COA 375886 VHS OF MICHIGAN V MAIPF Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 8/7/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
VHS OF MICHIGAN, INC., doing business as
DETROIT MEDICAL CENTER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
UNPUBLISHED
August 07, 2026
9:16 AM
v No. 375886
Wayne Circuit Court
MICHIGAN AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
PLACEMENT FACILITY, MICHIGAN
ASSIGNED CLAIMS PLAN, and CURRENTLY
UNNAMED ASSIGNEE OF THE MICHIGAN
ASSIGNED CLAIMS PLAN,
LC No. 22-001462-NF
Defendants,
and
USA UNDERWRITERS INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: ACKERMAN, P.J., and BAZZI and LIEVENSE, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this no-fault action, plaintiff, VHS of Michigan, Inc., doing business as Detroit Medical
Center (DMC), appeals as of right the trial court’s stipulated order regarding apportionment and
to dismiss the consolidated litigation. However, DMC substantially challenges the trial court’s
previous order granting summary disposition in part to defendant, USA Underwriters Insurance
Company (USA), under MCR 2.116(C)(10) (no genuine issue of material fact), and the trial court’s
prior opinion and order denying DMC’s motion for reconsideration. We affirm.

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I. BASIC FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The pertinent facts were previously summarized in part by this Court in Downer v USA
Underwriters, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued May 30, 2024
(Docket Nos. 363824; 363831; 366081), pp 3-4:
On March 16, 2021, [Angerica L. Downer] applied for a no-fault
automobile insurance policy from USA. On the application form, Downer checked
“No” in response to the question, “In the past three (3) years, have you . . . had your
driver’s license suspended or revoked?” However, Downer’s driver’s license was
suspended from October 19, 2018 until December 6, 2018. Downer also elected
[personal protection insurance (PIP)] benefits at a coverage limit of $50,000, but
this option is available only to individuals who are enrolled in Medicaid, MCL
500.3107c(1)(a). Downer was not enrolled in Medicaid at the time she submitted
her application. USA issued the policy without discovering that Downer had
provided incorrect information in her application.
On May 12, 2021, Downer was injured in an automobile accident with
another driver, Nakaylin Ashburn. DMC treated Downer for her injuries and
submitted bills to USA for reimbursement under Downer’s no-fault policy. On
May 24, 2021, USA obtained Downer’s driving record and discovered her previous
driver’s license suspension. On July 16, 2021, USA informed Downer that her
insurance policy was being rescinded ab initio, as of the date it was issued. Downer
subsequently brought suit against USA, Ashburn, and the [Michigan Automobile
Insurance Placement Facility (MAIPF)]. DMC brought a separate provider’s action
against USA under MCL 500.3112(1). The trial court consolidated the two actions.
* * *
DMC moved for partial summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) on
the issue of the applicable coverage limit for Downer’s PIP benefits. DMC argued
that Downer chose a benefit limit of $50,000, which was only available to Medicaid
enrollees, but Downer was not a Medicaid enrollee. DMC argued that the policy
should be regarded as providing for unlimited PIP benefits under MCL
500.3107c(4). USA argued that the court should apply a rebuttable presumption
that $50,000 was the correct level under MCL 500.3107c(3). The trial court denied
DMC’s motion. DMC now appeals that decision by leave granted in Docket No.
366081.
Ultimately, as relevant in the present case, this Court held that “the trial court correctly concluded
that the rebuttable presumption provided by MCL 500.3107c(3) can apply to an insurer who issued
a policy with a $50,000 coverage limit under MCL 500.3107(1)(a) to an insured who did not meet
the statutory eligibility requirements for that level of coverage.” Id. at 16. But the Downer Court
agreed with DMC that USA failed to properly establish its rebuttable presumption pursuant to
Bronson Health Care Group, Inc v Esurance Prop & Cas Ins Co, 348 Mich App 428; 19 NW3d
151 (2023), because USA did not provide an affidavit to demonstrate that Downer submitted a
premium payment corresponding to the $50,000 coverage level. Downer, unpub op at 15.

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Accordingly, this Court remanded the matter to provide USA with the opportunity to submit an
adequate affidavit, noting that if it “satisfies the prima facie case of a presumption, DMC will then
have the opportunity to rebut the presumption as described in Bronson . . . .” Id. at 15-16.
On remand from Downer, USA moved for partial summary disposition under MCR
2.116(C)(10) regarding the PIP policy-limit issue, contending that the provided affidavit of Takara
Thompkins, a USA underwriting specialist, established the rebuttable presumption of MCL
500.3107c(3). USA asserted that Thompkins’s affidavit demonstrated: (1) USA issued an
insurance policy to Downer; (2) Downer did not make an effective selection because she was not
enrolled in Medicaid at the time of selection; and (3) Downer advanced premium payments
consistent with a $50,000 coverage level. USA further argued that Thompkins’s affidavit detailed
how the premium payment amount would differ if a different coverage level were selected, such
as a $250,000 or $500,000 PIP policy. USA concluded that it was entitled to summary disposition
because it established the rebuttable presumption pursuant to MCL 500.3107c(3), Bronson, and
Downer.
DMC responded that both Bronson and Downer improperly interpreted MCL 500.3107c(3)
by failing to construe the statute as a whole, instead dismissing any argument for a holistic reading
as policy-based rather than examining Subsection (3) in conjunction with Subsection (4) to give
effect to the statutory scheme. DMC further contended that USA failed to establish the rebuttable
presumption under MCL 500.3107c(3) because Thompkins’s affidavit was inadequate under MCR
2.119(B)(1). DMC asserted that Thompkins did not explicitly state in her affidavit that she
maintained personal knowledge of USA’s policy-setting process, such that she would be qualified
to testify regarding how different premium payments correspond to different coverage levels.
DMC advanced that Thompkins’s deposition testimony featured similar flaws regarding her
expertise.
Following a hearing, the trial court granted summary disposition on the PIP policy-limit
issue under MCR 2.116(C)(10), opining, “I think it’s quite clear that USA has established its
rebuttable presumption under Bronson that Downer made the premium payment corresponding to
the $50,000 coverage, regardless of the issue of her Medicaid card.” The trial court further
explained:
USA laid out pretty thoroughly in [its] motion how [Downer’s] premium
payment corresponded to the $50,000 coverage. I don’t think that’s disputable at
all.
The issue is whether the affidavit [USA] provided is satisfactory in
establishing a prima facie case of presumption. DMC has attempted to rebut the
presumption by arguing that the affidavit is hearsay and that it was made or signed
by someone other than [the insurer] who took the initial information. But USA has
provided a copy of the Medicaid card and I’m satisfied that [USA] met [its] burden.
The court entered an order consistent with its statements on the record.
DMC moved for reconsideration of the summary disposition order, reiterating its
arguments regarding the inadequacy of Thompkins’s affidavit under MCR 2.119(B)(1) and the

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lack of documentation establishing the premium payment rate for a $50,000 PIP policy. The trial
court entered an opinion and order denying DMC’s motion, resolving that DMC failed to identify
any palpable error or novel argument warranting reconsideration of the contested order. Following
further proceedings, the court entered a stipulated order regarding apportionment and to dismiss
the consolidated litigation. This appeal ensued.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition.
El-Khalil v Oakwood Healthcare, Inc, 504 Mich 152, 159; 934 NW2d 665 (2019). A motion under
MCR 2.116(C)(10) “tests the factual sufficiency of a claim.” Id. at 160 (emphasis omitted).
When considering such a motion, a trial court must consider all evidence submitted
by the parties in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. A
motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) may only be granted when there is no genuine
issue of material fact. A genuine issue of material fact exists when the record leaves
open an issue upon which reasonable minds might differ. [Id. (quotation marks and
citations omitted).]
This Court further reviews de novo whether the trial court properly interpreted and applied the
relevant statutes and court rules. Brecht v Hendry, 297 Mich App 732, 736; 825 NW2d 110 (2012).
III. ANALYSIS
DMC argues that the rebuttable presumption under MCL 500.3107c(3) is inapplicable
because the statute does not address circumstances in which a selection of coverage is ineffective
due to the insured’s statutory ineligibility to make that selection. Because of the law-of-the-case
doctrine, we disagree.
“The law-of-the-case doctrine is a judicially created, self-imposed restraint designed to
promote consistency throughout the life of a lawsuit.” Rott v Rott, 508 Mich 274, 286; 972 NW2d
789 (2021). Pursuant to this doctrine, legal matters “determined by the appellate court will not be
differently determined on a subsequent appeal in the same case where the facts remain materially
the same.” Grievance Admin v Lopatin, 462 Mich 235, 259; 612 NW2d 120 (2000) (quotation
marks and citation omitted). “Thus, as a general rule, an appellate court’s determination of an
issue in a case binds lower tribunals on remand and the appellate court in subsequent appeals.” Id.
at 260.
Despite DMC’s contentions to the contrary, its arguments pertaining to the applicability of
MCL 500.3107c(3) were previously addressed by this Court, and the facts remain materially the
same as in the previous appeal. In Downer, unpub op at 10-12, this Court examined whether
Downer was entitled to unlimited PIP coverage under her policy with USA when she selected the
$50,000 coverage option in her application despite her inability to elect that option because she
was not enrolled in Medicaid. This Court considered MCL 500.3107c, which provides, in
pertinent part:
(1) Except as provided in sections 3107d and 3109a, and subject to
subsection (5), for an insurance policy that provides the security required under

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section 3101(1) and is issued or renewed after July 1, 2020, the applicant or named
insured shall, in a way required under section 3107e and on a form approved by the
director, select 1 of the following coverage levels for personal protection insurance
benefits under section 3107(1)(a):
(a) A limit of $50,000.00 per individual per loss occurrence for any personal
protection insurance benefits under section 3107(1)(a). The selection of a limit
under this subdivision is only available to an applicant or named insured if both of
the following apply:
(i) The applicant or named insured is enrolled in Medicaid, as that term is
defined in section 3157.
(ii) The applicant’s or named insured’s spouse and any relative of either
who resides in the same household has qualified health coverage, as that term is
defined in section 3107d, is enrolled in Medicaid, or has coverage for the payment
of benefits under section 3107(1)(a) from an insurer that provides the security
required by section 3101(1).
(b) A limit of $250,000.00 per individual per loss occurrence for any
personal protection insurance benefits under section 3107(1)(a).
(c) A limit of $500,000.00 per individual per loss occurrence for any
personal protection insurance benefits under section 3107(1)(a).
(d) No limit for personal protection insurance benefits under section
3107(1)(a).
(2) The form required under subsection (1) must do all of the following:
(a) State, in a conspicuous manner, the benefits and risks associated with
each coverage option.
(b) Provide a way for the applicant or named insured to mark the form to
acknowledge that he or she has read the form and understands the options available.
(c) Allow the applicant or named insured to mark the form to make the
selection of coverage level under subsection (1).
(d) Require the applicant or named insured to sign the form.
(3) If an insurance policy is issued or renewed as described in subsection
(1) and the applicant or named insured has not made an effective selection under
subsection (1) but a premium or premium installment has been paid, there is a
rebuttable presumption that the amount of the premium or installment paid
accurately reflects the level of coverage applicable to the policy under subsection
(1).

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(4) If an insurance policy is issued or renewed as described in subsection
(1), the applicant or named insured has not made an effective selection under
subsection (1), and a presumption under subsection (3) does not apply, subsection
(1)(d) applies to the policy.
(5) The coverage level selected under subsection (1) applies to the named
insured, the named insured’s spouse, and a relative of either domiciled in the same
household, and any other person with a right to claim personal protection insurance
benefits under the policy.
The Downer Court recognized that MCL 500.3107c(1) permitted an insured to choose
unlimited PIP coverage, or coverage limited to $50,000, $250,000, or $500,000, and provided that
the $50,000 option was solely available to insureds who are enrolled in Medicaid and meet other
eligibility requirements. Downer, unpub op at 12. This Court noted that the parties did not dispute
that Downer was not enrolled in Medicaid when she submitted her application, and that the statute
“does not specify how an insurer is to verify an insured’s Medicaid enrollment.” Id. However,
the Court explained:
MCL 500.3107c(3)[1] provides a rebuttable presumption for cases where an insured
“has not made an effective selection” from the PIP coverage options, but the named
insured paid a premium or premium installment. The statute creates a rebuttable
presumption that the amount of the premium “accurately reflects the level of
coverage applicable.” If the presumption under Subsection (3) does not apply,
MCL 500.3107c(4) provides that the unlimited coverage option applies. [Id.]
In addressing the proper interpretation of the phrase “has not made an effective selection” under
MCL 500.3107c(3), this Court considered “how the $50,000 limit in Subsection (1)(a) is distinct
from the levels offered in Subsections (1)(b) through (d),” as “the options of a $250,000 limit, a
$500,000 limit, or unlimited coverage are available to all insureds, but the $50,000 limit is only
available to insureds who satisfy certain enumerated eligibility requirements.” Id. But the Court
opined that “MCL 500.3107c(3) and (4) do not distinguish between an ‘effective selection’ of the
$50,000 option from the other available options,” such that DMC’s construction “improperly reads
into the statute a distinction not expressed by the statutory language,” and “also shifts to USA the
consequences of Downer’s improper selection on the ground that USA could have discovered the
error if it had verified Downer’s Medicaid enrollment before issuing her a policy with a $50,000
coverage limit under Subsection (1)(a).” Id.
1 MCL 500.3107c(3) states:
If an insurance policy is issued or renewed as described in subsection (1) and the
applicant or named insured has not made an effective selection under subsection
(1) but a premium or premium installment has been paid, there is a rebuttable
presumption that the amount of the premium or installment paid accurately reflects
the level of coverage applicable to the policy under subsection (1).

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The Downer Court further opined that DMC’s interpretation of the statute was contradicted
by this Court’s decision in Bronson, which provided that “ ‘the Legislature intended for MCL
500.3107c(3) to apply to any situation in which MCL 500.3107c(1) was not followed to the
letter . . . but the parties to the policy nevertheless had an apparent understanding about the level
of coverage.’ ” Downer, unpub op at 15, quoting Bronson, 348 Mich App at 448-449. The Court
acknowledged that the matter was distinguishable from Bronson because “Downer was not a
Medicaid enrollee eligible for the $50,000 coverage option when she applied for auto insurance,”
but it resolved that DMC’s construction would “require reading into the statute a distinction that
the Legislature could have, but did not, include in the statute.” Downer, unpub op at 15.
This Court then addressed DMC’s contention that if it were to adopt USA’s interpretation,
“the default unlimited coverage provision in MCL 500.3107c(4) will never apply as a practical
matter because an insurer will not issue a policy without receiving at least one premium payment,”
and that “reliance on the premium payment to determine the applicable coverage limit as
prescribed in MCL 500.3107c(3) violates the principle of statutory interpretation by rendering
MCL 500.3107c(4) meaningless and nugatory.” Id. The Court explained that the argument “that
insurance companies could disregard the safeguards of MCL 500.3107c(2), allowing insureds to
make uninformed choices, but avoid the consequences provided by MCL 500.3107c(4) because
the rebuttable presumption under MCL 500.3107c(3) will automatically become available when
the uninformed insured pays the premium or premium installment” was also considered in
Bronson. Id. at 15. The Downer Court resolved that, much like in Bronson, such policy concerns
belonged to the Legislature and were speculative, and an insurer acting in such a manner was
unlikely to operate in Michigan for long. Id. This Court, however, agreed with DMC that USA
failed to properly establish its rebuttable presumption pursuant to Bronson because USA did not
provide an affidavit to demonstrate that Downer submitted a premium payment corresponding to
the $50,000 coverage level. Id. Accordingly, this Court remanded the matter to provide USA with
the opportunity to submit an adequate affidavit, noting that if it “satisfies the prima facie case of a
presumption, DMC will then have the opportunity to rebut the presumption as described in
Bronson . . . . ” Id. at 15-16.
As discussed above, the Downer Court expressly held that MCL 500.3107c(3) applied and
remanded the case for further proceedings to determine whether the rebuttable presumption had
been sufficiently established and, if so, whether it had been rebutted. Although DMC contends
that Downer was wrongly decided in light of this Court’s subsequent decision in Northland
Radiology, Inc v Allstate Fire and Cas Ins Co, ___ Mich App ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2026) (Docket
No. 374214), the two cases address distinct statutory issues. In Northland Radiology, ___ Mich
App at ___; slip op at 7-9, this Court held that an applicant or named insured cannot make an
effective selection to opt out of PIP benefits unless all eligibility requirements set forth in MCL
500.3107d are satisfied, in which case MCL 500.3107c(1)(d) governs. Downer, by contrast,
addressed the separate question of whether the rebuttable presumption under MCL 500.3107c(3)
applies when an applicant or named insured “ ‘has not made an effective selection’ from the PIP
coverage options, but the named insured paid a premium or premium installment.’ ” Downer,
unpub op at 10-16. As Northland Radiology itself recognized, MCL 500.3107c includes a
rebuttable presumption in Subsection (3) that is absent from MCL 500.3107d, noting, “The
Legislature could have included similar language in MCL 500.3107d, but it did not.” Northland
Radiology, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 8. That presumption precludes the automatic
application of the unlimited PIP benefits otherwise available under MCL 500.3107c(1)(d) when

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an applicant or named insured, such as Downer, makes an ineffective selection. Accordingly,
Northland Radiology does not undermine Downer’s conclusion that the rebuttable presumption of
MCL 500.3107c(3) remains applicable in these circumstances. Ultimately, despite DMC’s attempt
to now relitigate the issue in this appeal, the law-of-the-case doctrine governs, and DMC has failed
to show any grounds that would justify disregarding it.
DMC then argues that even if the rebuttable presumption of MCL 500.3107c(3) applies,
USA failed to establish the presumption because its affidavit was legally deficient under MCR
2.119(B)(1). We disagree.
MCR 2.116(G)(6) provides that an affidavit submitted in support of or in opposition to a
motion for summary disposition “shall only be considered to the extent that the content or
substance would be admissible as evidence to establish or deny the grounds stated in the motion.”
MCR 2.119(B)(1) governs the form of affidavits submitted to a court, providing that such
affidavits must: “(a) be made on personal knowledge; (b) state with particularity facts admissible
as evidence establishing or denying the grounds stated in the motion; and (c) show affirmatively
that the affiant, if sworn as a witness, can testify competently to the facts stated in the affidavit.”
Such an affidavit must include an oath or affirmation of the person who has knowledge of the facts
stated. See MCR 1.109(D)(3); MCR 2.116(G)(4).
In her affidavit, Thompkins attested that she was an underwriting specialist employed by
USA, and she was assigned to review the insurance application and payment history for Downer.
Thompkins asserted that on March 16, 2021, Downer applied for, and was issued, a $50,000 PIP
policy with USA, based on Downer’s purported enrollment in Medicaid. Thompkins stated that
Downer opted for a six-month installment plan with a minimum payment of $228.88 per month,
in addition to a $228.88 down payment and a separate $150 “Complete Protection Program
membership.” Thompkins further asserted that USA “re-rated Downer’s policy premium” to
demonstrate the differing six-month premium for a $250,000, $500,000, and an unlimited PIP
policy; a $250,000 PIP policy would warrant a $1,625 premium, a $500,000 PIP policy would
result in a $1,919 premium, and an unlimited PIP policy would require a $2,310 premium.
Thompkins provided, “I swear that the contents in my affidavit are truthful under the penalty of
perjury,” and the affidavit was notarized.
Although Thompkins did not expressly state in the affidavit that the assertions therein were
based on personal knowledge, she explained at the outset that she was an underwriting specialist
for USA and had been assigned to review Downer’s application and payment history.
Thompkins’s statements regarding those matters logically flowed from the review she was
assigned to conduct, making it apparent that the affidavit was based on her personal knowledge.
Moreover, Thompkins affirmed under the penalty of perjury that the statements contained in the
affidavit were true, further supporting the reliability of her assertions. Additionally, the affidavit
cited and attached several supporting documents substantiating Thompkins’s contentions
regarding Downer’s enrollment in the $50,000 PIP policy, as well as the comparative premium
rates for policies providing $250,000, $500,000, and unlimited PIP coverage. These exhibits
included Downer’s insurance policy application with USA, her Medicaid card, the client quote
disclosure and payment schedule, payment receipts, and an “MMR Quote Calculator” reflecting
the premium amounts associated with the various available PIP coverage limits. DMC likewise
fails to establish how Thompkins’s deposition testimony is inconsistent with, or otherwise negates,

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her personal knowledge of the matters addressed in the affidavit or the factual assertions set forth
therein. Rather, much like Mary Free Bed Rehab Hosp v Esurance Prop & Cas Ins Co, ___ Mich
App ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2026) (Docket No. 370846); slip op at 9, “this evidence sufficiently
connects the dots between the amount of the premium paid and the selection of limited PIP
coverage such that [the insurer] has shown that the premium paid ‘accurately reflects the level of
coverage.’ ” In light of the foregoing, USA adequately demonstrated the rebuttable presumption
under MCL 500.3107c(3).
Affirmed.
/s/ Matthew S. Ackerman
/s/ Mariam S. Bazzi
/s/ Andrew J. Lievense

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