Nore Electric v. S & H Holdings

- 197 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
316 Nebraska Reports
NORE ELECTRIC v. S & H HOLDINGS
Cite as 316 Neb. 197
Nore Electric Inc., appellee and cross-appellant, v.
S & H Holdings, L.L.C., a Nebraska limited liability
company, and Realty Income Properties 19, LLC,
a Delaware limited liability company, appellants
and cross-appellees, Rose Plumbing, LLC, et al.,
appellees and cross-appellants, and Energy
Roofing Technology, Inc., a Nebraska
corporation, appellee and
cross-appellant.
___ N.W.3d ___
Filed March 15, 2024. 	No. S-23-282.
1. Statutes: Appeal and Error. Statutory interpretation presents a ques-
tion of law, which an appellate court reviews independently of the
lower court.
2. Statutes: Liens. The construction lien statutes are cumulative and reme-
dial in nature and require a liberal construction so as to effectuate their
objects and purposes and protect all claimants within their scope, as well
as to promote substantial justice.
3. Statutes: Legislature: Intent. When construing a statute, a court must
determine and give effect to the purpose and intent of the Legislature
as ascertained from the entire language of the statute considered in its
plain, ordinary, and popular sense.
4. Statutes: Intent. In construing a statute, a court must look at the
statutory objective to be accomplished, the problem to be remedied,
or the purpose to be served and then place on the statute a reasonable
construction that best achieves the purpose of the statute, rather than a
construction defeating the statutory purpose.
5. Statutes: Legislature: Intent. In determining the meaning of a statute,
a court may conjunctively consider and construe a collection of statutes
that pertain to a certain subject matter to determine the intent of the
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
10/14/2026 08:43 AM CDT

- 198 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
316 Nebraska Reports
NORE ELECTRIC v. S & H HOLDINGS
Cite as 316 Neb. 197
Legislature so that different provisions of the act are consistent, harmo-
nious, and sensible.
6. Contracts: Real Estate: Liens. Under the Nebraska Construction Lien
Act, Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 52-125 to 52-159 (Reissue 2021), the real estate
subject to construction liens is ultimately determined by the contracting
owner’s contract for the improvement of the real estate.
7. Contracts: Contractors and Subcontractors: Real Estate: Liens.
By operation of the Nebraska Construction Lien Act, Neb. Rev. Stat.
§§ 52-125 to 52-159 (Reissue 2021), a construction lien is automati-
cally created whenever a contractor furnishes services or materials and
originates from the contracting owner’s entering into the improvement
contract, even though it has not yet attached to the real estate and is not
yet enforceable.
Appeal from the District Court for Dawson County: James
E. Doyle IV, Judge. Affirmed.
Richard P. Garden, Jr., and Nathan D. Clark, of Cline,
Williams, Wright, Johnson & Oldfather, L.L.P., for appellants.
Jared J. Krejci, of Smith, Johnson, Allen, Connick & Hansen,
for appellee Energy Roofing Technology, Inc.
Elizabeth J. Klingelhoefer, of Jacobsen Orr, Lindstrom &
Holbrook, P.C., L.L.O., for appellees Nore Electric Inc., and
Rose Plumbing, LLC, et al.
Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke,
and Freudenberg, JJ., and Keane, District Judge.
Heavican, C.J.
INTRODUCTION
This action arises under the Nebraska Construction Lien Act
(NCLA), Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 52-125 to 52-159 (Reissue 2021).
Nore Electric Inc. instituted judicial proceedings against S
& H Holdings, L.L.C. (S&H), and Realty Income Properties
19, LLC (RIP), to enforce its construction lien. Nore Electric
joined all other construction lienholders as defendants. We
refer to all of the construction lienholders, including Nore
Electric, collectively as the “contractors.”

- 199 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
316 Nebraska Reports
NORE ELECTRIC v. S & H HOLDINGS
Cite as 316 Neb. 197
Relevant to this appeal, the district court concluded that
under the NCLA, S&H was the “contracting owner” and effec-
tively terminated its “notice of commencement,” causing the
notice of commencement to “lapse.” It further concluded that
the contractors’ liens attached to the subject property after the
notice lapsed and that the contractors’ liens had priority over
RIP’s interest.
S&H and RIP appeal the district court’s conclusion that the
construction liens attached with priority over RIP’s fee interest.
Energy Roofing Technology, Inc., and Nore Electric, with the
other contractors, cross-appeal the court’s conclusion that the
notice of commencement was effectively terminated. We affirm
the district court’s decision without reaching the merits of the
contractors’ cross-appeal.
BACKGROUND
S&H owned the subject property from February 11, 2014,
to February 1, 2019. On June 11, 2018, S&H entered into a
project management agreement with Integrated Construction
Management Services, Inc. (ICMS), to construct a “new
Burger King” on the subject property. On July 18, S&H
recorded a notice of commencement 1 with the Dawson County
register of deeds. The notice of commencement provided that
S&H was the contracting owner and the fee simple holder of
the subject property and that the notice would expire on June
11, 2019.
The contractors entered into contracts with ICMS to provide
materials and services in the construction of the Burger King.
Ultimately, ICMS did not fully pay the contractors for their
materials and services.
On January 18, 2019, S&H executed a warranty deed con-
veying the subject property with the Burger King improvement
to RIP. The warranty deed was recorded in the Dawson County
register of deeds office on February 1.
1 See §§ 52-127(5) and 52-145.

- 200 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
316 Nebraska Reports
NORE ELECTRIC v. S & H HOLDINGS
Cite as 316 Neb. 197
On February 11, 2019, S&H recorded a notice of termina-
tion of the notice of commencement. 2 The notice of termi-
nation named S&H as the contracting owner and the fee simple
holder of the subject property and provided that the notice of
commencement would be terminated as of March 15.
On March 15, 2019, S&H recorded an affidavit that stated
the notice of termination was published as statutorily required. 3
The publications stated that S&H was the contracting owner
and fee simple holder of the subject property. 4
From March 22 through April 18, 2019, the contractors
recorded construction liens against the subject property. 5 S&H
and RIP refused to satisfy the liens and pay the contractors.
Nore Electric brought this suit to enforce the liens and joined
the other lienholders as defendants. 6
Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment
The parties brought cross-motions for summary judgment.
S&H and RIP argued that they were entitled to summary judg-
ment because the contractors’ liens did not attach to the subject
property, since S&H was no longer the property’s owner when
the liens were recorded. For their part, the contractors argued
that their liens attached because (1) the transfer in ownership
had no effect on the liens’ attachment and (2) S&H’s notice of
termination was not effective.
In its order on the summary judgment motions, the dis-
trict court found that “[S&H] complied with all the recording
requirements imposed to terminate its notice of commence-
ment”; thus, the notice lapsed on March 15, 2019, but the liens
still attached to the subject property.
2 See §§ 52-127(6) and 52-146.
3 See § 52-146(1)(c) and (d).
4 See § 52-146(2).
5 See § 52-147.
6 See § 52-155.

- 201 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
316 Nebraska Reports
NORE ELECTRIC v. S & H HOLDINGS
Cite as 316 Neb. 197
The court reasoned that the argument advanced by S&H
and RIP “inappropriately conjoin[ed] the specification in the
statute of who can become a ‘contracting owner,’ . . . with
the definition of the real property subject to a construction
lien . . . .” 7 In the court’s view, “[t]he descriptor ‘contracting
owner’s’ in §52-133(2) is used as a modifier of the term ‘real
estate being improved or directly benefited’ [and] identifies
the real estate . . . to which a lien may attach.” It concluded
that the transfer of the subject property “did not extinguish the
character of the real estate, i.e., under the [NCLA,] the real
estate retained its character as the ‘contracting owner’s real
estate being improved or directly benefited’ by the work and
materials of the [contractors].”
Because the notice of commencement had lapsed before any
of the liens were recorded, the court found that pursuant to
§ 52-137(3), the contractors’ construction liens attached to the
subject property at the time each lien was recorded or on the
31st day after the notice of commencement lapsed. However,
due to disputes of material fact, further proceedings were
required to determine the liens’ priority and amounts.
Decree of Foreclosure
Thereafter, the parties submitted the matter on stipulated
facts, and the court issued a decree of foreclosure. In its decree,
the court again found that S&H completed all the actions speci-
fied under § 52-146(1) and that the notice of commencement
lapsed on March 15, 2019.
The court also again rejected the argument advanced by
S&H and RIP that the liens did not attach to the subject prop-
erty because the liens were filed when RIP had title to the
property, not S&H—the contracting owner. The relevant por-
tion of the court’s decree is as follows:
7 Compare § 52-127(3), with § 52-133(2).

- 202 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
316 Nebraska Reports
NORE ELECTRIC v. S & H HOLDINGS
Cite as 316 Neb. 197
This claim, if honored, would completely nullify the
statutory provisions pertaining to the notice of com-
mencement and how it is terminated, and the protection
the notice of commencement and the process for its ter-
mination provide to lien claimants. The claim by [S&H
and RIP] also negates the underlying principles behind
the process for the filing of the notice of commencement
and its termination as they relate to the protection of
contractors who rely upon the termination date originally
stated in the notice of commencement.
The effort by [S&H and RIP] to avoid the clear appli-
cation of the law is rejected. To allow [S&H] to transfer
the property [free of all construction liens] while its
notice of commencement was effective would be contrary
to the express language of the NCLA and to the intended
purposes behind the notice of commencement, including
the purpose of stating a termination date in the notice of
commencement. [S&H and RIP’s] claims would com-
pletely remove the protection in §52-137 given contrac-
tors and would negate the rationale behind such statute[,]
which authorizes a lien claimant who had not filed prior
to the originally stated termination date, to record its lien
during the periods specified in §52-137.
The court found that under §§ 52-137 and 52-138, the con-
tractors’ liens had priority based on the dates that the liens
were recorded and that “[RIP’s] fee interest in the subject real
estate is subject to the liens of the contractors.”
S&H and RIP appeal and challenge the court’s conclusion
that the contractors’ liens could have attached when S&H, as
the contracting owner, was no longer the owner of the subject
property when the liens otherwise would have attached under
§ 52-137(3)(b). S&H and RIP rely primarily on the language
of § 52-133(2) that provides contractors’ liens are on “the
contracting owner’s real estate being improved or directly
benefited.” The contractors cross-appeal and challenge the

- 203 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
316 Nebraska Reports
NORE ELECTRIC v. S & H HOLDINGS
Cite as 316 Neb. 197
court’s conclusion that the notice of termination was effective
when S&H failed to strictly comply with the requirements
of § 52-146. The court’s determinations regarding the lien
amounts and awards of prejudgment interest are not at issue in
this appeal.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
S&H and RIP assign, summarized, that the district court
erred in finding that the contractors’ liens attached to the sub-
ject property and had priority over RIP’s fee interest. The con-
tractors assign that the district court erred in finding that S&H
effectively terminated its notice of commencement.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1,2] Statutory interpretation presents a question of law,
which an appellate court reviews independently of the lower
court. 8 The construction lien statutes are cumulative and reme-
dial in nature and require a liberal construction so as to effectu-
ate their objects and purposes and protect all claimants within
their scope, as well as to promote substantial justice. 9
ANALYSIS
In substance, the parties’ assignments of error concern only
the issues of the contractors’ liens attachment and priority
based on the district court’s conclusions of law under the
NCLA. But before turning to those issues, a review of our prin-
ciples of law concerning liens generally, and construction liens
specifically, is in order.
Liens and Construction Liens
The term “lien” is applied in various modes, but in all
cases, it signifies an obligation, tie, duty, or claim annexed to
8 Echo Group v. Tradesmen Internat., 312 Neb. 729, 980 N.W.2d 869
(2022).
9 Senften v. Church of the Nazarene, 214 Neb. 708, 335 N.W.2d 753 (1983);
Chicago Lumber Co. v. Horner, 210 Neb. 833, 317 N.W.2d 87 (1982).
See, also, McCormick v. Lawton, 3 Neb. 449 (1872).

- 204 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
316 Nebraska Reports
NORE ELECTRIC v. S & H HOLDINGS
Cite as 316 Neb. 197
or attaching upon property by the common law, equity, con-
tract, or statute. 10 A lien affords a supplemental and additional
remedy for collection that is given the force of law. 11 A statute
giving a lien is regarded as remedial and must be so construed
as to give full force and effect to the remedy in view of the
beneficial purpose contemplated. 12
Under Nebraska’s prior existing acts pertaining to con-
struction liens, 13 the liens related back to the time work began
on the improvement. 14 To that end, we referred to such liens
as “inchoate” 15 or “‘hidden’” 16 liens. Any party purchasing
the property within the time a contractor was allowed to
perfect the lien under the acts took title subject to any future
construction lien. 17 The law served as notice that such a lien
may be filed. 18 Accordingly, even though the liens were not
recorded prior to the purchase, no party could be a bona fide
purchaser. 19 In that way, Nebraska’s construction lien acts
10 See Landis Machine Co. v. Omaha Merchants Transfer Co., 142 Neb. 389,
6 N.W.2d 380 (1942). See, also, Dupuy v. Western State Bank, 221 Neb.
230, 375 N.W.2d 909 (1985).
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 See, Neb. Rev. Stat. ch. 52 (1943); Gen. Stat. ch. 42 (1873); Rev. Stat. ch.
35 (1866); 1855 Neb. Laws, part II, Liens to Mechanics (1st Sess.).
14 See, e.g., Goodwin v. Cunningham, 54 Neb. 11, 74 N.W. 315 (1898); Bohn
Sash & Door Co. v. Case, 42 Neb. 281, 60 N.W. 576 (1894); Doolittle &
Gordon v. Plenz, 16 Neb. 153, 20 N.W. 116 (1884).
15 See, e.g, Goodwin v. Cunningham, supra note 14, 54 Neb. at 13, 74 N.W.
at 315.
16 See Borrenpohl v. DaBeers Properties, 276 Neb. 426, 432, 755 N.W.2d 39,
44 (2008). See, also, Smith v. Potter, 92 Neb. 39, 137 N.W. 854 (1912),
modified on denial of rehearing 92 Neb. 39, 138 N.W. 1135.
17 See, Goodwin v. Cunningham, supra note 14; Bohn Sash & Door Co. v.
Case, supra note 14; Doolittle & Gordon v. Plenz, supra note 14.
18 See, Doolittle & Gordon v. Plenz, supra note 14; Henry & Coatsworth Co.
v. Fisherdick, 37 Neb. 207, 55 N.W. 643 (1893).
19 See id.

- 205 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
316 Nebraska Reports
NORE ELECTRIC v. S & H HOLDINGS
Cite as 316 Neb. 197
derogated the common law, which held that under other cir-
cumstances, subsequent bona fide purchasers, whose deeds
were recorded first, would be able to void any prior existing,
but unrecorded, encumbrance. 20
The NCLA was enacted in 1981 21 and amended our prior
statutes concerning construction liens. This court has recog-
nized that “[a]n examination of these statutes, together with
prior acts in sequence, discloses some changes and extensions
in some respects, but there has been no change in the designa-
tion of persons entitled to a lien under the act, or the priorities
created by the act.” 22 Additionally, this court has recognized
that the NCLA is an almost verbatim version of article 5 of
the Uniform Simplification of Land Transfers Act (USLTA), 23
and although the Nebraska Legislature did not adopt the com-
ments or other articles of the USLTA, this court nonetheless
looks to them in order to understand the NCLA. 24
Under the NCLA, “[a] person who furnishes services or
materials pursuant to a real estate improvement contract has a
construction lien . . . to secure the payment of his or her con-
tract price.” 25 A “real estate improvement contract” is defined
as “an agreement to perform services, including labor, or to
furnish materials for the purpose of producing a change in the
20 See, e.g., Carpenter Paper Co. v. Wilcox, 50 Neb. 659, 70 N.W. 228
(1897); Weaver v. Coumbe, 15 Neb. 167, 17 N.W. 357 (1883); Kittle v. St.
John, 10 Neb. 605, 7 N.W. 271 (1880).
21 See 1981 Neb. Laws, L.B. 512.
22 Hulinsky v. Parriott, 232 Neb. 670, 673-74, 441 N.W.2d 883, 886 (1989).
23 Unif. Simplification of Land Transfers Act art. 5, 14 U.L.A. 312 (1990).
24 Tilt-Up Concrete v. Star City/Federal, 261 Neb. 64, 621 N.W.2d 502
(2001). See Action Heating & Air Cond. v. Petersen, 229 Neb. 796,
429 N.W.2d 1 (1988). See, also, Omaha Constr. Indus. Pension Plan v.
Children’s Hosp., 11 Neb. App. 35, 642 N.W.2d 849 (2002).
25 § 52-131(1).

- 206 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
316 Nebraska Reports
NORE ELECTRIC v. S & H HOLDINGS
Cite as 316 Neb. 197
physical condition of land or of a structure.” 26 A construction
lien is not valid absent a contract between the parties. 27
A “[c]laimant” is a person having a right to a lien upon
real estate and includes his or her successor in interest, 28 in
this case, the contractors. A “[c]ontracting owner” is a person
who owns real estate and who, personally or through an agent,
enters into a contract, express or implied, for the improve-
ment of the real estate, 29 undisputedly S&H herein. The word
“owner” is not limited in its meaning to an owner of the fee
but means the owner of any interest in the lands and includes
every character of title, whether legal or equitable, fee simple,
or leasehold. 30 Both S&H and RIP qualify as owners.
With these principles in mind, we turn to the issues raised
by the parties.
Attachment and Priority
S&H and RIP’s primary argument is that construction liens
can only attach to the contracting owner’s real estate. They
contend that the contractors’ liens did not attach to the sub-
ject property because S&H was undisputedly the contracting
owner and, at the time the liens were recorded, RIP was undis-
putedly the owner of the real estate. Like the district court, we
reject this argument.
In support, S&H and RIP rely upon the statutory language
of § 52-133 governing the real estate subject to a construc-
tion lien. They point to the language provided in multiple
26 § 52-130(1). See, also, Taylor v. Taylor, 277 Neb. 617, 764 N.W.2d 101
(2009).
27 See, Tilt-Up Concrete v. Star City/Federal, supra note 24; Mid-America
Maintenance v. Bill Morris Ford, 232 Neb. 920, 442 N.W.2d 869 (1989).
See, also, Sorenson v. Dager, 8 Neb. App. 729, 601 N.W.2d 564 (1999).
28 § 52-127(1).
29 § 52-127(3).
30 See Midlands Rental & Mach. v. Christensen Ltd., 252 Neb. 806, 566
N.W.2d 115 (1997).

- 207 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
316 Nebraska Reports
NORE ELECTRIC v. S & H HOLDINGS
Cite as 316 Neb. 197
subsections that a construction lien is on the contracting own-
er’s real estate. Section 52-133 provides in full:
(1) If at the time a construction lien is recorded there
is a recorded notice of commencement covering the
improvement pursuant to which the lien arises, the lien
is on the contracting owner’s real estate described in the
notice of commencement.
(2) Except as provided in subsection (3) of this sec-
tion, if at the time a construction lien is recorded there
is no recorded notice of commencement covering the
improvement pursuant to which the lien arises, the lien is
on the contracting owner’s real estate being improved or
directly benefited.
(3) If a claimant who recorded a lien while there was
no recorded notice of commencement covering the real
estate later records a notice of commencement, his or her
lien is on the contracting owner’s real estate described in
the notice of commencement.
(4) If as a part of an improvement on his or her real
estate or for the purpose of directly benefiting his or her
real estate an owner contracts for improvements on real
estate not owned by him or her, persons who furnish ser-
vices or materials in connection with that improvement
have a lien against the contracting owner’s real estate
being improved or directly benefited to the same extent as
if the improvement had been on the contracting owner’s
real estate.
(5) If a recorded notice of commencement covers more
than one lot in a platted subdivision of record, a claimant
may apportion his or her lien to the various lots covered
by the notice of commencement in any proportion he or
she chooses and states in his or her recorded lien, includ-
ing assigning all his or her lien to a particular lot.
(6) If a recorded lien does not contain an appor-
tionment as provided in subsection (5) of this section,
the owner may make demand on the claimant to make

- 208 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
316 Nebraska Reports
NORE ELECTRIC v. S & H HOLDINGS
Cite as 316 Neb. 197
an apportionment and, if the claimant does not, within
thirty days after the demand, make an apportionment by
recording an amendment of the recorded lien, the owner
may make a good faith apportionment by recording
an owner’s statement of apportionment. Notwithstanding
the fact that the owner did not in fact give the notice to
apportion referred to in this subsection or for any other
reason was not entitled to record a statement of appor-
tionment, or did not make a good faith apportionment,
the apportionment is conclusive in favor of persons
acquiring interests in the real estate after the statement of
apportionment is recorded.
For their part, the contractors point to the first comment
within the corresponding USLTA section. They contend that
§ 52-133 is limited in application to the geographic or spatial
scope of the lien and does not apply in the temporal context of
who owned the property when. The comment states:
1. This section deals with the geographic or spatial
extent of a construction lien. If a notice of commence-
ment is effective as to the improvement when the lien
is recorded, the lien is on the real estate described in
the notice of commencement. Therefore, an owner mak-
ing improvements on a tract which he owns may, in his
notice of commencement, limit the real estate against
which a lien will arise to that particular real estate on
which the improvement is being made. If, for example, a
100,000 square feet building is being built on a portion
of a 40-acre tract, the notice of commencement could
limit the lienable real estate to the 100,000 square feet
on which the building sets and the surrounding land on
which related work will be done. If, however, in a case
in which there is a recorded notice of commencement
describing a limited part of a single tract and improve-
ment work outside the described part takes place, the
work is not covered by the notice of commencement
since the notice of commencement can apply only to

- 209 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
316 Nebraska Reports
NORE ELECTRIC v. S & H HOLDINGS
Cite as 316 Neb. 197
the real estate described therein. If, in the case of the
100,000 square feet building, the notice of commence-
ment described 200,000 square feet with the building
in the center and, as a part of the construction, an
access road and sidewalks were built on owner’s real
estate outside the described 200,000 square feet, the
lien arising for the road and sidewalks would not be
limited to the real estate described in the notice of com-
mencement. In that case, under subsection (b), the lien
would be “on the contracting owner’s real estate being
improved or directly benefited.” Under that language,
a court might decide that all the owner’s 40-acre tract
was being “directly benefited” and allow a lien for the
sidewalk and road improvements to be claimed against
the entire tract. 31
The district court concluded that in § 52-133, “‘contracting
owner’s’” is a descriptor used as a modifying term that identi-
fies the real estate being “‘improved or directly benefited.’”
We agree.
[3-5] When construing a statute, a court must determine
and give effect to the purpose and intent of the Legislature
as ascertained from the entire language of the statute consid-
ered in its plain, ordinary, and popular sense. 32 In construing
a statute, a court must look at the statutory objective to be
accomplished, the problem to be remedied, or the purpose to
be served and then place on the statute a reasonable construc-
tion that best achieves the purpose of the statute, rather than a
construction defeating the statutory purpose. 33 In determining
the meaning of a statute, a court may conjunctively consider
and construe a collection of statutes that pertain to a certain
subject matter (i.e., the NCLA) to determine the intent of the
31 Unif. Simplification of Land Transfers Act, supra note 23, § 5-203,
comment 1, 14 U.L.A. at 320 (emphasis supplied).
32 Echo Group v. Tradesmen Internat., supra note 8.
33 See id.

- 210 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
316 Nebraska Reports
NORE ELECTRIC v. S & H HOLDINGS
Cite as 316 Neb. 197
Legislature so that different provisions of the act are consist-
ent, harmonious, and sensible. 34
Within § 52-133(4), it is contemplated that a contracting
owner may sometimes improve related real estate that the con-
tracting owner does not own. In that event, the construction
lien would not attach to the unowned real estate but only to
the contracting owner’s real estate. Without limiting the real
estate being improved or directly benefited to the “contracting
owner’s real estate,” § 52-133(4) would be unable to distin-
guish between real estate owned and unowned by the contract-
ing owner. Similarly, § 52-133(6) refers to the “apportionment”
of construction liens, 35 which provides further support for the
conclusion that the term “contracting owner’s” is used only to
identify the geographic or spatial extent of the real estate to
which a construction lien attaches.
Moreover, S&H and RIP’s reading of § 52-133 ignores
§ 52-147, which governs the recording requirements of a
contractor’s lien. Among other things, § 52-147 provides that
a recorded lien needs to state the “real estate subject to the
lien” 36 and the “name of the person against whose inter-
est in the real estate a lien is claimed.” 37 But § 52-147(2)
plainly refutes S&H and RIP’s argument, as it provides: “The
name given in the lien in accordance with the requirement
of subdivision (1)(b) of this section may be the name of the
contracting owner or the name of the record holder of the
contracting owner’s interest at the time of recording the lien.”
(Emphasis supplied.)
[6] Section 52-147(2) evinces that § 52-133 does not con-
template or include any temporal limitation on ownership
of the property to which a lien may attach, as S&H and RIP
34 See Tilt-Up Concrete v. Star City/Federal, supra note 24.
35 See, also, § 52-133(5).
36 § 52-147(1)(a).
37 § 52-147(1)(b).

- 211 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
316 Nebraska Reports
NORE ELECTRIC v. S & H HOLDINGS
Cite as 316 Neb. 197
contend. To the contrary, it establishes that although the geo-
graphic or spatial extent of a construction lien may be limited
under § 52-133, the real estate subject to construction liens is
ultimately determined by the contracting owner’s “contract . . .
for the improvement of the real estate.” 38
Furthermore, although the Legislature did not adopt article
1 of the USLTA, article 1 provides general definitions 39 that
apply to article 5. As mentioned above, the NCLA is an almost
verbatim version of article 5 of the USLTA. Relevant to read-
ing § 52-133 is the USLTA’s definition of “real estate”:
“Real estate” means an estate or interest in, over, or
under land, including minerals, structures, fixtures, and
other things that by custom, usage, or law pass with a
conveyance of land though not described or mentioned in
the contract of sale or instrument of conveyance and, if
appropriate to the context, the land in which the interest
is claimed. [The term] includes rents [and] the interest of
a landlord or tenant . . . . 40
We note that when the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws carved out article 5 of the USLTA into
the Uniform Construction Lien Act in 1987, it included this
definition of “real estate” within the general definitions section
equivalent to § 52-127. 41
Reading § 52-133 in light of this definition, there is no
question that the “contracting owner’s real estate” was estab-
lished at the time the contract to improve the real estate was
entered into. Under § 52-131(1), “[a] person who furnishes
services or materials pursuant to a real estate improvement
contract has a construction lien . . . to secure the payment of
38 § 52-127(3).
39 Unif. Simplifications of Land Transfers Act, supra note 23, § 1-201, 14
U.L.A. at 258.
40 Id., § 1-201(15), 14 U.L.A. at 259-60.
41 See, also, Unif. Construction Lien Act § 102(16), 7 (pt. III) 10-11 (2002).

- 212 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
316 Nebraska Reports
NORE ELECTRIC v. S & H HOLDINGS
Cite as 316 Neb. 197
his or her contract price,” and § 52-131(2) goes on to provide
that “[a] lien arises . . . only if the claimant records a lien
within the time specified by section 52-137.” The time speci-
fied by § 52-137(1) is “after entering into the contract under
which the lien arises and not later than [120] days after his or
her final furnishing of services or materials.”
[7] Under these provisions, contractors who furnish services
or materials have a construction lien, and the lien arises out of
the improvement contract—not from the recording of the lien.
By operation of the NCLA, a construction lien is automatically
created whenever a contractor furnishes services or materials
and originates from the contracting owner’s entering into the
improvement contract, even though it has not yet attached to
the real estate and is not yet enforceable. 42
There is nothing in the NCLA that prevents a contractor’s
lien from attaching to the real estate improved or directly ben-
efited after a notice of commencement has lapsed, by either
the running of its duration or its termination. To the contrary,
§ 52-137(3) specifically provides for the attachment of a con-
struction lien after the lapse of the last notice of commence-
ment covering the improvement.
Likewise, the corresponding comment in the USLTA states
that “‘[a]ttachment’ . . . is a priority concept,” and “the time
of attachment is the claimant’s priority date against third
parties, such as judgment creditors or holders of security
interests.” 43 The limitation on relation back following a lapsed
notice of commencement “provides persons who deal with the
land a mechanism for assuring themselves that no construc-
tion claimant can later come in and take priority over their
interest.” 44 Therefore, contravening S&H and RIP’s argument,
42 See, also, § 52-126.
43 Unif. Simplification of Land Transfers Act, supra note 23, § 5-207,
comment 2, 14 U.L.A. at 335.
44 Id., comment 6, 14 U.L.A. at 335.

- 213 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
316 Nebraska Reports
NORE ELECTRIC v. S & H HOLDINGS
Cite as 316 Neb. 197
the NCLA does not contain any provision that failing to obtain
priority prevents a construction lien from attaching or auto-
matically extinguishes the lien.
In addition, under § 52-139, “a construction lien has priority
over adverse claims against the real estate as if the construc-
tion-lien claimant were a purchaser for value without knowl-
edge who had recorded at the time his or her lien attached,”
except as to (1) subsequent advances “made under a [construc-
tion] security agreement recorded before the construction lien
attached,” if particular requirements are met, and (2) if the
construction lien was not recorded at the time a protected party
records a title. 45
Consequently, the ability of the contracting owner’s inter-
est to be subject to future construction liens passes with a
conveyance of the interest. In this manner, the NCLA did
not change the fact that any nonprotected party purchasing
property within the time a contractor is allowed to perfect the
lien under the act takes title subject to any future construction
lien. 46 The law continues to serve as notice that such a lien
may be filed. 47 To read the NCLA otherwise would completely
remove the protection given to contractors by the Legislature
and negate the rationale behind the creation of construc-
tion liens.
There is no dispute that at the time RIP purchased S&H’s
interest in the subject property, the notice of commencement
was recorded and its duration was set to expire on June 11,
2019. Nor is there a dispute that in addition to constructive
notice, RIP had actual notice of the notice of commencement,
45 See Lincoln Lumber Co. v. Lancaster, 260 Neb. 585, 618 N.W.2d 676
(2000). See, also, Henry & Coatsworth Co. v. Fisherdick, supra note
18; Unif. Simplification of Land Transfers Act, supra note 23, §§ 3-202,
3-204, and 3-205, 14 U.L.A. at 281, 283, and 284.
46 See, Goodwin v. Cunningham, supra note 14; Bohn Sash & Door Co. v.
Case, supra note 14; Doolittle & Gordon v. Plenz, supra note 14.
47 See Doolittle & Gordon v. Plenz, supra note 14.

- 214 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
316 Nebraska Reports
NORE ELECTRIC v. S & H HOLDINGS
Cite as 316 Neb. 197
as well as actual notice that S&H had entered into an improve-
ment contract with ICMS. It is also undisputed that none of
the NCLA provisions pertaining to protected parties apply in
this case.
Thus, when S&H entered into the improvement contract
with ICMS, S&H’s interest in the real estate being improved or
directly benefited or described in the notice of commencement
became encumbered by the future interest of any contractors
who later furnished services or materials to attach a construc-
tion lien by recording the lien within 120 days of the final
furnishing of services or materials. It is this interest that S&H
conveyed to RIP. 48
The NCLA provides owners various options to avoid a
construction lien from attaching to the real estate, such as
procuring a surety bond 49 or obtaining a written waiver of
construction lien rights of a potential claimant, 50 as well as
methods for releasing the real estate from liens. 51 However, it
does not provide for a recorded conveyance before the termina-
tion or expiration of a notice of commencement to extinguish
construction liens that have not yet attached. We find no merit
in S&H and RIP’s argument that RIP’s fee interest has priority
over the contractors’ liens.
Because we conclude that the contractors’ liens attached
to the real estate, we do not consider the contractors’ cross-
appeal, since the contractors represented at oral argument that
the result would be the same. An appellate court is not obli-
gated to engage in an analysis that is not necessary to adjudi-
cate the case and controversy before it. 52
48 See, also, Midlands Rental & Mach. v. Christensen Ltd., supra note 30.
49 See §§ 52-141 and 52-150.
50 See § 52-144.
51 See §§ 51-142 and 52-151.
52 Swicord v. Police Stds. Adv. Council, 314 Neb. 816, 993 N.W.2d 327
(2023).

- 215 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
316 Nebraska Reports
NORE ELECTRIC v. S & H HOLDINGS
Cite as 316 Neb. 197
CONCLUSION
The NCLA provides that construction liens attach to the
contracting owner’s interest. Because RIP acquired S&H’s
interest, the contractors’ liens attached to the subject property.
Hence, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
Affirmed.
Papik, J., not participating.