State v. Clausen

- 12 -
Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets
33 Nebraska Appellate Reports
STATE v. CLAUSEN
Cite as 33 Neb. App. 12
State of Nebraska, appellee, v.
Chad R. Clausen, appellant.
___ N.W.3d ___
Filed June 18, 2024. 	No. A-23-960.
1. Convictions: Evidence: Appeal and Error. Regardless of whether
the evidence is direct, circumstantial, or a combination thereof, and
regardless of whether the issue is labeled as a failure to direct a verdict,
insufficiency of the evidence, or failure to prove a prima facie case, the
standard is the same: In reviewing a criminal conviction, an appellate
court does not resolve conflicts in the evidence, pass on the credibility
of witnesses, or reweigh the evidence; such matters are for the finder
of fact.
2. Convicted Sex Offender: Words and Phrases. For purposes of the
Sex Offender Registration Act, “working day” is commonly understood
to mean Monday through Friday, excluding weekends, and “a period of
at least three working days” would be understood to mean 3 consecutive
working days.
3. Convicted Sex Offender. The purpose of the Sex Offender Registration
Act is to protect communities from sex offenders who present a high
risk to reoffend by providing information about where previous offend-
ers live, work, and attend school.
4. Constitutional Law: Rules of the Supreme Court: Statutes: Notice:
Appeal and Error. Neb. Ct. R. App. P. § 2-109(E) (rev. 2023) requires,
in part, that a party presenting a case involving the federal or state
constitutionality of a statute must file and serve notice thereof with
the Supreme Court Clerk by separate written notice or in a petition to
bypass at the time of filing such party’s brief.
5. Constitutional Law: Rules of the Supreme Court: Statutes: Appeal
and Error. A party challenging the constitutionality of a statute must
strictly comply with Neb. Ct. R. App. P. § 2-109(E) (rev. 2023).
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
10/14/2026 07:25 AM CDT

- 13 -
Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets
33 Nebraska Appellate Reports
STATE v. CLAUSEN
Cite as 33 Neb. App. 12
Appeal from the District Court for Washington County:
John E. Samson, Judge. Affirmed.
Adam J. Sipple, of Sipple Law, for appellant.
Michael T. Hilgers, Attorney General, and Nathan A. Liss
for appellee.
Pirtle, Chief Judge, and Riedmann and Bishop, Judges.
Riedmann, Judge.
INTRODUCTION
Nebraska’s Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) requires
a person subject to the act to register a new address, tempo-
rary domicile, or habitual living location within 3 working
days prior to the change. See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-4004(2)
(Reissue 2016). At issue in this appeal is the sufficiency of
the evidence to prove the appellant, Chad R. Clausen, estab-
lished such address, temporary domicile, or habitual living
location. Finding the evidence sufficient, we affirm the district
court’s order.
BACKGROUND
Det. Sgt. Brian Beckman of the Washington County sher-
iff’s office received an anonymous tip that a registered sex
offender, identified as Clausen, was staying at a Washington
County, 	Nebraska, 	residence, 	despite 	being 	registered 	in
Douglas County, Nebraska. Beckman confirmed that accord-
ing to the registered sex offender database, Clausen was
registered as living in Douglas County. Beckman relayed the
information to Det. Samuel Vacha for further investigation.
Vacha and another officer went to the Washington County
residence to investigate the anonymous tip. Upon arrival,
Vacha spoke with Virginia Guerrero, who identified herself as
Clausen’s fiance’s mother. Guerrero testified at trial that she
lived with her daughter at the residence. She relayed that in
October 2022, Clausen had been staying at the residence for

- 14 -
Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets
33 Nebraska Appellate Reports
STATE v. CLAUSEN
Cite as 33 Neb. App. 12
the past 3 to 4 months because he and her daughter planned
to get married. She explained that Clausen was there “off and
on” and would spend the night, but he did not have any of his
belongings there. Vacha was allowed to testify, for impeach-
ment purposes, that Guerrero told him that Clausen had resided
there for approximately 6 months.
Clausen called Vacha later that day. Vacha testified at trial
that when he asked Clausen if he had been living at the
Washington County residence, Clausen informed him he was
living at the property for 3 days, then he would live at his
Omaha, Nebraska, residence for 3 days. When Vacha con-
fronted Clausen with the information from Guerrero, Clausen
admitted that “he was staying there most nights.” Clausen then
apologized and asked if he was going to jail.
Following 	the 	above 	testimony, 	the 	parties 	stipulated
to receipt of the 56-second video from the other officer’s
body camera containing the encounter between Vacha and
Guerrero 	for 	impeachment 	purposes 	only. 	In 	that 	video,
Guerrero informed Vacha that Clausen had been residing at
the Washington County residence “maybe 6 months.”
The district court found that the State proved beyond a
reasonable doubt that Clausen failed to comply with SORA.
Specifically, it found that Clausen was subject to registration
under SORA; between May 31 and October 18, 2022, Clausen
had only registered in Douglas County; and Clausen did not
contact or otherwise attempt to register as a sex offender in
Washington County. Next, the district court found that Clausen
established a temporary domicile and a habitual living location
in Washington County between May 31 and October 18. In
making this finding, the district court noted that Vacha was a
credible witness, and his testimony was corroborated to some
degree by Guerrero’s testimony. Because Clausen established
a temporary domicile and habitual living location somewhere
different than his registered address without timely reporting
it, the district court found that he violated SORA by failing to
register his new address. Clausen appeals.

- 15 -
Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets
33 Nebraska Appellate Reports
STATE v. CLAUSEN
Cite as 33 Neb. App. 12
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Clausen assigns the district court erred by (1) finding the
State proved beyond a reasonable doubt Clausen intentionally
established a temporary domicile or habitual living location in
Washington County, and (2) declining to find § 29-4004 and
its definitions under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-4001.01(3) and (6)
(Reissue 2016) unconstitutionally vague on their face.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1] Regardless of whether the evidence is direct, circumstan-
tial, or a combination thereof, and regardless of whether the
issue is labeled as a failure to direct a verdict, insufficiency of
the evidence, or failure to prove a prima facie case, the stan-
dard is the same: In reviewing a criminal conviction, an appel-
late court does not resolve conflicts in the evidence, pass on
the credibility of witnesses, or reweigh the evidence; such mat-
ters are for the finder of fact. State v. Keadle, 311 Neb. 919,
977 N.W.2d 207 (2022). The relevant question for an appellate
court is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could
have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a rea-
sonable doubt. Id.
ANALYSIS
SORA Requirements.
The parties do not dispute that Clausen was subject to SORA
or that he had registered in Douglas County pursuant to the
act. Rather, the parties dispute whether the State proved that
Clausen established either a temporary domicile or habitual
living location. For purposes of this appeal, the following pro-
visions of SORA are relevant.
Section 29-4004 states:
(2) Any person required to register under the act
shall inform the sheriff of the county in which he or she
resides, in person, and complete a form as prescribed
by the Nebraska State Patrol for such purpose, if he or
she has a new address, temporary domicile, or habitual

- 16 -
Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets
33 Nebraska Appellate Reports
STATE v. CLAUSEN
Cite as 33 Neb. App. 12
living location, within three working days before the
change. . . .
(3) Any person required to register under the act shall
inform the sheriff of the county in which he or she
resides, in person, and complete a form as prescribed by
the Nebraska State Patrol for such purpose, if he or she
has a new address, temporary domicile, or habitual living
location in a different county in this state, within three
working days before the address change.
Section 29-4001.01 contains the following definitions:
(3) Habitual living location means any place that an
offender may stay for a period of more than three days
even though the sex offender maintains a separate perma-
nent address or temporary domicile;
. . . .
(6) Temporary domicile means any place at which the
person actually lives or stays for a period of at least three
working days.
Sufficiency of Evidence.
Clausen assigns the district court erred by finding the
State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that he intentionally
established a temporary domicile or habitual living location
in Washington County. Clausen relies on Doe v. Nebraska,
734 F. Supp. 2d 882 (D. Neb. 2010), to conclude that because
the State failed to show he stayed at the Washington County
residence for “three consecutive weekdays” or more than 3
consecutive days, it did not meet its burden of proof. See brief
for appellant at 10. We disagree.
[2] In Doe v. Nebraska, supra, the U.S. District Court
for the District of Nebraska addressed whether the registra-
tion requirements of SORA were unconstitutionally vague.
Finding that they were not, the court applied the commonly
understood meaning of the phrases “working day” and “a
period of at least three working days.” As to the former, it
held “working day” is commonly understood to mean Monday

- 17 -
Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets
33 Nebraska Appellate Reports
STATE v. CLAUSEN
Cite as 33 Neb. App. 12
through Friday, excluding weekends. As to the latter, it deter-
mined a person of reasonable intelligence would understand
that phrase to mean 3 consecutive working days. The State
does not dispute these interpretations; therefore, for purposes
of this appeal, we utilize those definitions.
Here, Clausen told Vacha that he stayed at his fiance’s resi-
dence in Washington County for 3 days, then he would stay at
his Omaha residence for 3 days. After Vacha confronted him
with Guerrero’s statement, Clausen apologized and admit-
ted he stayed at the Washington County residence “most
nights.” The heart of Clausen’s argument is that the district
court could not have found enough evidence to convict him
when “the calendar reveals numerous ways a person can stay
‘most nights’ without staying either three consecutive work-
ing days or four consecutive days.” Brief for appellant at 11.
He correctly points out that there is no evidence to indicate
whether Clausen stayed at the Washington County residence
on weekdays, weekends, or both. However, under our stan-
dard of review, we must determine, after viewing the evidence
in the light most favorable to the State, whether any rational
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Keadle, 311
Neb. 919, 977 N.W.2d 207 (2022). We answer that question
in the affirmative.
According 	to 	Guerrero, 	Clausen 	was 	staying 	at 	the
Washington County residence “for the past 3-4 months.”
Impeachment evidence indicates she told Vacha he had been
residing there maybe 6 months. Regardless, Clausen admitted
to Vacha he was staying there “most nights,” apologized, and
asked if he was going to jail. This admission, corroborated
by Guerrero’s testimony, could lead a rational trier of fact to
find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt, i.e.: that Clausen established a temporary domicile, or
habitual living location, in Washington County based upon
the number of days he stayed there.

- 18 -
Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets
33 Nebraska Appellate Reports
STATE v. CLAUSEN
Cite as 33 Neb. App. 12
[3] The district court found Vacha credible and that his tes-
timony, which established that Clausen had stayed there “most
nights,” was supported by Guerrero’s testimony. The defini-
tion of “most” is the “greatest in quantity, extent, or degree”
or “the majority of.” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary
809 (11th ed. 2020). If Clausen stayed at the Washington
County residence a majority of the time, a reasonable trier
of fact could find that he stayed 3 consecutive weekdays or
more than 3 consecutive days. Furthermore, it would be an
absurd result to allow a registered sex offender to stay at a
residence other than his registered one for 3 days out of every
week, as long as one of those days was a weekend. See State
v. Hochstein and Anderson, 262 Neb. 311, 632 N.W.2d 273
(2001) (stating penal statutes are given sensible construction
in context of object sought to be accomplished, evils and
mischiefs sought to be remedied, and purpose sought to be
served). This would frustrate the purpose of SORA, which
is to protect communities from sex offenders who present a
high risk to reoffend by providing information about where
previous offenders live, work, and attend school. See State v.
Wilson, 306 Neb. 875, 947 N.W.2d 704 (2020).
After viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, we agree that a rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reason-
able doubt.
Constitutional Challenge.
Clausen assigns the district court erred by not finding uncon-
stitutional § 29-4004 and the definitions under § 29-4001.01(3)
and (6). We need not reach this argument, because Clausen
failed to strictly comply with Neb. Ct. R. App. P. § 2-109(E)
(rev. 2023).
[4,5] Section 2-109(E) requires, in part, that a party pre-
senting a case challenging the federal or state constitution-
ality of a statute must file and serve notice thereof with
the Supreme Court Clerk by separate written notice or in a

- 19 -
Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets
33 Nebraska Appellate Reports
STATE v. CLAUSEN
Cite as 33 Neb. App. 12
petition to bypass “at the time of filing such party’s brief.” A
party challenging the constitutionality of a statute must strictly
comply with § 2-109(E); a notice of a constitutional question
filed 1 day after the filing of an appellate brief is too late. See
SID No. 596 v. THG Development, 315 Neb. 926, 2 N.W.3d
602 (2024).
Here, Clausen filed his brief on January 9, 2024. He did
not file his notice of constitutional question until January 11.
Because his notice of constitutional question was not filed at
the same time as his brief, Clausen failed to strictly comply
with § 2-109(E). As did the Supreme Court in SID No. 596
v. THG Development, supra, we decline to address Clausen’s
constitutional challenge due to his failure to comply.
CONCLUSION
After viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, a rational trier of fact could have found Clausen
failed to comply with the SORA registration requirements
beyond a reasonable doubt. We decline to address his con-
stitutional claim because of noncompliance with § 2-109(E).
Accordingly, we affirm.
Affirmed.