24022566.doc

NORTH CAROLINA INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

I.C. NO. 24-022566, DAVID PERRY, Employee, Plaintiff, v. NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF ADULT CORRECTION, Employer, SELF-INSURED (CORVEL CORP., Third-Party Administrator) Defendant.

OPINION AND AWARD for the Full Commission by JAMES C. GILLEN, Commissioner.

Filed:  10 September 2026
					
This case was heard before the Full Commission on 22 April 2026, upon appeal of Plaintiff from an Opinion and Award filed by former Deputy Commissioner David Mark Hullender on 14 November 2025.  The deposition transcript of Dr. Joseph Molnar is part of the evidence of record.  
A P P E A R A N C E S
         Plaintiff: 	Elliott Morgan Parsonage, PLLC, Charlotte, North Carolina;
	R. Michael Elliot, Counsel of Record.
	
        Defendant:	North Carolina Department of Justice, Raleigh, North Carolina; 
		William L. Flowers, III, appearing.

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	The Full Commission has reviewed the prior Opinion and Award based upon the record of the proceedings before former Deputy Commissioner Hullender, the Form 44 Application for Review, and the briefs and arguments of the parties.  The Full Commission hereby enters the following Opinion and Award pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-85:
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The Full Commission finds as fact and concludes as matters of law the following, which were entered into by the parties as:
STIPULATIONS
All parties are properly before the Commission, and the Commission has jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject matter.
All parties have been correctly designated, and there is no question as to misjoinder or nonjoinder of parties.
All parties are subject to and bound by the provisions of the North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act.
An employment relationship existed between Plaintiff and Defendant-Employer on 11 June 2024.
Plaintiff alleges he sustained a work-related injury on 11 June 2024. 
Corvel Corp. was the risk carrier for the Defendant-employer on 11 June 2024. 
Plaintiff's average weekly wage at the time of injury was $1,537.83, yielding a compensation rate of $1,025.27.
Defendant filed a Form 19 Employer's Report of Employee's Injury or Occupational Disease to the Industrial Commission on 13 June 2024.
Defendant filed a Form 61 Denial of Workers' Compensation Claim on 17 June 2024.
Plaintiff filed a Form 18 Notice of Accident to Employer and Claim of Employee, Representative, or Dependent on 22 August 2024 claiming an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment on 11 June 2024.
Plaintiff filed a Form 33 Request that Claim be Assigned for Hearing on 27 January 2025. 
Defendants filed a Form 33R Response to Request that Claim be Assigned for Hearing on 20 February 2025. 
All parties attended mediation on 14 May 2025, and the mediation resulted in an impasse.
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	The following were entered into evidence by the Deputy Commissioner as:
EXHIBITS
StipulatedExhibit1:Pre-Trial Agreement; 

Stipulated Exhibit #2: IndustrialCommission forms, medical 
	records,andphotographs; and
Stipulated Exhibit #3: Plaintiff's wage verification and Industrial              Commission Forms 19, 22, and 61. 

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The Full Commission addresses the following:
ISSUE
Whether Plaintiff suffered a compensable injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment with Defendant on 11 June 2024 and, if so, what compensation is Plaintiff entitled to receive under the Workers' Compensation Act? 
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Based on the preponderance of the evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom, the Full Commission makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.	At the time of the hearing before the former Deputy Commissioner, Plaintiff was 40 years old and remained employed by Defendant.  Plaintiff has been employed at Anson Correctional Institution in Polkton, North Carolina for two separate periods.  He was first hired in 2007, eventually left, and was rehired in 2014.  On 11 June 2024, Plaintiff was a Correctional Officer.  At the time of the hearing before the former Deputy Commissioner, Plaintiff had been promoted to Correctional Sergeant.  
2.	As a Correctional Officer, Plaintiff's job duties for Defendant included maintaining the safety and security of the general public, offenders, and interior of Anson Correctional Institution. 
3.	On 11 June 2024, Plaintiff participated in an event at Anson Correctional Institution during his shift that was organized by his supervisor to congratulate a coworker for a promotion.  This event involved the use of an on-site propane grill provided by Defendant.  Grills provided by Defendant were customarily used by Defendant's employees during work hours to prepare food for these types of events, and Plaintiff often operated the grill.
4.        Plaintiff testified credibly that the facility had a previous grill which had become dilapidated and that as a result "the assistant superintendent approved for another lieutenant to bring a tow-behind grill for the staff to use."  The tow-behind grill was being used during the 11 June 2024 event.  Plaintiff further explained that the lieutenant's tow-behind grill was subsequently removed and replaced by a grill located near the break room. 
5.	The 11 June 2024 event was to begin just after the completion of the 5:45 p.m. line-up procedure at the beginning of Plaintiff's shift.  Although Plaintiff testified that he was not given a "direct order" to light the grill, he nonetheless testified credibly that just after line-up, Plaintiff's immediate supervisor, Sergeant Chaffin, indicated to Plaintiff that he was to light the grill: "it was more of, let's go ahead and start the grill up.  And I mean, I'm standing there to start the grill up then.  So it was like, go ahead and light the grill."  Plaintiff also credibly testified that he was "basically in charge of . . . cooking the meal." 
6.	 Plaintiff also testified credibly that Sergeant Chaffin had asked Plaintiff to light the grill at previous events, and that Plaintiff had grilled at Defendant-Employer's facility "[t]he whole time I've been there, countless times."  When he was asked if he was "kind of the cook," Plaintiff responded "Absolutely." 
7.	After Plaintiff lit the grill the first time, Plaintiff was prepping food when it became apparent that the grill's temperature was decreasing.   Plaintiff testified credibly that Sergeant Chaffin indicated to him to relight the grill: "So he was like, let's try to relight it."  
8.	As Plaintiff attempted to relight the grill while its cover was closed, Plaintiff's face, arms, and right hand were burned by a propane flash. 
9.	Plaintiff was on the clock during this incident, and had he not been operating the grill at the event, he would have been performing his regular job duties. 
10.	Plaintiff was initially treated for his burn injuries on 11 June 2024 at Anson Correctional Institution by the on-site nurse.  He was then driven by a staff member to Anson Hospital, which sent him to Wake Forest Baptist Hospital.  The records from Wake Forest Baptist Emergency Department reflect that he arrived there at 1:45 a.m. on 12 June 2024, having sustained a "flash burn yesterday."  The records further explain that Plaintiff "presents as a burn consult from an outside hospital after sustaining a flash burn yesterday. Briefly, the patient was lighting a grill when his face and arms were hit with the flames.  He reports his bear[d] caught fire but was quickly put out."  The record continued: "[Plaintiff] has an estimated 2% TBSA partial thickness burns to his face, bilateral upper extremities, and right hand." 
11.	Later on 12 June 2024, Plaintiff's wounds were treated by Dr. Alana Zeitany at Wake Forest Baptist Hospital and Plaintiff was given a dose of oxycodone for pain.  Dr. Zeitany's note from that date reflects that Plaintiff:
has about 1 to 2% partial-thickness burns to the right hand and the left face.  Otherwise first-degree involvement of the right arm and left arm . . . [h]e does have burn to the left face with this very small amount of blistering but does not appear to have any eye involvement as he was wearing his glasses during the event."  

Dr. Zeitany released Plaintiff to return to work on 17 June 2024.  A follow-up appointment was scheduled for 24 June 2024.  
12.	Plaintiff returned to Wake Forest Baptist Hospital on 14 June 2024 and was seen by Nurse Cynthia Adams.  The record from this visit reflects that Plaintiff's "[w]ife states she was instructed to change to clean and reapply Mepilex but dressing has pulled the blister off the wound site.  [Plaintiff] is diabetic and has concerns for infection."  Plaintiff was treated and released.  
13.	On 17 June 2024, Defendant filed a Form 61 Denial of Workers' Compensation Claim.  This Form reflects that compensability was denied because Plaintiff "did not sustain an injury by accident as alleged and this was not a mandatory lunch . . . [t]here was no interruption of his/her work routine.  The employee was not performing his/her normal job duties in the usual way when he/she alleges a burn injury" (emphasis in original).     
14.	Plaintiff was seen at his 24 June 2024 follow-up appointment at Wake Forest Baptist Hospital by Dr. Jospeh Molnar.  The record from this visit reflects Dr. Molnar's exam observations: "Erythema of face, bilateral forearms and right hand.  Right hand deepest."  The "Plan" section of Dr. Molnar's 24 June 2024 record reflects that Plaintiff should "[a]void sun exposure for a year," "[a]pply nonperfumed skin moisturizers such as [E]ucerin, [A]ququaphor, cocoa butter, or Vaseline twice a day."  Dr. Molnar also wrote Plaintiff "[o]ut of work until July 15, 2024[,] then return to full duty." 
15.	On 22 August 2024, Plaintiff, through counsel, filed a Form 18 Notice of Accident to Employer and Claim of Employee, Representative, or Dependent.  On this form, Plaintiff represented that he sustained an injury to his "Right/Left arm, left side of face" which occurred when "[h]e was turning on the grill and the flame back flashed onto him." 
16.	According to a 20 June 2024 written statement prepared by night shift Captain Randy Mullis, the 11 June 2024 event "was planned by Sgt. Derek Chafin and would involve using a propane grill that was available at the facility to prepare the food."  Captain Mullis' written statement also explained that "[t]his grill had been used before for similar staff morale meal preparations by various staff/shifts to include Sgt. Chaffin and [Plaintiff]" and that "[s]taff participation for this meal was voluntary with staff funding the meal through donations." 
17.	According to a 20 June 2024 written statement prepared by Associate Warden William Rodgers, the 11 June 2024 "function was voluntary . . . the staff wanted to congratulate their Shift Lieutenant who was promoted to Captain at another facility and this was [his] last day."  Associate Warden William Rodgers' statement also provided that the event "included the usage of a propane grill that was used various times by staff including [Plaintiff]" and that "the grill[] used was not own[ed] by Anson but own[ed] by another shift [officer in charge] that had allowed its usage in the past . . . this propane grill had been previously used by the Sergeant and [Plaintiff] for voluntary meals."  Associate Warden William Rodgers' written statement concluded: "Meals that were prepared in the past by Staff for morale purposes had knowledge of its preparation and volunteered their services but never mandated to do so." 
18.	Dr. Joseph A. Molnar, who has extensive experience treating burn injuries and is board certified in plastic surgery and hand surgery, was deposed by the parties on 8 September 2025.  Dr. Molnar testified that Plaintiff sustained partial thickness burns, which are burns "confined to the upper levels of the skin, usually what lay people refer to as first-degree or second-degree burns."  When asked why he released Plaintiff to return to work on 15 July 2024, Dr. Molnar testified "[h]is burns were superficial . . . I wanted to give him some time off because he did have some superficial burns of his hands.  And so that was an estimate when he would be ready."  Dr. Molnar also testified that Plaintiff's right hand sustained the worst burn, and that, looking at the post-injury pictures of Plaintiff's face and hands, that those burns could have resulted from a propane flash during the 11 June 2024 incident.  
19.	Plaintiff testified that he was out of work beginning 12 June 2024 and returned to work on 17 July 2024.  Plaintiff also testified that as a result of the burns, he has scars on his hands, forearms, arms, and cheek.  Photographs entered into evidence show slight skin discolorations on these areas. 
20.	Based upon a preponderance of the evidence in view of the entire record, the Full Commission finds that Plaintiff, while on Defendant-Employer's premises and on duty, sustained burns to his face, arms, and right hand on 11 June 2024 when he was hit by a propane flash as he was relighting a grill during a meal-centered staff celebration which had been organized by his immediate supervisor.
21.	Based upon a preponderance of the evidence in view of the entire record, the Full Commission finds that Defendant-Employer promoted a culture in which the staff was encouraged to use an on-site grill while on duty, and specifically promoted grill usage during meal-centered staff events.  In making this finding, the Full Commission observes Plaintiff's credible testimony, that Defendant-Employer and/or the Anson Correctional Institution's supervisors provided grills for staff use, and the written statements of Captain Mullis and Associate Warden Rodgers, which corroborated Plaintiff's testimony.
22.	Based upon a preponderance of the evidence in view of the entire record, the Full Commission finds that Defendant-Employer, through the actions of Plaintiff's supervisors, endorsed Plaintiff's role as the grill operator for the events conducted during his shift and further finds that Plaintiff was in charge of meal preparation and grilling for the staff celebration on 11 June 2024.
23.	Based upon a preponderance of the evidence in view of the entire record, the Full Commission finds that Plaintiff's immediate supervisor, who was present throughout the incident, indicated to Plaintiff that he should light and then relight the grill.
24.	Based upon a preponderance of the evidence in view of the entire record, the Full Commission finds that, as a result of the injuries he sustained on 11 June 2024, Plaintiff was incapable of work in any employment from 12 June 2024 through 14 July 2024.
25.	Based upon a preponderance of the evidence in view of the entire record, the Full Commission finds that the medical treatment Plaintiff received for the burn injuries sustained on 11 June 2024 was reasonably necessary to effect a cure, lessen disability, and provide relief. 
26.	Based on the preponderance of the evidence in view of the entire record, the Full
Commission finds that the slight skin discolorations Plaintiff sustained as a result of the burn injuries are not such disfigurements that they adversely affect Plaintiff's appearance to such an extent that they can be reasonably presumed to lessen his opportunities for remunerative employment and reduce his future earning power.  In making this finding, the Full Commission considered that there is no physical disability resulting from the disfigurement as well as Plaintiff's age, training, experience, occupation, and the fact that Plaintiff has retained his pre-injury job and received a promotion subsequent to the incident.
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Based upon the foregoing Stipulations and Findings of Fact, the Full Commission makes the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
In workers' compensation cases, a plaintiff has the burden of proving every element of compensability.  N.C. Gen. Stat. §§97-2(6), 97-2(9) (2025); Harvey v. Raleigh Police Department, 96 N.C. App. 28, 384 S.E.2d 549 (1987), disc. rev. denied, 325 N.C. 706, 388 S.E.2d 454 (1989); Gaddy v. Kern, 17 N.C. App. 680, 195 S.E.2d 141, 143 (1973), cert. denied 283 N.C. 585, 197 S.E.2d 873 (1973).  Regarding the Industrial Commission's ability to draw inferences from the evidence presented, the North Carolina Court of Appeals has held "[it] is for the Commission to determine the credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given the evidence, and the inferences to be drawn from it. . . ."  Rackley v. Coastal Painting, 153 N.C. App. 469, 472, 570 S.E.2d 121, 124 (2002).  The Industrial Commission is the sole judge of the credibility of witnesses.  Adams v. AVX Corp., 349 N.C. 676, 680, 509 S.E.2d 411, 413 (1998).  As the sole judge of credibility, the Commission may believe all or part or none of any witness's testimony.  Harrell v. J.P. Stevens & Co., Inc., 45 N.C. App. 197, 205, 262 S.E.2d 830, 835 (1980).
For an injury to be compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act, the claimant must prove three elements: (1) that the injury was caused by an accident; (2) that the injury was sustained in the course of the employment; and (3) that the injury arose out of the employment."  N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2(6) (2025); Hedges v. Wake Cty. Pub. Sch. Sys., 206 N.C. App. 732, 736, 699 S.E.2d 124, 127 (2010), disc. review denied, 365 N.C. 77, 705 S.E.2d 746 (2011) (citation omitted).  North Carolina's appellate courts have defined a compensable "accident" under the Act: 
. . . an unlooked for and untoward event which is not expected or designed by the person who suffers the injury.  The elements of an "accident" are the interruption of the routine of work and the introduction thereby of unusual conditions likely to result in unexpected consequences. 

Porter v. Shelby Knit, Inc., 46 N.C. App. 22, 26, 264 S.E.2d 360, 363 (1980) (internal citations omitted).  There can be no controversy that Plaintiff in this matter was injured in an accident.  The central question for decision is whether the injury arose out of and in the course of his employment with Defendant.   
It is well-established in North Carolina that "arising out of the employment" refers to the origin or cause of the accidental injury while "in the course of the employment" refers to the time, place, and circumstances under which an accidental injury occurs, and that, while often interrelated, these two concepts are distinct requirements, and both must be established to receive compensation.  Roberts v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 321 N.C. 350, 354, 364 S.E.2d 417, 420 (1988).  Generally, "[a]n accident arises out of and in the course of employment when it occurs while the employee is engaged in some activity or duty which he is authorized to undertake and which is calculated to further, directly or indirectly, the employer's business."  Perry v. American Bakeries Co., 262 N.C. 272, 274, 136 S.E.2d 643, 645 (1964) (citation omitted).
The seminal North Carolina appellate cases discussing whether injuries sustained during recreational or social activities arose out of and in the course of employment contemplate injuries which, unlike the injury in the case at bar, befell employees at activities while off-site and outside of normal working hours.  In Frost v. Salter Path Fire and Rescue, 361 N.C. 181, 185, 639 S.E.2d 429, 433 (2007), an employee was injured in a go-cart accident at a private amusement park while attending a "Fun Day" organized by the community to thank emergency personnel.  The Perry case considered an employee injured late in the evening while swimming in a hotel pool while he attended an out-of-town meeting.  262 N.C. at 274, 136 S.E.2d at 645.  In Berry v. Colonial Furniture Co., 232 N.C. 303, 304, 60 S.E.2d 97, 99 (1950), the employee was injured when, after the store was closed and the work for the day was done, he fell out of the company truck while on the way to the coast to take part in company-sponsored fishing trip   In Chilton v. Bowman Gray School of Medicine, 45 N.C. App. 13, 14, 262 S.E.2d 347, 348 (1980), the employee, a medical school instructor, was injured playing volleyball at a picnic organized by the medical school faculty so incoming residents could become acquainted with faculty members.  In Holliday v. Tropical Nut & Fruit Co., 242 N.C. App. 562, 564, 775 S.E.2d 885, 888 (2015), the employee was injured while participating in a team "Laser Tag" activity with coworkers while attending an out-of-town three-day meeting.  In Graven v. N.C. Dep't of Pub. Safety-Div. of Law Enforcement, 235 N.C. App. 37, 38, 762 S.E.2d 230, 232 (2014), two employees sustained injuries when their vehicle spun out of control after encountering a patch of ice on the way back from a holiday lunch. 
While there is ample North Carolina appellate caselaw analyzing the compensability of off-premises injuries associated with recreational activities, there is little to none contemplating injuries sustained during recreational activities such as the one presented in the case at bar, which occurred on the employer's premises while Plaintiff was on duty and under the direction of a supervisor.  However, there is some relevant direction provided by the Supreme Court in Perry v. American Bakeries Co.  262 N.C. at 274, 136 S.E.2d at 645.  The Perry Court recited a test articulated in Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law.  Id. at 275, 136 S.E.2d at 646.  This test explains that injuries suffered by employees during recreational or social activities are compensable when:
They occur on the premises during a lunch or recreation period as a regular incident of the employment; or

The employer, by expressly or impliedly requiring participation, or by making the activity part of the services of an employee, brings the activity within the orbit of the employment; or

The employer derives substantial benefit from the activity beyond the intangible value of improvement in employee's health and morale that is common to all kinds of recreation and social life.

Id. (quoting Larson's Workmens' Compensation Law, Vol. 1, s. 22.00, pp. 328-329) (emphasis added).  Because none of the decisions summarized above contemplated injuries which occurred on the premises of the employer, none implicated any analysis under the first prong of the Larson's test quoted by the Perry court.  However, given that Plaintiff's injury occurred on Defendant's premises during work hours, the Full Commission must evaluate the facts presented in light of the first prong of this test.
In the case at bar, the Full Commission concludes that Defendant's supervisory personnel promoted a culture which: 1) encouraged employees to use an on-site, Defendant-supplied propane grill during work hours; 2) promoted this grill's usage by employees during staff events; and 3) specifically endorsed Plaintiff as a grill operator for the events conducted during his shift. The Full Commission further notes that Plaintiff had operated a grill on Defendant's premises while working for Defendant many times with the knowledge of his supervisors and that during the 11 June 2024 incident, which occurred immediately after line-up at the beginning of the shift, Plaintiff's supervisor indicated to him that he should light and then relight the grill.  The Full Commission concludes that these facts, taken together, rendered Plaintiff's grill activities on 11 June 2024 "a regular incident of employment" under the first prong of the Larson's test cited by the Perry Court, and therefore that Plaintiff's on-premises 11 June 2024 accident arose out of and in the course of his employment.   Perry, 262 N.C. at 275, 136 S.E.2d at 646. 
The Full Commission is not persuaded by Defendant's arguments, which largely rely on the application of the factors articulated by the Chilton Court and assume that caselaw contemplating injuries which occurred during off-premises recreational events is controlling.  The Full Commission notes that the Frost Court specifically declined to recognize the Chilton factors as controlling and instead followed the analysis presented in Perry.  Frost, 361 N.C. at 187, 639 S.E.2d at 434. 
5.	Plaintiff also has the burden to prove a causal relationship between the work-related accident and the injuries for which he is seeking compensation.  Holley v. ACTS, Inc., 357 N.C. 228, 231, 581 S.E.2d 750, 752 (2003).  In cases involving complicated medical questions, only an expert can give competent opinion testimony as to the issue of causation.  Click v. Pilot Freight Carriers, 300 N.C. 164, 265 S.E.2d 389 (1980).  Based upon a preponderance of the evidence in view of the entire record, including the expert medical testimony of Dr. Molnar, the Full Commission concludes that Plaintiff's burn injuries were caused by the 11 June 2024 grill incident.  N.C. Gen. Stat. §97-2(6) (2025); Holley v. ACTS, Inc., 357 N.C. 228, 581 S.E.2d 750 (2003)
6.	Subject to the provisions of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-25.1, Plaintiff is entitled to have Defendant provide medical treatment, incurred or to be incurred, necessitated by the 11 June 2024 compensable injuries when bills for the same have been approved pursuant to Industrial Commission Procedures.  N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 97-2(19); 97- 25; 97-25.1 (2025).  
7.	Disability is defined by the Act as "incapacity because of injury to earn the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of injury in the same or other employment."  N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2(9) (2025).  The burden is on the plaintiff to prove disability.  A plaintiff must meet this burden by producing evidence that (1) he is incapable after his injury of earning the same wages he had earned before his injury in the same employment; (2) he is incapable after his injury of earning the same wages he had earned before his injury in any other employment; and (3) his incapacity to earn was caused by his injury.  Hilliard v. Apex Cabinet Co., 305 N.C. 593, 595, 290 S.E.2d 682, 683 (1982).  See Medlin v. Weaver Cooke Constr., LLC, 367 N.C. 414, 418, 760 S.E.2d 732, 735 (2014).  Additionally, the existence and extent of plaintiff's disability is established by producing one of the following:  (1) medical evidence that he is physically or mentally, as a result of the work-related injury, incapable of work in any employment; (2) evidence that he is capable of some work, but that he has, after a reasonable effort, been unsuccessful in his efforts to obtain employment; (3) evidence that he is capable of some work, but that it would be futile because of preexisting conditions, such as age, inexperience, or lack of education, to seek employment; or (4) evidence that he has obtained other employment at wages less than his pre-injury wages.  N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2(9) (2025); Hilliard, 305 N.C. at 595, 290 S.E.2d at 683; Medlin, 367 N.C. at 418, 760 S.E.2d at 735; Russell v. Lowes Product Distribution, 108 N.C. App. 762, 765, 425 S.E.2d 454, 457 (1993).  The Russell factors are not exhaustive and do not preclude the Commission from considering other evidence to support disability as set forth in Hilliard.  Medlin, 367 N.C. at 422, 760 S.E.2d at 737.
8.	In the case at bar, the Full Commission concludes that, as a result of the 11 June 2024 accident, Plaintiff was incapable of work in any employment for the period from 12 June 2024 through 14 July 2024.  In reaching this conclusion, the Full Commission notes Dr. Molnar's 24 June 2024 record which removed Plaintiff from work for this period, as well as Dr. Molnar's testimony.  Plaintiff is therefore entitled to temporary total disability compensation during this period at a rate of $1,025.27 per week.  N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-29 (2025); Russell, 108 N.C.App. at 765, 425 S.E.2d at 457; Medlin, 367 N.C. at 418, 760 S.E.2d at 735.
9.	Our appellate courts have held that, to be compensable under N.C. Gen. Stat. §97-31, disfigurement must be "serious," and that "to be serious, the disfigurement must be of such nature that it may be fairly presumed that the injured employee has suffered a diminution of his future earning power."  Liles v. Charles Lee Byrd Logging Co., 309 N.C. 150, 154, 305 S.E.2d 523, 526 (1983) (quoting Davis v. Sanford Const. Co., 247 N.C. 332, 101 S.E.2d 40 (1957) (emphasis in original).  Regarding the proper standard to assess whether there has been diminution in future earning power, the Supreme Court has explained:
In awarding compensation for serious disfigurement, we think the Commission, in arriving at the diminution of earning power from disfigurement and making its award, should take into consideration the natural physical [disability] resulting from the disfigurement, the age, training, experience, education, occupation and adaptability of the employee to obtain and retain employment.  

Stanley v. Hyman-Michaels Co., 222 N.C. 257, __ , 22 S.E.2d 570, 576 (1952).  The Full Commission concludes that the slight discoloration to Plaintiff's face, arms, forearms and hands are not a "serious" disfigurement that "may be fairly presumed" to have caused "a diminution of his future earning power."  N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 97-31(21); 97-31(22) (2025); Liles, 309 N.C. at 154, 305 S.E.2d at 526.  In reaching this conclusion, the Full Commission considered that there is no physical [disability] resulting from the disfigurement, as well as Plaintiff's age, training, experience, occupation, and the fact that Plaintiff has retained his pre-injury job and received a promotion subsequent to the incident.  Stanley, 222 N.C. at 257, 22 S.E.2d at 576. 
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Based upon the foregoing Stipulations, Findings of Fact, and Conclusions of Law, the Full Commission makes the following:
A W A R D
Subject to the attorney's fee set forth below, Defendant shall pay Plaintiff temporarytotal disabilitycompensationatthe rate of $1,025.27 per week for the period from 12 June 2024 through 14 July 2024.  As this amount has accrued, it shall be paid in a lump sum.
A reasonable attorney's fee of 25% of the compensation due Plaintiff under paragraph 1 ofthis Award is approved forPlaintiff's counsel and shall bededucted from the due Plaintiff and paid directly to Plaintiff's counsel.  
Subject to the provisions of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-25.1, Defendant shall pay all medicalexpensesincurred,or tobe incurred, necessitated by Plaintiff's burn injuries consequent of the 11 June 2024 accident.  N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 97-2(19); 97-25; 97-25.1 (2025).  

Commissioners GRIFFIN and GOODMAN concur. 

 Elizabeth B. Hilker appeared before the Full Commission in this matter on 22 April 2026.  On 30 April 2026, Plaintiff filed Motion for Substitution of Counsel informing the Industrial Commission that R. Michael Elliot of Elliot Morgan Parsonage, PLLC, would be substituted as counsel for Plaintiff. 

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