Naranjo v. North Platte, Neb. Hosp. Corp.

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Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets
33 Nebraska Appellate Reports
NARANJO v. NORTH PLATTE, NEB. HOSP. CORP.
Cite as 33 Neb. App. 435
Laurence Naranjo and Sandra Naranjo, husband and
wife, appellants, v. North Platte, Nebraska Hospital
Corporation, a Nebraska nonprofit corporation,
doing business as Great Plains Regional Medical
Center, doing business as Great Plains Health,
appellee, and Waste Connections
of Nebraska, Inc., appellee.
___ N.W.3d ___
Filed February 11, 2025. 	No. A-24-195.
1. Summary Judgment: Appeal and Error. An appellate court affirms a
lower court’s grant of summary judgment if the pleadings and admitted
evidence show that there is no genuine issue as to any material facts or
as to the ultimate inferences that may be drawn from the facts and that
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
2. ____: ____. An appellate court reviews the district court’s grant of sum-
mary judgment de novo, viewing the record in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party and drawing all reasonable inferences in that
party’s favor.
3. Negligence: Liability: Proximate Cause. A possessor of land is subject
to liability for injury caused to a lawful visitor by a condition on the
land if (1) the possessor either created the condition, knew of the condi-
tion, or by the existence of reasonable care would have discovered the
condition; (2) the possessor should have realized the condition involved
an unreasonable risk of harm to the lawful visitor; (3) the possessor
should have expected that a lawful visitor either (a) would not discover
or realize the danger or (b) would fail to protect himself or herself
against the danger; (4) the possessor failed to use reasonable care to
protect the lawful visitor against the danger; and (5) the condition was a
proximate cause of damage to the plaintiff.
4. Summary Judgment. Summary judgment is proper only when the
pleadings, depositions, admissions, stipulations, and affidavits in the
record disclose that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact or
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Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets
33 Nebraska Appellate Reports
NARANJO v. NORTH PLATTE, NEB. HOSP. CORP.
Cite as 33 Neb. App. 435
as to the ultimate inferences that may be drawn from those facts and that
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
5. Summary Judgment: Proof. The party moving for summary judgment
must make a prima facie case by producing enough evidence to show
the movant would be entitled to judgment if the evidence were uncon-
troverted at trial. If the moving party makes a prima facie case, the bur-
den shifts to the nonmovant to produce evidence showing the existence
of a material issue of fact that prevents judgment as a matter of law.
6. ____: ____. If the burden of proof at trial would be on the nonmov-
ing party, then the party moving for summary judgment may satisfy its
prima facie burden either by citing to materials in the record that affirm-
atively negate an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim or
by citing to materials in the record demonstrating that the nonmoving
party’s evidence is insufficient to establish an essential element of the
nonmoving party’s claim.
7. Negligence: Liability: Invitor-Invitee: Notice. In order for a defendant
to have constructive notice of a condition, the condition must be visible
and apparent and it must exist for a sufficient length of time prior to an
accident to permit a defendant or the defendant’s employees to discover
and remedy it.
Appeal from the District Court for Lincoln County: Cindy
R. Volkmer, Judge. Affirmed.
Nolan J. Niehus and Corey L. Stull, of Atwood Law, P.C.,
L.L.O., for appellants.
Isaiah J. Frohling and Mark A. Christensen, of Cline,
Williams, Wright, Johnson & Oldfather, L.L.P., for appellee
North Platte, Nebraska Hospital Corporation.
Riedmann, 	Chief 	Judge, 	and 	Pirtle 	and 	Arterburn,
Judges.
Riedmann, Chief Judge.
INTRODUCTION
In this slip and fall case, the appellants challenge the dis-
trict court for Lincoln County’s order finding that no issue
of material fact existed as to a hospital’s lack of knowledge
or constructive knowledge of the ice upon which one of the
appellants fell. Upon our review of the record, we affirm.

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Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets
33 Nebraska Appellate Reports
NARANJO v. NORTH PLATTE, NEB. HOSP. CORP.
Cite as 33 Neb. App. 435
BACKGROUND
Laurence Naranjo was an employee of a trash collection
company tasked with the removal of a rolloff trash compactor
from Great Plains Regional Medical Center (the hospital). To
complete the task, after backing his truck up to the compac-
tor, Naranjo was required to disconnect hydraulic and electri-
cal lines from the back of the compactor and make sure that
the compactor’s lid was secure. This required him to walk
up an incline from his truck to the compactor. On the morn-
ing of December 4, 2015, as he was walking back down the
slope, he slipped on ice and fell. The weather that day was
clear; the most recent precipitation was 1.6 inches of snow on
December 1. However, the temperature on December 3 fluctu-
ated from 13 degrees to 43 degrees and reached a low of 21
degrees on December 4, allowing any accumulated snow to
melt and refreeze.
Naranjo and his wife (collectively Naranjo) filed a com-
plaint against the hospital seeking damages for the injuries he
sustained. They claimed the hospital failed to maintain safe
premises for invitees, specifically citing its failure to “clear,
salt, or de-ice” areas where invitees were known and expected
to traverse. The hospital denied the allegations of the com-
plaint and asserted that Naranjo’s fall and injuries were a result
of his own negligence.
Following discovery, the hospital filed a motion for sum-
mary judgment. It asserted that Naranjo would be unable to
produce evidence that the hospital created, knew of, or should
have known of the ice on which Naranjo fell. Accordingly, it
claimed that Naranjo would be unable to prove an essential ele-
ment of his claim. Naranjo opposed the motion.
At the hearing on the hospital’s motion for summary judg-
ment, the parties agreed that the issue before the court was
whether the hospital had constructive notice of the ice. The
court received into evidence the hospital’s statement of undis-
puted material facts, excerpts from Naranjo’s deposition, an
affidavit of the hospital’s attorney objecting to Naranjo’s

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Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets
33 Nebraska Appellate Reports
NARANJO v. NORTH PLATTE, NEB. HOSP. CORP.
Cite as 33 Neb. App. 435
affidavit, an affidavit of Naranjo’s attorney attaching the hospi-
tal’s discovery responses and depositions of Naranjo and vari-
ous hospital employees, an affidavit of Naranjo, and Naranjo’s
supplemental answers to interrogatories.
The evidence, as relevant to this appeal, establishes Naranjo
testified at his deposition that the hospital parking lot “looked
good” the day of his fall, but that the “[a]rea around the com-
pactor didn’t look that good.” He described “maybe two inches
of snow in areas, different areas around the compactor.” On
further inquiry, Naranjo clarified that there “was leftover snow
where they bladed,” “[o]n the edges of the retaining wall” and
“up . . . [b]y the dumpsters.” Naranjo testified that he did not
see any ice before he fell and that he had no trouble walk-
ing up the incline. He described the surface as “normal” and
stated that “it looked clean and dry.” However, after the fall,
he realized he was lying on ice. He described the area cov-
ered in ice as “the whole area until the walkway going in for
the employees.” In an affidavit prepared in opposition to the
motion for summary judgment, Naranjo stated that prior to his
fall, he frequently reported to the hospital about snow and ice
accumulations in areas he needed to access, but that despite his
complaints, the area was frequently snowy and icy.
Kevin Jess was a plumber in the hospital’s engineering
department at the time of Naranjo’s fall. As such, he shared
responsibilities with other members of his department for
snow removal. He testified as to the hospital’s snow removal
policy in general and its applicability in the area in which
Naranjo fell. He stated that he, personally, would run a snow-
blower over the area, blowing the snow away from the build-
ing. He described that he would go “all the way close to the
building” and take three paths or more, “treat[ing] it like a big
sidewalk.” He would then have someone on a Bobcat utility
vehicle remove the rest, and the snow would be taken to “curb
islands” in the parking lot, so when it melted, it would run
into the grass. He would also on occasion apply icemelt to the
area in which Naranjo fell.

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Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets
33 Nebraska Appellate Reports
NARANJO v. NORTH PLATTE, NEB. HOSP. CORP.
Cite as 33 Neb. App. 435
As it relates to Naranjo’s fall, Jess testified that he saw a
group of people gathered who looked like they were placing
someone “‘onto a backboard.’” He did not approach, but after
they got the person into the hospital, Jess returned to put down
icemelt. Discovery responses from the hospital indicate that
Jess observed the area was wet and somewhat slick. At the
time of his deposition, Jess did not recall the area’s being slick
and explained he put down the icemelt because he was think-
ing, “If somebody fell, better put some ice melt down.”
Tina Pate was the manager of a surgical unit at the time of
Naranjo’s fall. As she arrived to work that morning, there was
a man lying on the ground. She immediately knelt beside him,
stabilized his head, and began assessing his cognitive state.
The hospital discovery responses indicate that she recalled the
area’s being wet and somewhat slushy, although she did not
recall at the time of her deposition the area’s being slushy.
Pate denied, however, that there was any ice in the area where
Naranjo fell.
The only issue submitted for determination at the sum-
mary judgment hearing was whether the hospital knew of or
should have known of the ice upon which Naranjo claims to
have fallen. The district court determined that there was no
issue of material fact as to whether the hospital created the ice
upon which Naranjo fell or had constructive knowledge of it.
Therefore, it granted summary judgment in favor of the hospi-
tal and dismissed Naranjo’s complaint. Naranjo appeals.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Naranjo assigns, restated and renumbered, that the district
court erred in finding no dispute of material fact existed (1)
demonstrating the hospital’s constructive notice, by the court’s
disregarding Naranjo’s sworn affidavit alleging prior com-
plaints of snow and ice; (2) as to whether the snow and ice
were visible and apparent; and (3) as to whether the snow and
ice existed for a sufficient amount of time to warrant discovery
by the hospital.

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Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets
33 Nebraska Appellate Reports
NARANJO v. NORTH PLATTE, NEB. HOSP. CORP.
Cite as 33 Neb. App. 435
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1,2] An appellate court affirms a lower court’s grant of
summary judgment if the pleadings and admitted evidence
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material facts
or as to the ultimate inferences that may be drawn from the
facts and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Strahan v. McCook Hotel Group, 317 Neb. 350,
10 N.W.3d 187 (2024). An appellate court reviews the dis-
trict court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the
record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and
drawing all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. Id.
ANALYSIS
Principles Relating to Premises Liability.
Generally speaking, premises liability cases fall into one
of three categories: (1) those concerning the failure to protect
lawful entrants from a dangerous condition on the land, (2)
those concerning the failure to protect lawful entrants from
a dangerous activity on the land, and (3) those concerning
the failure to protect lawful entrants from the acts of a third
person on the land. Sundermann v. Hy-Vee, 306 Neb. 749, 947
N.W.2d 492 (2020). The present case falls squarely in the first
category, as Naranjo argues he was injured by an unreason-
ably dangerous condition on the property.
[3] A possessor of land is subject to liability for injury
caused to a lawful visitor by a condition on the land if (1) the
possessor either created the condition, knew of the condition,
or by the existence of reasonable care would have discovered
the condition; (2) the possessor should have realized the con-
dition involved an unreasonable risk of harm to the lawful
visitor; (3) the possessor should have expected that a lawful
visitor either (a) would not discover or realize the danger or
(b) would fail to protect himself or herself against the danger;
(4) the possessor failed to use reasonable care to protect the
lawful visitor against the danger; and (5) the condition was a
proximate cause of damage to the plaintiff. See id.

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Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets
33 Nebraska Appellate Reports
NARANJO v. NORTH PLATTE, NEB. HOSP. CORP.
Cite as 33 Neb. App. 435
Application of Principles to Naranjo’s Claim.
[4] The district court dismissed Naranjo’s complaint on the
hospital’s motion for summary judgment. Summary judgment
is proper only when the pleadings, depositions, admissions,
stipulations, and affidavits in the record disclose that there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact or as to the ulti-
mate inferences that may be drawn from those facts and that
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Strahan v. McCook Hotel Group, supra.
[5,6] The party moving for summary judgment must make
a prima facie case by producing enough evidence to show the
movant would be entitled to judgment if the evidence were
uncontroverted at trial. Id. If the moving party makes a prima
facie case, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to produce evi-
dence showing the existence of a material issue of fact that
prevents judgment as a matter of law. Id. And, if the burden of
proof at trial would be on the nonmoving party, then the party
moving for summary judgment may satisfy its prima facie
burden either by citing to materials in the record that affirma-
tively negate an essential element of the nonmoving party’s
claim or by citing to materials in the record demonstrating that
the nonmoving party’s evidence is insufficient to establish an
essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim. Id.
[7] The parties agree the only issue on appeal is whether an
issue of material fact exists as to whether the hospital knew
of the icy condition, or by the existence of reasonable care
would have discovered the condition. In order for a defend-
ant to have constructive notice of a condition, the condition
must be visible and apparent and it must exist for a sufficient
length of time prior to an accident to permit a defendant or the
defendant’s employees to discover and remedy it. Edwards v.
Hy-Vee, 294 Neb. 237, 883 N.W.2d 40 (2016).
Here, the burden of proof at trial would have been on
Naranjo to prove the snow and ice were visible and apparent
and existed for a sufficient length of time prior to the fall to
permit the hospital or the hospital’s employees to discover

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Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets
33 Nebraska Appellate Reports
NARANJO v. NORTH PLATTE, NEB. HOSP. CORP.
Cite as 33 Neb. App. 435
and remedy them; thus, the hospital could satisfy its prima
facie burden either by citing to materials in the record that
affirmatively negate that it knew or should have known of
the ice or by citing to materials in the record demonstrating
that Naranjo’s evidence is insufficient to establish the hospital
knew or should have known of the ice.
Naranjo assigns that the district court disregarded his affi-
davit alleging that he made prior complaints of snow and ice
to the hospital. At the hearing on the motion for summary
judgment, Naranjo offered his affidavit, which stated in part,
“Prior to my injury, I frequently reported to [the hospital]
about the snow and ice accumulation on the concrete where
I had to walk to disconnect the roll off dumpster. Despite my
complaints, that portion of the concrete was frequently snowy
and icy.” The hospital offered a written objection authored by
its attorney, primarily relating to photographs attached to the
affidavit. The district court took the objection under advise-
ment and in its written order overruled the objection.
On appeal, Naranjo assigns that the district court disre-
garded the portion of his affidavit regarding his prior com-
plaints. Relying upon Garcia v. City of Omaha, 316 Neb. 817,
7 N.W.3d 188 (2024), he argues that evidence of prior com-
plaints creates an issue of material fact as to whether construc-
tive notice existed. We find Garcia distinguishable.
In Garcia, the driver of a garbage truck brought a negli-
gence action against the city of Omaha, seeking to recover for
injuries he sustained when his truck fell into a sinkhole on a
city street. The city moved for summary judgment, claiming
sovereign immunity based on lack of notice of the defect. Id.
The district court denied the motion, and pursuant to statute,
the city appealed. Id. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed.
Addressing the issue of notice, the Garcia court found that
an affidavit asserting prior calls to the city complaining of
“‘holes in the street, erosion that could be observed below
the street, cracks in the street, etc.’” created an issue of mate-
rial fact regarding whether the city had received actual or

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Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets
33 Nebraska Appellate Reports
NARANJO v. NORTH PLATTE, NEB. HOSP. CORP.
Cite as 33 Neb. App. 435
constructive notice of a localized defect. Id. at 821, 7 N.W.3d
at 193. However, whereas Garcia involved a condition that
would have existed until repaired, the same cannot be said for
the existence of snow and ice. Additionally, under the facts in
Garcia, complaints of street defects made prior to the injury
implied the existence of the defect for a sufficient length of
time to permit the city to remedy it. But complaints that snow
and ice had accumulated on prior occasions do not imply that
the same condition existed on the date of Naranjo’s fall; nor
do they warrant an inference that the condition was apparent
or existed for a sufficient length of time to permit the hospital
to remedy it.
Therefore, Naranjo’s complaints that the hospital’s prior
snow removal efforts were ineffective to alleviate the pres-
ence of ice and snow accumulation do not create an issue of
material fact as to whether that condition existed at the time
of Naranjo’s fall and was visible or apparent, or whether it
existed for a sufficient length of time prior to the fall to per-
mit the hospital to discover and remedy it. And the burden to
prove that the hospital had at least constructive knowledge
that such a condition existed at the time of the fall was on
Naranjo. The allegations contained in the affidavit, however,
failed to establish a question of material fact as to this issue.
This assigned error fails.
Naranjo additionally assigns there was a dispute of mate-
rial fact that the ice was visible and apparent. He argues his
testimony and affidavit, the testimony of Jess and Pate, and the
hospital’s discovery responses establish the existence of a fact
on this issue. We disagree.
Naranjo relies upon his deposition testimony in which he
stated that when he arrived at the hospital the morning of his
fall, the parking lot looked good but the area around the com-
pactor “didn’t look that good.” He stated that there was a “lot
of ice [and] maybe two inches of snow in . . . different areas
around the compactor.” However, when asked to identify on
a photograph where the snow was in relation to his fall, he

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Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets
33 Nebraska Appellate Reports
NARANJO v. NORTH PLATTE, NEB. HOSP. CORP.
Cite as 33 Neb. App. 435
indicated it was “[o]n the edges of the retaining wall” and in
an area “[b]y the dumpsters.” He clarified that while he was
lying on the ground, “the snow was to the side of [him] against
the wall.”
Naranjo further explained that he did not have a problem
walking up the incline and that even though he was looking,
he could not tell it was icy. The following recounts Naranjo’s
description of the area in which he fell:
Q. Okay. Did the surface just look wet or did it look
normal?
A. It looked normal to me.
Q. Okay. And there was just a little snow along
the wall?
A. Yes.
Q. But other than that, it looked like it was clean
and dry?
[Naranjo’s counsel]: Objection to form of the question,
foundation.
Q. You can still answer, sir.
A. I believe it was — I — I couldn’t hardly tell it
was icy.
Q. Right. So it looked clean and dry and you were sur-
prised when you found the ice?
A. Yes.
The hospital’s discovery responses on which Naranjo relies
identify Jess as having some relevant knowledge that includes
his having arrived at the scene after the fall and “observed
that it was wet and somewhat slick and applied ice melt to the
area.” Jess explained in his deposition that he put down ice
melt because “you stop and think about it, just better put ice
melt down. If somebody fell, better put some ice melt down.”
Regardless, Jess testified he did not see any snow in the area
of Naranjo’s fall and “definitely didn’t see no ice.”
Those same discovery responses identify Pate as having
some relevant knowledge and stated that she “recalls that
the area where [Naranjo] was lying was wet and somewhat

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Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets
33 Nebraska Appellate Reports
NARANJO v. NORTH PLATTE, NEB. HOSP. CORP.
Cite as 33 Neb. App. 435
slushy.” In her deposition, Pate testified that she did not recall
there being snow on the ground where she was kneeling,
attending to Naranjo, and that “[t]here was no ice.”
The district court characterized the statements by Naranjo,
Jess, and Pate as “statements that the ground was generally
slick on the day in question,” but found “no evidence that the
ice upon which [Naranjo] slipped was visible and apparent.”
We agree.
For the hospital to have constructive notice of the ice
and snow, they must have been visible and apparent. See
Edwards v. Hy-Vee, 294 Neb. 237, 883 N.W.2d 40 (2016).
Here, although there is evidence that snow was visible along
the wall and near a dumpster, no evidence was presented that
there was snow where Naranjo fell. Nor was evidence pre-
sented that created an issue of fact regarding the visibility of
ice; to the contrary, Naranjo admitted he never saw ice before
he fell, and both Jess and Pate denied the existence of ice
at all.
Upon this record, we find no issue of material fact as to
whether ice and snow were visible and apparent prior to
Naranjo’s fall. Given the absence of any material fact regard-
ing the visibility of ice and snow, it necessarily follows that
Naranjo’s final assignment that the district court erred in find-
ing no issue of fact regarding the duration for which the ice
and snow existed likewise fails.
CONCLUSION
Naranjo’s evidence in opposition to the hospital’s motion
for summary judgment is insufficient to establish the hospital
knew or should have known of the ice and snow. Accordingly,
the district court did not err in granting summary judgment
to the hospital and we affirm its order dismissing Naranjo’s
complaint.
Affirmed.