Marcus Taylor v. State of Mississippi

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 2023-CA-00738-COA

MARCUS TAYLOR APPELLANT

v.

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 06/01/2023
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. JOSEPH H. LOPER JR.
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: CHOCTAW COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: DAMON RAMON STEVENSON
JOSEPH SCOTT HEMLEBEN
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: BARBARA WAKELAND BYRD
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 05/06/2025
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: 06/02/2025 - GRANTED; REVERSED AND
RENDERED - 11/18/2025

EN BANC.

McCARTY, J., FOR THE COURT:

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING

¶1. The motion for rehearing is granted. The previous opinions of this Court are

withdrawn, and these opinions are substituted in their place.

¶2. The question this Court must decide is whether we are required to deny relief to an

incarcerated man suffering under an illegal sentence. The State argues that his relief is

barred by the passage of time. In our prior opinions issued on May 6, 2025, all ten members

of the Court reasoned the sentence was illegal, but we were split evenly on how to address

it, ultimately leaving the man’s excessive sentence intact.
¶3. Upon rehearing, we find that Marcus Taylor was erroneously sentenced to a term of

years beyond the five years authorized by the Legislature. In sentencing Taylor to a term of

fifteen years—ten beyond the maximum—the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction. When a

trial court acts outside the scope of its authority, its actions are void. As over a century of

precedent firmly establishes, our Judiciary has the inherent power to correct this error, and

therefore we reverse and render.

*****

Taylor is indicted and pleads guilty.

¶4. In 2014, a Choctaw County grand jury indicted Taylor on three counts: First, for

conspiracy to sell “Hydrocodone Acetaminophen, a schedule III controlled substance;”

second, for conspiracy to sell “Promethazine with Codeine, a schedule V controlled

substance;” and last, business burglary for breaking and entering a drugstore to steal drugs.

All offenses were alleged to have been committed on or about December 7, 2013. Taylor

was indicted as a nonviolent habitual offender. The case was prosecuted by the Office of the

Attorney General.

¶5. In February 2015, Taylor, represented by counsel, accepted a plea bargain. Under the

terms of the plea, he would plead guilty to Count I as a habitual offender, and the State would

recommend a sentence of fifteen years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of

Corrections. Counts II and III would be dismissed, and “any other pending charges in other

counties related to burglary of a pharmacy [would] be dismissed.”

¶6. Taylor’s plea petition acknowledged that the maximum sentence for Count I,

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conspiracy to sell a schedule III controlled substance, was twenty years. This was wrong.

¶7. At his plea hearing, Taylor pled guilty to Count I, conspiracy to sell “a schedule III

controlled substance.” At least six times during the hearing, the trial court or the State

specifically stated that Count III involved “a schedule III controlled substance.”

¶8. The trial court advised Taylor that the maximum sentence for Count I was twenty

years. This was also wrong.

¶9. As the factual basis for the charge, the prosecutor stated that if the case went to trial,

the State would prove that Taylor and three accomplices broke into Ackerman Discount

Drugs and stole “Hydrocodone Acetaminophen,” “which is a schedule III controlled

substance,” and conspired to sell the drugs. Taylor agreed that he was guilty of Count I as

described. The prosecutor stated that the State had agreed to dismiss Counts II and III of the

indictment and “to not pursue or dismiss any other charges or indictments related to drugstore

burglaries [in other] counties,” including but not limited to “Carroll, Lincoln, Pike,

Yalobusha, and Warren Counties.” Taylor agreed to give truthful testimony against any of

his co-defendants in any of those counties. The court accepted Taylor’s guilty plea and

sentenced him to serve fifteen years in the MDOC’s custody as a nonviolent habitual

offender.

¶10. The judgment, which the circuit court signed the same day, did not accurately record

Taylor’s plea. The judgment correctly stated that Taylor pled guilty to Count I of the

indictment and that Counts II and III were dismissed.

¶11. But the judgment erroneously stated that Taylor had been indicted for three counts of

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business burglary. The judgment did not mention the actual charge to which Taylor pled

guilty: conspiracy to sell a schedule III controlled substance. See Miss. Code Ann. § 97-1-1

(Supp. 2007).

¶12. Consistent with the trial court’s pronouncement, the judgment sentenced Taylor to

serve fifteen years in MDOC custody as a nonviolent habitual offender.

¶13. One year later, Taylor, represented by a new attorney, filed a “motion to reconsider

sentencing” in which he claimed that “[d]ue to some confusion and miscommunication,

[Taylor] believe[d] that he pleaded guilty to Business Burglary which carries a maximum

sentence of seven years.” See Miss. Code Ann. § 97-17-33(1) (Rev. 2006). Taylor asked the

court to resentence him consistent with the maximum sentence for business burglary.

¶14. In response, the State filed a motion to amend the judgment to show that Taylor pled

guilty to conspiracy to sell “a schedule III controlled substance.” The State characterized the

original judgment’s indication that Taylor pled guilty to burglary as a “scrivener’s error.”

¶15. In March 2016, the trial court1 entered a corrected judgment recognizing that the

original judgment should have stated that Taylor pled guilty to conspiracy to sell “a Schedule

III Controlled Substance,” not business burglary. The corrected judgment made no change

to Taylor’s sentence.

¶16. Two days later, the trial court denied Taylor’s motion to reconsider the sentencing.

The trial court stated that it had reviewed Taylor’s plea petition and the transcript of his plea

1
Judge Clarence E. Morgan III accepted Taylor’s plea, sentenced Taylor, and entered
the original judgment in the case. Judge Morgan retired in December 2015, and Judge
Joseph H. Loper Jr. presided over all subsequent proceedings in the case.

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hearing and found that it was “clear” that Taylor “was fully aware” he was pleading guilty

to conspiracy to sell “a Schedule II controlled substance” and that the sentence imposed was

consistent with Taylor’s plea bargain and plea petition. (Emphasis added).

¶17. The trial court acknowledged that the original judgment “contained a clerical error”

in indicating that Taylor pled guilty to business burglary when, in fact, he pled guilty to

conspiracy to distribute “a Schedule II controlled substance.” (Emphasis added). This

order’s two references to “a Schedule II controlled substance” are the only such references

to “a Schedule II controlled substance” in the entire record.

Taylor seeks post-conviction relief.

¶18. Seven years passed. In March 2023, Taylor, again represented by his original

attorney, filed a rather unusual PCR motion. Although it was styled as a PCR motion and

cited the Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act, the motion did not articulate any

cognizable ground for relief under the Act. Rather, Taylor argued that he had “been

rehabilitated during his term of incarceration”; that his prior criminal history was attributable

to his youth, “peer pressure,” and a lack of education; that two of his co-defendants had

already been released from custody; and that his children and elderly parents needed his

support. For all these reasons, Taylor asked the court “to resentence him with parole

eligibility” as a non-habitual offender under the UPCCRA.

¶19. The trial court denied Taylor’s motion. The court recounted the case’s procedural

history: that in 2015, Taylor pled guilty to conspiracy to sell “a Schedule III Controlled

Substance” and was sentenced to serve fifteen years in the MDOC’s custody as a habitual

5
offender; that the original “judgment contained a scrivener’s error” in indicating that Taylor

was sentenced for burglary rather than conspiracy to sell “a Schedule III Controlled

Substance”; and that in 2016, the court entered a corrected judgment imposing the same

sentence for the true crime of conspiracy to sell “a Schedule III Controlled Substance.” The

trial court then held that Taylor’s motion was barred by the statute of limitations, that none

of the statutory exceptions to the statute of limitations applied, and that the court had no

authority to modify Taylor’s sentence.

Proceedings on appeal.

¶20. Taylor timely filed a notice of appeal. After briefing was completed, and although

Taylor did not raise the issue, this Court directed the parties to provide supplemental briefing.

See Order, Taylor v. State, No. 2023-CA-00738-COA (Miss. Ct. App. July 19, 2024). In that

order, signed by Presiding Judge Wilson, it was pointed out that despite the fifteen-year

sentence Taylor received, “the maximum prison sentence for the conspiracy to which Taylor

pled guilty is only five years.” Accordingly, we requested briefing on two points:

1. Is the maximum prison sentence for Taylor’s offense five years? If so, is
Taylor’s fifteen-year prison sentence illegal?

2. Is Taylor’s PCR motion nonetheless barred by the three-year statute of
limitations of the Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act, Miss. Code
Ann. § 99-39-5(2) (Rev. 2020)? See Howell v. State, 358 So. 3d 613, 616 (¶12)
(Miss. 2023).

¶21. This Court issued an evenly divided opinion on May 6, 2025, ultimately resulting in

affirming the trial court’s denial of Taylor’s motion for post-conviction relief. The lead

opinion explained that while “it is apparent that Taylor’s fifteen-year sentence exceeds the

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five-year maximum sentence for the crime to which he pled guilty,” he “filed his PCR motion

eight years after his judgment was entered,” or five years too late. As a result, the lead

opinion concluded that “the circuit court correctly found that Taylor’s PCR motion is barred

by the statute of limitations” and that he was entitled to no relief.

¶22. Taylor timely filed a motion for rehearing. Two days later, the Mississippi Office of

Capital Post-Conviction Counsel sought leave to file an amicus curiae brief in support of

Taylor’s motion for rehearing, which was granted.

DISCUSSION

¶23. The sole issue before the Court on rehearing is whether Taylor’s excessive sentence

can be challenged after the three-year time-bar set by the PCR Act. We must first examine

the jurisdiction of the trial court to enter such a judgment.

Courts may only act when they have the power to do so.

¶24. Earlier this year, our Supreme Court explained that “[s]ubject matter jurisdiction

involves a court’s power to hear a particular type of claim.” Miss. Apartment Ass’n v. City

of Jackson, 407 So. 3d 1061, 1065-66 (¶16) (Miss. 2025). A court must have subject matter

jurisdiction before it exercises authority, and this is a “threshold inquiry.” Id. at 1066 (¶16).

“Generally speaking, [jurisdiction] means the power or authority of a court to hear and decide

a case.” Penrod Drilling Co. v. Bounds, 433 So. 2d 916, 922 (Miss. 1983).

¶25. In the early days of the last century, our Supreme Court explained what happens when

a court exceeds its authority. It quoted with approval a court that previously grappled with

a similar question of whether an action was void. “It is an axiom of the law that judgments

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entered without any jurisdiction are void, and will be so held in a collateral proceeding[.]”

McHenry v. State, 91 Miss. 562, 44 So. 831, 834 (1907) (quoting Hovey v. Elliott, 39 N.E.

841, 844 (N.Y. 1895), aff’d, 167 U.S. 409 (1897)). And so “although a court had jurisdiction

over both the person and the subject-matter, but did not have the jurisdiction to enter the

particular judgment entered in the case,” the Court determined that the general trend among

courts was “to hold that . . . such judgment is void, and may be collaterally impeached.” Id.2

¶26. It was from this general principle that the McHenry Court adopted the United States

Supreme Court’s reasoning that a trial court is “limited in its modes of procedure and in the

extent and character of its judgments.” Id. That is, a trial court cannot impose a different

remedy than one which does not match the charge before it.

If the action be for libel, or personal tort, the court cannot order in the case a
specific performance of a contract. If the action be for the possession of real
property, the court is powerless to admit in the case the probate of a will.

....

The judgments mentioned, given in the cases supposed, would not be merely
erroneous. They would be absolutely void, because the court in rendering them
would transcend the limits of its authority in those cases.

Id. (quoting Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U.S. 274, 282 (1876)). The Court continued with this

analogy, reasoning that “if a court of general jurisdiction should, on an indictment for libel,

render a judgment of death or confiscation of property, it would, for the same reason, be

void[.]” Id. Judgments of this type are “in excess of the authority of the court and forbidden

2
The Court believed the point could be made clearer: “Perhaps the word ‘power’
should be used in place of ‘jurisdiction’ in the last clause of this sentence, to prevent
confusion of thought.” Id.

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by the Constitution.” Id.

¶27. Just one month after McHenry, the Court was again confronted with the import of

jurisdiction—this time, specifically addressing its application in cases of habeas corpus. Ex

parte Burden, 92 Miss. 14, 45 So. 1, 1 (1907). Chester Burden was found guilty of assault

and battery. Id. But contrary to nearly thirty years of caselaw, the jury included “mere

surplusage” in their verdict that the assault and battery was based on the “intent to commit

manslaughter.” Id.

¶28. Despite this surplusage, the Court recognized that “[w]e have, therefore, a conviction

for a misdemeanor.” Id. But the trial court, “misinterpreting this verdict, held it to be a

conviction for a felony, and sentenced the defendant to six years in the penitentiary.” Id.

¶29. After declaring that this was a “sentence [the trial court] had no power or jurisdiction

to impose,” the Supreme Court explained, “The distinction, abundantly established by

authority, is between a sentence which is merely excessive or erroneous, regard being had

to the particular offense, and a sentence which is absolutely void.” Id.

¶30. Because the Court already determined that the trial court exceeded its authority in

imposing the sentence before it, the true question before the Burden Court—as is the one we

face today—was whether this could be remedied through a collateral attack. Id. Seventy-

seven years before the PCR Act, the method to challenge an illegal sentence was through

habeas corpus. This was not a close question for the majority: “Want of jurisdiction over

person or subject-matter is always a ground for relief on habeas corpus[.]” Id. at 1-2.

(emphasis added). “[F]or, if the court has acted without jurisdiction, its judgment or order

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is absolutely void, even on collateral attack[.]” Id. at 2.

¶31. As the Burden Court ruled, even when a court has jurisdiction, it cannot exceed it, or

it will create a void judgment.

Even where a court has jurisdiction of the offense charged and of the person
of the accused, it may so far transcend its powers in assessing the penalty for
the offense, by imposing a punishment of a character different from that
prescribed by law, or otherwise, that the sentence will be void and furnish no
authority for holding the accused in custody, though the conviction on which
the sentence was entered was valid and correct; and in such a case the accused
may be discharged on habeas corpus.

Id. at 2. For an “excessive judgment is one that the court did not have the power to render,

and is therefore void.” Id.

¶32. Crucially, this did not mean that the entire conviction was void—only that part which

exceeded the scope of the trial court’s jurisdiction. “[S]uch judgment or sentence is not void

ab initio because of the excess, but that it is good so far as the power of the court extends,

and is invalid only as to the excess[.]” Id. Indeed, the excess then would not be subject to

attack until the valid part of the sentence were served: “a person in custody under such a

sentence cannot be discharged on habeas corpus until he has suffered or performed so much

of it as it was within the power of the court to impose.” Id.

¶33. Echoing the same reasoning used in McHenry, the Court reiterated that “[a] sentence

of a different character than that authorized by law to be imposed for the crime of which the

accused has been found guilty is void, while a sentence which imposes the statutory kind of

punishment is not absolutely void, although excessive.” Id. at 3. “In the former case the

entire judgment is invalid, while as to the latter the excessive portion is alone erroneous, and

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not void in such a sense as to be available on habeas corpus, at least until after the valid

portion of the judgment has been executed.” Id.

¶34. The majority in Burden held that habeas corpus was the correct avenue to challenge

a void or excessive judgment; to prohibit habeas relief, the Court declared, would be to

destroy a constitutional right of the citizenry: “To deny the right of habeas corpus in such a

case is a virtual suspension of it; and it should be constantly borne in mind that the writ was

intended as a protection of the citizen from encroachment upon his liberty from any source,

equally as well from the unauthorized acts of courts and judges as the unauthorized acts of

individuals[.]” Id. (emphasis added). Accordingly, the Court allowed the sentence to be

challenged by a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Id.

¶35. In the end, the Supreme Court ruled that habeas relief was correctly granted to the

defendant since the trial court “imposed a sentence which he was without power or

jurisdiction to impose.” Id. at 3.

Post-conviction habeas corpus is absorbed into the UPCCRA.

¶36. Our Supreme Court’s decision in Burden expressly centered on whether habeas corpus

was available to a defendant after his conviction. The Court concluded it was. Id. at 3. The

Constitution of 1890 declared that “[t]he privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be

suspended, unless when in the case of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it,

nor ever without the authority of the legislature.” Miss. Const. art. 3, § 21 (emphasis added).

“A habeas corpus proceeding has but one purpose, that is to set at liberty persons illegally

held[.]” Walker v. State, 555 So. 2d 738, 740 (Miss. 1990) (emphasis added) (internal

11
quotation marks omitted). “The purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to give a person

restrained of his liberty an immediate hearing so that it can be determined whether that

person is being deprived of constitutional rights, such as the right to due process of law.”

Carson v. Hargett, 689 So. 2d 753, 755 (Miss. 1996).

¶37. In 1984, the Legislature attempted to corral the variety of common law methods a

prisoner might use to attack a conviction or sentence by adopting the PCR Act, which had

as its express “purpose . . . to revise, streamline and clarify the rules and statutes pertaining

to post-conviction collateral relief law and procedures, to resolve any conflicts therein and

to provide the courts of this state with an exclusive and uniform procedure for the collateral

review of convictions and sentences.” Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-3(1). In doing so, the Act

purported to “abolish[] the common law writs relating to post-conviction collateral relief,

including by way of illustration but not limitation, error coram nobis, error coram vobis, and

post-conviction habeas corpus, as well as statutory post-conviction habeas corpus.” Id.

¶38. Not long after the Legislature noted this “abolishment,” the Supreme Court ruled in

Walker it was ineffective as to habeas corpus. A defendant was convicted of the possession

of cocaine, and sought bail pending appeal, which was denied. Walker, 555 So. 2d at 739.

He then sought habeas corpus relief—not in the trial court, but with the Supreme Court itself.

Id. The Court ordered the trial court to have “a full hearing on the merits” of the request for

bail. Id. The Attorney General protested and asked the Court to rehear its decision. Id. The

Attorney General’s core argument—as in the case before us—is that the only avenue for

relief was PCR, not habeas. Id. The Attorney General argued “that any suggestion that the

12
matter is a habeas corpus action which should be heard in the jurisdiction of confinement is

erroneous in view of Mississippi’s Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act,” so “any

relief beyond that . . . must be sought pursuant to . . . the Post-Conviction Collateral Relief

Act, and must further be sought in the trial court of conviction.” Id. at 740.

¶39. The Supreme Court rejected this argument. Id. It first determined that “the

Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act is inapplicable in this situation.” Id. Generally

speaking, “purely collateral post-conviction remedies attacking a judgment of conviction or

sentence should be sought under authority of the Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act since

that Act, in the pure post-conviction collateral relief sense, is arguably post-conviction

habeas corpus renamed.” Id. (emphasis added) (quotation marks omitted). But “[a]rguments

over nomenclature should be avoided so long as the Act affords the relief formerly available

by habeas corpus in this limited context.” Id. (emphasis added). Since Walker was not

attacking his conviction in the strict sense of post-conviction collateral proceedings, the

Court held that it could review the habeas request. Id.

¶40. Six years after Walker, in 1996, the Court reiterated that “the State is incorrect in its

argument that the writ of habeas corpus was abolished by the Post-Conviction Collateral

Relief Act.” Carson, 689 So. 2d at 755; see also Hill v. State, 838 So. 2d 994, 997 (¶8)

(Miss. Ct. App. 2002) (“the [Supreme] [C]ourt has found that the writ of habeas corpus

remains available even though the Post Conviction Relief Act explicitly establishes the

procedure to replace habeas corpus in most situations”).

¶41. Seeking to harmonize this jurisprudence and the PCR Act, a former member of our

13
Court opined that “[i]t is more accurate to say that the procedures for the writ of habeas

corpus in post-conviction matters have been established by these statutes, but the writ itself

remains alive.” Norwood v. State, 846 So. 2d 1048, 1056 (¶27) (Miss. Ct. App. 2003)

(Southwick, P.J., concurring). For as the Supreme Court has concluded, the “overriding

intent and purpose of the [UPCCRA]” is simply to “guide and assist the judiciary in its duty

to provide an orderly means of administering the post-conviction claims of a growing prison

population.” Sykes v. State, 757 So. 2d 997, 1000 (¶11) (Miss. 2000).

The Supreme Court returns to Legislative intent behind the UPCCRA.

¶42. For many years, these distinctions were mostly academic. The PCR Act expressly

allows for a three year statute of limitations period from the date of conviction by way of a

guilty plea or after a direct appeal. See Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-5(2). However, the

Supreme Court implemented its own judicially crafted exception to the time-bar, which

allowed a petitioner to file an out-of-time challenge if the claim involved the individual’s

“fundamental rights.” See generally Howell v. State, 358 So. 3d 613, 615 (¶7) (Miss. 2023)

(discussing the time-bar in the UPCCRA). Accordingly, there was little discussion after the

creation of the “fundamental rights exception” on what method could be used to attack an

excessive or illegal sentence, as issues involving violations of fundamental rights could be

raised at any time.

¶43. However, in the Howell decision, the Supreme Court decreed that it would return to

a faithful interpretation of the statute in accord with the express Legislative intent, in turn

abolishing the “fundamental-rights exception.” Id. Yet within Howell is an important caveat

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that recognized there are “other arguments or doctrines” that preclude an absolute application

of the time-bar. Id. at 616 (¶12). In paragraph 12 of the Howell opinion, the majority of the

Court “acknowledge[d]” that other arguments may be used to attack the constitutionality of

the statutory bars, either as applied to particular cases or on their face.” The Court “further

recognize[d] that, in specific cases, other arguments or doctrines, e.g., equitable tolling,

might be available to afford relief from the statute of limitations.” Id.

¶44. Indeed, it was this language in paragraph 12 the Court used as a fulcrum for reversing

and rendering a judgment decided later that same year. Hathorne v. State, 376 So. 3d 1209,

1214 (¶15) (Miss. 2023). A PCR petitioner claimed to be illegally held, contending his

indictment for possession of “ethylone” “was defective and did not charge a crime,” and he

“urge[d]” the “[Supreme] Court to find that actual innocence claims survive Howell and

constitute an exception to the statutory time bar under the UPCCRA.” Hathorne, 376 So. 3d

at 1211 (¶6). The facts were unique, as both the Court of Appeals in a previous opinion and

the Supreme Court agreed that Hathorne’s indictment had not charged him with a crime as

defined by the Legislature. Id. at 1212 (¶10).

¶45. In reviewing Howell, the Supreme Court pointed out that paragraph 12 had “left open

the door for other challenges that are not substantive in nature[.]” Id. at 1214 (¶15). Without

elaboration, the Court determined that it would then “turn to the facts of this case utilizing

that approach.” Id. Ultimately, the Court decreed that Hathorne’s defective indictment could

not be waived through inaction or action since it was “a nullity, and may be objected to at any

time.” Id. at 1215 (¶19).

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¶46. Crucially, the Court held:

To hold otherwise in this case would preclude relief from a person, who we
have determined was never charged with a crime, serving twenty years in
prison, day-for-day. Granting relief in this extraordinary case is the only just
outcome—to keep Hathorne in prison under no legal requirement would
certainly constitute “cruel or unusual punishment” and an “excessive fine[],”
which is expressly prohibited under our Constitution. Miss. Const. art. 3, § 28.

Id. at (¶20) (emphasis added). Accordingly, the Court reversed and rendered the conviction.

Id. at (¶21).

The trial court exceeded its authority in sentencing Taylor.

¶47. Like Hathorne, this appeal presents us with a unique situation. While three opinions

comprised our first review of this matter, all three opinions—the lead, a separate

concurrence, and a dissent—agreed that Marcus Taylor was serving a sentence in excess of

what the law authorized. Taylor pled guilty to the crime of conspiracy to sell a Schedule III

drug, which carries a maximum penalty of five years of incarceration. See Miss. Code Ann.

§ 97-1-1 (Supp. 2007). Nonetheless, he was sentenced to and is still currently incarcerated

under a sentence of twenty years.3

¶48. In Hathorne, a unanimous Supreme Court declared it would not “preclude relief from

a person” who was incarcerated “under no legal requirement,” as to do so would “constitute

‘cruel or unusual punishment’” contrary to our Constitution. Hathorne, 376 So. 3d at 1215

(¶20). As that document guarantees: “Cruel or unusual punishment shall not be inflicted, nor

excessive fines be imposed.” Miss. Const. art 3, § 28.

3
The Mississippi Department of Corrections lists Taylor’s release date as June 2030.
It also lists his offense as “Burglary.”

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¶49. Over a century ago, our Supreme Court made clear that when a trial court acts in

excess of its jurisdiction, it creates a void judgment. For “[e]ven where a court has

jurisdiction of the offense charged and of the person of the accused, it may so far transcend

its powers in assessing the penalty for the offense, by imposing a punishment of a character

different from that prescribed by law . . . that the sentence will be void and furnish no

authority for holding the accused in custody, though the conviction on which the sentence

was entered was valid and correct; and in such a case the accused may be discharged on

habeas corpus.” Burden, 45 So. at 2.

¶50. As a matter of law, it is without debate that confining Marcus Taylor to a term of years

in custody beyond that authorized by statute is an illegal sentence. This is an offense to our

Constitution that cannot stand. For our citizens have a “fundamental right . . . to be free from

an illegal sentence.” Young v. State, 368 So. 3d 299, 304 (¶11) (Miss. 2023); Sneed v. State,

722 So. 2d 1255, 1257 (¶11) (Miss. 1998) (“The right to be free from an illegal sentence has

been found to be fundamental”).

¶51. In accord with Howell and Hathorne, we recognize in this extraordinary case that the

Judiciary must act to correct a manifest injustice. In accord with Burden and McHenry, we

conclude that the trial court was without authority to impose upon Taylor a sentence

exceeding that authorized by the Legislature. The trial court, in error, imposed an excessive

sentence on Taylor of ten years beyond the five-year maximum for the crime of which he

pled guilty. In doing so, the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction, and therefore the excessive

sentence is utterly void.

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¶52. As Judge Lawrence solemnly declared regarding our original decision:

Make no mistake about it: Taylor sits in jail, illegally held, because a judicially
crafted order incorrectly provided for a fifteen-year term when five years was
the statutorily mandated maximum sentence. The judicial branch created the
illegal order, and this Court should have the inherent authority to correct that
order. Courts lacking the ability to correct illegal and erroneous orders stands
contrary to the foundational and fundamental aspect of what the courts do and
stand for. It should not require grace from the Legislature for the judiciary to
fix a judiciary problem.

Taylor v. State, No. 2023-CA-00738-COA, 2025 WL 1303363, at *7 (¶25) (Lawrence, J.,

concurring) (Miss. Ct. App. May 6, 2025).

CONCLUSION

¶53. Although the trial “court had jurisdiction over both the person and the subject-matter,”

it did not have the “power” to “enter the particular judgment entered” against Marcus Taylor.

McHenry, 44 So. at 834. Therefore, we order the immediate release of Marcus Taylor from

his incarceration, as it unlawfully exceeds that which is authorized by law. Accordingly, we

reverse the order denying post-conviction collateral relief. We render void the part of the

corrected judgment sentencing Taylor to more than five years in custody.

¶54. REVERSED AND RENDERED.

BARNES, C.J., CARLTON, P.J., WESTBROOKS, McDONALD, LAWRENCE,
WEDDLE AND LASSITTER ST. PÉ, JJ., CONCUR. EMFINGER, J., CONCURS IN
PART AND DISSENTS IN PART WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.
WILSON, P.J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION, JOINED BY
EMFINGER, J.

WILSON, P.J., DISSENTING:

¶55. Taylor’s fifteen-year sentence exceeds the five-year maximum for the crime to which

he pled guilty. However, the Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act (UPCCRA)

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provides that a motion for post-conviction relief (PCR) must be filed within three years after

the entry of a judgment of conviction entered on a guilty plea. Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-5(2)

(Rev. 2020). Taylor filed his PCR motion eight years after his judgment was entered. The

UPCCRA’s statute of limitations includes certain statutory exceptions, but none apply here.4

Therefore, the UPCCRA’s statute of limitations bars Taylor’s claim.

¶56. Prior to Howell, we would have addressed the merits of Taylor’s claim under the so-

called “fundamental-rights exception” to the statute of limitations. Howell, 358 So. 3d at 615

(¶¶7-8). However, Howell expressly “overrule[d]” “any . . . case in which the Mississippi

Supreme Court ha[d] held that the courts of Mississippi can apply the judicially crafted

fundamental-rights exception to constitutional, substantive enactments of the Legislature

such as the [UPCCRA’s] three-year statute of limitations.” Id. at 615 (¶8). Moreover,

Howell specifically held that a claim alleging an “illegal sentence” is not excepted from the

UPCCRA’s statute of limitations. Id. at 615 (¶¶7-8). Subsequently, in Hathorne v. State,

376 So. 3d 1209, 1213-14 (¶15) (Miss. 2023), the Supreme Court reiterated that the

UPCCRA’s statute of limitations “preclude[s] relief” on a claim alleging an “illegal

4
“[C]ases in which the petitioner claims that his sentence has expired” are excepted
from the statute of limitations. Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-5(2)(b). However, the Mississippi
Supreme Court has held that this exception does not apply to a case, such as this one, in
which the petitioner argues that his actual “sentence [is] illegal,” and the legal sentence he
should have received “would have expired.” Sneed v. State, 722 So. 2d 1255, 1257 (¶10)
(Miss. 1998), overruled on other grounds by Howell v. State, 358 So. 3d 613, 615 (¶8)
(Miss. 2023). The Court stated, “This is obviously not a claim that the sentence has expired.
It is a claim that the sentence is somehow incorrect or illegal. This claim is not excepted
from the time bar by virtue of the statute.” Id. at 1257 (¶11). Likewise, Taylor’s sentence
clearly has not expired. Rather, he claims his unexpired sentence is illegal.

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sentence” “even if the claim [is] meritorious.”5 Therefore, under Howell and Hathorne, the

UPCCRA’s statute of limitations bars Taylor’s claim.

¶57. The UPCCRA was enacted “to revise, streamline and clarify the rules and statutes

pertaining to post-conviction collateral relief law and procedures, to resolve any conflicts

therein and to provide the courts of this state with an exclusive and uniform procedure for

the collateral review of convictions and sentences.” Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-3(1) (Rev.

2020). To that end, the UPCCRA expressly “abolishes the common law writs relating to

post-conviction collateral relief, including by way of illustration but not limitation, . . . post-

conviction habeas corpus.” Id. Therefore, a petition for post-conviction habeas corpus must

be filed as a PCR motion subject to the UPCCRA’s requirements and limitations. Id.

¶58. The majority argues that we may consider the merits of Taylor’s claim because the

trial court lacked “jurisdiction” to impose a sentence that exceeded the statutory maximum.

Notably, claims “[t]hat the trial court was without jurisdiction to impose sentence” and

“[t]hat the sentence exceeds the maximum authorized by law” are cognizable grounds for

relief under the UPCCRA. Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-5(1)(b), (d). However, just as notably,

in the very same section of the Act, the Legislature did not include such claims in the list of

exceptions from the UPCCRA’s statute of limitations. Id. § 99-39-5(2). Thus, the

Legislature expressly authorized relief on such grounds, but it also made clear that such

5
The majority’s reliance on Hathorne is misplaced for two significant reasons. First,
Hathorne specifically emphasized that Hathorne’s claim was not barred by the statute of
limitations, stating: “First, and perhaps most weighty, this is Hathorne’s first PCR motion,
and it was timely filed.” Id. at 1214 (¶18) (emphasis added). Second, as noted in the text,
Hathorne specifically reaffirmed that the UPCCRA’s statute of limitations bars even
“meritorious” claims alleging an “illegal sentence.” Id. at 1213-14 (¶15).

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claims are subject to the three-year statute of limitations.

¶59. Accordingly, the issue in this case is simply whether this Court is obligated to enforce,

or may instead ignore, the statute of limitations on PCR claims that the Legislature enacted.

The Mississippi Supreme Court decisively answered this question in Howell, holding:

The Legislature . . . does have authority to fix reasonable periods within which
an action shall be brought and, within its sound discretion, determine the
limitation period in post-conviction relief cases. . . . It is a well-settled
principle that a state may attach reasonable time limitations to the assertion of
federal constitutional rights.

Howell, 358 So. 3d at 615 (¶9) (brackets, citations, and quotation marks omitted). The Court

further held that it could not “lawfully amend or ignore” the UPCCRA’s statute of

limitations, a “constitutionally sound law enacted by the Legislature.” Id. at 616 (¶12).

Thus, Howell definitively answers the dispositive question in this case.

¶60. The law has not changed since we previously affirmed the denial of Taylor’s PCR

motion. The UPCCRA’s statute of limitations still bars Taylor’s claim. Therefore, I would

deny the motion for rehearing, and I respectfully dissent.6

EMFINGER, J., JOINS THIS OPINION.

6
As noted in the original opinion affirming the denial of Taylor’s PCR motion, under
this Court’s decision in Shies v. State, 185 So. 3d 1081 (Miss. Ct. App. 2016), there is a
question whether Taylor would be entitled to relief even if the statute of limitations did not
bar his claim. See Taylor v. State, No. 2023-CA-00738-COA, 2025 WL 1303363, at *6 n.8
(Miss. Ct. App. May 6, 2025). Since the statute of limitations does bar Taylor’s claim, I do
not address the issue.

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