MSC 150371 PEOPLE OF MI V CHARLES ALMANDO-MAURICE DUNBAR Opinion on Application - Reverse CoA 03/29/2016

PEOPLE v DUNBAR
Docket No. 150371. Argued on application for leave to appeal November 4, 2015.
Decided March 29, 2016.
Charles Almando-Maurice Dunbar was charged in the Muskegon Circuit Court with
possession of cocaine, possession of marijuana, and carrying a concealed weapon in connection
with items seized from his truck during a traffic stop. Defendant’s truck had a towing ball
attached to the rear bumper, and the police officers were unable to read one of the seven
characters on the truck’s registration plate because the towing ball partially obstructed their view.
Surmising that the plate read either CHS 5818 or CHS 6818, one the officers entered CHS 5818
into the Law Enforcement Information Network and discovered that it was the plate number for a
different vehicle. The officers then stopped defendant after concluding that he was violating
MCL 257.225(2), which provides that a vehicle’s registration plate must be mounted in a place
and position that is clearly visible and maintained free from foreign materials that obscure or
partially obscure the registration information and in a clearly legible condition. They smelled
burned marijuana within the vehicle, leading to a search during which they found drugs and a
handgun. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence of the contraband on the grounds that it
was the fruit of an illegal seizure under the Fourth Amendment and Const 1963, art 1, § 11
because the officers lacked a lawful basis for stopping his vehicle. The court, Timothy G. Hicks,
J., denied the motion, concluding that defendant’s obstructed plate violated MCL 257.225(2) and
therefore provided a lawful basis for the stop. Defendant appealed by leave granted. The Court
of Appeals, S HAPIRO, J. (O’C ONNELL, J., concurring and M ETER , P.J., dissenting), reversed. In
the lead opinion, Judge S HAPIRO asserted that while the officers had difficulty reading one
character on the registration plate because of the towing ball, the circumstances that the officers
observed did not constitute a violation of MCL 257.225(2) because the plate itself was clean and
legible and the statute does not refer to trailer hitches, towing balls, or other commonly used
towing equipment. Judge O’C ONNELL concurred in the result and wrote separately to state that
the statute was ambiguous and unconstitutionally vague, criminalizing the use of ordinary car
equipment such as bicycle carriers, trailers, and trailer hitches. He concluded that
MCL 257.225(2) required only that the plate itself be maintained free from materials that
obscure the registration information and in a clearly legible condition. Judge M ETER dissented
and contended that defendant’s obstructed registration plate provided a lawful basis to stop him.
306 Mich App 562 (2014). The prosecution sought leave to appeal, and the Supreme Court
ordered and heard oral argument on whether to grant leave or take other action. 497 Mich 978
(2015).
Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan
Syllabus Chief Justice:
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Justices:
Stephen J. Markman
Brian K. Zahra
Bridget M. McCormack
David F. Viviano
Richard H. Bernstein
Joan L. Larsen
This syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
Reporter of Decisions:
Corbin R. Davis

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In a unanimous opinion by Justice M ARKMAN , the Supreme Court held:
Defendant violated MCL 257.225(2) because the attached towing ball partially obstructed
the police officers’ view of the truck’s plate. The officers therefore had a lawful basis for
stopping defendant’s vehicle and, after smelling marijuana within it, lawfully discovered the
contraband. The trial court correctly denied defendant’s motion to suppress. MCL 257.225(2)
regulates the placement and condition of registration plates. The second sentence of that
subsection requires that the plate be attached at no less than a specific height on the vehicle and
in a place and position that is clearly visible. The third sentence of the subsection requires that
the plate be maintained free from foreign materials that obscure or partially obscure the
registration information and in a clearly legible condition. The Court of Appeals panel examined
the wrong part of the statute in concluding that defendant did not violate MCL 257.225(2).
Rather than analyzing whether defendant violated the clear-visibility requirement of the
subsection’s second sentence, the panel analyzed only whether he violated the subsection’s third
sentence, concluding that there was no evidence indicating that defendant’s plate had not been
maintained in legible condition. This case, however, concerns the second sentence of the
subsection, which directs that a registration plate must be attached in a place and position that is
clearly visible. It requires that the registration plate be attached where it can be seen without
obstruction. Under it, a person must configure his or her vehicle’s registration plate and
surrounding attachments in a manner that ensures that the plate is not partially or fully
obstructed. The statute therefore prohibits obstruction of a registration plate by an object
attached to a vehicle. Even if the Court of Appeals panel correctly concluded that the plate was
clearly legible under the third sentence of MCL 257.225(2), the statute’s second and third
sentences impose separate and distinct duties. One can comply with the third sentence by
maintaining a legible plate yet still violate the second sentence by failing to attach that legible
plate in a place and position that is clearly visible. The Court of Appeals panel erred by failing
to consider whether defendant violated the subsection’s second sentence.
Court of Appeals’ judgment reversed, trial court’s denial of motion to suppress reinstated,
and case remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
©2016 State of Michigan

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FILED March 29, 2016
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
SUPREME COURT
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v No. 150371
CHARLES ALMANDO-MAURICE
DUNBAR,
Defendant-Appellee.
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH
MARKMAN , J.
This case arises from a traffic stop of defendant made after police officers
observed that his vehicle’s registration plate was partially obstructed by a bumper-
mounted towing ball, a civil infraction under MCL 257.225(2) and (7). During this stop,
the officers smelled burnt marijuana within the vehicle, leading to a search of the vehicle
during which they discovered contraband, including marijuana, cocaine, and a handgun.
Defendant subsequently moved in the trial court to suppress that contraband as the fruit
of an illegal seizure because, according to defendant, the officers lacked a lawful basis on
Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan
OPINION Chief Justice:
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Justices:
Stephen J. Markman
Brian K. Zahra
Bridget M. McCormack
David F. Viviano
Richard H. Bernstein
Joan L. Larsen

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which to stop his vehicle. The trial court denied defendant’s motion, concluding that his
obstructed plate violated MCL 257.225(2) and therefore provided a lawful basis on which
to stop his vehicle. The Court of Appeals, however, concluded that MCL 257.225(2)
does not prohibit the obstruction of a registration plate by a towing ball and reversed. We
respectfully disagree with the Court of Appeals and reverse its judgment. For the reasons
set forth below, we conclude that defendant violated MCL 257.225(2) and therefore that
the police officers had a lawful basis on which to stop him. The trial court accordingly
was correct to deny defendant’s motion to suppress.
I. FACTS AND HISTORY
In the early morning of October 12, 2012, defendant was driving his Ford Ranger
pickup truck on West Hackley Avenue in Muskegon Heights. Muskegon County Sheriff
Deputies James Ottinger and Jason Van Andel were on a routine patrol and started
following defendant. Ottinger testified that the officers’ decision to follow defendant was
not based on any particular suspicious activity. They nonetheless decided to check his
truck’s registration plate against the Law Enforcement Information Network (LEIN), a
statewide computerized information system, which, according to Ottinger, is commonly
done on patrol. According to Van Andel, a towing ball on the truck’s bumper partially
obstructed his view of the truck’s registration plate; however, from his vantage point, the
officer surmised that the plate read either CHS 5818 or CHS 6818. He entered CHS 5818
into LEIN, which returned as the registration-plate number for a 2007 Chevrolet Equinox
rather than a Ford Ranger. Both officers testified that they decided to stop defendant for

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having an obstructed registration plate.1 The officers then turned on their overhead
lights, and defendant promptly pulled over.
The officers approached defendant’s pickup truck and could then see that the plate
read CHS 6818 rather than CHS 5818. While talking with defendant, the officers smelled
burnt marijuana coming from the vehicle. A vehicle search revealed contraband,
including marijuana, cocaine, and a handgun, leading to defendant’s being criminally
charged with possession of cocaine, possession of marijuana, and carrying a concealed
weapon.2
In the trial court, defendant moved to suppress the contraband. He argued that he
had been unlawfully seized under the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution and article 1, § 11 of the Michigan Constitution because the officers lacked a
“reasonable suspicion” of an offense supporting the traffic stop. Therefore, he proceeded
to argue, the ensuing discovery of contraband had been the fruit of an illegal seizure.
Following a hearing, the trial court determined that the towing ball on defendant’s truck
had obstructed the officers’ view of the truck’s registration plate and thus concluded that
the stop had been properly grounded on defendant’s violation of MCL 257.225(2).
Accordingly, it denied defendant’s motion to suppress.
The Court of Appeals granted defendant’s motion for interlocutory appeal and
reversed in a split decision. People v Dunbar, 306 Mich App 562; 857 NW2d 280
1 When asked why he had not attempted to enter CHS 6818 into LEIN, Van Andel
testified merely that the decision to stop defendant was made upon learning that CHS
5818 was associated with a 2007 Chevrolet Equinox.
2 The vehicle search itself has not been challenged.

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(2014). In the lead opinion, Judge SHAPIRO asserted that while the officers “had
difficulty reading one of the seven characters on the pickup’s license plate due to the
presence of a trailer towing ball attached to the rear bumper,” “the circumstances
observed by the officers did not constitute a violation” of MCL 257.225(2) because the
plate itself was clean and legible and the “statute makes no reference to trailer hitches,
towing balls, or other commonly used towing equipment . . . .” Id. at 565-566 (opinion
by SHAPIRO , J.). Judge O’CONNELL concurred in the result and wrote separately to state
that the statute is “ambiguous” and “unconstitutionally vague” because it “casts a net so
wide that it could be construed to make ordinary car equipment illegal, including
equipment like bicycle carriers, trailers, and trailer hitches.” Id. at 566-567 (opinion by
O’C ONNELL, J.). He thus read MCL 257.225(2) “to require only that the license plate
itself be maintained free from materials that obscure the registration information and that
the plate itself be in a clearly legible condition.” Id. at 567. Judge M ETER dissented and
contended that defendant’s obstructed registration plate provided the officers with a
lawful basis on which to stop defendant. Id. at 569-570 (opinion by M ETER , P.J.).
The prosecutor applied in this Court for leave to appeal, and we ordered under
MCR 7.302(H)(1) that oral argument be held to address whether to grant leave or take
other action. People v Dunbar, 497 Mich 978 (2015). The parties were directed to brief
“whether the license plate affixed to the defendant’s vehicle violated MCL 257.225(2)
where it was obstructed by a towing ball, thereby permitting law enforcement officers to
conduct a traffic stop of the defendant’s vehicle.” Id. We heard oral argument on
November 4, 2015, and now consider the prosecutor’s application. In lieu of granting
leave to appeal, we reverse the Court of Appeals’ judgment.

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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
In considering a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we review its factual
findings for clear error and its interpretation of the law de novo. People v Tanner, 496
Mich 199, 206; 853 NW2d 653 (2014).
III. ANALYSIS
We review here the Court of Appeals’ determination that defendant did not violate
MCL 257.225(2) when his truck’s registration plate was partially obstructed by a towing
ball. If defendant violated this statute, the ensuing traffic stop was lawful. See MCL
257.742(1) (“A police officer who witnesses a person violating [the Michigan Vehicle
Code, MCL 257.1 through MCL 257.923] . . . , which violation is a civil infraction, may
stop [and temporarily] detain the person . . . .”); MCL 257.225(7) (“A person who
violates this section is responsible for a civil infraction.”); see also Whren v United
States, 517 US 806, 810; 116 S Ct 1769; 135 L Ed 2d 89 (1996) (“[T]he decision to stop
an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic
violation has occurred.”).
When interpreting a statute, we seek “to ascertain the legislative intent that may be
reasonably inferred from the words expressed in the statute.” Epps v 4 Quarters
Restoration LLC, 498 Mich 518, 529; 872 NW2d 412 (2015). We “give effect to every
word, phrase, and clause and avoid an interpretation that would render any part of the
statute surplusage or nugatory.” People v Miller, 498 Mich 13, 25; 869 NW2d 204
(2015). We interpret the text “according to the common and approved usage of the
language.” MCL 8.3a. Unless we conclude that the statute is ambiguous, the Legislature
is “presumed to have intended the meaning expressed” in the statute. People v Likine,

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492 Mich 367, 387; 823 NW2d 50 (2012). A clear and unambiguous statute “must be
enforced as written and no further judicial construction is permitted.” Gardner v Dep’t of
Treasury, 498 Mich 1, 6; 869 NW2d 199 (2015).
The provision of the statute at issue, MCL 257.225(2), regulates the placement and
condition of registration plates:
A registration plate shall at all times be securely fastened in a
horizontal position to the vehicle for which the plate is issued so as to
prevent the plate from swinging. The plate shall be attached at a height of
not less than 12 inches from the ground, measured from the bottom of the
plate, in a place and position which is clearly visible. The plate shall be
maintained free from foreign materials that obscure or partially obscure the
registration information, and in a clearly legible condition. [3]
This case concerns the second sentence of the provision, which directs that a registration
plate “shall be attached . . . in a place and position which is clearly visible.”4 The phrase
“place and position” indicates that this sentence governs the location of the registration
plate on a vehicle. This location must be “clearly visible,” meaning that the location
where the plate is attached-- and after attachment the plate itself5-- can be viewed without
3 As amended by 1995 PA 129. Following the events giving rise to this case, the
Legislature enacted 2014 PA 26, which amended MCL 257.225(2) by substituting “that”
for “which” in the second sentence and striking the comma after “information” in the
third sentence. Neither change affects our interpretation of the statute.
4 The first sentence of MCL 257.225(2) is not implicated in this case because there is no
evidence that the truck’s registration plate was not “securely fastened in a horizontal
position.” Because we ultimately conclude that defendant violated the subsection’s
second sentence, we need not decide whether he also violated its third sentence.
Nonetheless, even if we assume that there was no such violation, it would not affect our
determination that the second sentence was violated and therefore that the officers had
probable cause to stop defendant’s vehicle.
5 Defendant argues that MCL 257.225(2) requires the clear visibility of the registration
plate’s “place and position” (i.e., its location) rather than expressly requiring the clear

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obstruction.6 MCL 257.225(2) accordingly and simply requires that the registration plate
be attached where it can be seen without obstruction.7
Defendant argues that a clear-visibility requirement would be “absurd” if it
imposed liability for an obstructing object (e.g., a building or pedestrian) or condition
(e.g., snow or fog) outside a driver’s control. We note, however, that the instant violation
was based not on an object or condition outside defendant’s control but on an object fully
within his control-- namely, a towing ball attached to his rear bumper. But in any event,
defendant’s concern is misplaced; nothing in MCL 257.225(2) evinces the Legislature’s
intention to impose liability on a person on the basis of conduct or circumstances outside
his or her control. Instead, the statute requires a registration plate to “be attached . . . in a
place and position which is clearly visible.” MCL 257.225(2). These words evince no
intention to require any person to do anything other than configure his or her vehicle’s
visibility of the plate. Nonetheless, because the plate is a thin sheet of metal, we see no
effective distinction between the plate’s location and the plate itself or between the
visibility of the plate’s location and the visibility of the plate itself.
6 We note that this interpretation accords with the definitions in Merriam-Webster’s
Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed) (stating that “clearly” means “in a clear manner,” which,
incorporating the definition of “clear,” means in a manner “free from obstruction,” and
that “visible” means “capable of being seen”).
7 We interpret MCL 257.225(2) using the language of the statute. We note, however, that
our interpretation accords with a reasonable view of the Legislature’s police power:
requiring registration plates to be unobstructed certainly advances public safety by
permitting witnesses to a hit-and-run motor-vehicle accident or police officers engaged in
the investigation of criminal flight to observe the registration information of a fleeing
vehicle or by enabling officers effecting a traffic stop to determine whether a driver has a
violent criminal history posing some threat.

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registration plate, and surrounding attachments, in a manner that ensures the unobstructed
visibility of the plate.8
The Court of Appeals panel, in concluding that defendant did not violate
MCL 257.225(2), examined the wrong part of the subsection. Rather than analyzing
whether defendant violated the clear-visibility requirement of the subsection’s second
sentence, the lead opinion and the concurring opinion analyzed only whether he violated
the subsection’s third sentence, which requires that a registration plate “be maintained
free from foreign materials that obscure or partially obscure the registration information,
and in a clearly legible condition.” MCL 257.225(2). Focusing on whether the plate was
“legible,” the lead opinion concluded that there was “no evidence that defendant’s plate
was dirty, rusted, defaced, scratched, snow-covered, or otherwise not ‘maintained’ in
legible condition.” Dunbar, 306 Mich App at 566 (opinion by SHAPIRO , J.). The
concurring opinion apparently agreed with this conclusion. See id. at 567 (opinion by
O’C ONNELL, J.). A majority of the panel therefore concluded that defendant had not
violated the statute.
But even if the panel correctly concluded that the plate was “clearly legible” under
the third sentence of MCL 257.225(2), it failed altogether to consider whether the plate
was “clearly visible” under that subsection’s second sentence. These two sentences
impose separate and distinct duties: the second sentence, by requiring that the plate be
8 We do not decide today whether MCL 257.225(2) is violated when a trailer hitch is, in
fact, being used to tow a trailer and the combination of the hitch and the trailer obstructs
the registration plate. We note that trailers are permitted under the statutory scheme, see
MCL 257.721, and that trailers generally must have their own registration plates, see
MCL 257.73; MCL 257.216; MCL 257.225.

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“clearly visible,” requires that the plate be attached where it will not be obstructed and
the third sentence requires that the plate itself “be maintained free from foreign materials
that obscure or partially obscure the registration information, and in a clearly legible
condition.” Quite clearly, the third sentence concerns an ongoing duty to maintain the
plate so that it can be read, that is, to ensure that no foreign materials adhere to the plate
and thus obscure the plate and registration information. Because one can comply with
the third sentence by maintaining a legible plate yet still violate the second sentence by
failing to attach the plate, legible though it may be, “in a place and position which is
clearly visible,” the panel’s analysis was incomplete for not having considered whether
defendant violated the second sentence.
Having concluded that MCL 257.225(2) requires that a vehicle’s registration plate
be attached where it can be seen without obstruction, we apply that understanding of the
statute to the instant case to determine whether defendant violated the statute. The trial
court found, on the basis of the testimony of the officers and pictures taken during the
traffic stop, that the officers’ view of the truck’s plate was obstructed by the attached
towing ball. Indeed, that finding is not challenged. Because MCL 257.225(2) prohibits
an obstruction of a vehicle’s registration plate, defendant violated the statute. The
officers’ stop of defendant thus was lawful, and the trial court properly denied
defendant’s motion to suppress.9
9 The prosecutor argues in the alternative that even if the officers misinterpreted MCL
257.225(2), their stop of defendant (and their ensuing discovery of contraband) was
nonetheless lawful because, under Heien v North Carolina, 574 US ___; 135 S Ct 530,
536; 190 L Ed 2d 475 (2014), a police officer’s reasonable suspicion supporting a traffic
stop may rest on a “reasonable mistake of law.” Because we conclude that defendant

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IV. OBSERVATIONS
As this case demonstrates, a towing ball, when attached to a vehicle in a way that
obstructs a view of the vehicle’s registration plate, may subject a driver to a police stop,
including the possibility of a citation and, if circumstances warrant, a search, seizure, or
both. We are cognizant that Michiganders’ vehicles commonly have items such as trailer
hitches and bicycle racks attached to them, and accordingly recognize that under
MCL 257.225(2) common conduct may lead to what some might consider harsh
consequences.
But the potentially broad reach of a statute by itself does not invest a judicial body
with the authority either to revise that statute or to interpret it in a manner inconsistent
with its language. We do not sit as the “legislators in chief” of this state in order to
correct statutes that may be viewed by some (or even by many) as “cumbersome,”
“impractical,” or “inadequately precise.” See Lansing Mayor v Pub Serv Comm, 470
Mich 154, 163-164; 680 NW2d 840 (2004). Rather, the language of MCL 257.225(2)
“compels a particular result,” id. at 164, and those desiring to alter this result must seek to
do so “through those bodies authorized by our Constitution to undertake such decisions—
typically the legislative branch,” AFT Mich v Michigan, 497 Mich 197, 215; 866 NW2d
782 (2015).
We further note that MCL 257.225(2) is not rendered “ambiguous” or “vague”
merely because “the statute casts a net so wide that it could be construed to make
violated MCL 257.225(2), we necessarily also conclude that the officers did not make a
mistake of law, reasonable or otherwise, and therefore Heien is not pertinent.

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ordinary car equipment illegal.” Dunbar, 306 Mich App at 566 (opinion by
O’C ONNELL, J.). One may observe, for example, from common experience that many
drivers on Michigan roads exceed speed limits, but we would not conclude from that
observation alone that speed-limit laws are unenforceable, let alone “ambiguous” or
“vague.” If the Legislature possesses the constitutional authority to enact a statute
regulating the placement of registration plates, then it may do so regardless of the number
of persons affected by the statute’s enforcement.10 Accordingly, when the people wish to
argue “that a statute is unwise or results in bad policy,” those arguments “should be
addressed to the Legislature.” Oakland Co Bd of Co Rd Comm’rs v Mich Prop & Cas
Guaranty Ass’n, 456 Mich 590, 613; 575 NW2d 751 (1998) (quotation marks and
citation omitted). This Court is simply not authorized to alter the meaning of MCL
257.225(2) on the ground that it might potentially encompass common conduct, and we
accordingly decline to do so.
V. CONCLUSION
We conclude that the second sentence of MCL 257.225(2) requires a vehicle’s
registration plate and surrounding attachments to be configured in such a manner that the
plate is not partially or fully obstructed. The statute therefore prohibits a registration
plate from being obstructed by an object attached to a vehicle. We further conclude that
defendant violated MCL 257.225(2) because the towing ball attached to his truck
10 See, e.g., Mich Coalition of State Employee Unions v Michigan, 498 Mich 312, 331-
332; 870 NW2d 275 (2015) (“[T]he legislative authority of the state ‘can do anything
which it is not prohibited from doing by the people through the Constitution of the State
or the [Constitution of the] United States.’ ”) (citation omitted).

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partially obstructed the truck’s registration plate from the view of police officers
following him. The officers thus lawfully stopped defendant and, after smelling burnt
marijuana from within the vehicle, lawfully discovered contraband. In lieu of granting
leave to appeal, we reverse the Court of Appeals’ judgment, reinstate the trial court’s
denial of defendant’s motion to suppress the contraband, and remand this case to the trial
court for further proceedings.
Stephen J. Markman
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Brian K. Zahra
Bridget M. McCormack
David F. Viviano
Richard H. Bernstein
Joan L. Larsen

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