Johnson v. Vosberg

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
316 Nebraska Reports
JOHNSON v. VOSBERG
Cite as 316 Neb. 658
Daniel Johnson, appellee, v.
Tina Vosberg, appellant.
___ N.W.3d ___
Filed May 17, 2024. 	No. S-23-396.
1. Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. A jurisdictional question which does
not involve a factual dispute is determined by an appellate court as a
matter of law.
2. Moot Question: Justiciable Issues: Appeal and Error. Mootness is a
justiciability question that an appellate court determines as a matter of
law when it does not involve a factual dispute.
3. Statutes: Appeal and Error. The right of appeal in Nebraska is purely
statutory, and unless a statute provides for an appeal, such right does
not exist.
4. Judgments: Final Orders: Legislature: Appeal and Error. Through
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1912 (Cum. Supp. 2022), the Legislature has autho-
rized appeals from “judgments and decrees rendered,” as well as “final
orders,” made by the district court; additionally, where implicated, an
order must comply with Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1315 (Reissue 2016).
5. Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. If the district court, sitting as an
intermediate appellate court, lacked jurisdiction over a party’s appeal,
a higher appellate court also lacks jurisdiction to decide the merits of
the appeal.
6. Judgments. A judgment disposes of the case fully and leaves nothing
for further determination.
7. Judgments: Words and Phrases. Every direction of a court or judg-
ment made or entered in writing and not included in a judgment is
an order.
8. Final Orders. Final orders are defined in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1902
(Cum. Supp. 2022), which currently recognizes four categories of final
orders; some categories pertain to actions, and one pertains to spe-
cial proceedings.
9. Landlord and Tenant: Judgments: Appeal and Error. The Uniform
Residential Landlord and Tenant Act provides for an immediate appeal
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
10/14/2026 08:33 AM CDT

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
316 Nebraska Reports
JOHNSON v. VOSBERG
Cite as 316 Neb. 658
from the rendition of the judgment in the trial of the action for posses-
sion, regardless of whether other causes of action relating to the tenancy
under the act are still pending.
10. Landlord and Tenant: Judgments. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1315 (Reissue
2016) is not implicated when a judgment in an action under the Uniform
Residential Landlord and Tenant Act for possession has been rendered
and the only pending claims are those relating to the tenancy as contem-
plated under the act.
11. Moot Question: Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. Mootness does not
prevent appellate jurisdiction.
12. Moot Question: Jurisdiction. Mootness is a justiciability doctrine that
can prevent courts from exercising jurisdiction.
13. Moot Question: Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. Appellate courts
review mootness determinations under the same standard of review as
other jurisdictional questions.
14. Moot Question: Words and Phrases. A case is moot if the facts under-
lying the dispute have changed, such that the issues presented are no
longer alive.
15. Moot Question. The central question in a mootness analysis is whether
changes in circumstances that prevailed at the beginning of litigation
have forestalled any occasion for meaningful relief.
16. ____. While a moot case is normally subject to summary dismissal,
Nebraska recognizes a public interest exception to the mootness doctrine.
17. Moot Question: Appeal and Error. The public interest exception to the
mootness doctrine requires an appellate court to consider (1) the public
or private nature of the question presented, (2) the desirability of an
authoritative adjudication for guidance of public officials, and (3) the
likelihood of recurrence of the same or a similar problem.
Appeal from the District Court for Douglas County, Tressa
M. Alioth, Judge, on appeal thereto from the County Court
for Douglas County, Grant A. Forsberg, Judge. Appeal
dismissed.
Natalie M. Hein and Damien J. Wright, of Welch Law Firm,
P.C., for appellant.
Jason C. Hubbard, of Jason Hubbard Law, P.C., L.L.O., for
appellee.
Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke,
Papik, and Freudenberg, JJ.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
316 Nebraska Reports
JOHNSON v. VOSBERG
Cite as 316 Neb. 658
Freudenberg, J.
INTRODUCTION
The landlord filed a complaint under Nebraska’s Uniform
Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (URLTA) asking for
restitution of the premises, unpaid rent, and statutory dam-
ages for willful holdover. The landlord presented a copy of a
90-day lease, but the tenant alleged the lease was for a period
of 1 year. While the claims for unpaid rent and holdover
remained pending, the county court held an expedited trial
on the claim for possession, ultimately ordering judgment in
favor of the landlord and issuing a writ of restitution of the
premises. The tenant immediately appealed, and the writ was
stayed pending the appeal, pursuant to a supersedeas bond.
The district court affirmed, and the tenant appeals to our
court. During the pendency of the appeal, the alleged 1-year
lease period passed, the tenant vacated the premises, and the
tenant stopped paying monthly rent pursuant to the superse-
deas bond. We hold that we have appellate jurisdiction, but
that the appeal is moot.
BACKGROUND
Complaint
On October 11, 2022, Daniel Johnson filed a complaint
against Tina Vosberg, a tenant living in his residence, in the
county court for Douglas County, pursuant to the URLTA. 1
In his complaint, Johnson asserted three “causes of action”
under the URLTA: (1) restitution of the premises (possession),
(2) unpaid rent, and (3) holdover. Johnson sought possession
of the premises, damages, and attorney fees as provided by
§ 76-1437(3) and costs.
In support of the cause of action for possession, Johnson
alleged that the initial term of the lease had run and was on
a month-to-month basis when Johnson served a 30-day notice
1 See Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 76-1401 to 76-1449 (Reissue 2018 & Cum. Supp.
2022).

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
316 Nebraska Reports
JOHNSON v. VOSBERG
Cite as 316 Neb. 658
that the lease would end. Johnson alleged that Vosberg did not
vacate the premises after the 30-day notice had run and that
Vosberg continues to be unlawfully in possession of the prem-
ises. In support of the cause of action for unpaid rent, Johnson
alleged that he had incurred $3,358.11 in special damages due
to Vosberg’s failure to pay rent as it became due during her
tenancy. In support of the cause of action for holdover, Johnson
alleged Vosberg’s continuing possession of the premises was
willful and in bad faith, entitling Johnson to damages for will-
ful holdover in the amount of three times the monthly rent
($4,500) pursuant to § 76-1437(3).
Trial on Possession
An 	expedited 	trial 	was 	conducted 	on 	Johnson’s 	claim
for possession while the other claims remained pending. At
trial, the parties primarily disputed the duration of the lease
agreement. Johnson presented a written “Roommate Lease
Agreement” signed by Johnson’s wife and Vosberg on May
3, 2022. The lease provides for a term beginning May 7 and
ending August 5. Also entered into evidence was Johnson’s
notice to Vosberg on August 15 that her tenancy would not be
renewed at the end of its term and that she was expected to
vacate the premises by September 30.
Vosberg admitted at trial that it was her signature on the last
page of the lease entered into evidence and that she received
the 30-day notice of nonrenewal. Nevertheless, Vosberg testi-
fied that the lease was not the lease she signed. There were no
initials or signatures on the other pages of the lease. Vosberg
claimed she signed a 1-year lease agreement.
Vosberg did not have a copy of the alleged 1-year lease
agreement that she said she signed. Instead, in support of the
alleged 1-year lease agreement, Vosberg presented evidence
that she had set up a hair salon in the basement of the resi-
dence. She testified that she would not have gone through the
expense and difficulty of doing so if she had only signed a
3-month lease. There was conflicting evidence as to whether

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
316 Nebraska Reports
JOHNSON v. VOSBERG
Cite as 316 Neb. 658
Johnson gave Vosberg permission to install a “shampoo bowl”
in the residence.
Vosberg also presented evidence that Johnson and his fam-
ily have another, larger residence and purchased the residence
Vosberg rented so Johnson’s daughter could play volleyball
in the school district connected to the residence. According
to Vosberg, Johnson and his family did not decide to occupy
the residence until Johnson came under investigation by the
school district. Johnson and his wife, however, testified they
had always intended on living in the residence when the
school year began, because their other residence was too far
of a commute to their daughter’s school. For that reason, they
leased the property only for the summer. Johnson and his wife
denied any investigation by the school district.
The county court entered judgment in favor of Johnson for
restitution of the premises on November 21, 2022. It found that
Vosberg signed the 90-day lease and that Johnson had lawfully
terminated the lease and given effective notice to vacate.
Appeal to District Court,
Writ, and Bond
Vosberg timely filed a notice of appeal to the district court.
A writ of restitution was ordered, commanding Vosberg to
forthwith be removed from the premises, but the court also
ordered a supersedeas bond to be collected and held until the
mandate of the district court in the appeal was entered. The
court ordered that any writ of restitution be recalled until after
the deadline by which the supersedeas bond was to be paid. If
the supersedeas bond was not paid, then the writ of restitution
could be issued forthwith; but if it was timely paid, the writ
was to be recalled and Vosberg was to be permitted to return
to the premises during the pendency of the appeal. On May 4,
2023, the district court affirmed the county court’s judgment
for restitution of the premises. Vosberg filed her notice of
appeal from the district court on May 24, 2023.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
316 Nebraska Reports
JOHNSON v. VOSBERG
Cite as 316 Neb. 658
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Vosberg assigns as error that (1) the county court erred as
a matter of law by failing to consider evidence outside the
four corners of the “Roommate Lease Agreement” and (2) the
county court’s factual finding that the lease agreement was
the parties’ agreement was clearly erroneous and unsupported
by the evidence. Although the district court acted as an inter-
mediate appellate court and affirmed the county court’s deci-
sion, Vosberg’s assignments of error in her appellate brief only
assign how the county court erred. In accordance with State v.
Jennings, 2 however, these assignments of error are sufficiently
stated to be reviewable.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1] A jurisdictional question which does not involve a factual
dispute is determined by an appellate court as a matter of law. 3
[2] Mootness is a justiciability question that an appellate
court determines as a matter of law when it does not involve a
factual dispute. 4
ANALYSIS
Appellate Jurisdiction
Because Vosberg appealed from an order of restitution that
did not resolve Johnson’s claims for unpaid rent and willful
holdover, we begin our analysis by examining whether there
is appellate jurisdiction by virtue of a timely appeal from a
judgment or final order that does not implicate Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 25-1315 (Reissue 2016).
[3-5] The right of appeal in Nebraska is purely statutory,
and unless a statute provides for an appeal, such right does
not exist. 5 Through Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1912 (Cum. Supp.
2 See State v. Jennings, 308 Neb. 835, 957 N.W.2d 143 (2021).
3 Ryan v. Ryan, 313 Neb. 938, 987 N.W.2d 620 (2023).
4 George Clift Enters. v. Oshkosh Feedyard Corp., 306 Neb. 775, 947
N.W.2d 510 (2020).
5 Mann v. Mann, 312 Neb. 275, 978 N.W.2d 606 (2022).

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JOHNSON v. VOSBERG
Cite as 316 Neb. 658
2020), the Legislature has authorized appeals from “judg-
ments and decrees rendered,” as well as “final orders,” made
by the district court. Additionally, where implicated, an order
must comply with § 25-1315. 6 Section 25-1315(1) is impli-
cated only when “an action” presents more than one “claim
for relief” or involves multiple parties, and the court enters
an order, however designated, which adjudicates fewer than
all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the
parties. 7 If the district court, sitting as an intermediate appel-
late court, lacked jurisdiction over a party’s appeal, we also
lack jurisdiction to decide the merits of the appeal. 8
[6] A judgment is defined in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1301
(Cum. Supp. 2022) to mean “the final determination of the
rights of the parties in an action.” A judgment disposes of the
case fully and leaves nothing for further determination. 9 Under
§ 25-1301(2), “Rendition of a judgment is the act of a court,
or a judge thereof, in signing a single written document stating
all of the relief granted or denied in an action.”
[7,8] Every direction of a court or judgment made or entered
in writing and not included in a judgment is an order. 10 Final
orders are defined in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1902 (Cum. Supp.
2022), which currently recognizes four categories of final
orders; some categories pertain to actions, and one pertains to
special proceedings. 11
Section 76-1418 of the URLTA describes that “[t]he land-
lord may bring an action for possession against any per-
son wrongfully in possession and may recover the dam-
ages provided in subsection (3) of section 76-1437.” Section
6 Mathiesen v. Kellogg, 315 Neb. 840, 1 N.W.3d 888 (2024).
7 See Mann v. Mann, supra note 5.
8 State v. McCave, 282 Neb. 500, 805 N.W.2d 290 (2011).
9 See, Mathiesen v. Kellogg, supra note 6; Paxton v. Paxton, 314 Neb. 197,
989 N.W.2d 420 (2023).
10 See Mathiesen v. Kellogg, supra note 6.
11 Mann v. Mann, supra note 5.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
316 Nebraska Reports
JOHNSON v. VOSBERG
Cite as 316 Neb. 658
76-1437(2) of the URLTA provides that a month-to-month
tenancy may be terminated by written notice at least 30 days
before the periodic rental date. Section 76-1437(3) provides
that if the tenant remains in possession without the landlord’s
consent after expiration of the term or its termination,
the landlord may bring an action for possession and if
the tenant’s holdover is willful and not in good faith the
landlord, in addition, may recover an amount not more
than three months’ periodic rent or threefold the actual
damages sustained by him, whichever is greater, and rea-
sonable attorney’s fees.
Section 76-1440 of the URLTA sets forth specific require-
ments for a complaint for possession as the means of com-
mencing an action for possession. Section 76-1441(1) describes
that “[t]he complaint may also contain other causes of action
relating to the tenancy, but such causes of action shall be
answered and tried separately, if requested by either party
in writing.”
Under § 76-1446, trial of the action for possession shall be
held not less than 10 nor more than 14 days after the issuance
of the summons. This requirement, however, does not apply
to the other causes of action relating to the tenancy. Section
76-1446 states:
If judgment is rendered against the defendant for the
restitution of the premises, the court shall declare the
forfeiture of the rental agreement, and shall, at the request
of the plaintiff or his or her attorney, issue a writ of
restitution, directing the constable or sheriff to restore
possession of the premises to the plaintiff on a specified
date not more than ten days after issuance of the writ
of restitution.
Thus, while the URLTA contemplates that “other causes of
action relating to the tenancy” may be joined in the complaint,
there is an expedited process for litigating the claim for posses-
sion separately from those other causes of action. 12
12 See § 76-1441(1).

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
316 Nebraska Reports
JOHNSON v. VOSBERG
Cite as 316 Neb. 658
[9] We hold that the URLTA provides for an immediate
appeal from the rendition of the judgment in the trial of the
action for possession, regardless of whether other causes of
action relating to the tenancy under the URLTA are still pend-
ing. This right to an immediate appeal derives most directly
from § 76-1447, which sets forth an appeal from the “judg-
ment” of restitution of the premises and a stay of the execution
of any writ of restitution:
If either party feels aggrieved by the judgment, he may
appeal as in other civil actions. An appeal by the defend-
ant shall stay the execution of any writ of restitution, so
long as the defendant deposits with the clerk of the dis-
trict court the amount of judgment and costs, or gives an
appeal bond with surety therefor, and thereafter pays into
court, on a monthly basis, an amount equal to the monthly
rent called for by the rental agreement at the time the
complaint was filed.
[10] As discussed, in civil actions, appellate courts have
jurisdiction over a timely appeal from a judgment. Because
the URLTA refers to the court’s determination in the expedited
action for possession as a “judgment,” such judgment is imme-
diately appealable even though other causes of action relating
to the tenancy remain pending or dismissed without prejudice.
Furthermore, such “judgment,” by definition, is at odds with
an order that determines fewer than all the claims or the rights
and liabilities of fewer than all the parties. Thus, it was the
Legislature’s intent that § 25-1315 is not implicated when a
judgment in an action under the URLTA for possession has
been rendered and the only pending claims are those relating to
the tenancy as contemplated under the URLTA.
TDP Phase One v. The Club at the Yard 13 is distinguish-
able from the case at bar. The plaintiff therein brought an
action for restitution of the premises under the forcible entry
13 TDP Phase One v. The Club at the Yard, 307 Neb. 795, 950 N.W.2d 640
(2020).

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JOHNSON v. VOSBERG
Cite as 316 Neb. 658
and detainer (FED) statutes, Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 25-21,219 to
25-21,235 (Reissue 2016 & Cum. Supp. 2018), but that action
was joined with non-FED claims, including counterclaims for
fraud in the inducement and conspiracy to tortiously interfere
with business expectancies. The court granted partial summary
judgment for restitution of the premises but did not determine
other claims outside of the FED statutes. Section 25-21,233
provides that “[a]ny party against whom judgment has been
entered in an action of [FED], or forcible detention only, of
real property, may appeal as provided for in a civil action.”
We held we lacked appellate jurisdiction because the court
did not issue a certification under § 25-1315. We explained
that the statutory scheme did not indicate a legislative intent
to allow orders determining FED claims to be immediately
appealable without certification under § 25-1315 when non-
FED claims remain pending.
Here, there were no pending non-URLTA claims. Because the
only pending claims were those contemplated by the URLTA,
§ 25-1315 is not implicated. Accordingly, we are presented
with a “judgment” over which we have appellate jurisdiction
despite the lack of a certification under § 25-1315.
Mootness
[11,12] Having found we have appellate jurisdiction, we turn
to the question of mootness. Mootness does not prevent appel-
late jurisdiction. 14 Instead, mootness is a justiciability doctrine
that can prevent courts from exercising jurisdiction. 15
[13-15] We review mootness determinations under the
same standard of review as other jurisdictional questions. 16 A
case is moot if the facts underlying the dispute have changed,
14 See, e.g., Applied Underwriters v. S.E.B. Servs. of New York, 297 Neb.
246, 898 N.W.2d 366 (2017); Al-Ameen v. Frakes, 293 Neb. 248, 876
N.W.2d 635 (2016).
15 See, e.g., Applied Underwriters v. S.E.B. Servs. of New York, supra note
14.
16 Al-Ameen v. Frakes, supra note 14.

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JOHNSON v. VOSBERG
Cite as 316 Neb. 658
such that the issues presented are no longer alive. 17 The cen-
tral question in a mootness analysis is whether changes in cir-
cumstances that prevailed at the beginning of litigation have
forestalled any occasion for meaningful relief. 18
[16,17] While a moot case is normally subject to summary
dismissal, Nebraska recognizes a public interest exception to
the mootness doctrine. 19 The public interest exception to the
mootness doctrine requires us to consider (1) the public or
private nature of the question presented, (2) the desirability of
an authoritative adjudication for guidance of public officials,
and (3) the likelihood of recurrence of the same or a similar
problem. 20 We have said that even if a problem is likely to
recur, it is generally inappropriate for an appellate court to
review a moot case that does not evade review as a result of
a transitory setting. 21 In NP Dodge Mgmt. Co. v. Holcomb, 22
we recently held that an appeal from a writ of restitution
under the URLTA was moot when the writ of restitution was
executed, and the tenant removed before the court entered the
order setting the supersedeas bond that would recall the writ.
Furthermore, the term of the lease had expired by the time we
issued our opinion. The tenant raised on appeal the denial of
her request for a jury trial, the alleged violation of § 76-1447
by issuing the writ before setting the appeal bond, and the
alleged violation of her constitutional right to due process by
issuing the writ without first serving her notice that the writ
would issue.
We observed that the tenant had offered no reason why
she would be entitled to possession of the apartment after the
17 NP Dodge Mgmt. Co. v. Holcomb, 314 Neb. 748, 993 N.W.2d 105 (2023).
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id. See, also, Banks v. Housing Auth. of City of Omaha, 281 Neb. 67, 795
N.W.2d 632 (2011).

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JOHNSON v. VOSBERG
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term of her lease. 23 Therefore, even if we were to find error
in her removal, there was nothing we could do on appeal to
allow her to stay in the apartment pending appeal. 24 Nor would
vacating the writ provide meaningful relief when the only
subject of the underlying action was to determine whether the
tenant was entitled to immediate possession. 25
We declined to exercise our discretion to address the alleged
right to a jury trial under the public interest exception to the
mootness doctrine. 26 We reasoned that it was not clear such
issue would inherently evade appellate review, since there are
means by which a tenant can stay enforcement of a writ of res-
titution pending appeal. 27
We also found no merit to the tenant’s argument that we
should proceed to the merits of her appeal under the collateral
consequences exception to the mootness doctrine, because she
faced negative collateral consequences in the form of future
landlords’ not accepting her as a tenant. 28 We explained that
we have previously refused to apply the collateral conse-
quences exception to mootness outside of the criminal context
and continued to decline to do so in that case. 29
The situation presented here is similar. The term of the
alleged 1-year lease has expired, and Vosberg has vacated
the premises. She is no longer paying the monthly rent under
the terms of the supersedeas bond. While Vosberg argues she
suffers collateral consequences from the writ because a judg-
ment of eviction on her record makes it harder for her to find
landlords willing to rent to her, we have already rejected a
similar argument in NP Dodge Mgmt. Co. Vosberg presents
23 See NP Dodge Mgmt. Co. v. Holcomb, supra note 17.
24 See id.
25 See id.
26 See id.
27 See id.
28 See id.
29 See id.

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no public interest exception. And because of the variety of
terms possible under lease agreements, the issue presented is
unlikely to recur.
CONCLUSION
Vosberg’s appeal is dismissed as moot.
Appeal dismissed.