John Chadwick Grimes v. State of Mississippi

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 2023-KA-01254-COA

JOHN CHADWICK GRIMES APPELLANT

v.

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 10/19/2023
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. JOHN R. WHITE
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: ALCORN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: LAURANCE NICHOLAS CHANDLER
ROGERS
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: BARBARA WAKELAND BYRD
DISTRICT ATTORNEY: JOHN DAVID WEDDLE
NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 01/21/2025
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:

BEFORE WILSON, P.J., LAWRENCE AND EMFINGER, JJ.

LAWRENCE, J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. John Chadwick Grimes was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced in the Alcorn

County Circuit Court. In his 2022 appeal of that conviction, Grimes argued, among other

things, that the jury’s verdict may have been influenced by alleged juror misconduct. In

2023, this Court remanded the case to the circuit court for an evidentiary hearing on the issue

of possible juror misconduct. The circuit court conducted the evidentiary hearing and

questioned each juror individually on possible misconduct that may have occurred. At the

conclusion of the hearing, the circuit court found that no conduct by the jurors had prejudiced

Grimes. Aggrieved, Grimes appeals for a second time. Upon review, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2. As stated above, Grimes’s direct appeal was previously before this Court. See Grimes

v. State, 361 So. 3d 179 (Miss. Ct. App. 2023). In summary, on April 28, 2017, Grimes was

involved in an altercation with multiple people, one of whom was Greg Seago. Id. at 183-84

(¶¶2-11). At one point, Grimes “struck” Seago, who “fell and his head hit the pavement.”

Id. at 185 (¶11). “Grimes jumped on him and threw a few more punches before he realized

Seago was offering no resistance, and Grimes got up.” Id. Seago was transported to the

hospital, “where he died on May 19, 2017.” Id. at (¶13). Grimes was indicted for second-

degree murder on September 6, 2017. Id. at (¶14). Grimes’s trial began on April 19, 2019.

Id. at (¶15). For purposes of this appeal, we recite the remaining background information:

During deliberations, the jury asked the circuit court for a list of definitions for
“depraved heart.” The State suggested a definition found in the case of
Westbrook v. State, [29 So. 3d 828 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009),] to which the
defense agreed. The circuit court then submitted an instruction that read:

‘The Court instructs that depraved-heart murder and culpable
negligence manslaughter are distinguishable simply by degree
of mental state of culpability. In short, depraved-heart murder
involves a higher degree of recklessness from which malice or
deliberate design may be implied.’

After further discussion, the jury returned a verdict of ‘not guilty’ on the
charge of second-degree murder but convicted Grimes on the lesser-included
offense of manslaughter.

....

After the trial, Grimes’s attorney wrote to the jurors and invited them to
discuss the case with him. One juror, Janice Parrish, responded. Parrish said
that the jury apparently had been dissatisfied with the Court’s supplemental
instruction and that several of the jurors did their own internet search on their
cell phones for definitions of ‘depraved heart.’ According to Grimes’s

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attorney, the jurors also searched for ‘other terms foreign to them.’ The jury
then went further and searched the internet for the possible sentences that
Grimes could receive. After talking for several minutes with Juror Parrish,
Grimes’s attorney recorded the rest of his conversation and included it in
Grimes’s motion for JNOV[.]

....

On January 14, 2022, the circuit court summarily denied Grimes’s motion;
however, on the issue of juror misconduct, the court specifically stated:

‘Following the trial and conviction, but prior to sentencing,
defense counsel was contacted by Juror No. 5, Janice Parrish,
around May 12, 2021. The record reflects that Ms. Parrish
notified defense counsel of potential juror misconduct, by which
some juror(s) “googled” the lay definition of depraved heart, as
well as the potential sentences for second degree murder and
manslaughter.’

....

[T]he circuit court found that the common definition of ‘depraved heart’ and
the potential sentencing discrepancies ‘are not the type of improper extraneous
information that have been found to invalidate jury verdicts in our case law.
There is nothing inherently prejudicial in the definitions or as applied to this
case.’ Furthermore, the circuit court held, the content which was ‘googl[ed]’
is clearly something within the collective intelligence and common knowledge
of any jury. Finally, the court said that ‘[t]here is a very strong legal
presumption that jurors follow the law, as they are instructed by the court. To
engage in speculation otherwise, without a sound basis, would be contrary to
the foundations of our jury system.’

Id. at 361 So. 3d at 186-90 (¶¶18-22) (citations, footnotes, and paragraph numbering

omitted).

¶3. On January 28, 2022, Grimes appealed his conviction and sentence. Id. at 189 (¶23).

On May 16, 2023, this Court issued an opinion on the matter. This Court held that Grimes

“made a good-cause showing of juror misconduct, [so] the circuit court erred in summarily

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denying Grimes’s request for a new trial without holding an investigative hearing.” Id. at

201 (¶64). The case was remanded “for the circuit court to convene a hearing of the jurors,

determine the specific materials the jurors reviewed during their independent internet search

of legal terms and sentences, and make the appropriate finding as to whether this information

reasonably could have affected the jury’s verdict.” Id. Finally, this Court instructed the

circuit court to grant Grimes a new trial should it find that the jury’s verdict had been

“influenced by extraneous information[.]” Id. If not, the court would “make on-the-record

findings and enter a final order disposing of the request for a new trial.” Id.

¶4. Accordingly, the circuit court conducted the evidentiary hearing. The court recalled

all twelve jurors who sat for Grimes’s trial for questioning on the record. On September 19,

2023, eleven members of the jury testified in person. On September 22, 2023, the remaining

juror (who had moved out of state) testified via Zoom. All twelve jurors were asked some

variation of the same questions, which had been agreed to by Grimes and the State.

¶5. The jurors were first asked, “During your time as a juror in this case, are you aware

of anyone using a phone or any other device to research the definition of depraved heart or

any other legal term?” Nine jurors answered in the negative, while three jurors answered in

the affirmative. As for those three jurors, Juror Lowery “remember[ed] somebody getting

their phone out” but did not know “what they Googled or searched or anything.” Juror Parish

responded, “Yes . . . [t]hey looked . . . . I think they Googled it[.] . . . [W]hen you hear the

word depraved heart everybody has a definition that comes to their mind. . . . And somebody

Googled it and then we . . . decided, well, we better get clarification on that[.] . . . We sent

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the note out[.]” Finally, Juror Mancell stated, “The only thing I remember is somebody did

bring in a list of definitions of a bunch of words. And I don’t want to point anybody out, but

I told them -- you know, they were sitting beside me, that we couldn’t use that, so they put

it away right then. But that’s the only thing I remember like that.”

¶6. The jurors were then asked, “During your time as a juror in this case, are you aware

of anyone using a phone or other device to research possible sentences in this case?” Two

jurors indicated they were aware. Juror Parish stated, “I think somebody looked at – like, one

time somebody said what is the – what would be the sentence in Mississippi for something,

maybe it was the murder, whatever they had asked for . . . . I think somebody looked up what

– the Mississippi – the sentence in Mississippi for whatever the District Attorney was asking

for.” Juror Mancell testified, “Yeah, I remember it. But I think that was done after we went

in the courtroom and gave the verdict and then we come back and I remember them looking

it up.” Nine remaining jurors said they were not aware of any cell phone use, while one

stated he could not remember.

¶7. Finally, the jurors were asked, “Is there any other outside source brought to bear in

the jury room?” That question was rephrased as, “[W]as there ever any Internet, anybody

call somebody, anybody call you, anything like that going on in the jury room?” Juror

Johnson stated, “I, myself, had checked on my kids with my phone.” Juror Lowery testified,

“I only got my phone out of my purse to check the time.” Nine of the remaining jurors stated

they were not aware of any such activity, while one stated he could not remember.

¶8. Following the hearing, Grimes filed a renewed motion for a new trial on September

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29, 2023. On October 19, 2023, the circuit court entered a final order denying Grimes’s

motion for acquittal and for a new trial. The court made the following findings in reaching

this decision:

1. The information considered by the jury in this cause allegedly consisted
of some outside knowledge or research into the definitions of depraved
heart, which Juror Parrish believed to have occurred when other jurors
were using their phones; however, this was contradicted by the
testimony of jurors claiming they were using their phones to either
check on their children, or to check the time, and no one admitted
to performing independent, external research on depraved heart.
Additionally, Juror Mancell testified that another juror brought a
handwritten list of definitions for depraved heart into the jury room, but
he personally instructed this juror to put the list away because they
could not use them. Furthermore, Juror Parrish testified that the
independent depraved heart definitions were discussed prior to the
jury’s request for proper instruction by the Court on the definition of
depraved heart. Finally, this Court finds that any possible independent
research performed related to the lengths of punishment (i.e.,
sentencing) involving the charges against Defendant were allegedly
performed after the jury had rendered its verdict, and was awaiting
dismissal, which was precisely the testimony of Juror Mancell.

2. The information related to both the definitions of depraved heart, and
possible sentences could not have reasonably affected the jury’s
verdict. On the issue of the external definitions related to depraved
heart, the testimony from Juror Parrish was that any independent
research, and inadmissible discussion, of the same occurred prior to the
jury’s seeking the Court’s clarification of the definition that should be
applied in the case sub judice. Once the Court provided its
supplemental instruction on depraved heart, the overwhelming
testimony is that the jurors only applied the instructions of the
Court and the evidence produced at trial in reaching any
conclusions. Likewise, Juror Mancell’s testimony was that, while there
were independent, handwritten definitions of depraved heart brought
into the jury room, these definitions were not seen by any other
member of the jury, no other juror admitted to seeing or producing
them, and again, the overwhelming testimony was that the jury
followed the instructions of law and applied the same to the
evidence presented during the trial. Furthermore, as it pertains to the

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jury’s research into possible sentences, the most precise testimony,
which was provided by Juror Mancell, was that such research was
performed after the jury had rendered its verdict, thereby estopping
any application of this research to the outcome of deliberations. Finally,
to the extent that any misconduct may have occurred and been
prejudicial, such conduct was to Defendant’s benefit, because the
verdict rendered did not conclude that Defendant acted with a depraved
heart (i.e., the jury found Defendant guilty of manslaughter instead of
incorrectly applying a definition of depraved heart and finding him
guilty of second degree murder), or that he would not (or could not) be
sentenced to a harsher sentence than the lowest offense charged (i.e.,
manslaughter).

(Emphasis added). On October 30, 2023, Grimes appealed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶9. Grimes’s notice of appeal concerns previous motions in addition to the court’s final

order denying him a new trial. Pursuant to this Court’s opinion issued on May 16, 2023, the

circuit court was instructed to “grant Grimes a new trial should it find that the jury’s verdict

had been influenced by extraneous information,” and, “[i]f not, the court would make

on-the-record findings and enter a final order disposing of the request for a new trial.”

Grimes, 361 So. 3d at 201 (¶64) (emphasis added). Therefore, we will only address the

circuit court’s order denying Grimes a new trial.

¶10. “The grant or denial of a motion for a new trial is a matter entrusted to the lower

court’s sound discretion, and this Court will only reverse the denial of a new trial when we

are convinced that the lower court abused its discretion.” Perkins v. Dauterive, 882 So. 2d

773, 777 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2004) (citing Green v. Grant, 641 So. 2d 1203, 1207 (Miss.

1994)). Additionally, this Court reviews the evidence “in a light most favorable to the

verdict.” Id. (citing Wilson v. State, 276 So. 3d 1241, 1262 (¶57) (Miss. Ct. App. 2018)).

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ANALYSIS

¶11. The circuit court followed this Court’s mandate to the letter, “conven[ing] a hearing

of the jurors, determin[ing] the specific materials the jurors reviewed during their

independent internet search of legal terms and sentences, and mak[ing] the appropriate

finding as to whether this information reasonably could have affected the jury’s verdict.”

Grimes, 361 So. 3d at 201 (¶64). All twelve jurors provided testimony concerning the

happenings of the jury room. Of those twelve jurors, only three testified to seeing a phone

or other device being used to research the definition of “depraved heart.” Only two jurors

testified to being aware of some kind of research regarding sentencing. Finally, only two

jurors testified to ever seeing a cell phone or other device being used in the jury room. In

total, only four individual jurors testified to seeing any prohibited activity occur in the jury

room.

¶12. The circuit court addressed all these facts in the final order denying a new trial. The

court found that the allegation of research on “depraved heart” was “contradicted by the

testimony of jurors claiming they were using their phones to either check on their children,

or to check the time, and no one admitted to performing independent, external research on

depraved heart.” As for the handwritten list of definitions, Juror Mancell “personally

instructed th[at] juror to put the list away[.]” The order also stated that any discussion of the

“independent depraved heart definitions” occurred “prior to the jury’s request for proper

instruction by the [c]ourt on the definition of depraved heart.” Likewise, the order stated that

“any possible independent research performed . . . involving the charges against Grimes were

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allegedly performed after the jury had rendered its verdict.” Following this reasoning, the

circuit court held that the jury’s verdict could not have been “reasonably affected” and that

the “overwhelming testimony” showed “the jurors only applied the instructions of the [c]ourt

and the evidence produced at trial in reaching any conclusions.”

¶13. Finally, the circuit court addressed whether Grimes had truly been prejudiced by these

events. The court found that any sort of misconduct that “may have occurred . . . was to

[Grimes]’s benefit, because . . . the jury found [him] guilty of manslaughter instead of

incorrectly applying a definition of depraved heart and finding him guilty of second degree

murder,” meaning Grimes could not “be sentenced to a harsher sentence than the lowest

offense charged (i.e., manslaughter).” The circuit court held the required evidentiary hearing,

thoughtfully considered each juror’s testimony (as evidenced in his final order), and came

to a decision to deny Grimes’s motion for a new trial.

¶14. Again, “this Court will only reverse the denial of a new trial when we are convinced

that the lower court abused its discretion.” Perkins, 882 So. 2d at 777 (¶12) (citing Green,

641 So. 2d at 1207). This Court will find an abuse-of-discretion if we have “definite and

firm conviction that the court below committed a clear error of judgment and the conclusion

it reached upon a weighing of the relevant factors.” McCord v. Healthcare Recs. Inc., 960

So. 2d 399, 405 (¶13) (Miss. 2007) (quoting Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. McDaniel, 951 So. 2d 523,

526 (Miss. 2006)). There is simply nothing in the record before us evidencing “a clear error

of judgment[.]” Id. The circuit court’s order clearly explains the reasoning used to reach the

decision, which was supported by the testimony produced at the evidentiary hearing, and we

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find no abuse of discretion in denying the motion for a new trial.1

CONCLUSION

¶15. This Court finds that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by denying Grimes

a new trial and affirms.

¶16. AFFIRMED.

BARNES, C.J., CARLTON AND WILSON, P.JJ., WESTBROOKS,
McDONALD, McCARTY AND EMFINGER, JJ., CONCUR. WEDDLE AND ST. PÉ,
JJ., NOT PARTICIPATING.

1
This State’s appellate courts have previously addressed allegations involving juror
misconduct, and the results are in line with the circuit judge’s finding in this case that a new
trial was not required. See Scates v. State, 388 So. 3d 564, 579 (¶¶44-45) (Miss. Ct. App.
2023) (holding that alleged “improper influence occur[ring] during deliberations by other
jurors” did not necessitate a new trial); Hayes v. Entergy Miss. Inc., 871 So. 2d 743, 747-48
(¶¶12-14) (Miss. 2004) (finding testimony by three jurors who felt “pressured into making
a decision by other members of the jury who had grown impatient with the deliberation
process” did not require any “further investigation of alleged jury misconduct”)); Rutland
v. State, 60 So. 3d 137, 144 (¶27) (Miss. 2011) (finding that a trial court’s decision that a
“juror’s use of [a] dictionary definition” was not prejudicial to defendant was “in accord
with our precedent”).

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