Shundray Johnson v. State of Mississippi

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 2022-CP-01186-COA

SHUNDRAY JOHNSON APPELLANT

v.

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 10/14/2022
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. JAMES T. KITCHENS JR.
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: CLAY COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: SHUNDRAY JOHNSON (PRO SE)
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: ASHLEY LAUREN SULSER
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 11/14/2023
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:

BEFORE BARNES, C.J., McDONALD AND SMITH, JJ.

SMITH, J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. Shundray Johnson appeals from the Clay County Circuit Court’s order denying his

motion for post-conviction collateral relief (PCR). Finding no reversible error, we affirm the

circuit court’s order.

FACTS

¶2. A Clay County grand jury indicted Johnson for two counts of first-degree murder.

During his jury trial, Johnson filed a petition to plead guilty to both counts. At Johnson’s

first plea colloquy, the circuit judge ensured that Johnson fully understood the constitutional

rights he would waive by pleading guilty and that no one had threatened him or offered any

inducement to persuade him to plead guilty. After the State presented a factual basis for both
indictment counts, Johnson stated that he felt responsible for the two victims’ deaths, but he

denied that he had murdered the victims, had instructed someone else to murder them, or was

present when they were murdered. Based on Johnson’s responses, the circuit judge halted

the plea colloquy so that the trial could resume.

¶3. Following testimony from several more witnesses, the circuit judge allowed a recess.

When proceedings resumed, the circuit judge stated on the record that Johnson’s trial

attorney had again informed him that Johnson wanted to plead guilty to the two counts of

murder. The circuit judge noted that he had previously conducted a plea hearing but had not

allowed Johnson to plead guilty due to concerns raised by Johnson’s responses. Based on

the concerns that arose during Johnson’s first plea colloquy, the circuit judge conducted an

entirely new plea hearing. After once more discussing with Johnson the constitutional rights

he would waive by pleading guilty, the circuit judge asked, “Why are you pleading guilty to

these two counts?” In response, Johnson stated, “Because I did it.” Johnson then assured

the circuit judge that no one had threatened him, offered him an inducement in exchange for

his plea, or asked him to lie so that the circuit judge would accept his guilty plea. The circuit

judge also inquired as to whether Johnson’s attorney had properly advised him and whether

Johnson was satisfied with his attorney’s representation. Johnson responded affirmatively

to each of the circuit judge’s questions regarding the sufficiency of his legal representation.

¶4. After the State again provided a factual basis for the indictment counts, the following

exchange occurred:

[The Court]: Is that what happened?

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[Johnson]: Yes, sir.

[The Court]: You killed those two individuals?

[Johnson]: Yes, sir.

Following the second plea colloquy, the circuit judge found that Johnson had knowingly,

intelligently, and voluntarily entered his guilty pleas. The circuit judge accepted Johnson’s

guilty pleas and the State’s recommendation to allow Johnson to plead as a non-habitual

offender to both counts. The circuit judge then sentenced Johnson to two consecutive terms

of life imprisonment in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections.

¶5. Johnson filed a timely PCR motion and argued that his guilty pleas were involuntary

and that he was denied due process and equal protection under the law. He also filed an

amended PCR motion in which he asserted an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. The

circuit judge entered an order and addressed Johnson’s claim that his trial attorney had forced

him to enter his guilty pleas. After reviewing all relevant documents, including the

pleadings, the transcript from Johnson’s plea hearings, and his petition to plead guilty, the

circuit judge concluded that Johnson’s claims lacked merit. As a result, the circuit judge

entered an order denying Johnson’s requested relief. Aggrieved, Johnson appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶6. “When reviewing a [circuit] court’s denial or dismissal of a PCR motion, we will only

disturb the [circuit] court’s decision if the [circuit] court abused its discretion and the

decision is clearly erroneous; however, we review the [circuit] court’s legal conclusions

under a de novo standard of review.” Green v. State, 242 So. 3d 176, 178 (¶5) (Miss. Ct.

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App. 2017).

DISCUSSION

I. Voluntariness of the Guilty Pleas

¶7. Johnson asserts on appeal that he “had wanted to proceed with trial until its final

resolution and had expressed that [desire] to counsel” but that his attorney erroneously “led

him to believe that introducing plea(s) of guilty at that particular stage of the trial was

procedural.” As a result, Johnson contends that he involuntarily entered his guilty pleas.

“[A] plea is binding only if it is entered into voluntarily. A defendant’s guilty plea will be

deemed involuntary if induced by fear, violence, deception, or improper inducements.”

Varnado v. State, 362 So. 3d 127, 136 (¶24) (Miss. Ct. App. 2023) (citations and internal

quotation marks omitted).

¶8. Johnson’s sworn statements to the circuit court during his second plea colloquy

directly contradict his PCR claim that his trial attorney somehow deceived or pressured him

into entering his guilty pleas. During his second plea colloquy, Johnson informed the circuit

court that his attorney had reviewed with him and explained to him each part of the plea

petition and that he (Johnson) understood everything they had discussed. The circuit court

reviewed each of the constitutional rights Johnson would waive by pleading guilty, including

the right to a jury trial. Specifically with regard to Johnson’s waiver of a jury trial, the circuit

judge stated, “Now, if you wanted to continue this trial, [your attorney] would. And he’s

doing a fine job. But when you plead guilty, he doesn’t have to go to trial on this case. Do

you understand?” In response, Johnson answered, “Yes, sir.”

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¶9. At a later point during the plea colloquy, Johnson affirmed that his attorney had

discussed the facts of the case with him, the State’s burden of proof, and any defense to the

charges against him. Johnson also avowed that he was satisfied with his attorney’s assistance

and that no one had offered him an inducement, threatened him, or persuaded him to enter

his guilty pleas. Johnson also expressly stated under oath that no one had asked him to lie

so that the circuit court would accept the guilty pleas. After Johnson admitted his guilt to the

circuit court and the State provided a factual basis for the charges against Johnson, the State

informed the circuit court of its plea agreement with Johnson. The circuit judge then asked

Johnson directly whether the State’s recommended plea agreement was the same one to

which Johnson had agreed, and Johnson responded, “Yes, sir.”

¶10. “This Court is entitled to place great weight on the sworn testimony of a defendant

given at a plea hearing, and a defendant faces a rather high hurdle in recanting that

testimony.” Varnado, 362 So. 3d at 136 (¶28) (quoting Baldwin v. State, 923 So. 2d 218, 222

(¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2005)). “We also have held ‘that a PCR movant may not rely solely

on his own self-serving affidavit or otherwise unsupported allegations in his brief.’” Smith

v. State, 354 So. 3d 396, 403 (¶25) (Miss. Ct. App. 2023) (quoting McCray v. State, 107 So.

3d 1042, 1046 (¶15) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012)). Here, Johnson has failed to present any

evidence other than his own bare assertions to support his involuntary-plea claim or to

overcome the “rather high hurdle in recanting” his sworn testimony before the circuit court.

Varnado, 362 So. 3d at 136 (¶28) (quoting Baldwin, 923 So. 2d at 222 (¶11)). We therefore

find this issue lacks merit.

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II. Request for an Evidentiary Hearing

¶11. Johnson also argues that the circuit court erred by failing to grant him an evidentiary

hearing on his PCR claims. “A trial court enjoys wide discretion in determining whether to

grant an evidentiary hearing.” Smith, 354 So. 3d at 404 (¶30) (quoting Crockett v. State, 334

So. 3d 1232, 1240 (¶26) (Miss. Ct. App. 2022)). “[A] defendant’s PCR motion that ‘meets

basic requirements is sufficient to mandate an evidentiary hearing unless it appears beyond

a doubt that the movant can prove no set [of] facts in support of his claim which would

entitle him to relief.’” Id. at 403 (¶24) (quoting Sanders v. State, 846 So. 2d 230, 234 (¶13)

(Miss. Ct. App. 2002)).

¶12. “[N]o hearing is required when, based on the record of the guilty plea hearing, it is

clear that the petitioner is entitled to no relief.” Crockett, 334 So. 3d at 1240-41 (¶26)

(quoting Bias v. State, 245 So. 3d 534, 539 (¶17) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017)). Moreover, “to be

entitled to an evidentiary hearing, a defendant must demonstrate, by affidavit or otherwise,

that there are unresolved issues of fact that, if concluded favorably to the defendant, would

warrant relief. This may not be accomplished through the defendant’s own unsupported

allegations.” Id. (quoting Huggins v. State, 291 So. 3d 401, 405 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. App.

2020)).

¶13. As previously discussed, Johnson’s allegations on appeal directly contradict his sworn

statements to the circuit court during his plea hearing. In addition, the record reflects that

Johnson provided no affidavits—either his own or others—to substantiate his claim

regarding the involuntariness of his pleas or to demonstrate his entitlement to an evidentiary

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hearing. We therefore conclude that no abuse of discretion occurred in the circuit court’s

denial of Johnson’s request for an evidentiary hearing.

CONCLUSION

¶14. Because we find no clear error or abuse of discretion, we affirm the circuit court’s

order denying Johnson’s requested relief.

¶15. AFFIRMED.

BARNES, C.J., CARLTON AND WILSON, P.JJ., GREENLEE,
WESTBROOKS, McDONALD, LAWRENCE, McCARTY AND EMFINGER, JJ.,
CONCUR.

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