Tom Foster and Alumni of Ruleville Central High School v. Sunflower County Consolidated School District

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 2019-CA-01640-COA

TOM FOSTER AND ALUMNI OF RULEVILLE APPELLANTS
CENTRAL HIGH SCHOOL

v.

SUNFLOWER COUNTY CONSOLIDATED APPELLEE
SCHOOL DISTRICT

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 09/27/2019
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. DEBRA MICHELLE GILES
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: SUNFLOWER COUNTY CHANCERY
COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS: ALSEE McDANIEL
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: CARLOS D. PALMER
TANGALA L. HOLLIS-PALMER
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - OTHER
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 02/09/2021
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:

BEFORE BARNES, C.J., McDONALD AND LAWRENCE, JJ.

BARNES, C.J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. This action arises from a decision by the Sunflower County Consolidated School

District School Board (Board) to rename “Ruleville Central High School” to “Thomas

Edwards, Sr. High School” at the request of Thomas Edwards Sr.’s son. Plaintiffs are

alumni of the high school who oppose the name change (collectively “Plaintiffs”). After the

Board made the decision at a regular board meeting, the alumni asked the Board to

reconsider its decision. When the Board did not reconsider the name change, Plaintiffs filed

a complaint for a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against the Sunflower County
Consolidated School District (District) as well as a motion for a temporary restraining order

and a temporary injunction in the Sunflower County Chancery Court. Plaintiffs contended

the District violated existing policies about community involvement in board decisions and

provided inadequate notice of the name change. The chancery court denied Plaintiffs’

request for relief and dismissed their complaint, finding not only that Plaintiffs failed to seek

relief properly under Mississippi Code Annotated section 11-51-75 (Rev. 2019)1 but also

because there was no merit to their arguments. Foster and the other alumni appealed.

¶2. We affirm the chancery court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ complaint for declaratory and

injunctive relief. While the chancery court erred in applying section 11-51-75 to the matter,

Plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the claim. Therefore, the chancery court lacked

jurisdiction to consider the complaint. “[A]n appellate court may affirm a trial court if the

correct result is reached, even if the trial court reached the result for a different reason.”

Davis v. City of Jackson, 240 So. 3d 381, 385 (¶13) (Miss. 2018) (While the chancery court

dismissed the complaint based on the failure to follow section 11-51-75 procedure, the

proper result was reached because the plaintiffs lacked standing, and the supreme court

affirmed.). Accordingly, we affirm the chancery court’s dismissal.

STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶3. The District oversees and maintains several schools in Sunflower County, including

the high school at issue here. Ruleville Central High School (High School) was established

in the 1930s and has alumni throughout Mississippi and other parts of the United States.

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This statute provides aggrieved parties with the procedure to appeal from a
judgment or decision made by municipal or county governing authorities.

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Tom Foster is an alumnus of the High School and lives in Ruleville, Mississippi.

Additionally, he is a member of the “Concerned Citizens Group of Ruleville” (Concerned

Citizens), which is a group that opposes the name change.

¶4. In April 2018, Dr. Darron Edwards, the superintendent of a neighboring school

district and Ruleville resident, made a verbal proposal before the Board to change the name

of the High School to “Thomas Edwards, Sr. High School” in honor of his father, who was

a former superintendent of the District. The Board’s policy for renaming a school required

posthumous recommendations and a majority vote from the Board; however, at this time,

Thomas Edwards Sr. was still alive. During the May or June 2018 board meeting, the Board

informed Dr. Edwards of its policy. The Board instructed him to “get a pulse from the

community” by submitting to them a petition of signatures from residents who supported the

High School’s name change. Miskia Davis, superintendent for the District, testified that the

Board asked Dr. Edwards to obtain 250 to 500 signatures for “community input” supporting

the name change. Later, Dr. Edwards presented the Board with the petition of signatures,

but there was no testimony about the number of signatures obtained.

¶5. During the September 2018 board meeting, the Board decided to change its

posthumous requirement and allow a school to be named after a living person. The Board

also revised the voting policy so that a unanimous vote would be required for the name

change. However, the Board did not vote to change the name of the High School at this

meeting. The Board continued to meet monthly through the fall without taking action on

the proposed name change.

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¶6. Foster testified that he learned about the Board’s considering the name change from

his son, also an alumnus of the High School. His son attended the September 2018 meeting

by invitation of Dr. Edwards, where the High School’s possible name change and revision

of the posthumous policy were discussed. Foster also read an article about the meeting and

possible name change in the local newspaper in September 2018.

¶7. On December 18, 2018, during its regular board meeting, the Board voted

unanimously to rename the High School as Thomas Edwards, Sr. High School. However,

Plaintiffs complained that they did not find out about the name change until after this

meeting. Superintendent Davis acknowledged that no formal notice about the name change

was issued to the students of the High School, the Ruleville community, or any community

organizations in Ruleville or Sunflower County.

¶8. Foster claimed neither he nor the Concerned Citizens were made aware of the initial

proposal for the name change by Dr. Edwards back in April 2018. Despite Foster’s

opposition to the name change, after he learned about it in September 2018 from his son, he

did not attend the October, November, or December 2018 regular board meetings. Foster

did, however, attend the board meeting in either January or February 2019, after reading

another article in the local newspaper entitled “RCHS To Be Renamed in Honor of Thomas

Edwards.” Only at that time did Foster begin mobilizing alumni and members of the

Concerned Citizens group to address the Board and “get an understanding . . . of what was

going on.” Foster testified that he was not personally aware of any board or district policy

that authorized the Board to change the name of the High School. Further, he admitted he

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was unaware of any policy requirement for community participation in changing a school’s

name.

¶9. Tom Allen, a High School alumnus and resident of Madison, Mississippi, learned of

the Board’s decision to change the school’s name during a Christmas party on December 24,

2018. Allen then called alumni, friends, and community members in Ruleville to find out

if they were aware of the Board’s decision. Allen also called Edward Thomas, the Board’s

president, to confirm that the Board had approved the name change. Allen requested

attendance at a meeting in order to ask the Board to reconsider or reverse the name change.

Allen also testified that a circulated petition had received 700 signatures of alumni and

Ruleville community members who opposed the name change. Allen testified he attended

five or six board meetings to request the Board reconsider its decision, without success.

When the District’s counsel asked if Allen had filed a bill of exceptions, he stated he had

not, explaining he had hoped his petition and personal appeal would cause the Board to

change its decision.

¶10. On July 11, 2019, Foster, individually and on behalf of alumni against the name

change, filed a complaint and motion asserting the District violated existing policies and

provisions by changing the name of the school. Plaintiffs claimed the Board’s decision was

made based only upon the request of Thomas Edwards Sr.’s family members without any

input from school officials, students, or the Ruleville community. Plaintiffs sought “to

preclude the school district . . . from proceeding with further actions to effectuate the

Board’s decision until a final judgment [wa]s rendered” in the case. They claimed the

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Board’s name change would have “immediate and irreparable harm” as well as “a

detrimental effect on the educational, athletic, and other programs at Ruleville Central High

School, including future community support for the School, including . . . financial support

. . . from the community.”

¶11. On July 22, 2019, the District filed a motion to strike Plaintiffs’ complaint, as well

as Plaintiffs’ motions, and a motion to dismiss all claims. The District argued that Plaintiffs

had failed to file their appeal properly under section Mississippi Code Annotated section 37-

7-115 (Rev. 2019), which provides:

Any person aggrieved by an order of the school board adopted under any of
the foregoing provisions may appeal therefrom within ten (10) days from the
date of the adjournment of the meeting at which such order is entered. Said
appeal shall be taken in the same manner as appeals are taken from judgments
or decisions of the board of supervisors as provided in Section 11-51-75,
Mississippi Code of 1972, the provisions of which shall be fully applicable to
appeals taken hereunder. . . .

(Emphasis added). The District also cited Mississippi Code Annotated section 11-51-75,

referenced in the above statute, which provides that “[a]ny person aggrieved by a judgment

or decision of the board of supervisors of a county, or the governing authority of a

municipality, may appeal . . .” to the circuit court within ten days of the decision. The

District argued that Plaintiffs’ complaint and motions under section 11-51-75 were untimely

and filed in the wrong court; therefore, they should be dismissed.

¶12. On August 13, 2019, the chancery court held an evidentiary hearing where Davis,

Foster, and Allen testified. Plaintiffs also entered into evidence the local newspaper article

dated December 20, 2018, seeking to show the proper policy was not followed for the name

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change. The article reported that “after a brief discussion in an earlier work session,” the

Board added the name change to the December meeting agenda after placing the decision

“on hold” during the Board’s September 13 meeting in order to change the policy that an

individual must be deceased before having a school named in his or her honor. A board

member who voted against the policy change was quoted in the article as stating she was

“not against the change, but there was a proper protocol that needed to be met and everyone

needed to be made aware of it ‘in all fairness.’” According to the article, “[s]he also

maintained that others had approached her with additional suggestions for naming the

school.”

¶13. The chancery court denied Plaintiffs’ requested relief and dismissed the complaint.

The court analyzed “the success of Plaintiffs’ petition for declaratory and injunctive relief

contesting a municipal authority’s decision.” However, a school board is not a “municipal

authority.” Moreover, the chancery court analyzed the complaint under section 11-51-75

and caselaw involving appeals from county and municipal authorities, finding that section

11-51-75 was the “exclusive remedy” and that the complaint was untimely because it was

not filed within the ten-day statute of limitations. On the merits, the chancery court found

substantial evidence to support the propriety of the name change: the Board properly notified

the community about its intention to change the school’s name and obtained community

input; the Board conducted its meetings properly including proper notice about the name

change; and the name change would not affect the quality of the school’s education.

¶14. Plaintiffs appealed, raising two issues: (1) whether the chancery court erred in

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dismissing Plaintiffs’ complaint for failure to exercise the exclusive remedy provided by

section 11-51-75; and (2) whether there was substantial, credible evidence that the Board’s

action to rename the High School was arbitrary or capricious, in violation of the District’s

policies. We find the chancery court erred in dismissing the complaint for failure to exercise

the exclusive remedy provisions of section 11-51-75 because that section does not apply to

Plaintiffs’ action. However, the chancery court did not have jurisdiction to hear the matter

because Plaintiffs lacked standing.

ANALYSIS

I. Applicability of Section 11-51-75

¶15. First, we discuss the applicability of section 11-51-75, which provides:

Any person aggrieved by a judgment or decision of the board of supervisors
of a county, or the governing authority of a municipality, may appeal the
judgment or decision to the circuit court of the county in which the board of
supervisors is the governing body or in which the municipality is located. A
written notice of appeal to the circuit court must be filed with the circuit clerk
within ten (10) days from the date at which session of the board of supervisors
or the governing authority of the municipality rendered the judgment or
decision.

Miss. Code Ann. §11-51-75 (emphasis added). This code section describes how to appeal

from judgments or decisions made by the county board of supervisors or municipal

governing authorities. “The statute, by its plain language, does not apply to appeals from

school board decisions. Furthermore, the Legislature has not otherwise provided for . . . a

general judicial review of school board decisions . . . .” Prisock v. Perkins, 735 So. 2d 440,

443 (¶17) (Miss. 1999). Section 37-7-115 provides that appeals from certain school board

orders may be taken under section 11-51-75; however, these decisions must have been

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adopted under “the foregoing provisions,” meaning Chapter 7, Article 3 of Title 37 of the

Mississippi Code Annotated. These provisions provide for the “abolition, alteration, and

creation of [school] districts”—not the renaming of a school. Accordingly, section 37-7-115

does not apply, and as a result, section 11-51-75 is inapplicable as well. For this reason, the

chancery court erred in dismissing Plaintiffs’ complaint for failure to exercise the statute’s

exclusive remedy.

II. Standing

¶16. Neither the parties nor the chancery court addressed Plaintiffs’ standing to raise their

claims. “[S]tanding is a jurisdictional issue that may be raised by the parties or the Court at

any time.” Araujo v. Bryant, 283 So. 3d 73, 77 (¶12) (Miss. 2019) (citing City of Madison

v. Bryan, 763 So. 2d 162, 166 (¶20) (Miss. 2000)). Lack of standing “robs the court of

jurisdiction to hear the case.” Schmidt v. Catholic Diocese of Biloxi, 18 So. 3d 814, 826

(¶32) (Miss. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Pruitt v. Hancock Med. Ctr.,

942 So. 2d 797, 801 (¶14) (Miss. 2006)). Standing is a question of law. City of Jackson v.

Allen, 242 So. 3d 8, 13 (¶19) (Miss. 2018). Mississippi’s law on standing is “quite liberal,”

and Mississippi courts have been “more permissive in granting standing to parties who seek

review of governmental actions.” City of Jackson v. Greene, 869 So. 2d 1020, 1023 (¶11)

(Miss. 2004). Generally, under Mississippi jurisprudence, “parties may sue only where they

assert a colorable interest in the subject matter of the litigation or experience an adverse

effect from the conduct of the defendant, or as otherwise authorized by law.” Id. at 1024

(¶12).

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An interest is deemed colorable if it ‘appears to be true, valid, or right.’ An
individual’s legal interest or entitlement to assert a claim against a defendant
must be grounded in some legal right recognized by law, whether by statute
or by common law. For a plaintiff to establish standing on grounds of
experiencing an adverse effect from the conduct of the defendant/appellee, the
adverse effect experienced must be different from the adverse effect
experienced by the general public.

Araujo, 283 So. 3d at 77 (¶14) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

¶17. Here, we must determine whether Plaintiffs asserted “a colorable interest in the

subject matter of the litigation” or experienced an adverse effect different from that

experienced by the general public. They have presented neither a legal right grounded in

statutory or common law to challenge the Board’s renaming of the school, nor adverse

effects that would impact them differently than the school and community.

¶18. The Mississippi Supreme Court set forth the requirements for a party to have standing

to bring a civil action in Ball v. Mayor & Board of Aldermen of Natchez, 983 So. 2d 295

(Miss. 2008), and Burgess v. City of Gulfport, 814 So. 2d 149 (Miss. 2002). Both cases

dealt with appeals under section 11-51-75 involving property. In Ball, residents of Natchez

challenged the City’s sale of surplus land to a condominium developer. Ball, 983 So. 2d at

297 (¶1). The supreme court held that the residents had standing because when they owned

property within the municipality, their property was located near the subject property, and

they alleged the project at issue would adversely impact their properties. Id. at 301 (¶21).2

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In Prisock, the Mississippi Supreme Court held that since there was no statutory
scheme for appealing the school board’s decision to select another competing bid for a
hunting and fishing lease, the plaintiff had an inadequate remedy at law, and he could file
an original action for injunction in chancery court to challenge the decision. Prisock, 735
So. 2d at 443 (¶18). Although standing was not mentioned, the plaintiff had an interest in
the subject matter of the litigation because he was the unsuccessful bidder.

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In contrast, the supreme court in Burgess found the residents did not have standing.

Burgess, 814 So. 2d at 153 (¶17). In that case, Gulfport residents challenged the city

council’s decision to accept the recommendation of the planning commission to issue tree-

removal permits to condominium developers. Id. at 150 (¶1). The supreme court found no

colorable interest in the litigation because the residents did not own the property in question,

or the land around the property in question, and the land had not been affected in an adverse

manner. Id. at 153 (¶15). The residents argued that merely residing in the municipality was

sufficient to confer standing, but the supreme court disagreed. Id. at (¶16).

¶19. Similarly, in Mississippi Division of Sons of Confederate Veterans v. University of

Mississippi, 269 So. 3d 1235, 1242 (¶16) (Miss. Ct. App. 2018), this Court found the

plaintiffs had no standing. The plaintiffs filed an action for an injunction in response to the

university’s plan to move or rename confederate monuments and related items. Id. at 1238

(¶2). This Court found “SCV had no interest separate from or in excess of that of the

general public” but the matter “affected the public interest and could be brought, if at all,

only by the Attorney General or a district attorney. SCV’s members have no private right

that entitles them to require that UM refrain from implementing its diversity plan.” Id.

Further, in Schmidt, the supreme court held that former parishioners had no standing to

assert a claim for interest in church property after a bishop closed the church due to damage

from Hurricane Katrina. Schmidt, 18 So. 3d at 818, 826 (¶¶1, 31). The church no longer

existed due to a merger with another church, and the supreme court found the “extent of the

plaintiffs’ property or beneficial interest in the [church] property was inextricably tied to

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their status as members of [the church].” Id. at 828 (¶34). Further, the fact that certain

former parishioners donated money to the church to purchase property did not give them

standing to assert a resulting trust. Id. at (¶36). The supreme court found that donors who

make contributions for a specific purpose or with the intent to benefit only a certain parish

do not acquire any ownership interest in church assets; therefore, the donors had no legally

enforceable interest in the church property and lacked standing to assert a resulting trust.

Id. The supreme court found that subject matter jurisdiction existed for a claim that the

church defendants improperly diverted designated funds, but in order to establish a viable

claim, a plaintiff must prove that the funds were solicited by the church and that the donor

pledged a contribution for the solicited purpose. Id. at 830-31 (¶¶44-45).

¶20. In this case, the only adverse effects Plaintiffs have expressed are vague allegations

of “immediate and irreparable” harm to the High School and community due to lack of

future financial support from the community. However, these alleged harms would not

impact Plaintiffs individually, but rather the school and community, and therefore any

adverse effects on them would be no different than those to the general public. Accordingly,

Plaintiffs lacked standing.

CONCLUSION

¶21. Plaintiffs lacked standing to sue the District, and therefore the chancery court lacked

jurisdiction to hear the complaint. Because we find the chancery court reached the proper

result in dismissing the complaint, we affirm.

¶22. AFFIRMED.

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CARLTON AND WILSON, P.JJ., GREENLEE, WESTBROOKS, McDONALD,
LAWRENCE, McCARTY AND SMITH, JJ., CONCUR.

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