Nicholas Beasley a/k/a Nicholas A. Beasley v. State of Mississippi

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 2021-CA-00653-COA

NICHOLAS BEASLEY A/K/A NICHOLAS A. APPELLANT
BEASLEY

v.

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 06/03/2021
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. STEVE S. RATCLIFF III
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: MADISON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: CYNTHIA ANN STEWART
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: ALLISON ELIZABETH HORNE
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 09/06/2022
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:

BEFORE WILSON, P.J., McCARTY AND SMITH, JJ.

SMITH, J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. Nicholas Beasley was indicted for one count of selling methamphetamine and one

count of conspiracy to sell methamphetamine as a habitual offender and a subsequent drug

offender. Beasley accepted a negotiated plea agreement and entered a guilty plea to the sale

of methamphetamine as a habitual offender. The Madison County Circuit Court sentenced

Beasley to serve twenty years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections

(MDOC). Beasley subsequently filed a motion for post-conviction collateral relief (PCR)

alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, which the trial court denied.

Beasley now appeals, arguing that his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of
counsel was violated and that his conviction should be set aside. Finding no error, we affirm.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2. On October 24, 2017, a Madison County grand jury indicted Nicholas Beasley on two

charges: one count for the sale of more than two grams but less than ten grams of

methamphetamine within 1,500 feet of a church and one count for conspiracy to sell

methamphetamine. He was indicted as a habitual offender under Mississippi Code Annotated

section 99-19-81 (Rev. 2015) and as a subsequent drug offender under Mississippi Code

Annotated section 41-29-147 (Rev. 2013). Beasley entered a guilty plea on May 14, 2018,

and pled guilty to one count of the sale of methamphetamine as a habitual offender. Under

the plea agreement, the State agreed to nolle prosequi the count for conspiracy to sell

methamphetamine and to drop the subsequent-drug-offender enhancements. The trial court

sentenced Beasley to serve twenty years in MDOC’s custody.

¶3. Thereafter, on May 6, 2021, Beasley filed a PCR motion in the trial court. He claimed

that he received ineffective assistance of counsel due to his counsel’s failure to acquire,

provide, and review discovery before Beasley entered his guilty plea; failure to pursue and

offer mitigating evidence of his rehabilitation; and inherent conflict of interest in

representing drug dealers. The trial court dismissed Beasley’s motion on June 3, 2021, upon

finding that the face of the motion clearly showed Beasley was not entitled to relief.

Aggrieved, Beasley appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶4. “When reviewing a trial court’s denial or dismissal of a PCR motion, we will only

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disturb the trial court’s decision if the trial court abused its discretion and the decision is

clearly erroneous.” Miles v. State, 301 So. 3d 718, 721 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2020) (quoting

Green v. State, 242 So. 3d 176, 178 (¶5) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017)).

DISCUSSION

¶5. Beasley claims his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel was

violated by the attorney who represented Beasley in his guilty-plea proceedings. Beasley

alleges his trial attorney’s representation was deficient based on a failure to acquire and

provide discovery before Beasley entered a plea and a failure to advocate evidence of

Beasley’s rehabilitation. Beasley also raises a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on

the ground that his trial attorney represented him despite an inherent conflict of interest.

¶6. “To succeed on an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, [the defendant] must meet

both prongs of the test laid out in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) . . . .”

Lovett v. State, 270 So. 3d 133, 135 (¶5) (Miss. Ct. App. 2018). Under the two-part test in

Strickland, “[f]irst, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient.” Id.

(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). Second, the defendant must “show that there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different.” Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). “As

applied to the plea process, the focus of the first prong remains the same, while the second

prong focuses on whether counsel’s unprofessional performance affected the outcome.”

McBride v. State, 108 So. 3d 977, 980 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012) (quoting Hannah v. State,

943 So. 2d 20, 24 (¶6) (Miss. 2006)).

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¶7. Mississippi caselaw holds that “[a] prisoner seeking post-conviction relief must

‘allege both prongs of the above test with specific detail.’” Ingram v. State, 107 So. 3d 1024,

1028 (¶10) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012) (quoting Coleman v. State, 979 So. 2d 731, 735 (¶15)

(Miss. Ct. App. 2008)). “The burden is on the defendant to bring forth proof which

demonstrates that both prongs of the Strickland test are met.” Anderson v. State, 766 So. 2d

133, 136 (¶10) (Miss. Ct. App. 2000). Additionally, “the claim must be supported by

affidavits other than his own.” Cook v. State, 301 So. 3d 766, 778 (¶36) (Miss. Ct. App.

2020) (quoting Shavers v. State, 215 So. 3d 502, 507 (¶14) (Miss. Ct. App. 2016)).

I. Obtaining and Providing Discovery

¶8. Beasley first argues that his trial attorney’s representation was deficient because the

attorney failed to obtain or provide to Beasley any discovery before he entered a guilty plea.

To support this claim, Beasley recounts statements from an alleged conversation between his

mother, his wife, and his attorney. Beasley offered statements supposedly made by his

attorney indicating that the attorney did not have an opportunity to obtain and review audio

and video evidence in Beasley’s case before Beasley decided whether to enter a plea deal.

Attached to Beasley’s PCR motion was an affidavit from a different attorney not involved

in Beasley’s representation who attested to the fact that she always was provided with

discovery and evidence to review when she represented other defendants in Madison County.

¶9. Contrary to Beasley’s claims, a review of the evidentiary record shows that his trial

attorney did request and obtain discovery before Beasley pled guilty. The record includes a

motion for discovery that was dated and filed on February 23, 2018, in which Beasley’s trial

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attorney made a request to the State to disclose evidence in its possession for Beasley’s case

for the defense to review. The motion specifically included a provision requesting a copy of

any recorded statement of the defendant and any physical evidence, photographs, and data

or information that existed in electronic form. The record shows that the State subsequently

responded with a letter dated March 13, 2018, which expressed that the State had received

the defense attorney’s request for discovery and, in turn, had enclosed the discovery materials

on file.

¶10. We find Beasley’s claim is without merit. Beasley not only failed to offer sufficient

evidence to support his assertions, but the record in fact contradicts his claim and shows that

his trial attorney did obtain discovery before Beasley entered his guilty plea. Beasley’s claim

is only supported by bare assertions in his PCR motion recalling that his attorney made

certain comments during a previous conversation. “Our supreme court has held that a PCR

movant may not rely solely on his own self-serving affidavit or otherwise unsupported

allegations in his brief.” Ingram, 107 So. 3d at 1028 (¶15). Beasley did not provide any

corroborating evidence from the record or offer a personal affidavit to attest to his trial

attorney’s alleged deficiency in providing discovery. While Beasley’s PCR motion was

accompanied by an affidavit from another person, the affidavit was from an attorney who had

no firsthand knowledge about the circumstances of Beasley’s case. The affidavit merely

stated generalizations about her experience with obtaining discovery for other defendants in

the past but did not help to establish whether Beasley’s trial attorney specifically obtained

or reviewed with Beasley any discovery in this case.

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¶11. Based on the evidence in the record, we cannot find that Beasley’s trial attorney failed

to obtain any discovery as Beasley alleges. Furthermore, Beasley did not present evidence

in his PCR motion to support his contention that his trial attorney had failed to review or

provide him with the discovery materials, which the attorney clearly had obtained from the

State before Beasley entered his guilty plea. Thus, Beasley’s claim fails to meet the first

prong of the Strickland test. Additionally, we cannot find that Beasley made any attempt to

argue that his trial attorney’s alleged deficiency in providing disclosure would have affected

the outcome of the case. Thus, Beasley fails to meet the second prong of the Strickland

standard as well.

II. Advocating Rehabilitative Evidence

¶12. Second, Beasley claims his trial attorney’s representation was deficient because the

attorney failed to seek out evidence of Beasley’s rehabilitation to provide to the State as a

mitigating factor when advocating for Beasley during plea negotiations. According to

Beasley, his plea offer likely would have changed considerably if his attorney had provided

the State with the mitigating evidence of his rehabilitation. Beasley’s argument points to

record excerpts submitted along with his PCR motion that consist of a collection of letters,

various employment records, and a certificate of recovery.

¶13. After a review of the record, we find Beasley’s claim fails to meet both prongs of

Strickland. Beasley does not offer any evidence or affidavits to substantiate his allegations

that his trial attorney failed to pursue mitigating evidence or to prove that his plea deal would

have changed. “In cases involving post-conviction collateral relief, ‘where a party offers only

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his affidavit, then his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim is without merit.’” Mooney v.

State, 130 So. 3d 145, 147 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting Watts v. State, 97 So. 3d

722, 726 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012)). Rather, we find the record proves that Beasley’s trial

attorney did provide mitigating evidence to the State and to the trial court, which effectively

invalidates the basis of Beasley’s argument. The transcripts from Beasley’s guilty plea

hearing indicate that his trial attorney presented the trial court with a letter from Beasley’s

parole officer explaining that Beasley maintained employment and was a model parolee.

Additionally, the attorney advocated for Beasley on the record at the hearing and argued that

Beasley had changed his life on his own initiative and had voluntarily turned himself in after

learning of his warrant. The transcripts also include a statement from the prosecutor

expressing that Beasley’s trial attorney had been in communication numerous times in pursuit

of a more favorable plea deal for Beasley. Therefore, we find Beasley’s claim that his trial

attorney failed to advocate in his behalf and provided deficient representation lacks merit.

III. Conflict of Interest

¶14. Lastly, Beasley claims his trial attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel as

a result of an inherent conflict of interest. Beasley alleges the attorney told Beasley’s mother

that the reason the attorney went into the practice of law was to see drug dealers put away

because the attorney had “lost his brother to drugs.” Accordingly, Beasley implies it was a

conflict of interest for his trial attorney to represent him in this case, as Beasley was indicted

on charges for the sale of drugs.

¶15. “Conflict-of-interest claims involving attorneys in criminal cases are a species of

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ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment.” Galloway v. State, 298 So.

3d 966, 974 (¶43) (Miss. 2020). Our supreme court has stated that “to demonstrate a violation

of his Sixth Amendment Rights, a defendant must establish that an actual conflict of interest

adversely affected his lawyer’s performance.” Crawford v. State, 192 So. 3d 905, 918 (¶58)

(Miss. 2015) (quoting Armstrong v. State, 573 So. 2d 1329, 1333 (Miss. 1990)). Further, this

Court has previously held that “[a]n ‘actual conflict’ means that ‘a potential for conflict or

hypothetical or speculative conflicts will not suffice for reversal.’” Witt v. State, 781 So. 2d

135, 137 (¶7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2000) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Stringer v. State, 485 So.

2d 274, 275 (Miss. 1986)).

¶16. Again, Beasley’s PCR motion lacked evidence proving that his trial attorney made the

alleged statement or otherwise corroborating his claim that the attorney suffered from a

conflict of interest. The conflict raised here is solely based on Beasley’s unsupported

allegations that his trial attorney’s representation was affected by the attorney’s own

self-interest. Beasley’s claim is based on mere conclusory allegations in his PCR motion, and

“[b]are allegations are insufficient to prove ineffective assistance of counsel.” Ingram, 107

So. 3d at 1028 (¶13). As a result, we find this claim is without merit.

CONCLUSION

¶17. Based on the foregoing reasons, we find that none of Beasley’s asserted claims meet

the two-prong Strickland test required to establish ineffective assistance of counsel.

Beasley’s PCR motion did not include evidence to substantiate that his trial attorney’s

representation was deficient, and the motion lacked supporting affidavits related to Beasley’s

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specific claims. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s denial of Beasley’s PCR motion.

¶18. AFFIRMED.

BARNES, C.J., CARLTON AND WILSON, P.JJ., GREENLEE,
WESTBROOKS, McDONALD, LAWRENCE AND McCARTY, JJ., CONCUR.
EMFINGER, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.

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