State v. Dejaynes-Beaman

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
317 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. DEJAYNES-BEAMAN
Cite as 317 Neb. 131
State of Nebraska, appellee, v.
Daniel Dejaynes-Beaman, appellant.
___ N.W.3d ___
Filed July 12, 2024. 	No. S-23-974.
1. Constitutional Law: Sentences. Whether a sentence constitutes cruel
and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment presents
a question of law.
2. Judgments: Appeal and Error. When reviewing a question of law, an
appellate court reaches a conclusion independent of the lower court’s
ruling.
3. Sentences: Appeal and Error. Absent an abuse of discretion by the trial
court, an appellate court will not disturb a sentence imposed within the
statutory limits.
4. Judgments: Words and Phrases. An abuse of discretion occurs when a
trial court’s decision is based upon reasons that are untenable or unrea-
sonable or if its action is clearly against justice or conscience, reason,
and evidence.
5. Sentences: Appeal and Error. Where a sentence imposed within the
statutory limits is alleged on appeal to be excessive, the appellate court
must determine whether a sentencing court abused its discretion in con-
sidering and applying the relevant factors as well as any applicable legal
principles in determining the sentence to be imposed.
6. Sentences. In determining a sentence to be imposed, relevant factors
customarily considered and applied are the defendant’s (1) age, (2) men-
tality, (3) education and experience, (4) social and cultural background,
(5) past criminal record or record of law-abiding conduct, and (6) moti-
vation for the offense, as well as (7) the nature of the offense and (8) the
amount of violence involved in the commission of the crime.
7. ____. The appropriateness of a sentence is necessarily a subjective judg-
ment and includes the sentencing judge’s observation of the defendant’s
demeanor and attitude and all the facts and circumstances surrounding
the defendant’s life.
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
10/14/2026 08:21 AM CDT

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
317 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. DEJAYNES-BEAMAN
Cite as 317 Neb. 131
Appeal from the District Court for Douglas County, Todd
O. Engleman, Judge. Affirmed.
Thomas C. Riley, Douglas County Public Defender, John J.
Jedlicka, and Rebecca A. McClung for appellant.
Michael 	T. 	Hilgers, Attorney 	General, 	and 	Melissa 	R.
Vincent for appellee.
Heavican, 	C.J., 	Cassel, 	Stacy, 	Funke, 	Papik, 	and
Freudenberg, JJ.
Papik, J.
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Daniel Dejaynes-Beaman
entered no contest pleas to charges of second degree murder
and use of a deadly weapon other than a firearm to commit a
felony. The district court accepted Dejaynes-Beaman’s pleas
and sentenced him to 65 years’ to life imprisonment on the
second degree murder conviction and 40 to 50 years’ impris-
onment on the use of a deadly weapon conviction with the
sentences to run consecutively. Dejaynes-Beaman, who was
18 years old at the time of his offenses, now argues on appeal
that his sentences were unconstitutional and otherwise an
abuse of the district court’s discretion. We find no merit to his
arguments and therefore affirm.
BACKGROUND
Dejaynes-Beaman’s Pleas and Convictions.
The charges in this case arose out of the death of Jolene
Harshbarger. Harshbarger was found dead in her Omaha,
Nebraska, residence. An autopsy concluded that her death
was caused by 12 stab wounds. The autopsy also revealed
proof of vaginal penetration and injury.
Law enforcement investigating Harshbarger’s death learned
that Dejaynes-Beaman, then 18 years of age, had recently
come to Omaha from Texas and had met Harshbarger in
the days leading up to her death. Video evidence collected
from the night before Harshbarger’s body was discovered

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
317 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. DEJAYNES-BEAMAN
Cite as 317 Neb. 131
showed Dejaynes-Beaman walking to Harshbarger’s residence
and returning to the place where he had been staying. In an
interview with law enforcement, Dejaynes-Beaman confessed
to going to Harshbarger’s residence, engaging in sexual inter-
course with her, and then stabbing her multiple times with
a knife.
The State initially charged Dejaynes-Beaman with first
degree murder and use of a deadly weapon other than a firearm
to commit a felony, but the parties later entered a plea agree-
ment whereby Dejaynes-Beaman agreed to plead no contest to
charges of second degree murder and use of a deadly weapon
other than a firearm to commit a felony. At the plea hearing,
the State provided a factual basis for the pleas that included the
information summarized above regarding Dejaynes-Beaman’s
role in Harshbarger’s death. Dejaynes-Beaman did not object
to the State’s factual basis. After the district court accepted
Dejaynes-Beaman’s pleas, it ordered the preparation of a pre-
sentence investigation report (PSR) and set the matter for a
separate sentencing hearing.
Sentencing.
At the sentencing hearing, the district court stated that it
had received and reviewed the PSR along with a letter from
Dejaynes-Beaman’s counsel, a letter from Dejaynes-Beaman’s
sister, and a psychological evaluation of Dejaynes-Beaman
completed by Dr. Kirk Newring. Consistent with the request
of Dejaynes-Beaman’s counsel, the district court made the let-
ters and psychological evaluation part of the PSR.
The letter from Dejaynes-Beaman’s counsel argued that the
district court should consider various mitigating factors in sen-
tencing Dejaynes-Beaman, many of which were drawn from
the letter of Dejaynes-Beaman’s sister and Newring’s psycho-
logical evaluation. In her letter, Dejaynes-Beaman’s sister dis-
cussed Dejaynes-Beaman’s difficult childhood. She reported
that she and Dejaynes-Beaman grew up in extreme poverty
and that their parents were addicted to methamphetamine

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
317 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. DEJAYNES-BEAMAN
Cite as 317 Neb. 131
and physically abused Dejaynes-Beaman, his siblings, and
each other. She also stated that Dejaynes-Beaman was bul-
lied by other children and that he suffered a number of head
injuries as a child. In his evaluation, Newring opined that
Dejaynes-Beaman did not have “a childhood or adolescence
that equipped him for adulthood.” Newring also referenced
scientific literature asserting that the regions of the brain
responsible for impulse control and risk evaluation are not
yet fully formed at age 18. Newring claimed that the research
relating to adolescent brain development would suggest that,
as compared to a mature adult, Dejaynes-Beaman would be
impulsive and less appreciative of dangers and risk.
In the letter to the district court and at the sentencing hear-
ing, Dejaynes-Beaman’s counsel referenced the U.S. Supreme
Court’s opinion in Miller v. Alabama, a case in which the
Court held that “mandatory life without parole for those
under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on ‘cruel and unusual pun-
ishments.’” 567 U.S. 460, 465, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 183 L. Ed.
2d 407 (2012). Dejaynes-Beaman’s counsel acknowledged that
the protections of Miller apply only to those under 18 years
of age at the time of their offense but argued that the district
court should still consider Dejaynes-Beaman’s age and brain
development when sentencing him.
Prior to imposing the sentences, the district court stated
that it had reviewed the PSR and considered the factors set
forth in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2260 (Reissue 2016), as well as
Dejaynes-Beaman’s “age, mentality, education and experience,
social and cultural background, past criminal record, a record
of law abiding conduct[,] [t]he motivation for the offense,
the nature of the offense, [and the] amount of any violence
involved in the . . . offense.” The district court sentenced
Dejaynes-Beaman to a term of 65 years’ to life imprisonment
for the second degree murder conviction and a term of 40 to
50 years’ imprisonment for the use of a deadly weapon convic-
tion. The district court also granted Dejaynes-Beaman credit

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
317 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. DEJAYNES-BEAMAN
Cite as 317 Neb. 131
for time he had already served and ordered the sentences to
run consecutively.
Dejaynes-Beaman timely appealed.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Dejaynes-Beaman does not challenge his convictions on
appeal and instead assigns errors regarding only his sentences.
He claims that his sentences were (1) unconstitutional and (2)
an abuse of the district court’s discretion.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1,2] Whether a sentence constitutes cruel and unusual pun-
ishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment presents a
question of law. State v. Jones, 297 Neb. 557, 900 N.W.2d
757 (2017). When reviewing a question of law, an appellate
court reaches a conclusion independent of the lower court’s
ruling. Id.
[3,4] Absent an abuse of discretion by the trial court, an
appellate court will not disturb a sentence imposed within the
statutory limits. State v. Johnson, 308 Neb. 331, 953 N.W.2d
772 (2021). An abuse of discretion occurs when a trial court’s
decision is based upon reasons that are untenable or unreason-
able or if its action is clearly against justice or conscience,
reason, and evidence. Id.
ANALYSIS
Dejaynes-Beaman’s Sentences
Were Not Unconstitutional.
We begin our analysis with Dejaynes-Beaman’s contention
that his sentences were unconstitutional. Dejaynes-Beaman
argues that because he was only 18 years old at the time of his
offenses and because his sentences amount to what he charac-
terizes as a “de facto life sentence,” the sentences imposed on
him were unconstitutional. Brief for appellant at 17.
In arguing that his sentences were unconstitutional, Dejaynes-
Beaman references the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in Miller
v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 183 L. Ed. 2d

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
317 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. DEJAYNES-BEAMAN
Cite as 317 Neb. 131
407 (2012). As he did in the district court, Dejaynes-Beaman
appears to acknowledge on appeal that the rule recognized by
the U.S. Supreme Court in Miller applies to those who were
under 18 years of age at the time of their offenses. At the same
time, however, he states that he should have been “afforded the
protections of Miller.” Brief for appellant at 21. In support of
this assertion, Dejaynes-Beaman points out that Nebraska law
generally treats persons under 19 years of age as minors. See
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-2101 (Cum. Supp. 2022). He also cites to
cases from other states that have, as a matter of state constitu-
tional law, extended the rule recognized in Miller to offenders
who have reached the age of 18 at the time of their offenses.
See, e.g., Matter of Monschke, 197 Wash. 2d 305, 482 P.3d
276 (2021).
To the extent Dejaynes-Beaman is asking us to expand the
rule established in Miller to those who are 18 years of age and
older, we decline. We have previously rejected the argument
that because persons under age 19 are generally considered to
be “minors” in Nebraska, Miller should apply to an offender
who was 18 years old when the offender committed his or her
offense. See State v. Wetherell, 289 Neb. 312, 855 N.W.2d 359
(2014), disapproved on other grounds, State v. Goynes, 293
Neb. 288, 876 N.W.2d 912 (2016). Neither are we inclined to
expand the rule the U.S. Supreme Court announced in Miller as
a matter of state constitutional law.
That said, we see little need to devote significant discussion
to whether the Miller rule ought to apply to Dejaynes-Beaman
because, even if it did, there would have been no Miller vio-
lation. As mentioned above, Miller held that “mandatory life
without parole [sentences] for those under the age of 18 at
the time of their crimes” violated the Eighth Amendment.
567 U.S. at 465 (emphasis supplied). Not only was Dejaynes-
Beaman not under age 18 at the time of his offenses, he did
not receive a mandatory life without parole sentence. Second
degree murder is a Class IB felony, punishable by a minimum
term of 20 years’ imprisonment and a maximum term of life

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
317 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. DEJAYNES-BEAMAN
Cite as 317 Neb. 131
imprisonment. See Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 28-105 (Cum. Supp.
2022) and 28-304 (Reissue 2016). Use of a deadly weapon,
other than a firearm, to commit a felony is a Class II felony
punishable by a minimum term of 1 year’s imprisonment and
a maximum of 50 years’ imprisonment. See § 28-105 and Neb.
Rev. Stat. § 28-1205 (Reissue 2016).
The district court thus had discretion to impose a lesser
punishment than life without parole. Even when Miller applies,
that is all it requires. As the U.S. Supreme Court has since
clarified, “[i]n a case involving an individual who was under
18 when he or she committed a homicide, a State’s discretion-
ary sentencing system is both constitutionally necessary and
constitutionally sufficient.” Jones v. Mississippi, 593 U.S. 98,
105, 141 S. Ct. 1307, 209 L. Ed. 2d 390 (2021).
The U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in Jones v. Mississippi
also makes clear that Dejaynes-Beaman’s characterization of
his sentences as a “de facto life sentence,” see brief for
appellant at 17, is irrelevant to his constitutional argument.
Following Miller, supra, some courts concluded that “Miller’s
principles are fully applicable to a lengthy term-of-years
sentence,” sometimes termed a “de facto life sentence.” See,
e.g., State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41, 72 (Iowa 2013). But even
assuming a term-of-years sentence for a juvenile can reach a
length at which it becomes a de facto life-without-parole sen-
tence, Jones v. Mississippi held that a sentencing court may,
consistent with the Eighth Amendment, impose an actual life-
without-parole sentence so long as the sentencing court retains
discretion to impose a lesser penalty. It follows that, so long
as the sentencing judge has discretion to consider a juvenile
offender’s youth and impose a lesser sentence, there is no
Miller violation if a court imposes what may amount to a de
facto life sentence. Many other courts have relied on Jones v.
Mississippi to reach that conclusion. See, e.g., U.S. v. Grant,
9 F.4th 186 (3d Cir. 2021); People v. Wilson, 2023 IL 127666,
220 N.E.3d 1068, 468 Ill. Dec. 289 (2023); Commonwealth v.
Felder, 269 A.3d 1232 (Pa. 2022); Williams v. State, 314 Kan.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
317 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. DEJAYNES-BEAMAN
Cite as 317 Neb. 131
466, 500 P.3d 1182 (2021). See, also, State v. Cardeilhac, 293
Neb. 200, 876 N.W.2d 876 (2016) (concluding, pre-Jones v.
Mississippi, that even if Miller applied to lengthy term-of-
years sentence, no Miller violation occurred because sentenc-
ing hearing complied with Miller).
Finally, we note that the weakness of Dejaynes-Beaman’s
constitutional argument is demonstrated by the relief he seeks.
He argues that we should vacate his sentences and order a
resentencing hearing at which relevant mitigating circum-
stances, presumably his age and qualities related thereto,
could be considered. But Dejaynes-Beaman already received
as much. The district court received the PSR, which included
the letter from Dejaynes-Beaman’s sister recounting his dif-
ficult childhood, as well as Newring’s evaluation in which
he opined that, because of Dejaynes Beaman’s age and brain
development, he did not have the impulse control or ability
to appreciate risk that a mature adult would have. There is
nothing in the record to suggest that the district court did not
consider those materials in addition to Dejaynes-Beaman’s
age and experience in determining his sentences. The dis-
trict court thus already did what Dejaynes-Beaman contends
is constitutionally required. We find no basis to conclude
Dejaynes-Beaman’s sentences were unconstitutional.
Dejaynes-Beaman’s Sentences Were
Not an Abuse of Discretion.
This leaves Dejaynes-Beaman’s argument that the district
court abused its discretion in sentencing him. Dejaynes-Beaman
does not dispute that his sentences were within statutory limits,
but argues that the district court failed to consider all of the
mitigating information in the sentencing record.
[5-7] Where a sentence imposed within the statutory limits
is alleged on appeal to be excessive, the appellate court must
determine whether a sentencing court abused its discretion
in considering and applying the relevant factors as well as
any applicable legal principles in determining the sentence

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317 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. DEJAYNES-BEAMAN
Cite as 317 Neb. 131
to be imposed. State v. Stack, 307 Neb. 773, 950 N.W.2d 611
(2020). In determining a sentence to be imposed, relevant fac-
tors customarily considered and applied are the defendant’s
(1) age, (2) mentality, (3) education and experience, (4) social
and cultural background, (5) past criminal record or record
of law-abiding conduct, and (6) motivation for the offense,
as well as (7) the nature of the offense and (8) the amount
of violence involved in the commission of the crime. Id. The
appropriateness of a sentence is necessarily a subjective judg-
ment and includes the sentencing judge’s observation of the
defendant’s demeanor and attitude and all the facts and cir-
cumstances surrounding the defendant’s life. Id.
Dejaynes-Beaman argues that the district court did not con-
sider the factors enumerated above, particularly those factors
that pertain to his life experience. In arguing that the district
court did not consider his life experience, Dejaynes-Beaman
specifically highlights the letters submitted by his sister and
Newring. Those letters reveal an undoubtedly difficult child-
hood in which Dejaynes-Beaman lived in extreme poverty,
was exposed to drug use due to his parents’ addictions, was
physically abused by his parents, suffered various incidents of
head trauma, began abusing illegal drugs himself at a young
age, and developed various mental health issues. Dejaynes-
Beaman argues that if the district court had truly consid-
ered what he experienced in his childhood, along with his
minimal criminal history, it would have imposed substantially
shorter sentences.
We disagree that the district court abused its discretion
in sentencing Dejaynes-Beaman. Although Dejaynes-Beaman
argues that the district court did not consider his life experi-
ence, the record does not support his assertion. It appears
Dejaynes-Beaman’s true objection to his sentences is not that
the district court did not consider the mitigating informa-
tion he offered, but that it should have weighed the relevant
sentencing factors differently. We recall, however, that it is
not our function to conduct a de novo review of the record

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STATE v. DEJAYNES-BEAMAN
Cite as 317 Neb. 131
to determine what sentence we would impose, see State v.
Horne, 315 Neb. 766, 1 N.W.3d 457 (2024), and that the
district court was also obligated to consider the nature of
Dejaynes-Beaman’s murder of Harshbarger. With those con-
siderations in mind, we cannot say the district court abused
its discretion in sentencing Dejaynes-Beaman.
CONCLUSION
We find no error in Dejaynes-Beaman’s sentences. We there-
fore affirm.
Affirmed.
Miller-Lerman, J., participating on briefs.