Teamberya Simmons v. City of Picayune

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 2024-CA-00092-COA

TEAMBERYA SIMMONS APPELLANT

v.

CITY OF PICAYUNE APPELLEE

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 11/30/2023
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. CLAIBORNE McDONALD
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: PEARL RIVER COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: LAMPTON O’NEAL WILLIAMS JR.
CORY MORRIS WILLIAMS
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: KRISTI ROGERS BROWN
RANDOLPH SIMMONS MIKELL
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - PERSONAL INJURY
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 04/22/2025
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:

BEFORE BARNES, C.J., McCARTY AND ST. PÉ, JJ.

McCARTY, J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. A woman fell on a handicap ramp while at a city’s water department building. She

sued, but the trial court granted summary judgment for the city, finding the ramp was not a

dangerous condition. She appeals, arguing a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding

a dangerous condition and requires reversal. Finding the ramp was a common architectural

feature and not a dangerous condition, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2. Teamberya Simmons drove to the City of Picayune Water Department to pay her

water bill, as she had done many times before. Simmons parked on the street in front of the

building and began to walk toward the entrance. But she then realized she forgot to lock her
car, so she turned around and started to walk back to the street where she parked.

¶3. According to a video which sets the scene, there is a clean and level sidewalk that runs

parallel to the parking lot. There is a red and grey brick-paved section between the sidewalk

and the parking lot. Connected to the parking lot, there is a gently leveled concrete “curb

ramp”1 that rises to meet the sidewalk. The grey curb ramp stands out in color from the red

brick sections on the side of it. The edge of the ramp by the parking lot slopes up directly

from painted blue stripes, which Simmons acknowledged “obvious[ly]” indicated a handicap

parking space.

¶4. As Simmons was walking back, a man was passing in the opposite direction on the

grey sidewalk. The video shows Simmons shifting onto the red brick area perpendicular to

the curb ramp. As she crosses from the brick area, she loses her footing over the edge on the

sloped ramp and tumbles onto the hard concrete. In an affidavit, Simmons explained that

when she turned and walked back toward her car, she “fell when I stepped into a recessed

area that I could not see from the direction I was walking.”

¶5. Two other people witnessed the fall and helped Simmons into the building. An

employee offered to call an ambulance, but Simmons declined. She received medical

attention at a nearby urgent care clinic. As a result of the fall, she sustained a broken bone

in her right ankle. Over the next three years, she underwent two surgeries related to her

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The expert report refers to the slope as a “curb ramp that was provided for
accessability access.”

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injuries.

¶6. Simmons filed a premises liability action against the City of Picayune in the Pearl

River County Circuit Court. She alleged the curb ramp was a dangerous condition that

caused her injuries. After discovery, the City moved for summary judgment, arguing the

ramp was a common architectural feature and not a dangerous condition. The circuit court

granted summary judgment in favor of the City, finding the ramp was a common and

required architectural condition. The court further found Simmons was distracted as she

walked, and her own negligence was the cause of her fall. Aggrieved, Simmons appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶7. This Court reviews the grant of a motion for summary judgment de novo, “viewing

the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Loving v. MS Eye Care

P.A., 381 So. 3d 1111, 1113 (¶6) (Miss. Ct. App. 2024). “A grant of summary judgment will

be upheld only when, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving

party, there are no genuine issues of material fact.” Forbes v. Gen. Motors Corp., 993 So.

2d 822, 824 (¶7) (Miss. 2008); accord MRCP 56(c). “[S]ummary judgment ‘is appropriate

when the non-moving party has failed to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence

of an element essential to the party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of

proof at trial.’” Karpinsky v. Am. Nat. Ins. Co., 109 So. 3d 84, 89 (¶11) (Miss. 2013)

(quoting Buckel v. Chaney, 47 So. 3d 148, 153 (¶10) (Miss. 2010)).

DISCUSSION

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¶8. On appeal, Simmons argues summary judgment was improper because the curb ramp

was a dangerous condition, the City had notice of the dangerous condition, and the dangerous

condition was not open and obvious. She claims the ramp was difficult to see from the

direction she was walking and that the “elevation change was not readily apparent due to the

lack of contrast between the curb and the ramp.” Because we find one issue

dispositive—whether the curb ramp was a dangerous condition—we decline to address her

remaining arguments.

¶9. The Mississippi Tort Claims Act provides the exclusive remedy for plaintiffs filing

suit against governmental entities. Howard v. City of Biloxi, 943 So. 2d 751, 754 (¶5) (Miss.

Ct. App. 2006). To recover in a premises liability claim against a municipality, such as the

City of Picayune, the plaintiff must establish five elements:

(1) an injury was suffered;
(2) the injury was caused by a dangerous condition on the property of [the
City] caused by the negligent or other wrongful conduct of a City employee;
(3) the City had either actual or constructive notice of the defect;
(4) the City had an adequate opportunity to protect or warn of this defect; and
(5) the condition was not open and obvious to one exercising due care.

Id.; see also Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-9(1)(v) (Rev. 2019).

¶10. The City does not contest that Simmons was injured. The crux of the circuit court’s

ruling addressed the second element—whether there was a dangerous condition.

“Mississippi has long recognized that normally encountered dangers such as curves,

sidewalks, and steps are not hazardous conditions.” Jones v. Wal-Mart Stores E. LP, 187 So.

3d 1100, 1104 (¶14) (Miss. Ct. App. 2016). This Court has previously affirmed that “hazards

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that are similar to undamaged thresholds, curbs, and steps, which are common architectural

features for buildings and parking lots, may properly be found not to be unreasonably

dangerous.” Benson v. Rather, 211 So. 3d 748, 755 (¶23) (Miss. Ct. App. 2016).

¶11. We have previously held that a similar wheelchair ramp was not a dangerous

condition. Patterson v. Mi Toro Mexican Inc., 270 So. 3d 19, 22 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2018).

In Mi Toro, a man slipped and fell on a wheelchair ramp as he left a restaurant. Id. at 20

(¶2). He sued the restaurant, claiming the ramp was a dangerous condition because it was

“slick” in the rain. Id. at (¶3). The man had used that particular door and ramp many times

before without any problems. Id. at (¶2). The restaurant moved for summary judgment on

the ground that there was no evidence of a dangerous condition or any other falls on the

ramp. Id. at 21 (¶5). The circuit court granted summary judgment, agreeing that there was

no genuine issue of material fact regarding a dangerous condition. Id.

¶12. On appeal, we affirmed the restaurant’s lack of liability. Id. at 21-22 (¶8). We

reasoned that without proof of a dangerous condition, there could be no claim for premises

liability. Id. at 22 (¶8). Critically, we held that “an ordinary wheelchair ramp is an

accommodation required by federal law, not a dangerous condition.” Id. “Absent such

evidence” of a dangerous condition, “and absent proof of any similar incidents on the ramp,

no reasonable jury could conclude the ramp was unreasonably dangerous.” Id.

¶13. In another case where we examined a common architectural feature, a woman tripped

and fell on brick stairs behind a rental home. Lefler v. Wasson, 295 So. 3d 1007, 1009 (¶5)

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(Miss. Ct. App. 2020). She sued the landlord, claiming the loose brick created a dangerous

condition. Id. at 1009 (¶6). The landlord moved for summary judgment, which the trial court

granted. Id. On appeal, this Court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the landlord,

holding that “the brick stairs . . . and path fall within the normally encountered dangers that

do not give rise to liability.” Id. at 1010 (¶10). Further, the landlord had no knowledge of

any prior or subsequent slip-and-falls on the stairs. Id. at (¶12). The woman had safely used

the path and stairs several times prior to her fall. Id. at (¶10). Therefore, the court found the

woman failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding a dangerous condition.

Id.

¶14. As in Mi Toro, the curb ramp here was in good condition. Photos show the ramp was

free from cracks or irregularities. And just like the stairs in Lefler, a sloped curb ramp is a

“normally encountered danger” that does not give rise to liability. Although Simmons claims

the ramp was dangerous, just like the plaintiffs in Mi Toro and Lefler, she fails to provide any

evidence to support her allegation. Additionally, as in those two cases, there is no evidence

of any prior trips or falls on this ramp. Simmons had been to this location to pay her water

bill five to ten times before without any problems. On the day of the incident, she

successfully walked past the curb ramp on her way into the building before turning back to

lock her car and tripping on the ramp. Just like the plaintiffs in Mi Toro and Lefler, Simmons

failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact that the sloped curb ramp constituted a

dangerous condition, so summary judgment in favor of the City was warranted.

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¶15. Simmons did support her claim of the ramp being a dangerous condition with expert

testimony about potential code violations, particularly standards under the Americans with

Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213. However, this testimony does not overcome

precedent that holds curb ramps of this nature are common architectural features, not

dangerous conditions. As we determined almost seven years ago, “an ordinary wheelchair

ramp is an accommodation required by federal law, not a ‘dangerous condition.’” Mi Toro,

270 So. 3d at 22 (¶8).2

¶16. Furthermore, ordinary handicap or sloped ramps “do not become hazardous conditions

simply because they contain minor imperfections or defects.” Jones, 187 So. 3d at 1104

(¶14). There was no evidence to demonstrate this particular curb ramp was somehow

exceptionally dangerous or that the City had notice of such a condition. See Vivians v.

Baptist Healthplex, 234 So. 3d 304, 309 (¶20) (Miss. 2017) (finding a genuine issue of

material fact existed with regard to a dangerous condition when five other falls occurred

where the plaintiff fell). Accordingly, since the sloped curb ramp did not constitute a

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The United States Supreme Court has determined, “Congress enacted the ADA in
1990 to remedy widespread discrimination against disabled individuals.” PGA Tour Inc. v.
Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 674 (2001). But Simmons does not claim she was disabled or that the
curb ramp impeded her access to the water department; instead, she attempts to use the codes
and regulations the ADA has generated as a way to craft liability. The ADA does not
establish a method of proving tort liability for those not in the protected class. As Simmons
is not within the class of people the ADA protects, she cannot utilize the ADA to prove
liability for her fall. See Lugo v. St. Nicholas Assocs., 18 A.D.3d 341, 342 (N.Y. App. Div.
2005) (“Since [the] ADA’s purpose is to address issues of discrimination and not safety, the
act should not be construed as setting a safety standard for stairs or walkways, even with
respect to disabled plaintiffs.”).

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dangerous condition, the trial court properly granted summary judgment.

CONCLUSION

¶17. Because we find that Simmons failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact that

the curb ramp constituted a dangerous condition, we affirm the circuit court’s order granting

the City of Picayune’s summary judgment motion.

¶18. AFFIRMED.

BARNES, C.J., CARLTON AND WILSON, P.JJ., WESTBROOKS,
McDONALD, LAWRENCE, EMFINGER, WEDDLE AND ST. PÉ, JJ., CONCUR.

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