Craytonia Badger v. State of Mississippi

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 2022-CP-00831-COA

CRAYTONIA BADGER APPELLANT

v.

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 08/09/2022
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. TOMIKA HARRIS IRVING
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: COPIAH COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: CRAYTONIA BADGER (PRO SE)
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: LAUREN GABRIELLE CANTRELL
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 08/01/2023
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:

BEFORE CARLTON, P.J., LAWRENCE AND SMITH, JJ.

CARLTON, P.J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. This appeal was taken from the Copiah County Circuit Court’s order denying

Craytonia Badger’s third motion for post-conviction collateral relief (PCR). Badger filed this

PCR motion in July 2022, over twelve years after Badger pleaded guilty to possession of

contraband in a correctional facility, and was sentenced to serve seven years in the custody

of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC).

¶2. The circuit court denied Badger’s July 2022 PCR motion on August 9, 2022, finding

his motion was time-barred under the Mississippi Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief

Act (UPCCRA), Miss. Code Ann. §§ 99-39-1 to -29 (Rev. 2020). The circuit court further

found that Badger had failed to meet any statutory exception under the UPCCRA or
“fundamental rights” exception as set forth in Rowland v. State (Rowland II), 98 So. 3d 1032

(Miss. 2012), which was still in effect at that time. See infra ¶7. Finding no error, we affirm.

STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶3. In November 2009, Craytonia Badger pleaded guilty in the Copiah County Circuit

Court to possession of contraband (a cell phone) in a correctional facility. See Miss. Code

Ann. § 47-5-193 (Supp. 2008). The circuit court sentenced Badger to serve seven years in

the custody of the MDOC. Badger v. State, 290 So. 3d 377, 380 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2020).

¶4. Badger filed a PCR motion a month after pleading guilty, asserting in that motion

“that his guilty plea was unknowingly and involuntarily made.” Id. at 379 (¶1). The circuit

court denied Badger’s motion, and he appealed to this Court. Id. Badger then moved to

voluntarily dismiss his appeal in September 2010, which this Court granted in November

2010. Id. at (¶2); Order, Badger v. State, No. 2010-CP-00132-COA (Miss. Ct. App. Nov.

2, 2010).1

¶5. In August 2017, Badger filed a motion for certain relief that challenged, among other

matters, the validity of his November 2009 guilty plea. The circuit court denied Badger’s

motion, and he appealed. This Court found that the August 2017 motion was effectively a

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Following dismissal of his first appeal, Badger filed two more motions that were
dismissed by the circuit court, appealed, and dismissed on appeal. The first motion was
dismissed by the Mississippi Supreme Court for lack of jurisdiction. Order, Badger v. State,
No. 2016-CP-01259 (Miss. Feb. 23, 2017). The second motion was dismissed by the
Mississippi Supreme Court Clerk pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Appellate Procedure
2(a)(2) for Badger’s failure to file an appellant’s brief. Notice, Badger v. State, No.
2016-CP-01608 (Miss. May 2, 2017).

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PCR motion and affirmed the circuit court’s order denying Badger’s PCR motion because

it was untimely, successive, and lacked merit. Badger, 290 So. 3d at 384-86 (¶¶27-38).

¶6. Badger filed his current PCR motion on July 18, 2022, again attacking the validity of

his November 2009 guilty plea. The circuit court entered an order denying Badger’s PCR

motion as time-barred and without merit because Badger failed to show he met any statutory

exception to the bars set forth in the UPCCRA or a “fundamental rights” exception as set

forth in Rowland II.

¶7. As addressed below, the judicially crafted “fundamental rights” exception first

delineated in Rowland v. State (Rowland I), 42 So. 3d 503, 507 (¶12) (Miss. 2010), and

reiterated in subsequent cases, has since been overruled by Howell v. State, 358 So. 3d 613,

615 (¶8) (Miss. 2023). We therefore analyze Badger’s appeal under the principles adopted

by the Mississippi Supreme Court in Howell. Upon review, we find that Badger’s PCR

motion is both untimely and successive, and Badger has failed to show that his untimely,

successive motion meets any statutory exception to the bars set forth in the UPCCRA.

Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s denial of Badger’s July 18, 2022 PCR motion.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶8. “We review a circuit court’s ‘dismissal or denial of a PCR motion for abuse of

discretion’ and decline to reverse unless ‘the circuit court’s decision is clearly erroneous.’”

Taylor v. State, 348 So. 3d 1017, 1019 (¶4) (Miss. Ct. App. 2022) (quoting Hunt v. State, 312

So. 3d 1233, 1234 (¶6) (Miss. Ct. App. 2021)). Questions of law are reviewed de novo. Id.

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DISCUSSION

¶9. The UPCCRA contains a three-year time-bar. Applicable here, the UPCCRA

provides that a PCR motion following a guilty plea must be filed “within three . . . years after

entry of the judgment of conviction.” Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-5(2). The circuit court’s

sentencing order was entered in November 2009. Badger, 290 So. 3d at 385 (¶27). Badger

did not file his current PCR motion until July 18, 2022, which was well over twelve years

after his sentencing order was entered. Badger’s PCR motion is untimely and barred by the

three-year limitations period set forth in section 99-39-5(2).

¶10. The UPCCRA also bars successive motions. In particular, section 99-39-23(6)

provides that “any order dismissing the petitioner’s motion or otherwise denying relief” as

requested in a PCR motion “shall be a bar to a second or successive [PCR] motion.” Miss.

Code Ann. § 99-39-23(6). This appeal concerns Badger’s third PCR motion relating to his

guilty plea. In Badger, 290 So. 3d at 384 (¶28), this Court found that Badger’s second PCR

motion was successive. We find that Badger’s third PCR motion challenging his guilty plea

is likewise successive and barred by section 99-39-23(6).

¶11. In short, Badger’s current PCR motion is plainly barred as both untimely and

successive.

¶12. We recognize that the UPCCRA delineates certain statutory exceptions to these

litigation bars. See Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-5(2)(a)(i)-(ii) & (b) (providing exceptions to

the UPCCRA’s three-year statute of limitations); id. § 99-39-23(6) (providing substantively

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identical exceptions to the UPCCRA’s successive-motions bar). These statutory exceptions

under the UPCCRA are (1) “an intervening decision . . . which would have actually adversely

affected the outcome of his conviction or sentence,” (2) “[conclusive] evidence, not

reasonably discoverable at the time of trial,” (3) untested (or inadequately tested) biological

evidence, and (4) an expired sentence or unlawful revocation of probation, parole, or

conditional release. See Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-5(2)(a)(i)-(ii) & (b); id. § 99-39-23(6).

Badger, as the PCR movant, bears the burden of proving his claims are not barred because

of a statutory exception. Cook v. State, 301 So. 3d 766, 777 (¶32) (Miss. Ct. App. 2020).

Badger has not asserted any statutory exception to the time-bar or successive-motions bar

under the UPCCRA.

¶13. Instead, Badger essentially attacks the validity of his 2009 guilty plea based upon

alleged violations of his “fundamental rights.” He asserts on appeal that he was not advised

of his “fundamental right” to self-representation before entering his plea; nor, according to

Badger, was he advised of his “constitutional right to be informed of the right to appeal

claims outside the scope of the plea agreement.” Badger asserts that had he been so advised,

he would not have pleaded guilty and, instead, proceeded to trial. But these claims do not

fall within a statutory exception to the UPCCRA’s litigation bars.

¶14. These claims, if anything, would “fall within the judicially crafted ‘fundamental-rights

exception’ to the bars.” Simoneaux v. State, 359 So. 3d 665, 667 (¶7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2023).

But the supreme court recently addressed this exception and overruled any precedent that has

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held that “the fundamental-rights exception can apply to the substantive, constitutional bars

codified by the Legislature in the [UPCCRA].” Howell, 358 So. 3d at 616 (¶12).

Accordingly, based on the supreme court’s holding in Howell, we conclude that Badger’s

claims of a fundamental-rights exception fail to apply to or overcome the UPCCRA’s

statutory bars. See Simoneaux, 359 So. 3d at 667-68 (¶¶7-8).

CONCLUSION

¶15. Because Badger’s current PCR motion is barred by the UPCCRA, we find no error

in the circuit court’s denial of Badger’s motion.

¶16. AFFIRMED.

BARNES, C.J., WILSON, P.J., GREENLEE, LAWRENCE, McCARTY, SMITH
AND EMFINGER, JJ., CONCUR. WESTBROOKS AND McDONALD, JJ., CONCUR
IN RESULT ONLY WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.

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