d 650 (2012) (listing
federal circuit courts of appeals cases).
52 Id.
53 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, supra
note 51.
54 Id., 565 U.S. at 188-89.
55 See Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru, 591 U.S. 732, 140
S. Ct. 2049, 207 L. Ed. 2d 870 (2020).

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(c) Additional Facts
Because the relevant claims were disposed of on a motion
to dismiss, the factual record is limited to the allegations set
forth in Syring’s second amended complaint. We recite the
allegations.
On October 30, 2018, Syring was “abruptly removed from
public ministry” and “effectively compelled to resign.” At that
time, the archbishop of the Archdiocese told Syring that “his
ministry had been ‘above reproach’ and that there were no
complaints against him, but that the Archdiocese’s standard
for public ministry had changed and therefore he was being
removed from public ministry by the Archdiocese effective
immediately.” Because Syring “owed the [a]rchbishop a duty
of obedience and the [a]rchbishop was prohibiting [Syring]
from serving publicly as a priest going forward, [Syring] had
no meaningful choice but to resign his position.” The com-
plaint further alleged:
A Roman Catholic [b]ishop, in his diocese, is like a king
or ruler as to any matter pertaining to Catholicism. His
word is law. Every priest in his diocese owes a duty of
obedience to him; the priest’s faculties to minister come
from the bishop. A priest is unable to serve in any capac-
ity within the Church without faculties from his bishop.
As a consequence, when [the] [a]rchbishop . . . removed
[Syring] from public ministry, thereby also removing his
faculties to minister, it amounted to a constructive dis-
missal - not just within the Archdiocese . . . , but within
the universal Church.
Syring’s complaint then set forth allegations regarding the
list. It described the events in 2018, including the original
publication of the list on the Archdiocese’s website, the press
release, the article in the Archdiocesan-operated newspaper,
and the submission of the list to the Attorney General. It
also described the update to the list in 2020. There were no
allegations regarding Hastings’ specific reference to the list

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in 2020, though the complaint did describe the circumstances
surrounding the telephone conversation:
In latter September or early October of 2020, the [c]hap-
lain at [the hospital] resigned. On October 6, . . . Toline
the [c]hief [e]xecutive [o]fficer at [the hospital] called the
Archdiocese to inquire whether [Syring] could serve as
[c]hapl[a]in [there]. On that same day, . . . Hastings, on
behalf of [the Archdiocese], stated that the Archdiocese
would not give any permission for . . . Syring to serve
as a chaplain at [the hospital] because of the reasonable
possibility of his interaction with minors.
The complaint stated that an “allegation” was made against
Syring in 2013 while he was serving as an associate pas-
tor, though Syring denied any wrongdoing. Pursuant to the
Archdiocese’s “standard procedure,” the allegation was thor-
oughly investigated by law enforcement and a retired fed-
eral agent, and “no wrongdoing was identified.” Nonetheless,
Syring was evaluated at two treatment facilities, where it
was determined that Syring had a “‘normal’ profile” and
that he was “not a pedophile, he was not antisocial, he was
not predatory, he did not have a sexual disorder, he was not
a homosexual, he was not a narcissist and he was not an
exploiter.” It was further determined that there was “no indi-
cation that [Syring] would want to hurt anyone.” Thereafter,
the Archdiocese found Syring fit to serve in public ministry,
and he returned to service. Syring served in public ministry
for over 4 years “without incident” until he was “suddenly
removed by [the] [a]rchbishop” in 2018.
Finally, the complaint alleged that Syring had two graduate
degrees and training in teaching and counseling, but he could
not obtain “full-time, regular employment” in those professions
because of the Archdiocese’s “false publication.”
(d) Resolution
Syring challenges the district court’s application of the
U.S. Supreme Court’s jurisprudence to dismiss his claims

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for 	“Tortious 	Interference 	With 	Prospective 	Employment
Opportunity and Defamation,” “Slander-Per Se,” and “Breach
of Fiduciary Duty.” We see no error in the court’s dismissal.
The first two claims were premised solely upon the tele-
phone conversation regarding Syring’s ability to serve as
a chaplain at the hospital. Syring’s claims asserted that the
Archdiocese “falsely impute[d] unfitness to preform [sic]
duties of employment, and prejudice[d] [Syring] in his profes-
sion or trade.” The other claims were premised upon Syring’s
assertion that the Archdiocese owed him fiduciary duties.
For example, the complaint identified a purported breach of
a fiduciary duty in the Archdiocese’s “requiring [Syring’s]
resignation, and omitting to advise him of his right to counsel,
both civil and canonical.”
We cannot uphold Syring’s claims without interfering with
the internal governance of the church, or depriving the church
of control, over the selection of its ministers. The claims—
based on the conversation between officials of a Catholic
archdiocese and a hospital operated by a Catholic religious
order regarding permission for Syring to serve as a chaplain,
Syring’s fitness to perform the duties of his employment, and
the requiring of Syring’s resignation from that employment—
lie at the heart of the ministerial exception articulated by the
U.S. Supreme Court. The district court did not err in dismiss-
ing these claims.
VI. CONCLUSION
The district court correctly granted summary judgment for
the Archdiocese on Syring’s claims for libel and intentional
infliction of emotional distress. We likewise see no error in
the dismissal of his remaining claims pursuant to the ministe-
rial exception. We therefore affirm the judgment dismissing
all claims.
Affirmed.
Miller-Lerman, J., participating on briefs.