William Issac Arnold a/k/a William Arnold v. State of Mississippi

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 2023-KA-00519-COA

WILLIAM ISSAC ARNOLD A/K/A WILLIAM APPELLANT
ARNOLD

v.

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 11/23/2022
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. LAWRENCE PAUL BOURGEOIS JR.
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: HARRISON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: MICHAEL W. CROSBY
TYLER RAY HEFLIN
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: BARBARA WAKELAND BYRD
DISTRICT ATTORNEY: WILLIAM CROSBY PARKER
NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 10/08/2024
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:

BEFORE CARLTON, P.J., McCARTY AND EMFINGER, JJ.

CARLTON, P.J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. William Arnold appeals his convictions in the Harrison County Circuit Court of three

counts of sexual battery. On appeal, Arnold argues that the trial court erred in allowing the

State to present improper character evidence and that the State committed repeated instances

of prosecutorial misconduct.

¶2. Finding no error, we affirm the convictions and sentences.

FACTS
¶3. B.A.1 was born in 1990 to Arnold and Shanta Keyes.2 Arnold and Keyes were married

in 2001, separated in 2004, and eventually divorced in 2007. During her parents’ separation

and after their divorce, B.A. lived with Arnold. During B.A.’s high school years, she and

Keyes were estranged and did not communicate.

¶4. In 2018, B.A. alleged that Arnold had sexually abused her on a regular basis from the

time she was thirteen years old until she graduated from high school. B.A. reported the abuse

to the police, and Arnold was indicted on three counts of sexual battery that allegedly

occurred between 2004 and 2009 in violation of Mississippi Code Annotated section

97-3-95(1) (Rev. 2020).

¶5. Arnold’s trial was held in November 2022. At trial, B.A. testified that when she was

twelve years old, Arnold started kissing and touching her inappropriately, and when she was

thirteen years old, Arnold had sexual intercourse with her for the first time. B.A. described

the first instance of sexual abuse, testifying that one afternoon after school, Arnold “started

kissing on [her], he started touching [her] and taking down [her] pants, and he put his mouth

on [her] privates, and afterwards he stuck his penis in [her] vagina and had sex with [her].”

B.A. stated Arnold continued to have sexual intercourse with her on a regular basis until she

graduated from high school and moved out of Arnold’s house.

¶6. B.A. testified that no one else was ever present in the room when Arnold sexually

1
We will use initials for the victim and the two character-evidence witnesses to
protect their identities. See infra ¶11.
2
The record reflects that in 2018, B.A. transitioned from female to male and changed
her name. Because the sexual abuse occurred before the transition, we will refer to the
victim as a female throughout the opinion.

2
abused her. She explained that she would try to stop the abuse by pushing Arnold away from

her or locking the door to her bedroom, but Arnold would pick the lock. B.A. testified that

when Arnold observed her “frustration” with the abuse, he would punish her by refusing to

let her drive his truck to school. B.A. explained that she would then “have to go to work with

him early in the morning [and] sit in the truck until it was time for [her] to go to school

because [Arnold] didn’t want [B.A.] to drive his truck because [she] didn’t want to have sex

with him.”

¶7. When she was sixteen years old, B.A. discovered that she was pregnant with Arnold’s

child. B.A. informed Arnold about the pregnancy, and he arranged for his niece to take B.A.

to a clinic to receive an abortion. B.A. testified that she was too far along in her pregnancy

to undergo an abortion at that clinic, so Arnold drove B.A. to a clinic in Atlanta, Georgia,

that ultimately performed the abortion. Arnold’s niece, Tonia Price, testified at trial and

confirmed that Arnold asked her to take sixteen-year-old B.A. to a clinic for an abortion.

¶8. B.A. testified that she became pregnant by Arnold a second time after she graduated

from high school, and the pregnancy ended in a miscarriage. B.A. testified that she knew

Arnold was the father in both pregnancies because he was the only person with whom she

had ever had sexual intercourse. B.A. stated that after her miscarriage, Arnold’s abuse

stopped.

¶9. In 2012, B.A. moved to North Carolina and then later settled in Atlanta. In 2018,

while she was living in Atlanta, B.A. began therapy sessions with Dr. Edith Fresh, a clinical

psychiatrist. During her therapy sessions, B.A. eventually disclosed Arnold’s sexual abuse.

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B.A. testified that this was the first time she had ever fully shared details of the abuse with

anyone. B.A. explained that it took her a long time to disclose the abuse because Arnold was

the only family member who was present in her life, and she feared that if she reported the

abuse, she would be left with no family and nowhere to live. B.A. also testified that she had

wanted to seek counseling in the past, but Arnold “always talk[ed] [her] out of” going to

counseling.

¶10. Dr. Fresh testified at trial and confirmed that B.A. reported the sexual abuse to her

during a counseling session. Dr. Fresh testified that B.A.’s first counseling appointment was

in May 2018, and at that appointment, B.A. informed Dr. Fresh that she was planning to

transition genders from female to male. Dr. Fresh explained that people seeking to undergo

gender transition surgery are often required to receive a psychiatric evaluation from a

counselor before being approved for the surgery. Dr. Fresh stated that B.A. initially began

seeing her to meet the mental health requirements needed to obtain gender transition surgery.

However, after Dr. Fresh provided the necessary approval for B.A. to obtain her transition,

B.A. continued to see Dr. Fresh for counseling. After approximately five counseling

sessions, B.A. informed Dr. Fresh that Arnold had sexually abused her during her childhood.

Dr. Fresh testified that B.A.’s behavior, including protection of her perpetrator and delayed

reporting of the abuse, was consistent with that of a victim of sexual abuse.

¶11. The jury also heard testimony from M.S. and N.P., two of B.A.’s childhood friends

who testified that Arnold made sexual advances or sexually abused them when they were

children. M.S. is the same age as B.A., and N.P. is a year younger than B.A.

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¶12. M.S. testified that when she was twelve years old, Arnold made inappropriate sexual

advances toward her. M.S. stated that she and her older sister were at Arnold’s house

spending the night with B.A., and the three girls were sleeping in B.A.’s bed. M.S. recalled

that she had trouble sleeping, so she got out of bed and moved to the couch in the living

room. M.S. fell asleep on the couch and eventually woke up to find Arnold sitting next to

her. M.S. testified that at that time, she and Arnold were alone in the living room.

According to M.S., Arnold confided in her about his troubled relationship with Keyes and

then asked M.S. for a kiss. M.S. responded, “No,” and then got up and went back into B.A.’s

bedroom.

¶13. M.S. testified that as she and her sister prepared to go home the next morning, Arnold

offered ice cream sandwiches to the girls. M.S. stated that her sister and B.A. took an ice

cream sandwich and then went outside to get their bicycles, so she and Arnold were alone

in the house together. After some hesitation, M.S. accepted the ice cream sandwich and sat

down in a chair. Arnold then faced M.S., kneeled down in front of her on one knee, and

placed a hand on each arm of the chair. Arnold asked M.S. for a kiss, and she responded,

“No.” M.S. described Arnold as “adamant” about getting a kiss, so she got up and walked

out of the house.

¶14. M.S. testified that she was shocked by Arnold’s behavior. M.S. stated that Arnold

was a friend of her family, and she described him as “like an uncle” to her. M.S. testified

that she never told anyone about Arnold’s behavior because she “didn’t really have support

in [her] family” and because Arnold “was a friend of the family.”

5
¶15. N.P. testified that in December 2008 when she was sixteen years old, Arnold sexually

assaulted her. At the time, Arnold was at N.P.’s house repairing a broken toilet. N.P.

testified that she was standing in the pantry looking for a snack when Arnold came up behind

her, wrapped his arms around her waist, and inserted two of his fingers into her vagina. N.P.

stated that Arnold “rubbed” his fingers around inside of her, then pulled them out, and

smelled them. Arnold then asked N.P. if she “[knew] what oral sex was and did [she] want

to practice.”

¶16. N.P. testified that during the abuse, she “froze.” When Arnold asked her if she

wanted to practice oral sex, N.P. did not respond verbally but pushed Arnold away from her.

N.P. then opened the front door to the house and stood there, looking at Arnold. N.P.

testified that Arnold walked out without saying anything. After he left, N.P. locked the door.

¶17. N.P. testified that during this incident, her younger sister and two cousins were present

in the home, but none of them were in the room with her and Arnold during the abuse. N.P.

testified that Arnold eventually called her and asked her not to tell anyone what happened.

Arnold told N.P., “[I]f you need anything, you can call me, whether it’s money or to fix your

car, anything.”

¶18. N.P. testified that the only people she told about the abuse were her then-boyfriend

and her sister. Like M.S., N.P. described Arnold as “a friend of the family.” N.P. also

testified that she and B.A. were childhood friends, and they were one grade apart in school.

¶19. Arnold also testified at trial, and he denied sexually abusing B.A., M.S., and N.P.

Arnold claimed that he had a loving relationship with B.A. and testified that he was “just like

6
any other dad.” He acknowledged that B.A. had an abortion and suffered a miscarriage, but

Arnold denied impregnating B.A.

¶20. The jury ultimately returned a verdict finding Arnold guilty of three counts of sexual

abuse. The trial court sentenced Arnold to serve life in the custody of the Mississippi

Department of Corrections for Count I, thirty years for Count II, and thirty years for Count

III. The trial court ordered the sentences to run concurrently with one another.

¶21. Arnold filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial, which

the trial court denied. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

I. Mississippi Rule of Evidence 404(b)

¶22. On appeal, Arnold argues that the trial court erred by allowing testimony from M.S.

and N.P., who both alleged that Arnold made sexual advances or sexually abused them when

they were children. Arnold asserts that M.S. and N.P.’s testimony was unfairly prejudicial

character evidence and therefore inadmissible under Mississippi Rules of Evidence 404 and

403. Arnold further claims that the trial court failed to specifically identify an appropriate

purpose for the admission of the testimony and failed to give the jury an appropriate limiting

instruction.

¶23. We review a trial court’s admission of evidence for an abuse of discretion. Boggs v.

State, 188 So. 3d 515, 519 (¶9) (Miss. 2016). We will affirm a trial court’s evidentiary

rulings “unless they affect a substantial right of the complaining party.” Id.

¶24. Mississippi Rule of Evidence 404(b)(1) prohibits the admission of evidence of “a

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crime, wrong, or other act . . . to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a

particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.” MRE 404(b)(1).

However, evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act “may be admissible for another purpose,

such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence

of mistake, or lack of accident.” MRE 404(b)(2). Our supreme court has clarified that “[t]he

purposes listed in Rule 404(b) are not exhaustive; they simply are examples of noncharacter

purposes for which evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts may be admitted.” Boggs, 188

So. 3d at 519 (¶11). Additionally, “the mere fact that evidence offered for noncharacter

purpose(s) bears some reflection on the defendant’s character does not bar its admissibility

under Rule 404(b).” Green v. State, 89 So. 3d 543, 551 (¶18) (Miss. 2012).

¶25. If a trial court finds that evidence is admissible under Rule 404(b), the evidence must

then be “filtered through Rule 403,” which allows the trial court to “exclude relevant

evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the

following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting

time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Derouen v. State, 994 So. 2d 748, 756

(¶20) (Miss. 2008); accord MRE 403. Evidence admitted under Rule 404(b) and filtered

through Rule 403 must also be “accompanied by an appropriately-drafted limiting or

cautionary [jury] instruction.” Green, 89 So. 3d at 549 (¶15) (quoting Derouen, 994 So. 2d

at 756 (¶20)).

¶26. In the case before us, the State filed a pre-trial notice of its intent to call M.S. and N.P.

as witnesses under Rule 404(b) for the purpose of showing Arnold’s motive, intent, plan,

8
opportunity, and absence of mistake or accident. The State also provided a summary of

M.S.’s and N.P.’s anticipated testimonies, stating that M.S. would testify that when she was

twelve years old, Arnold made inappropriate sexual advances toward her, and N.P. would

testify that when she was sixteen years old, Arnold sexually abused her.

¶27. The trial court held a pre-trial hearing on the State’s motion. At the hearing, Arnold

asked the court to exclude the proposed testimonies from M.S. and N.P., arguing that their

testimony would be inadmissible as hearsay and character evidence. Arnold further asserted

that M.S.’s and N.P.’s claims of sexual abuse and inappropriate conduct were not relevant

because the alleged conduct occurred decades ago and was unsubstantiated. In response, the

State maintained that the testimony was admissible pursuant to the exceptions set forth in

Rule 404(b); namely, to prove “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,

identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” MRE 404(b).

¶28. After hearing arguments and considering caselaw, the trial court denied Arnold’s

motion to exclude the testimonies of M.S. and N.P. The trial court acknowledged that Rule

404 prohibits using a defendant’s character or actions to prove that he acted in conformity

with those actions on a particular occasion. However, the trial court determined that M.S.’s

and N.P.’s testimonies were admissible under 404(b) for the limited purpose of proving

“motive, opportunity, lack of mistake, [and] plan.” The trial court then applied the balancing

test under Rule 403 and found that, in this particular case, the probative value of M.S.’s and

N.P.’s testimonies was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.

¶29. At trial, the jury heard testimony from M.S. and N.P. detailing Arnold’s sexual

9
advances and sexual abuse that occurred when they were children. M.S. testified that she

was twelve years old, Arnold asked her for a kiss one evening when she was spending the

night with B.A. M.S. refused. Arnold also asked her for a kiss the next morning, and she

again refused. N.P. testified that when she was sixteen years old, Arnold approached her

from behind, inserted two of his fingers into her vagina, smelled his fingers, and then asked

her if she wanted to practice oral sex with him.

¶30. On appeal, Arnold argues that the State intended to use M.S.’s and N.P.’s testimonies

for the inadmissible purpose of showing that Arnold acted in conformity with the behavior

described by M.S. and N.P. when he allegedly sexually abused B.A. In support of his

argument, Arnold asserts that during the State’s closing argument, the prosecutor stated “It

wasn’t just her. You heard from [N.P.].” Arnold claims that the prosecutor’s statement is

simply another way of saying, “[T]his is what he does . . . this is his character[.]”

¶31. The supreme court has held that “evidence of a sexual offense, other than the one

charged, which involves a victim other than the victim of the charged offense for which the

accused is on trial[,]” may be considered by the jury “if properly admitted under Rule 404(b),

filtered through Rule 403, and accompanied by an appropriately-drafted limiting or

cautionary instruction.” Green, 89 So. 3d at 549 (¶15) (quoting Derouen, 994 So. 2d at 756

(¶20)). In sexual-assault cases involving minor victims, the supreme court has found that

evidence of other sexual misconduct was admissible and not unduly prejudicial where the

evidence demonstrated that the “defendant’s means of accomplishing [pedophilic sexual

activities] on past occasions bear substantial resemblance to each other and with the present

10
offense,” thus showing proof of motive and a common plan or scheme. Gore v. State, 37 So.

3d 1178, 1185-86 (¶18) (Miss. 2010); see also Boggs, 188 So. 3d at 521 (¶¶17-18); Young

v. State, 106 So. 3d 775, 780 (¶¶17-18) (Miss. 2012); Green, 89 So. 3d at 552 (¶20). The

supreme court explained that evidence of sexual misconduct that is “similar” to the charged

offense “supports an inference . . . of a common plan, scheme, or system, utilized repeatedly

to perpetrate separate but very similar crimes.” Green, 89 So. 3d at 551 n.19 (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted).

¶32. In the case before us, we find that M.S.’s and N.P.’s allegations against Arnold

“b[ore] a striking resemblance to the charged offense” and demonstrated that Arnold’s

“means of accomplishing [pedophilic sexual activities] on past occasions bear substantial

resemblance to each other and with the present offense.” Boggs, 188 So. 3d at 521 (¶17);

Gore, 37 So. 3d at 1186 (¶18). We therefore find that M.S.’s and N.P.’s testimonies were

admissible under Rule 404(b) because they showed proof of motive and established a

common plan or scheme. At trial, B.A. testified her father abused her from the time she was

thirteen years old until she graduated from high school. B.A. testified that the abuse occurred

when no one else was around, and she stated that she was surprised and also confused as to

why her father would sexually abuse her. M.S. and N.P. also testified that Arnold’s behavior

surprised them and caught them off guard and that no one else was present during the

incidents. Like B.A., M.S.’s and N.P.’s testimonies reflect that Arnold used his position of

trust to engage in inappropriate conduct and abuse. M.S. and N.P. testified that they were

friends with B.A. and that Arnold was a friend of the family. M.S. even described him as

11
“like an uncle.” Both girls were similar in age to B.A. when the abuse occurred—M.S.

testified that Arnold’s inappropriate sexual conduct occurred when she was twelve years old,

and N.P. testified that she was sixteen years old when Arnold sexually abused her. Arnold’s

sexual abuse of M.S. and N.P. escalated in a similar manner to his sexual abuse of B.A. B.A.

testified that when she was twelve years old, Arnold’s abuse was limited to kissing and

inappropriate touching. M.S., who is the same age as B.A., was twelve years old when

Arnold tried to kiss her. As B.A. grew older, Arnold’s sexual abuse escalated from kissing

to sexual penetration. Similarly, Arnold’s sexual abuse of sixteen-year-old N.P., who is a

year younger than B.A., was more extreme than his inappropriate conduct with twelve-year-

old M.S.

¶33. Arnold maintains that M.S.’s and N.P.’s testimonies are not relevant because the

alleged misconduct and abuse involving M.S. and N.P. was too remote in time and was

different from the type of abuse alleged by B.A. However, we find no merit to Arnold’s

arguments. This Court has held that “[i]n the context of child-sexual-abuse cases, even

evidence of remote past sexual-abuse allegations may be admitted for a proper purpose under

Rule 404(b), especially when coupled with an appropriate limiting instruction to the jury.”

Shoemaker v. State, 256 So. 3d 604, 614 (¶36) (Miss. Ct. App. 2018). Additionally, the

supreme court has held that differences in the type of alleged abuse, whether the severity of

the abuse or the ages of the victims, “[does] not negate [a defendant’s] substantially similar

opportunities and pedophilic motives” for purposes of Rule 404(b) admissibility. McGrath

v. State, 271 So. 3d 437, 442 (¶18) (Miss. 2019).

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¶34. We also find that the testimony of M.S. and N.P. was properly “filtered through” Rule

403. The transcript reflects that after finding that the testimony was admissible under Rule

404(b), the trial court then “considered the probative-versus-prejudicial nature of the

testimony at issue.” Butler v. State, 300 So. 3d 550, 555-59 (¶34) (Miss. Ct. App. 2020). As

stated, the trial court found that the probative value of M.S. and N.P.’s testimony was not

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.

¶35. Finally, we find that the record does not support Arnold’s claims that the trial court

failed to give the jury an appropriate limiting instruction and failed to specifically identify

an appropriate purpose for the admission of this evidence. First, the record clearly shows that

the trial court did give an appropriate limiting instruction. Jury instruction S-8A was given

to the jury and states as follows:

The [c]ourt instructs the [j]ury that acts testified to by [M.S.] and [N.P.] are
acts relating to charges for which the defendant is not presently on trial and are
to be considered only for the limited purpose of showing proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, common plan, and scheme. You cannot and must not
simply infer that the defendant acted in conformity with his previous acts and
that he is therefore guilty of the charges for which he is presently on trial.

The language of this instruction is nearly identical to the limiting instruction provided to the

jury in Gore, 37 So. 3d at 1184 (¶14). In Gore, the supreme court held that the limiting

instruction in that case satisfied the requirement of an “appropriately-drafted” limiting

instruction as mandated by Derouen, 994 So. 2d at 756 (¶20). Gore, 37 So. 3d. at 1187

(¶21).

¶36. Additionally, we recognize that the supreme court has held that “the trial court’s

failure to identify the specific applicable exception(s) under Rule 404(b) does not require

13
reversal.” Green, 89 So. 3d at 551 (¶17). However, the transcript shows that the trial court

in this case did identify the specific applicable exceptions under Rule 404(b). After hearing

arguments regarding the admissibility of M.S.’s and N.P.’s testimonies, the trial court made

an on-the-record finding that the testimonies “certainly pass[] [the requirements of] 404(b)

to prove [Arnold’s] motive, opportunity, lack of mistake, plan.”

¶37. The record shows that the trial court satisfied the supreme court’s requirement that

evidence of prior sexual assault or misconduct must be “properly admitted under Rule

404(b), filtered through Rule 403, and accompanied by an appropriately-drafted limiting or

cautionary instruction to the jury[.]” Derouen, 994 So. 2d at 756 (¶20). We therefore find

that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting M.S.’s and N.P.’s testimonies.

II. Prosecutorial Misconduct

¶38. Arnold also argues that the State committed repeated instances of prosecutorial

misconduct during its opening statements and closing arguments. Arnold asserts that the

cumulative effect of this prosecutorial misconduct deprived him of his right to a

fundamentally fair trial and therefore warrants reversal. When reviewing claims of

prosecutorial misconduct, we will reverse if “[the] prosecutorial misconduct endangers the

fairness of a trial and the impartial administration of justice[.]” Goodin v. State, 787 So. 2d

639, 645 (¶18) (Miss. 2001).

¶39. “Under the cumulative-error doctrine, individual errors, which are not reversible in

themselves, may combine with other errors to make up reversible error, where the cumulative

effect of all errors deprives the defendant of a fundamentally fair trial.” White v. State, 228

14
So. 3d 893, 905 (¶29) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017). “[R]eversal based upon cumulative error

requires a finding or findings of error.” Miskell v. State, 230 So. 3d 345, 360 (¶53) (Miss.

Ct. App. 2017).

A. Closing Arguments

¶40. Arnold asserts that during closing arguments, the prosecutors3 made several comments

vilifying Arnold and also made an improper “send-a-message” argument. The record shows

that Arnold’s defense counsel did not object to any of these allegedly improper comments

during closing arguments; accordingly, Arnold’s arguments are procedurally barred on

appeal. Evans v. State, 226 So. 3d 1, 31 (¶78) (Miss. 2017). However, “we will review such

a claim if the prosecutor’s statement was so inflammatory that the trial judge should have

objected on his own motion.” Ambrose v. State, 254 So. 3d 77, 129-30 (¶165) (Miss. 2018).

¶41. In reviewing Arnold’s claims of prosecutorial misconduct, we recognize that while

attorneys “are allowed a wide latitude in arguing their cases to the jury[,]” they may not make

arguments that “are inflammatory, highly prejudicial, or reasonably calculated to unduly

influence the jury.” Sheppard v. State, 777 So. 2d 659, 661 (¶7) (Miss. 2000). Additionally,

“any allegedly improper prosecutorial comment must be considered in context, considering

the circumstances of the case, when deciding on their propriety.” Ronk v. State, 172 So. 3d

1112, 1137 (¶60) (Miss. 2015). Reversible error occurs when “the natural and probable

effect of the improper argument of the prosecuting attorney is to create such an unjust

prejudice against the accused as to result in a decision influenced by the prejudice so

3
The transcript reflects that two prosecutors made closing arguments in this case.

15
created.” Murry v. State, 359 So. 3d 1104, 1113 (¶27) (Miss. Ct. App. 2022).

1. Vilification of Arnold

¶42. Arnold takes issue with the following statements made by the prosecutors during

closing arguments:

Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, it’s been said that a little girl’s first
true love is her daddy. You may have heard of little girls—they are always
going to dream of the person they are ever going to marry is their daddy, but
no little girl dreams of what this defendant did to [B.A.]. No little girl dreams
of being completely isolated from her entire family except her daddy. No little
girl dreams of her daddy viewing her only as a sexual object that he is going
to molest repeatedly. No little girl dreams of her daddy getting her pregnant
twice. No little girl dreams of having to abort her daddy’s child. William
Arnold, the defendant, may have been [B.A.]’s biological father, but he was
not her daddy. It may be hard to think of the fact that fathers may be able to
do or capable of doing such things to little girls.

....

[W]e can all agree that [B.A.] does not deserve to be molested by [her] dad.

¶43. Arnold also asserts that the following comments during the State’s rebuttal closing

arguments were improper:

He got a cousin, his niece, that barely knew him to go have an abortion. [W]as
he too busy to do that? [C]ould a father not take their child?

....

[N]o one should ever be molested, especially by your father. This is not a
father.

¶44. Arnold claims that the prosecutors made these comments for the purposes of vilifying

him and inflaming the jury. This Court has cautioned that prosecutors “should be careful not

to indulge in personal abuse or vilification of the defendant and should not appeal to passion

16
and prejudice.” White, 228 So. 3d at 911 (¶54) (quoting Stewart v. State, 263 So. 2d 754,

758-59 (Miss. 1972)).

¶45. In a sexual-abuse case involving a minor, this Court found that a prosecutor’s

misconduct rose to the level of reversible error where the prosecutor repeatedly called the

defendant a “pedophile” and a “child molester.” White, 228 So. 3d at 911 (¶55). This Court

explained the prosecutor’s “repeated vilification of [the defendant] during . . . closing

arguments served no other purpose than to inflame the passion and prejudice of the jury

against [the defendant].” Id.

¶46. In contrast, this Court found no prosecutorial misconduct in a sexual-abuse case

involving a minor where the prosecutor called the defendant a “child molester” but did not

refer to the defendant as a pedophile. Blackwell v. State, 273 So. 3d 801, 811 (¶29) (Miss.

Ct. App. 2019). In Blackwell, we distinguished the facts from those in White, explaining that

“[n]either of the prosecutors ever called [the defendant] a pedophile in front of the jury.” Id.

After viewing the prosecutor’s comment “in appropriate context,” this Court ultimately

determined that the prosecutor was not vilifying the defendant but, rather, “was arguing that

[the defendant] was guilty of the charges he faced—two counts of gratification of lust by

improperly touching a child.” Id. This Court explained that instead of using the full

language of the charge against the defendant, “the prosecution used a shorter, more familiar

synonym for the crime. Said differently, the comments at issue were tethered to the legal and

factual circumstances of the case, so they were ‘fair argument based upon the testimony and

evidence[.]’” Id. (quoting Divine v. State, 947 So. 2d 1017, 1022 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. App.

17
2007) (upholding a decision denying a motion for mistrial after a prosecutor referred to a

defendant as a sexual predator and a child molester during closing argument in a trial for

sexual battery of a minor)).

¶47. Additionally, the transcript reflects that at trial, Arnold testified that he was “just like

any other dad.” We have held that prosecutors “may comment upon any facts introduced into

evidence, and [they] may draw whatever deductions and inferences that seem proper . . . from

the facts.” Divine, 947 So. 2d at 1022 (¶11). Here, we find that Arnold’s testimony “opened

the door” to the prosecutor’s comments on the facts introduced into evidence—namely,

Arnold’s conduct toward his daughter.

¶48. The record also reflects that the trial court instructed the jury that arguments and

statements from attorneys are not evidence and that the jury should ignore any argument,

statement, or remark not based on the evidence. This Court has held that “opening and

closing arguments of counsel are not evidence, and reversal is not required when a jury is

properly instructed that statements made by counsel are not evidence.” Piccaluga v. State,

337 So. 3d 1142, 1153 (¶51) (Miss. Ct. App. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted).

¶49. Based on the above precedent, and after viewing the prosecutors’ comments during

closing arguments in the case before us in the appropriate context, we find that the comments

did not rise to the level of inflaming the jury and prejudicing Arnold. As stated, prosecutors

“may comment upon any facts introduced into evidence, and [they] may draw whatever

deductions and inferences that seem proper . . . from the facts.” Divine, 947 So. 2d at 1022

(¶11). After reviewing the charges against Arnold and the testimony at trial, we find that the

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prosecutors’ comments during closing arguments were “fair argument based upon the

testimony and the evidence[.]” Id. at (¶12).

2. Send-A-Message Arguments

¶50. Arnold also claims that the State made inappropriate and prejudicial “send a message”

arguments. Arnold takes issue with the following statements made by the prosecutors during

closing arguments:

We may not be able to tell [B.A.] why [Arnold] did this to her. We can only
console ourselves of saying, “Yes, [B.A.], we believe you. We believe he did
these despicable things to you.” And for that, he deserves to be held
accountable . . . .

....

[I]t’s the day to hold him accountable, ladies and gentlemen. It’s time for him
to stop making the calls, to stop directing how it’s going to happen, to stop
manipulating.

¶51. The supreme court has warned prosecutors not to “encourage juries to use their verdict

to send-a-message to the public or to other potential criminals.” Miskell, 230 So. 3d at 358

(¶46). “When reviewing a send-the-message claim, this Court considers two threshold

questions, followed by a two-prong test. The threshold questions are: (1) did defense counsel

object, and (2) was the comment uninvited by the defense.” Id.

¶52. As stated, Arnold’s defense counsel failed to object to any of the State’s comments

during closing arguments. “However, even in the absence of a contemporaneous objection,

we will review on appeal a claim that a prosecutor made an improper send-a-message

argument if the argument is so inflammatory that the trial judge should have objected on his

own motion.” O’Connor v. State, 120 So. 3d 390, 399 (¶23) (Miss. 2013) (internal quotation

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marks omitted).

¶53. In cases similar to the one before us, the supreme court has found no prosecutorial

misconduct where a prosecutor “point[ed] at the defendant and ask[ed] the jury to hold him

accountable for his actions with a guilty verdict.” Harris v. State, 384 So. 3d 493, 498 (¶14)

(Miss. 2024) (citing McGrath, 271 So. 3d at 443 (¶26)). The supreme court explained that

such a statement “was nothing more than simply reiterating the jury’s duty set forth in the

jury instructions.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

¶54. In reviewing the State’s comments in the present case, we find that the prosecutors

were not asking the jury to “send a message to the public or to other potential criminals.”

Miskell, 230 So. 3d at 358 (¶46). Rather, the prosecutors were encouraging the jury to render

a verdict based on the evidence introduced at trial. Because such statements are allowed

during closing arguments, we find no prosecutorial misconduct.

3. Additional Claims of Error

¶55. Arnold further argues that the prosecutors made inappropriate comments during

closing arguments that misled the jury and validated a witness’s credibility. Arnold cites no

caselaw in support of his arguments that these comments were inappropriate and amounted

to prosecutorial misconduct. “Failure to cite relevant authority obviates the appellate court’s

obligation to review such issues.” Cork v. State, 329 So. 3d 1183, 1190 (¶21) (Miss. 2021).

Procedural bar notwithstanding, we find no merit to Arnold’s claim. This Court has held that

prosecutors are “allowed to comment on the credibility of the testimony and evidence

presented at trial.” Miskell, 230 So. 3d at 359 (¶47).

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¶56. Arnold also reasserts his argument that the prosecutor made a prohibited “character

argument” during closing arguments when he said, “It wasn’t just [B.A.]. You heard from

[N.P.].” In claiming prosecutorial misconduct, Arnold restates his argument regarding Rule

404(b) evidence. As explained above, the trial court properly admitted M.S.’s and N.P.’s

testimonies regarding Arnold’s alleged prior misconduct under Rule 404(b) to show motive,

opportunity, lack of mistake, and plan. We therefore find no merit to Arnold’s claim that the

State’s reference to this testimony was prosecutorial misconduct.

B. Opening Statements

¶57. Arnold argues that during its opening statements, the State made an inflammatory and

unfairly prejudicial statement about the age of Keyes, Arnold’s former wife. As stated, “[t]he

standard of review that appellate courts must apply to lawyer misconduct during opening

statements or closing arguments is whether the natural and probable effect of the improper

argument is to create unjust prejudice against the accused so as to result in a decision

influenced by the prejudice so created.” Caston v. State, 823 So. 2d 473, 495 (¶71) (Miss.

2002). “[A] trial judge should intervene to prevent unfair argument when counsel departs

entirely from the evidence, makes statements intended solely to excite the passions or

prejudices of the jury, or makes inflammatory and damaging statements of fact not found in

the evidence.” Piccaluga, 337 So. 3d at 1153 (¶50) (internal quotation marks omitted). In

such matters, “we give deference to the trial court’s rulings because the trial court is in the

best position to determine if an alleged improper comment had a prejudicial effect.” Id.

¶58. The record reflects that Arnold filed a motion in limine to restrict the State from

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referencing the age difference between Arnold and his former wife, Keyes. Keyes was

sixteen years old when she started dating thirty-three-year-old Arnold. The State argued that

the fact that Arnold started dating Keyes when she was sixteen years old was relevant

because it “shows his motive towards younger [sixteen]-year-olds[.]” After a hearing on the

motion, the trial judge granted Arnold’s motion and ruled that the State could not reference

the age difference between Keyes and Arnold. However, the trial judge clarified that he was

“not going to stop anybody from asking the witness what their age is[.]”

¶59. During opening statements, the prosecutor stated that Keyes and Arnold “started

dating when [Keyes] was sixteen years old.” Defense counsel objected, and the trial judge

held a bench conference. The following exchange occurred:

[Defense Counsel]: Your Honor, my objection goes to your ruling yesterday.
I think that they can ask the age, but they can’t get into
when they started dating, when she was 16.

THE COURT: They can say they dated. I am not going to let him go
into the other stuff. That is what I ruled yesterday.

[State]: We are just talking basic ages. That is it.

THE COURT: Overruled.

¶60. Arnold argues that the State’s comment about Keyes’s age was inappropriate and also

violated the trial court’s ruling. Our review of the trial court’s ruling on Arnold’s motion in

limine shows that although the trial court prohibited the State from referencing the age

difference between Arnold and Keyes, the trial judge did not prohibit the State from stating

the witness’s age. After reading the entirety of the prosecutor’s opening statements, we find

that the State did not mention Arnold’s age or reference the age difference between Arnold

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and Keyes. The trial court overruled Arnold’s objection after finding that the State did not

violate its ruling on the motion in limine. As stated, “we give deference to the trial court’s

rulings because the trial court is in the best position to determine if an alleged improper

comment had a prejudicial effect.” Id.

¶61. After our review, we find that the State did not violate the trial court’s ruling, and no

prosecutorial misconduct occurred. We therefore find the trial court did not err in overruling

Arnold’s objection.

C. Cumulative Error

¶62. Because we find no error on any of Arnold’s claims of prosecutorial misconduct, we

therefore find that “no cumulative or plain error results to warrant a reversal.” Miskell, 230

So. 3d at 360 (¶54).

CONCLUSION

¶63. After our review, we find no reversible error. We therefore affirm Arnold’s

convictions and sentences.

¶64. AFFIRMED.

BARNES, C.J., WILSON, P.J., WESTBROOKS, McDONALD, LAWRENCE,
McCARTY AND EMFINGER, JJ., CONCUR. SMITH, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.

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