Timothy R. Turner v. State of Mississippi

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 2025-CP-00795-COA

TIMOTHY R. TURNER APPELLANT

v.

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 06/10/2025
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. SMITH MURPHEY
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: YALOBUSHA COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: TIMOTHY R. TURNER (PRO SE)
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: ASHLEY LAUREN SULSER
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 05/05/2026
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:

BEFORE CARLTON, P.J., LAWRENCE AND McCARTY, JJ.

CARLTON, P.J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. Timothy R. Turner appeals the Yalobusha County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his

motion for post-conviction collateral relief (PCR) filed pursuant to the Mississippi Uniform

Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act, Miss. Code Ann. §§ 99-39-1 through 99-39-29 (Rev.

2020). In his PCR motion, Turner challenged his conviction of possession of a firearm by

a felon. Turner asserted that Mississippi’s felon-in-possession statute, Miss. Code Ann. § 97-

37-5 (Rev. 2020), as applied to him, violated his Second Amendment right to keep and bear

arms. We affirm the circuit court’s dismissal of Turner’s PCR motion for the reasons stated

below.

STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2. On September 30, 2021, a Yalobusha County grand jury indicted Turner for one count

of possession of a firearm by a felon as a violent habitual offender. See Miss. Code Ann.

§ 97-37-5; Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-83 (Rev. 2020). On April 7, 2022, Turner subsequently

pleaded guilty to an agreed-upon reduced charge of possession of a firearm by a felon as a

nonviolent habitual offender. See Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-81 (Rev. 2020). On the same

day, the circuit court sentenced Turner to serve ten years in the custody of the Mississippi

Department of Corrections. The sentencing order was entered on April 13, 2022, as reflected

on the criminal docket for Cause No. 21-cr-00043-SM-1in the Yalobusha County Circuit

Court.1

¶3. Turner filed his PCR motion on January 22, 2025, asserting that his Second

Amendment right to arm himself so that he may “protect [his] family and self against bodily

harm[ and] intrusions[] of others” was violated when his “ordinary firearm” was confiscated.

As such, Turner asserted that the felon-in-possession statute, as applied to him, was

unconstitutional. The circuit court dismissed Turner’s PCR motion. Turner appealed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶4. “[T]his Court will not disturb the factual findings of a trial court in denying [a PCR

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We may take judicial notice of filing dates on a court docket. See Badger v. State,
290 So. 3d 377, 381 (¶14) (Miss. Ct. App. 2020). We further observe that although the
circuit court’s order details the documents the court relied upon from the underlying criminal
case, the order does not “direct that certified copies of those documents be placed in the
[PCR] motion cause number’s file.” M.R.C.P. 54(c). Nevertheless, we find “that the circuit
court’s failure to strictly comply with Rule 54(c) is harmless error” because “the relevant
information [necessary for our decision on appeal] is included in the appellate record” or
available on the public docket. See Havercome v. State, 387 So. 3d 1014, 1019 (¶16) (Miss.
Ct. App. 2023).

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motion] unless such findings are clearly erroneous.” Howell v. State, 358 So. 3d 613, 614-15

(¶5) (Miss. 2023). “[W]here questions of law are raised[, however,] the applicable standard

of review is de novo.” Id.

DISCUSSION2

¶5. As Turner asserted in the circuit court, he maintains on appeal that his conviction of

possessing a firearm as a felon violates his Second Amendment right “to bear arms of self-

protection in our homes for self defense.” We find that Turner’s assertions are without merit

for the reasons addressed below.

¶6. The Second Amendment to our federal Constitution provides that “the right of the

people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S. Const. amend. II. Although this

right certainly encompasses “the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in

defense of hearth and home,” District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008)

(emphasis added), this right is not without limitation. Id. at 626-27. The Heller Court

explained, “Like most rights, the right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited.

From Blackstone through the 19th-century cases, commentators and courts routinely . . . held

that prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons were lawful under the Second Amendment

or state analogues.” Id. at 626 (citations omitted). With this history in mind, the United

2
The State asserts that Turner’s PCR motion was untimely but mistakenly states that
“Turner entered his guilty plea in the Yalobusha County Circuit Court on October 15, 2021.”
This is incorrect. As reflected in the circuit court’s order denying Turner’s PCR motion and
on the criminal docket for Cause No. 21-cr-00043-SM-1 in the Yalobusha County Circuit
Court, Turner entered his guilty plea on April 7, 2022, and was sentenced by the circuit court
judge on that date. The sentencing order was entered on April 13, 2022. Accordingly,
Turner’s January 22, 2025 PCR motion was filed within the three-year statutory limitations
period.

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States Supreme Court made clear that “nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt

on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons . . . [among other]

conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.” Id. at 626-27 (emphasis

added).

¶7. Since Heller, the United States Supreme Court has continued to recognize that the

Second Amendment does not bar laws prohibiting felons from possessing firearms. See

United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680, 699 (2024) (pointing out Heller’s recognition that

“many . . . prohibitions [on firearm possession], like those on the possession of firearms by

‘felons and the mentally ill,’ are ‘presumptively lawful’” (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 626,

627 n.26)); N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Assoc. Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 8 (2022); McDonald

v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 786 (2010) (repeating the “assurances” stated in Heller that

its opinion “did not cast doubt on such longstanding regulatory measures as ‘prohibitions on

the possession of firearms by felons’ [and other similar conditions]” (emphasis added)

(quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 626-27)).

¶8. The Mississippi Supreme Court has similarly recognized that the Second Amendment

right to keep and bear arms is not violated by statutes, like section 97-37-5, “limiting the

possession of firearms by those persons who have been shown to present a threat to public

safety, peace and order.” James v. State, 731 So. 2d 1135, 1137 (¶9) (Miss. 1999);3 see

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In James, the supreme court held that Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-37-5
(Rev. 1994) did not violate the Second Amendment. James, 731 So. 2d at 1137. Section
97-37-5 provided then, as it provides now, that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any person who
has been convicted of a felony under the laws of this state, any other state, or of the United
States to possess any firearm . . . [unless certain conditions are met].” Miss. Code Ann.
§ 97-37-5(1) (Rev. 2020).

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Francis v. State, 377 So. 3d 952, 955 (¶17) (Miss. 2023) (recognizing that “this Court has

upheld Section 97-37-5’s prohibition of possession of firearms by felons as constitutional”).

¶9. In the case before us, the circuit court expressly found that “Turner was not an

‘ordinary, law-abiding citizen’ at the time the gun was confiscated [from him].” See Bruen,

597 U.S. at 8; Heller, 554 U.S. at 635. On the contrary, at the time Turner was found in

possession of a firearm in the underlying criminal case, “Turner had multiple violent

felonies,” including convictions “of manslaughter . . . on October 12, 1981; aggravated

assault . . . on October 12, 1981; aggravated assault . . . on April 18, 1991; burglary of a

dwelling . . . on April 18, 1991; aggravated assault . . . on June 6, 2007; felon in possession

of a firearm . . . on May 2, 2016; and burglary of a dwelling . . . on February 3, 2021.”

¶10. Based on these circumstances, we find nothing “clearly erroneous” with the circuit

court’s finding that Turner was not an “ordinary, law-abiding citizen,” and, accordingly,

Turner’s right to possess a weapon was not protected by the Second Amendment. Indeed,

Turner does not deny he was convicted of the felonies listed by the circuit court in its

opinion.

¶11. Turner, however, asserts that Mississippi’s felon-in-possession statute, as applied to

him, is unconstitutional, citing United States v. Bullock, 679 F. Supp. 3d 501 (S.D. Miss.

2023), rev’d & remanded, 123 F.4th 183 (5th Cir. 2024). There, the United States District

Court for the Southern District of Mississippi found that the federal felon-in-possession

statute was unconstitutional as applied to Bullock because, according to the federal district

court, the government failed “[to prove] that there is a historical tradition of disarming either

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the violent or the dangerous. The government had to prove the underlying principle of

disarmament before it could apply it to [] Bullock.” Id. at 537.

¶12. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, however, reversed the

federal district court’s decision, recognizing that in light of Bullock’s prior convictions of

aggravated assault and manslaughter, “[a] ban on [Bullock’s] ability to possess a firearm ‘fits

neatly’ within our Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” United States v.

Bullock, 123 F.4th 183, 185 (5th Cir. 2024) (quoting Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 693-99), cert.

denied, 146 S. Ct. 255 (2025). As such, the Fifth Circuit expressly maintained that “[t]he

historical record demonstrates that legislatures have the power to prohibit dangerous people

from possessing guns.” Id. (internal quotation mark omitted).

¶13. We find that this principle applies here. As Turner’s prior criminal record shows, and

as the circuit court found, “Turner was not an ‘ordinary, law-abiding citizen’ [when his

weapon] was confiscated.” See Bruen, 597 U.S. at 8; Heller, 554 U.S. at 635. Rather,

Turner is a felon “who [has] been shown to present a threat to public safety, peace and

order.” James, 731 So. 2d at 1137. Accordingly, we find that section 97-37-5, as applied

to Turner, did not violate the Second Amendment. For the reasons detailed above, we affirm

the circuit court’s dismissal of Turner’s PCR motion.

¶14. AFFIRMED.

BARNES, C.J., WILSON, P.J., WESTBROOKS, McDONALD, LAWRENCE,
McCARTY, EMFINGER, WEDDLE AND LASSITTER ST. PÉ, JJ., CONCUR.

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