Katelan Demetrice Johnson a/k/a Katelan D. Johnson v. State of Mississippi

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 2024-KA-01097-COA

KATELAN DEMETRICE JOHNSON A/K/A APPELLANT
KATELAN D. JOHNSON

v.

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 09/25/2024
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. MARK SHELDON DUNCAN
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: LEAKE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: RANKIN SUMNER FORTENBERRY
OFFICE OF STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
BY: JUSTIN TAYLOR COOK
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: PARKER ALAN PROCTOR JR.
DISTRICT ATTORNEY: STEVEN SIMEON KILGORE
NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 06/02/2026
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:

BEFORE BARNES, C.J., LAWRENCE AND EMFINGER, JJ.

BARNES, C.J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. A jury convicted Katelan Johnson of a charge for possession of more than two, but

less than ten, grams of methamphetamine under Mississippi Code Annotated section 41-29-

139(c)(1)(C) (Rev. 2023). The trial court sentenced him as a second or subsequent drug

offender1 to sixteen years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections, with

1
Johnson was also indicted and convicted under Mississippi Code Annotated section
41-29-147 (Rev. 2023), which provides that second or subsequent drug offenders may be
subject to enhanced penalties. In his indictment, Johnson’s prior conviction for possession
of cocaine in 2003 was offered to enhance his sentence, but at the sentencing hearing, the
trial court noted Johnson’s extensive pre-sentencing investigation report, which showed
four years suspended and twelve years to serve, followed by four years of supervised

probation. Johnson now appeals, arguing the trial court erred in failing to suppress the

results of an inventory search after an allegedly unconstitutional impoundment of a vehicle

on private property. We find no error and affirm.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

¶2. On the morning of January 26, 2023, Mississippi Bureau of Investigations Officer

Robert Atkinson and Attorney General Investigator Justin Sims (Officer Sims) drove

together to 1329 Pleasant Hill Road in the Good Hope Community of Leake County,

Mississippi. At the time, Officer Atkinson had been helping local agencies with drug cases,

and Officer Sims was “contracted out” to the Department of Homeland Security. The

purpose of their visit was to talk to Justin Johnson (Justin),2 who lived at that address.

¶3. The officers arrived at the property in an unmarked vehicle. The property included

a wood-frame house, a shed, a trailer, and a small mechanic shop off the driveway, where

Justin worked on small engine machinery, such as lawn mowers, motorcycles, and four-

wheelers, as well as vehicles. The officers noticed a GMC pickup truck parked in the

driveway, closer to the shop than to the residence. As they exited their vehicle, an individual

exited the truck from the driver’s seat. He walked to the front of the truck as if he were

Johnson had two other drug convictions in 2007 for the sale of methamphetamine and
possession of cocaine. The trial court stated that while Johnson was not indicted as a
habitual offender under Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-19-81 (Rev. 2020), he
“could have easily been.”
2
Justin and the defendant are not related.

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going to raise its hood. Officer Atkinson told the individual that they were looking for

Justin. He responded that Justin was not there but should be back shortly. The individual

explained that he was also waiting on Justin because he and Justin were going to repair the

GMC truck, which probably needed a thermostat. The person told Officer Atkinson that the

truck belonged to a family member.

¶4. Officer Sims recognized the individual as Katelan Johnson and told this information

to Atkinson, who then asked the individual his name; the defendant confirmed that he was

Katelan Johnson. Johnson then began getting back into the truck as if to leave. Officer

Atkinson told Johnson to step out of the vehicle, as Atkinson believed Johnson had

outstanding arrest warrants in Scott County, Mississippi. Johnson complied. Officer

Atkinson then called Mississippi Bureau of Investigations Agent Daniel Ogletree and

confirmed that there were two outstanding warrants for Johnson in Scott County for the sale

of methamphetamine.3 The officers then arrested Johnson and read him his Miranda4 rights.

¶5. Officer Atkinson testified that he went around to the passenger’s side of Johnson’s

vehicle to make sure there were no valuables in the truck because he was “calling a tow

truck to get the truck out of these people’s yard.” He noticed that nobody else was present

on the property to give permission to leave the truck there. Officer Atkinson testified that

in this situation, when the arrested individual does not own the vehicle in which he was

3
Agent Ogletree testified that both arrest warrants were issued on November 7,
2022, and were served on Johnson after his arrest.
4
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

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arrested, it is standard practice for the officers to call a tow truck to remove the vehicle.

Further, he testified that performing an inventory search for valuables in a vehicle to be

towed is a routine part of the “booking process.”

¶6. Officer Atkinson opened the passenger’s side door to perform the inventory search

for valuables. On the front passenger’s seat, in plain view, was an open backpack. Inside

the backpack, Officer Atkinson saw a bag of insulin syringes and a bag of what appeared

to be methamphetamine.5 Underneath the syringes and drugs was a set of scales. A

photograph of the open backpack was entered into evidence at trial. Officer Atkinson

testified that the backpack was within arm’s reach of the driver’s seat of the truck. No other

valuables were found in the truck except a thermostat and a gasket.

¶7. Justin was the only witness for the defense. He testified that Johnson was a lifelong

acquaintance. In January 2023, Johnson had been helping Justin with odd jobs at the shop.

Justin testified that while he was not present at the shop when Johnson was arrested, he

claimed the GMC truck had been there several days for Justin to “take a look at it” and

confirm any needed repairs. On January 26, Johnson called Justin wanting to work on the

truck and perform some odd jobs for money. Justin admitted on the witness stand that he

was recently released from prison for selling methamphetamine out of his shop; however,

he denied ever using methamphetamine with Johnson. Justin also denied buying

5
A forensic expert from the Mississippi Forensics Laboratory testified that the
substance removed from the backpack was 7.04 grams of methamphetamine.

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methamphetamine from Johnson or knowing anything about the backpack or its contents.

¶8. At trial, a hearing occurred during Officer Atkinson’s direct examination by the State

regarding what happened during and after Johnson’s arrest. The trial court excused the

jury, and the hearing ensued with Officer Atkinson and Agent Ogletree testifying for the

State.6 Officer Atkinson proffered his testimony. After a few questions, defense counsel

stated to the trial court, “Your Honor, this is where we would object to the . . . ensuing

testimony about [the] search. . . .” Officer Atkinson continued his proffer, after which the

prosecution called and examined Agent Ogletree. Defense counsel did not call any

witnesses at the hearing and did not cite any legal authority for his arguments. He explained

to the trial court his objection was that the State had failed to produce sufficient evidence

to show the search was properly performed and incident to arrest. He argued that the

officers exceeded their search premises by searching a vehicle that Johnson did not own.

Further, defense counsel argued the search was beyond Johnson’s “immediate area.”

¶9. The trial court overruled Johnson’s objection, finding both the impoundment and the

inventory search were proper. The trial court noted Johnson was arrested under valid

warrants while on another individual’s property, when neither the property owner nor

6
Johnson did not file a pretrial motion to suppress the evidence of the impoundment
and inventory search. Instead, the matter was brought up during trial as an “objection.” The
record indicates that the State knew Johnson wanted to object to the admission of this
evidence when the State suggested to the trial court: “[A]t this time, it might be prudent to
have a brief hearing outside the presence of the jury based on statements [defense counsel]
told me earlier.”

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anyone else was present. The trial court ruled that under these facts, Officer Atkinson was

within his legal rights to have the vehicle impounded. The trial court stated:

If they hadn’t have done that [(impound the vehicle)], they’d just be leaving
Mr. Johnson’s vehicle, or whoever owned it, in the middle of nowhere with
nobody responsible for it. If it comes up missing or damaged or property from
it missing or damaged then they’d get the blame for it.

The trial court also found the subsequent inventory search of the vehicle was proper to

prevent the loss or destruction of any valuables left in it. The defense renewed its objection

throughout the remainder of trial, but the objections were overruled.

¶10. The jury found Johnson guilty as charged, and the court sentenced Johnson as

provided above. Johnson now appeals, raising one issue regarding the constitutionality of

the truck’s impoundment.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶11. A “mixed standard of review” is applied “with respect to the denial of a motion to

suppress under the Fourth Amendment.” Holloway v. State, 282 So. 3d 537, 541 (¶13)

(Miss. Ct. App. 2019) (quoting Dies v. State, 926 So. 2d 910, 917 (¶20) (Miss. 2006)).

“[W]e are bound by the trial judge’s findings as to the underlying ‘historical facts’ unless

those findings are ‘clearly erroneous.’” Id. “‘The ultimate determination of the

reasonableness of’ the impoundment, however, ‘is a question of law to be reviewed . . . de

novo.’” United States v. Trujillo, 993 F.3d 859, 864 (10th Cir. 2021) (quoting United States

v. Ibarra, 955 F.2d 1405, 1409 (10th Cir. 1992)).

¶12. When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress evidence, this Court “must

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determine whether the trial court’s findings, considering the totality of the circumstances,

are supported by substantial credible evidence.” Pinter v. State, 221 So. 3d 378, 388 (¶26)

(Miss. Ct. App. 2017) (quoting Gore v. State, 37 So. 3d 1178, 1188 (¶25) (Miss. 2010)).

“Where supported by substantial credible evidence, this Court shall not disturb those

findings.” Id. (quoting Moore v. State, 933 So. 2d 910, 914 (¶9) (Miss. 2006)).

ANALYSIS

¶13. Johnson argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the

evidence of methamphetamine and syringes collected during an inventory search of the

GMC truck after he was arrested for outstanding warrants. Johnson claims the warrantless

impoundment of the vehicle violated the Fourth Amendment; therefore, he argues, the

resulting inventory search was also improper, and the incriminating evidence should have

been suppressed. The State responds by focusing predominantly on the constitutionality of

the inventory search.

¶14. “Impounding a vehicle qualifies as a seizure subject to a Fourth Amendment

analysis.” Degenhardt v. Bintliff, 117 F.4th 747, 756 (5th Cir. 2024) (citing United States

v. McKinnon, 681 F.3d 203, 207-08 (5th Cir. 2012)). “When an individual is arrested and

there is no one readily available to take possession of the arrestee’s vehicle, the arresting

officer will often have the car impounded.” Ray v. State, 798 So. 2d 579, 583 (¶13) (Miss.

Ct. App. 2001). This Court has held that “it is permissible for officers to conduct an

inventory search of the vehicle when the circumstances require it to be impounded by the

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officers, regardless of the reason for the necessary impoundment.” Sills v. State, 359 So. 3d

603, 608-09 (¶29) (Miss. 2023) (quoting Black v. State, 418 So. 2d 819, 821 (Miss. 1982)).

The search “is for the protection of both the vehicle owner and the impounding officers.”

Id. at 608-09. However, “the decision to impound is properly analyzed as distinct from the

decision to inventory.”7 McKinnon, 681 F.3d at 207 n.3 (quoting United States v. Duguay,

93 F.3d 346, 351 (7th Cir. 1996)).

1. Waiver

¶15. Johnson argues the impoundment was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.

However, we note Johnson did not challenge the impoundment in the trial court.8 Instead,

at the suppression hearing, defense counsel objected to testimony about the inventory search.

The defense made no objection about the legality of the impoundment, although the trial

court ultimately found it proper, along with the inventory search.

¶16. It is well settled that “when a party makes an objection on specific grounds, it is

considered a waiver regarding all other grounds.” Copeland v. Copeland, 904 So. 2d 1066,

1073 (¶24) (Miss. 2004) (citing Burns v. State, 729 So. 2d 203, 219 (¶67) (Miss. 1998)).

Further, “an objection at trial cannot be enlarged in a reviewing court to embrace an

omission not complained of at trial.” Burns, 729 So. 2d at 219 (¶67). “The rule that failure

to object constitutes waiver applies to Fourth Amendment claims as well.” Walker v. State,

7
While there is a large amount of caselaw concerning inventory searches, on which
the State focuses, there are far fewer cases on impoundment.
8
On appeal, Johnson retained different counsel from trial.

8
913 So. 2d 198, 224 (¶86) (Miss. 2005) (citing Stevens v. State, 458 So. 2d 726, 730 (Miss.

1984)).

¶17. Here, Johnson did not object to evidence about the impoundment, but to the inventory

search. Defense counsel argued that the search was improperly performed and not incident

to arrest. Additionally, defense counsel argued that Johnson did not own the vehicle, and

the search was beyond where Johnson was standing. On appeal, Johnson is now seeking to

enlarge his argument to encompass an improper impoundment. We find this argument was

not properly preserved for our review; therefore, it is waived.

¶18. However, because the trial court ruled on the impoundment, finding it proper, we

shall address the legality of the impoundment, waiver notwithstanding.

2. Reasonableness of Impoundment

¶19. Johnson argues the trial court erred in finding the truck’s impoundment proper

because the State offered no evidence that the truck was impounded under a standardized

procedure or served a community caretaking function. He points out that the truck was

owned by a third party, parked on private property by permission, and posed no threat to

public safety.

¶20. The trial court found the impoundment proper based upon the following evidence

during the suppression hearing. At the hearing, which occurred mid-trial, the only evidence

offered was from the State, which called Officer Atkinson and Agent Ogletree to the stand.

They testified about the facts surrounding Johnson’s arrest for outstanding warrants, the

9
decision to impound the vehicle, and the resulting inventory search. Defense counsel’s

objection was to Officer Atkinson’s testimony about the inventory search of the truck, which

the trial court noted. The defense made no objection about the impoundment; however,

Officer Atkinson testified about his justification for impounding the vehicle:

I went around to the passenger side of the vehicle going to look inside . . . to
make sure there was no valuables or anything because I was calling a tow
truck to get the truck out of these people’s yard. . . . Because no one was
home for him to okay it to be left there.

(Emphasis added). Officer Atkinson testified that he and Officer Sims saw no individual

on the property other than Johnson. Atkinson testified that the purpose of performing an

inventory search of the vehicle was “[t]o make sure there w[ere] no valuables left in the

vehicle to go to the tow yard,” which was “standard procedure” when a vehicle is towed and

something that is “routinely” done “as part of [the] booking process.” Officer Atkinson then

proceeded to testify about the inventory search and finding the contraband in plain view.

Agent Ogletree did not testify about the impoundment or the inventory search but confirmed

that there were outstanding warrants for Johnson’s arrest.

¶21. During cross-examination, Officer Atkinson testified that he did not know Johnson

was a mechanic, but he knew the vehicle was parked in the driveway closer to the “shop

yard” than the residence. The vehicle was not running, but the keys were in the ignition.

He knew the vehicle belonged to one of Johnson’s family members, and a license-plate

check confirmed this fact. He knew Johnson was at the property to wait on Justin to put a

thermostat in the truck. Officer Atkinson confirmed that Johnson could exercise control

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over the backpack when he reentered the vehicle, and Atkinson said that the reason for

looking in the backpack was for “inventory,” not securing a later prosecution. During the

State’s redirect examination, Officer Atkinson testified that he found nothing of value in the

vehicle except the backpack, a thermostat, and a gasket. Importantly, the defense did not

offer Justin’s testimony claiming the truck had been parked at his residence near the shop

for several days waiting on repairs.

¶22. The trial court found both the impoundment and resulting inventory search proper.

Johnson was arrested under proper warrants while on another individual’s property, and

nobody else was present to give permission to leave the truck. The trial court also noted that

if the truck was left there and became “missing or damaged,” the officers would “get the

blame.”

¶23. A vehicle may be impounded under the Fourth Amendment without a warrant if it

falls under the “community caretaking” exception. Degenhardt, 117 F.4th at 756 (citing

McKinnon, 681 F.3d at 207-08). Under this exception, police may impound a vehicle “in

furtherance of ‘public safety’ or ‘community caretaking functions,’ such as removing

‘disabled or damaged vehicles,’ and ‘automobiles [that] violate parking ordinances . . .

jeopardiz[ing] both the public safety and the efficient movement of vehicular traffic.’”

McKinnon, 681 F.3d at 208 (citing South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 371 (1976)).

“The State bears the burden to show that a warrantless search falls under one of the

permissible exceptions” to the warrant requirement. Murshid v. State, 326 So. 3d 489, 497

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(¶22) (Miss. Ct. App. 2021) (quoting Jones v. State, 261 So. 3d 1131, 1139 (¶26) (Miss. Ct.

App. 2018)).

¶24. Federal circuit courts have “grappled with the constitutionality of community-

caretaking impoundments,” using different approaches. United States v. Sanders, 796 F.3d

1241, 1247 (10th Cir. 2015). As Sanders explained, “[t]here is a clear divide between the

First, Third, and Fifth Circuits, which never consider whether an impoundment follows

standardized procedures, and the Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits,” which do. Id.

at 1248.9 The latter circuits, and the Tenth Circuit, recognize that “the existence of

standardized criteria [is] the touchstone” of whether an impoundment is lawful. Id. at 1248-

49. The former circuits, however, “conclude that reasonableness is the only test” for

determining if the vehicle impoundment is justified by a community caretaking purpose,

“without reference to any standardized criteria.” Id. (citing McKinnon, 681 F.3d at 208).

The reasonableness “of the ‘community caretaker’ impound [is] viewed in the context of the

facts and circumstances encountered by the officer.” McKinnon, 681 F.3d at 208.

¶25. Another distinction is whether the impoundment occurred on public or private

property. On appeal, Johnson points to the Tenth Circuit as instructive, where the

community-caretaking exception “operates differently depending on the nature of the

property from which the vehicle is impounded.” United States v. Ramos, 88 F.4th 862, 867

9
“There are also other subtle differences between the tests applied” for the majority
of circuits. Id.

12
(10th Cir. 2023). “When the vehicle is located on public property . . . officers have far

greater authority to impound.” Id. (citing United States v. Venezia, 995 F.3d 1170, 1175

(10th Cir. 2021)). But when the vehicle is located on private property, and the vehicle “is

neither ‘obstructing traffic [n]or creating an imminent threat to public safety,’ a

community-caretaking rationale ‘is less likely to exist.’” Id. The Tenth Circuit imposes a

“heightened requirement on police” where the impoundment must be “justified by both a

standardized policy and a reasonable, non-pretextual community-caretaking rationale.” Id.

at 867-68 (citing Sanders, 796 F.3d at 1248).10

¶26. Here, the trial court found the impoundment proper based upon the testimony of

Officer Atkinson. The defense did not present any legal authority on impoundment or the

community-caretaking exception to the trial court; the only matter on appeal that Johnson

challenges at all is the impoundment, and then he cites legal authority that was never

10
The Tenth Circuit has identified five “non-exclusive factors” that are helpful to
determining whether impoundment is justified by a reasonable, non-pretextual community
caretaking rationale:

(1) whether the vehicle is on public or private property; (2) if on private
property, whether the property owner has been consulted; (3) whether an
alternative to impoundment exists (especially another person capable of
driving the vehicle); (4) whether the vehicle is implicated in a crime; and (5)
whether the vehicle’s owner and/or driver have consented to the
impoundment.

Sanders, 796 F.3d at 1250. In Sanders, the Court found the impoundment improper because
the officers were not guided by standardized criteria when the vehicle at issue was legally
parked in a private lot. Id.

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presented to the trial court. It is well established that when an appellant cites new legal

authority or makes legal arguments on appeal that were not presented to the trial court, they

cannot be considered and are waived. We “cannot find that a trial judge committed

reversible error on a matter not brought before him or her to consider.” Smith v. State, 986

So. 2d 290, 295 (¶13) (Miss. 2008) (citing Montgomery v. State, 891 So. 2d 179, 187 (¶33)

(Miss. 2004)). Because the trial court was never presented with these standards or factors

utilized by the Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits in making its ruling on the

motion to suppress, we cannot consider them. Further, we have not found any Mississippi

authority exactly on point articulating a standard on impoundment.

¶27. Even so, under the totality of the circumstances, we find the trial court’s ruling on the

reasonableness of the impoundment was supported by substantial evidence. Officer

Atkinson testified that under the circumstances here, it was standard practice to have the

vehicle towed. In the context of these facts, impounding the truck was reasonable under the

community caretaking exception. Even though the vehicle posed no threat to public safety,

the owner of the private property, Justin, was not present to give permission to leave the

truck there, and the officers did not want to leave the truck in a rural area.11 Importantly, at

11
Johnson argues the trial court’s ruling that if the truck or its contents came up lost
or stolen, the officers would be to blame was “irrelevant” to the community caretaking
analysis, but we disagree. While Johnson quotes McKinnon in support of his contention
(that “[n]othing in Opperman suggests that limiting an officer’s liability in any way related
to the purpose of the community caretaking exception”), Johnson omits the next sentence
of McKinnon, which states, “We have recognized, however, that an appreciable risk of theft
or vandalism may support an officer’s decision to impound a vehicle.” McKinnon, 681 F.3d

14
the suppression hearing, the trial court never heard the testimony that Justin had allegedly

given Johnson permission to leave the truck there because the defense did not present it.

While the truck did not belong to Johnson, it was under his control. The keys were in the

ignition, and when Johnson suspected he was under arrest, he tried to leave in the vehicle.

We find Officer Atkinson’s impounding the vehicle reasonable under the specific facts and

circumstances encountered by the officers.

CONCLUSION

¶28. For the foregoing reasons, the trial court did not err in finding the impoundment and

inventory search proper. The trial court properly denied Johnson’s motion to suppress the

evidence of methamphetamine and syringes. Accordingly, we affirm Johnson’s conviction

and sentence.

¶29. AFFIRMED.

CARLTON, P.J., McDONALD, LAWRENCE, EMFINGER AND WEDDLE,
JJ., CONCUR. WILSON, P.J., WESTBROOKS AND McCARTY, JJ., CONCUR IN
PART AND IN THE RESULT WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.
LASSITTER ST. PÉ, J., CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART WITHOUT
SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.

at 208. Leaving the unsecured truck at a rural residence was a risk the officers recognized.

15