MSC 151374 BARBARA PACE V JESSICA EDEL-HARRELSON Opinion on Application - Remand to CoA 02/01/2016

PACE v EDEL-HARRELSON
Docket No. 151374. Decided February 1, 2016.
Barbara Pace brought an action in the Eaton Circuit Court against Jessica Edel-Harrelson,
Christy Long, and SIREN/Eaton Shelter, Inc. (SIREN), claiming that she had been discharged
from her employment with SIREN in violation of public policy and the Whistleblowers’
Protection Act (WPA), MCL 15.361 et seq. Plaintiff alleged that she was terminated because she
had reported to two supervisors and Edel-Harrison, SIREN’s executive director, that Long, a
coworker, had told plaintiff that she planned to use SIREN grant money to buy a stove for
Long’s daughter and implied that plaintiff should document the transaction in the name of a
client in order to cover up the unauthorized purchase. Edel-Harrelson claimed that she had fired
plaintiff for unrelated misconduct. The court, Conrad J. Sindt, J., granted defendants’ motion for
summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), and plaintiff appealed. The Court of Appeals,
S HAPIRO, P.J., and G LEICHER and R ONAYNE KRAUSE, JJ., reversed the trial court’s grant of
summary disposition on the WPA claim, but affirmed the trial court’s summary disposition of
the claim of discharge against public policy. 309 Mich App 256 (2015). Defendants applied for
leave to appeal in the Supreme Court.
In lieu of granting leave to appeal and without hearing oral argument, in a unanimous
opinion per curiam, the Supreme Court held:
Under MCL 15.362, the WPA provides protection to an employee who reports a violation
or a suspected violation of a law to a public body. The reference in MCL 15.362 to “a violation
or a suspected violation of a law” plainly envisions an act or conduct that has actually occurred
or is ongoing, and MCL 15.362 contains no language indicating that future, planned, or
anticipated acts amounting to a violation or a suspected violation of a law are included within the
scope of the WPA. Consequently, a stated intention to commit an act amounting to a violation of
a law in the future does not constitute a violation or a suspected violation of a law for purposes
of MCL 15.362. Because plaintiff merely reported another’s intent to violate a law in the future,
plaintiff did not engage in protected activity under the WPA as a matter of law and has no
recourse under that statute. The Court of Appeals decision to the contrary was reversed and the
case remanded to the Court of Appeals for consideration of the merits of plaintiff’s claim that her
discharge violated public policy.
Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan
Syllabus Chief Justice:
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Justices:
Stephen J. Markman
Brian K. Zahra
Bridget M. McCormack
David F. Viviano
Richard H. Bernstein
Joan L. Larsen
This syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
Reporter of Decisions:
Corbin R. Davis

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Reversed and remanded to the Court of Appeals for further consideration.
Justice LARSEN took no part in the decision of this case.
©2016 State of Michigan

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FILED February 1, 2016
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
SUPREME COURT
BARBARA PACE,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v No. 151374
JESSICA EDEL-HARRELSON, CHRISTY
LONG, and SIREN EATON SHELTER
INC.,
Defendants-Appellants.
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH
PER CURIAM.
This case requires the Court to consider the application of Michigan’s
Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (WPA) to an employee who alleges that she was
terminated because she reported a coworker’s plan to violate the law. Pursuant to MCL
15.362, the WPA provides protection to an employee who reports “a violation or a
suspected violation of a law” to a public body. Because “a violation or a suspected
violation” refers to an existing violation of a law, the plain language of MCL 15.362
envisions an act or conduct that has actually occurred or is ongoing. MCL 15.362
Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan
OPINION Chief Justice:
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Justices:
Stephen J. Markman
Brian K. Zahra
Bridget M. McCormack
David F. Viviano
Richard H. Bernstein
Joan L. Larsen

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contains no language encompassing future, planned, or anticipated acts amounting to a
violation or a suspected violation of a law. Because plaintiff in the instant case merely
reported another’s intent to violate a law in the future, plaintiff has no recourse under the
WPA. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals’ contrary decision and remand this
case to that court for further consideration.
I. BASIC FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Plaintiff, Barbara Pace, brought suit against her former employer, SIREN Eaton
Shelter, Inc., (SIREN),1 SIREN executive director, Jessica Edel-Harrelson, and SIREN
operations manager, Christy Long, claiming that she was wrongfully terminated on
January 18, 2012 in violation of the WPA.
Plaintiff claims Long stated that she intended to use SIREN grant money to
purchase a stove for her daughter. According to plaintiff, Long implied that plaintiff
should document the transaction in the name of a specific client to cover up the
unauthorized purchase. Long denies ever using grant funds for this purpose, or ever
discussing such a purchase with plaintiff.
Plaintiff testified that she contacted two of her supervisors to inform them of
Long’s plans. When plaintiff’s supervisors did not act upon her warning, plaintiff
reported her incident with Long directly to Edel-Harrelson in December 2011 or early
January 2012. Plaintiff stated in her deposition that, at that time, she believed that Long
had already purchased the stove with grant funds. Plaintiff alleges that Edel-Harrelson
1 SIREN is a nonprofit entity that provides services to survivors of domestic violence.

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told plaintiff that she would look into the matter, but Edel-Harrelson claimed in a later
deposition that she had no recollection of this discussion with plaintiff.2
SIREN terminated plaintiff’s employment on January 18, 2012. Plaintiff alleges
that she was terminated for reporting her conversation with Long to Edel-Harrelson.
SIREN’s stated reason for terminating plaintiff’s employment was plaintiff’s allegedly
harassing and intimidating behavior toward a fellow employee in violation of defendants’
employment policies in a January 2012 incident.3 The termination letter stated that
plaintiff was terminated because she “engaged in behavior that resulted in fear and
intimidation in coworkers, and which was witnessed by three employees.”
On April 10, 2012, plaintiff brought the instant action alleging that her termination
was in violation of the WPA. On August 21, 2013, defendants moved for summary
disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), arguing that plaintiff could not establish a prima
2 After plaintiff filed her complaint in April 2012, Edel-Harrelson investigated plaintiff’s
claim against Long and found no wrongdoing on Long’s part. As the Court of Appeals
acknowledged, defendants do not dispute that if Long had actually purchased a stove with
grant funds, or taken sufficient steps to constitute an attempt of such a purchase, she
would have committed the crime of embezzlement or attempted embezzlement. See
MCL 750.174.
3 Defendants presented evidence that on or about January 10, 2012, plaintiff made an
inappropriate comment to a coworker. Plaintiff admitted making the comment as a joke.
When Carol Hatch, a coworker who witnessed the comment, told plaintiff that the remark
was inappropriate, plaintiff asked Hatch if she wished to go “toe to toe” with her. The
incident was reported to plaintiff’s supervisor, Martha Miller, who discussed the incident
the next day with Edel-Harrelson. Edel-Harrelson instructed Miller to issue plaintiff a
verbal warning. When Miller met with plaintiff to issue that warning, Hatch averred that
plaintiff became angry and approached Hatch in a threatening manner in the presence of
two other case managers. Plaintiff denied that she engaged in any physically intimidating
behavior.

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facie case under the WPA because (1) no conduct had occurred that could be considered
a violation or suspected violation of a law, and therefore, plaintiff did not engage in
“protected activity” under the WPA and (2) plaintiff could not demonstrate a causal
connection between her alleged report of a suspected violation of a law and her
termination.
On November 6, 2013, the circuit court granted summary disposition in favor of
defendants, ruling that plaintiff failed to establish that a violation or suspected violation
of a law occurred. On February 24, 2015, the Court of Appeals reversed the circuit
court’s ruling with respect to plaintiff’s WPA claim.4 According to the panel, plaintiff
presented sufficient evidence to establish a genuine issue of material fact that she had
engaged in “protected activity,” and that the alleged protected activity was causally
connected to her subsequent termination, rendering summary disposition improper. The
panel remanded for proceedings consistent with its opinion. Defendants filed an
application for leave to appeal in this Court, arguing that plaintiff failed to establish a
prima facie claim under the WPA because there was no evidence that any conduct or
actions were taken that constituted a violation or a suspected violation of a law. After
review of the briefs filed on the application for leave to appeal, in lieu of granting leave
4 Pace v Edel-Harrelson, 309 Mich App 256; 870 NW2d 745 (2015). Plaintiff also
asserted an alternative claim that her discharge was against public policy. The trial court
dismissed that claim, ruling that there was no public policy basis to support it. And, in
light of its reversal on the WPA claim, the Court of Appeals found it unnecessary to
address the merits of the public policy claim. See Anzaldua v Neogen Corp, 292 Mich
App 626, 631; 808 NW2d 804 (2011).

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to appeal, we summarily reverse the Court of Appeals and remand this case to that court
for further consideration.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The interpretation of the WPA presents a statutory question that this Court reviews
de novo.5 This Court also reviews de novo decisions on motions for summary
disposition brought under MCR 2.116(C)(10).6
III. ANALYSIS
The pertinent issue before this Court is whether plaintiff has stated a viable claim
under the WPA. The applicable provision of the WPA, MCL 15.362, states the
following:
An employer shall not discharge, threaten, or otherwise discriminate
against an employee regarding the employee’s compensation, terms,
conditions, location, or privileges of employment because the employee, or
a person acting on behalf of the employee, reports or is about to report,
verbally or in writing, a violation or a suspected violation of a law or
regulation or rule promulgated pursuant to law of this state, a political
subdivision of this state, or the United States to a public body, unless the
employee knows that the report is false, or because an employee is
requested by a public body to participate in an investigation, hearing, or
inquiry held by that public body, or a court action.
This provision protects an employee who has reported, or is about to report, a violation or
suspected violation of a law to a public body. To establish a prima facie case under MCL
15.362, a plaintiff must show that “(1) the plaintiff was engaged in protected activity as
defined by the act, (2) the plaintiff was discharged or discriminated against, and (3) a
5 Whitman v City of Burton, 493 Mich 303, 311; 831 NW2d 223 (2013).
6 Johnson v Recca, 492 Mich 169, 173; 821 NW2d 520 (2012).

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causal connection exists between the protected activity and the discharge or adverse
employment action.”7
Our initial, and ultimately dispositive, inquiry is whether plaintiff engaged in
“protected activity” as articulated in MCL 15.362 when she reported Long’s alleged plan
to purchase a stove with SIREN grant money to Edel-Harrelson. When interpreting a
statute, the primary goal is to give effect to the intent of the Legislature by construing the
language of the statute.8 When the plain and ordinary meaning of statutory language is
clear, judicial construction is neither necessary nor permitted.9 When a statute does not
expressly define a term, courts may consult dictionary definitions to ascertain its ordinary
and generally accepted meaning.10
MCL 15.362 states that the WPA applies to employees who report “a violation or
a suspected violation of a law” to a public body.11 We agree with the Court of Appeals
that a plaintiff need not necessarily report an actual violation of a law to receive
protection under this provision, as MCL 15.362 explicitly provides protection for “a
suspected violation of a law.”12 Nonetheless, we disagree with the Court of Appeals to
7 West v Gen Motors Corp, 469 Mich 177, 183-184; 665 NW2d 468 (2003) (citations
omitted).
8 Sun Valley Foods Co v Ward, 460 Mich 230, 236; 596 NW2d 119 (1999).
9 Id.
10 Brackett v Focus Hope, Inc, 482 Mich 269, 276; 753 NW2d 207 (2008) (citations
omitted).
11 Defendants concede that SIREN is a “public body” for purposes of the WPA.
12 Debano-Griffin v Lake Co, 486 Mich 938, 938 (2010).

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the extent it held “that, where an employee has a good faith and reasonable belief that a
violation of the law . . . is being actively planned, the report of that belief is []sufficient to
trigger the protections of the WPA.”13
The reference in MCL 15.362 to “a violation or a suspected violation of a law”
plainly envisions an act or conduct that has actually occurred or is ongoing. A common
dictionary defines “violation” in part as “the act of violating: the state of being
violated[.]”14 This definition contemplates an existing act that has occurred or is
ongoing. That is, “a violation or a suspected violation” refers to an existing violation.
The provision must therefore be read in the context of some conduct or act that has
already occurred or is occurring, and not some conduct or act that may or may not occur.
MCL 15.362 contains no language indicating that future, planned, or anticipated acts
amounting to a violation or a suspected violation of a law are included within the scope
of the WPA. Consequently, a stated intention to commit an act amounting to a violation
of a law in the future does not constitute “a violation or a suspected violation of a law”
for purposes of MCL 15.362 as a matter of law.15
13 Pace, 309 Mich App at 268.
14 Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed).
15 We also find persuasive the Minnesota Court of Appeals’ interpretation of that state’s
Whistleblowers’ Act, which contains language very similar to MCL 15.362 of the WPA.
See Minn Stat § 181.932(1) (stating that an employer shall not discharge an employee
when that employee in good faith “reports a violation or suspected violation of any
federal or state law or rule . . . to an employer . . . .”). Interpreting § 181.932(1), the
Minnesota Court of Appeals recognized that it “does not apply where an employee
alleges that the employer contemplated but refrained from unlawful conduct.” Grundtner
v Univ of Minnesota, 730 NW2d 323, 330 (Minn App, 2007). Rather, “the statutory
language [of section 181.932] speaks to conduct which has already transpired, and the

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Plaintiff reported to Edel-Harrelson Long’s stated plans to commit a future act in
violation of the law. Plaintiff claimed in her deposition that Long said she was “going to
use the money” to buy the stove and agreed that Long “was simply telling [plaintiff] what
her intention was.” Plaintiff therefore did not engage in “protected activity” for purposes
of the WPA, as plaintiff’s report of a suspected planned or future violation of a law is not
encompassed within the protections provided by MCL 15.362.
In holding to the contrary, the Court of Appeals relied in part on plaintiff’s
statement in her deposition that at the time of her report to Edel-Harrelson, she
“believed” Long had already purchased the stove. Based on this statement, the Court of
Appeals concluded that plaintiff reported a “suspected violation of an actual law,” and
that defendants’ argument that plaintiff only suspected that Long might purchase the
stove in the future is inconsistent with the record.
However, the WPA provides protection to an employee only where that employee
“reports or is about to report” a violation or a suspected violation of a law.16 Thus, an
employee’s unexpressed personal belief when making a report is not relevant for
purposes of MCL 15.362. There is no indication in the record that plaintiff reported to
Edel-Harrelson her belief that Long had already purchased the stove. Instead, the record
fact that an avenue of action has been contemplated by the employer and rejected
insulates that conduct from the whistleblower proscriptions.” Id. (quotation marks and
citations omitted). Notably, after Grundtner, the Minnesota Legislature amended
§ 181.932(1), to provide protection to an employee who reports “a violation, suspected
violation, or planned violation of any federal or state law or common law or rule adopted
pursuant to law . . . to an employer . . . .”
16 MCL 15.362.

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indicates that plaintiff reported only her “incident” with Long, referring to the
conversation pertaining to Long’s plans to purchase the stove using grant funds in the
future. Therefore, because plaintiff reported a suspected future violation of a law, not a
suspected existing violation, plaintiff did not engage in “protected activity” for purposes
of the WPA, regardless of her deposition testimony pertaining to her subjective belief at
the time of her report to Edel-Harrelson.
In sum, the evidence presented by plaintiff indicates that Long merely announced
her intention to commit a violation of a law in the future. Consequently, because plaintiff
reported a suspected future violation of a law rather than “a violation or a suspected
violation of a law,” she did not engage in protected activity as a matter of law.17 By
concluding to the contrary, the Court of Appeals unduly expanded the scope of the clear
and plain language of the WPA without legislative approval.
IV. CONCLUSION
Because plaintiff reported Long’s announced intention to buy a stove with
unauthorized grant funds, which constituted an expression of an intent to act in the future,
not an accomplished or ongoing act, plaintiff has not established conduct that qualifies as
“a violation or a suspected violation of a law” under MCL 15.362. Consequently,
plaintiff did not engage in “protected activity” under the WPA as a matter of law.18 In
17 The Court of Appeals’ comparison of the instant case to Debano-Griffin, 486 Mich at
938, is misguided. The plaintiff in Debano-Griffin reported a suspected existing violation
of a law.
18 Because we conclude that plaintiff did not engage in “protected activity” under
MCL 15.362, we need not consider defendants’ argument that plaintiff failed to

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lieu of granting defendants’ application for leave to appeal, we summarily reverse the
judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the Court of Appeals for
consideration of the merits of plaintiff’s claim of discharge against public policy.19
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
Brian K. Zahra
Bridget M. McCormack
David F. Viviano
Richard H. Bernstein
L ARSEN , J., took no part in the decision of this case.
demonstrate a causal connection between her report to Edel-Harrelson and her
termination.
19 See Anzaldua, 292 Mich App at 631 (“[I]f the WPA does not apply, it provides no
remedy and there is no preemption.”) (citations omitted).

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