COA 377894 BRIAN TADAJEWSKI V BERG ASSESSING AND CONSULTING INC Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 10/5/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
BRIAN TADAJEWSKI,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
UNPUBLISHED
October 05, 2026
1:42 PM
v No. 377894
Alpena Circuit Court
BERG ASSESSING & CONSULTING, INC., LC No. 25-003160-CK
Defendant-Appellee,
and
ALLAN BERG, ALPENA COUNTY ROAD
COMMISSION, WILLIAM L. HENN, D. ADAM
TOUNTAS, and DREW W. BROADDUS,
Defendants.
BRIAN TADAJEWSKI,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v No. 378658
Alpena Circuit Court
BERG ASSESSING & CONSULTING, INC., and
ALPENA COUNTY ROAD COMMISSION,
LC No. 25-003160-CK
Defendants-Appellees,
and
ALLAN BERG, WILLIAM L. HENN, D. ADAM
TOUNTAS, and DREW W. BROADDUS,
Defendants.

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Before: MARIANI, P.J., and FEENEY and TREBILCOCK, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In Docket No. 377894, plaintiff, Brian Tadajewski, appeals by right the trial court’s order
granting summary disposition in favor of defendants Berg Assessing & Consulting, Inc., and Allan
Berg (collectively, “BAC”), and the court’s order granting summary disposition in favor of
defendants Alpena County Road Commission, William L. Henn, D. Adam Tountas, and Drew W.
Broaddus (collectively, “the Road Commission defendants”). In Docket No. 378658, plaintiff
appeals by right the trial court’s order awarding monetary sanctions to the Road Commission
defendants on the basis of the frivolousness of plaintiff’s claims.1 We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Although this appeal is the first in these particular cases, the underlying facts and
proceedings are not new to this Court. See Alpena Co Bd of Co Rd Comm’rs v Tadajewski, ___
Mich App ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2025) (Docket No. 374166). In Alpena Co, ___ Mich App at ___;
slip op at 1-2, this Court described the relevant factual and procedural background as follows:
[Plaintiff] owns land adjacent to Geronimo Road in Alpena County. In
December 2022, [the Road Commission] filed an action alleging that Geronimo
Road is a public right-of-way and that [plaintiff] had been placing dangerous
obstructions on the portion of the roadway adjacent to his property. In August
2023, the [trial] court granted [the Road Commission’s] motion for summary
disposition, ruling in a final order that a highway-by-user under MCL 221.20 had
been established and that [plaintiff] was not to place any encroachments in the
Geronimo Road right-of-way. [Plaintiff] did not appeal the order.
Over a year later, [plaintiff] filed a motion asserting that the right-of-way
was 33 feet wide, despite the clear language in MCL 221.20 that a highway-by-user
is 4 rods, or 66 feet, wide. After the court denied that motion, [plaintiff] filed an
untimely claim of appeal, which was dismissed.
After [plaintiff] placed additional encroachments in the right-of-way, [the
Road Commission] sought a hearing to show cause why [plaintiff] should not be
held in contempt for failing to adhere to the court’s August 2023 final order. In
December 2024, the trial court concluded that [plaintiff] was in contempt of court
and assessed $6,992 in attorney fees and $629.84 in expenses [the Road
Commission] incurred to remove [plaintiff’s] encroaching obstructions. [Plaintiff]
claimed an appeal from that order. [Footnote omitted.]
1 We consolidated these appeals “to advance the efficient administration of the appellate process.”
Tadajewski v Berg Assessing & Consulting, Inc, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals,
entered January 7, 2026 (Docket Nos. 377894; 378658).

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In Alpena Co, this Court ultimately dismissed plaintiff’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction, concluding
that because the trial court’s order imposing compensatory civil contempt sanctions was not a final
order conferring appellate jurisdiction under MCR 7.202(6), plaintiff could not appeal that order
by right. Id. at ___; slip op at 1, 3-4.
During the pendency of his appeal in Alpena Co, plaintiff, in propria persona,2 initiated
the instant proceedings. In his complaint, plaintiff sought to quiet title as to the portions of
Geronimo Road he had previously contested, and he continued to allege that his property had been
improperly altered and infringed upon.3 Plaintiff named as defendants the Road Commission,
Henn (the Road Commission’s counsel in the prior matter), Tountas and Broaddus (the Road
Commission’s counsel at that time), and BAC.4 In lieu of filing an answer, the Road Commission
defendants filed motions for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7) (dismissal
appropriate because of prior judgment or other disposition of the claim) and (8) (failure to state a
claim on which relief can be granted). The Road Commission defendants argued that plaintiff was
improperly attempting to relitigate the underlying case and had provided no legitimate factual or
legal basis to support any of the claims raised in his complaint. They also sought monetary
sanctions against plaintiff to cover their costs and attorney fees incurred as a result of defending
against his frivolous claims.
Following multiple hearings on the matter (and numerous additional filings by plaintiff),
the trial court granted summary disposition in favor of the Road Commission defendants,
concluding that plaintiff’s claims against them were “barred by res judicata or quasi-judicial
immunity, or otherwise fail[ed] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” The court also
concluded that plaintiff’s claims against those defendants “were frivolous within the meaning of
MCL 600.2591(3)(a),” and ordered plaintiff to reimburse “all costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees
incurred by them in connection with this lawsuit.” After conducting an additional hearing to
determine the appropriate amount of costs and fees—at which the Road Commission defendants
submitted a detailed bill of costs and fees along with affidavits from Tountas and Broaddus—the
court sanctioned plaintiff in the amount of $46,334.
Meanwhile, BAC had not been served properly and, as a result, had been defaulted. BAC,
however, later moved to set aside the default, which the trial court granted. BAC thereafter filed,
in lieu of an answer, a motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(4) (lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction), (7), and (8). Following a hearing on the matter, the trial court granted
BAC’s motion. In doing so, the court concluded that the assessing company had no power to, and
did not, alter the boundaries of plaintiff’s property, and had done nothing more than reduce his tax
burden in light of the public right-of-way that had previously been established under MCL 221.20.
2 Plaintiff represented himself below and is representing himself on appeal.
3 Plaintiff also raised a plethora of other claims in his complaint, often relying on criminal or
otherwise inapposite statutes. The particulars of those claims are not relevant to these appeals.
4 Plaintiff did not initially name Tountas and Broaddus as defendants, but later amended his
complaint to do so.

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The court explained that plaintiff’s claims against BAC were ultimately the result of plaintiff’s
“misunderstanding of the law and misunderstanding of what’s transpiring[.]”
These appeals followed.
II. DOCKET NO. 377894
On appeal, plaintiff raises a significant number of (largely unrelated) challenges regarding
the trial court’s decision to grant summary disposition to defendants. For the reasons that follow,
we do not see in these challenges any basis for relief.
A. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
In granting summary disposition, the trial court relied on MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (8). We
review that ruling de novo. Krieger v Dep’t of Environment, Great Lakes, & Energy, 348 Mich
App 156, 170; 17 NW3d 700 (2023). A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8) “tests the legal sufficiency
of a claim” and is decided “on the pleadings alone.” Id. at 171 (cleaned up). Summary disposition
under that subrule is appropriate when, taking the well-pleaded factual allegations of the complaint
as true and in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the “claim is so clearly
unenforceable that no factual development could possibly justify recovery.” Id. (quotation marks
and citation omitted). For a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(7), meanwhile, the court “consider[s]
all documentary evidence submitted by the parties, accepting as true the contents of the complaint
unless affidavits or other appropriate documents specifically contradict them.” Id. at 170
(quotation marks and citation omitted). “If a genuine issue of material fact exists after properly
considering all the evidence, dismissal is inappropriate,” but “if no facts are in dispute, and if
reasonable minds could not differ regarding the legal effect of those facts, the question whether
the claim is barred is an issue of law for the court.” Id. at 171 (cleaned up).
A few of plaintiff’s challenges were raised for the first time in a motion for reconsideration,
which the trial court denied. A decision on a motion for reconsideration is reviewed for an abuse
of discretion, which occurs when the trial court renders a decision that “falls outside the range of
reasonable and principled outcomes.” Jackson v Bulk AG Innovations, LLC, 342 Mich App 19,
24; 993 NW2d 11 (2022) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
B. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff first contends that because the register of actions contains no proof of service of a
summons, the trial court was without jurisdiction to grant summary disposition to BAC. But this
issue is meritless, as “a party who enters a general appearance and contests a cause of action on
the merits submits to the court’s jurisdiction.” In re Gordon Estate, 222 Mich App 148, 158; 564
NW2d 497 (1997). All defendants, including BAC, contested plaintiff’s claims on the merits. And
we see no basis to conclude that the trial court otherwise lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter
as it did.
Next, plaintiff contends that reversible error occurred when the trial court took too long to
rule on his motion for a default judgment after BAC had a default entered against it by the court
clerk. According to plaintiff, this prejudiced him because it allowed BAC to file a motion for

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summary disposition, which the court ultimately granted. But BAC operated under the assumption
that a default judgment had already been entered, and it moved to have it set aside, providing good
cause—improper service of the complaint—and an affidavit of meritorious defense. See MCR
2.603(D)(1). And although plaintiff contends that the court violated MCR 2.603(B)(3) and MCR
2.119(F)(1), neither of these subdivisions provides a timeline for when a court must rule on a
party’s motion for entry of a default judgment. Nor do we see any other basis to conclude that the
trial court reversibly erred in its handling of plaintiff’s motion.
Likewise meritless is plaintiff’s argument that the trial court improperly considered
documents that BAC attached to its motion for summary disposition rather than limiting its review
to the pleadings alone, given that BAC moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8).
Although plaintiff correctly observes that a court may consider “[o]nly the pleadings” when
rendering a decision on a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8), he neglects
the fact that BAC also moved for summary disposition under (C)(4) and (C)(7), both of which
require the court to consider a party’s proffered evidence. MCR 2.116(G)(5). In any event, it is
readily apparent from the trial court’s oral ruling on BAC’s motion that the court was, in fact,
relying on the pleadings alone when granting that motion.
Plaintiff next contends that BAC’s counsel was unsure of BAC’s position at the hearing on
its motion for summary disposition and that the trial court then improperly took on the role of
BAC’s advocate. But the record plainly belies this claim, showing instead that BAC’s counsel
clearly and emphatically stated why plaintiff’s claims were not viable. The trial court then merely
explained in its own words to plaintiff that BAC could not and did not alter his property description
and that his lawsuit against BAC was therefore misguided. The trial court did not abuse its
discretion by denying plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration as to this issue. See Jackson, 342
Mich App at 24.
Plaintiff also argues that the trial court and BAC’s counsel implied that he was confusing
his property claim with a taxation or assessment issue when there was no evidence that he was
confused or that he purported to object to the assessment or collection of taxes. But the record
simply shows BAC’s counsel and the trial court repeatedly attempting to explain to plaintiff that
BAC had no power to alter plaintiff’s property description or deed and was merely the entity that
determined the assessed value of his property for taxation purposes, while plaintiff continued to
insist that BAC altered his property description. We see no viable claim for relief as to this issue.
Throughout his brief on appeal, plaintiff raises several arguments in which he appears to
be contending that BAC improperly relied on the trial court’s August 2023 order from the
underlying Alpena Co case in determining his property’s dimensions when that order did not
contain the dimensions used by BAC. Again, plaintiff’s property claims against BAC are
unfounded and misguided, as BAC did not alter or purport to alter the legal dimensions of his
property; instead, BAC simply performed a tax assessment on plaintiff’s property and only acted
in plaintiff’s favor by lowering his property taxes as a result of that assessment. In any event, the
August 2023 order stated that Geronimo Road was “hereby declared a public highway established
by user, pursuant to MCL 221.20,” which provides that such highways “shall be 4 rods,” or 66
feet, in width. MCL 221.20. Here, BAC decreased the taxable area by one-half the width of the
road, i.e., the 33-foot-wide portion of Geronimo Road that the Road Commission had quieted title

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for in the underlying case. Plaintiff’s many arguments about BAC’s reliance on the August 2023
order do not demonstrate a viable claim for relief.
Plaintiff contends that BAC used the trial court’s August 2023 order “to justify land seizure
threats and contempt against” him, and that the trial court went along with BAC’s arguments,
thereby violating the court’s own prior approaches to boundary disputes. As discussed, however,
BAC did not seize any land from plaintiff, nor did it ever threaten to do so. And the contempt
plaintiff refers to arose from the underlying Alpena Co case, with which BAC was entirely
uninvolved. These arguments do not betray any error in the trial court’s disposition of the instant
matter and the motions presented therein.
Plaintiff next argues that the trial court did not make proper factual findings when ruling
on defendants’ motions for summary disposition. But, in doing so, plaintiff improperly relies on
MCR 2.517(A)(1), which pertains to a court’s factual findings in a bench trial—something that
never occurred in this case. And regardless, the record before us demonstrates that the trial court
thoroughly explained its factual findings either in its written orders granting summary disposition
or at the motion hearings when ruling on each of defendants’ motions.
Plaintiff also asserts that the trial court “disrespected” this Court’s authority at BAC’s
motion hearing when it allegedly dismissed the importance of plaintiff’s appeals in both the
underlying Alpena Co case and this case.5 Plaintiff argues, somewhat unclearly, that the trial court
was not showing adequate deference to this Court at the hearing. But the record reflects that the
trial court was merely explaining to plaintiff why the appellate proceedings did not affect its ruling
on BAC’s motion. Specifically, the court explained to plaintiff that his various appeals to this
Court did not stay the proceedings; that plaintiff should (and could) have requested a stay of
proceedings from the court; and that because plaintiff never made such a request, the court was
obligated to issue a ruling on BAC’s motion for summary disposition, despite plaintiff’s appeals
to this Court. The trial court retained jurisdiction over the pending proceedings against BAC that
were not the subject of plaintiff’s appeals. See Bass v Combs, 238 Mich App 16, 24-25; 604 NW2d
727 (1999), overruled in part on other grounds by Dimmitt & Owen Financial, Inc v Deloitte &
Touche (ISC), LLC, 481 Mich 618, 628; 752 NW2d 37 (2008). We see no error or grounds for
relief as to this issue.
5 This Court denied several of plaintiff’s attempts to appeal, either via claims of appeal or
applications for leave to appeal, through various non-final orders issued in this case while the
lower-court proceedings were still ongoing. See Tadajewski v Berg Assessing & Consulting, Inc,
unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered April 16, 2026 (Docket No. 378127);
Tadajewski v Berg Assessing & Consulting, Inc, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals,
entered April 16, 2026 (Docket No. 377961); Tadajewski v Berg Assessing & Consulting, Inc,
unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered April 16, 2026 (Docket No. 377852);
Tadajewski v Berg Assessing & Consulting, Inc, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals,
entered November 4, 2025 (Docket No. 377727); Tadajewski v Berg Assessing & Consulting, Inc,
unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered October 14, 2025 (Docket Nos. 377551;
377578).

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Finally, plaintiff accuses the trial court of judicial misconduct resulting in the violation of
his constitutional right to due process. At bottom, this claim is primarily based on a reiteration of
the other arguments plaintiff raises on appeal, all of which are, for the reasons discussed above,
without merit. And more generally, the record before us is devoid of any evidence of “a deep-
seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible” and that would be
sufficient to overcome the “heavy presumption of judicial impartiality.” Kern v Kern-Koskela,
320 Mich App 212, 231-232; 905 NW2d 453 (2017) (quotation marks and citations omitted).
In sum, plaintiff has not demonstrated reversible error in any of the issues he raises on
appeal. Accordingly, reversal of the trial court’s summary-disposition rulings is unwarranted.6
III. DOCKET NO. 378658
As with the trial court’s summary-disposition rulings, plaintiff raises a litany of challenges
to the trial court’s order awarding monetary sanctions to the Road Commission defendants. Here
too, we do not see grounds for relief in plaintiff’s challenges.
A. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
As discussed, the trial court awarded costs and attorney fees under MCL 600.2591 to the
Road Commission defendants after concluding that plaintiff’s claims against them were frivolous.
“A trial court’s finding that an action is frivolous is reviewed for clear error.” Kitchen v Kitchen,
465 Mich 654, 661; 641 NW2d 245 (2002). “A decision is clearly erroneous where, although there
is evidence to support it, the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been made.” Id. at 661-662. “The reasonableness of the fees awarded is . . . reviewed
for an abuse of discretion, and any underlying questions of law are reviewed de novo.” Lakeside
Retreats, LLC v Camp No Counselors, LLC, 340 Mich App 79, 89; 985 NW2d 225 (2022).
B. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff argues that the trial court erroneously granted sanctions to the Road Commission
defendants without ever resolving the boundary dispute. But the entire point of the Road
Commission defendants’ motion for summary disposition—and, ultimately, their request for
monetary sanctions—was that the boundary dispute was at issue in the underlying Alpena Co case
6 On appeal, plaintiff also raises arguments about a purported conspiracy to hide allegedly
damaging admissions made by BAC and to impair plaintiff’s rights, and about an alleged attempt
by BAC’s counsel to obstruct plaintiff’s appellate rights. Plaintiff, however, did not preserve these
arguments below, and has thereby waived appellate review of them. See In re Doe, 350 Mich App
1, 9; 29 NW3d 499 (2024) (“In civil cases, under the ‘raise or waive’ rule of appellate review, a
litigant must generally preserve an issue for appellate review by raising it before the trial court.”).
We note, however, that from what we can glean of these arguments, we do not see any merit or
basis for relief as to them.

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and that, as a result, res judicata barred plaintiff’s current lawsuit against them. There was no need
for the trial court to readdress the merits of that boundary dispute in order to properly conclude
that plaintiff’s current lawsuit was frivolous. And contrary to plaintiff’s assertion, the trial court’s
August 2023 order in the underlying case, which did resolve the boundary dispute, was itself
adequately supported as well, and was signed and entered into the record. See MCR 2.602.
Plaintiff also argues that the trial court’s August 2023 order did not authorize plowing a
100-by-275-foot area and that the court’s “tacit acceptance of unauthorized plowing endorsed
unlawful trespass.” Plaintiff did raise, by way of his complaint, an issue regarding snowplowing
going beyond the right-of-way. But his trespass claim regarding this plowing was based on MCL
750.377a and MCL 750.522, which are a penal statute and a repealed statute under the penal code,
respectively. Nor does plaintiff explain why the sanctions order would be reversibly erroneous
based solely on this claim, given the many other claims made in his complaint that the Road
Commission defendants had to defend against as well. See Wilson v Taylor, 457 Mich 232, 243;
577 NW2d 100 (1998) (noting that a party may not simply “announce a position or assert an error
and then leave it up to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for his claims, or unravel
and elaborate for him his arguments, and then search for authority either to sustain or reject his
position”) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Plaintiff next argues that the trial court improperly relied on attorney-fee invoices with
some redacted information and “on conversations outside the case” when determining the amount
of the costs and fees award. But plaintiff does not explain, nor is it apparent from the existing
record, what conversations “outside the case” the trial court relied on. See id. As for the submitted
billing records, the only redactions they contained were those pertaining to the names of nonparty
individuals with whom counsel conferred. Relatedly, plaintiff argues that “Michigan precedent
establishes that attorney fee awards must be supported by lawful authority and detailed
documentation,” but the award at issue was duly grounded in the law and the documentation
supporting it was very detailed and adequately indicated the nature of the work that was performed.
Plaintiff’s broad and general argument that there were “redactions” is insufficient to warrant any
appellate relief. See id.
Next, plaintiff argues that the trial court should have conducted a hearing regarding his
objections to the proposed fee award and that, without such a hearing having been held, it was
unclear whether the court even reviewed the pertinent briefs. Plaintiff, however, waived these
issues when he affirmatively stated below that the scheduled “December 16[, 2025] hearing,”
which was initially scheduled to address plaintiff’s objections, “must be canceled and void.” See
The Cadle Co v City of Kentwood, 285 Mich App 240, 254-255; 776 NW2d 145 (2009).
Furthermore, the record reflects that the trial court allowed plaintiff to raise his objections at the
motion hearing, and accepted and considered plaintiff’s additional written objections, prior to
issuing its order awarding $46,334 in costs and fees to the Road Commission defendants. Plaintiff
has shown no viable basis for relief as to these issues.
Finally, plaintiff contends that the trial court should not have allowed the Road
Commission defendants to file a motion for costs and fees because the order granting summary
disposition to BAC was a final order that closed the case. But “there can be more than one final
judgment or order in an action,” and “[a]n order to allow attorney fees after entry of an order

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disposing of the meritorious question is one of the specific circumstances where separate final
orders are recognized.” Avery v Demetropoulos, 209 Mich App 500, 503; 531 NW2d 720 (1994).
Plaintiff has not demonstrated reversible error as to any of these issues. We therefore see
no basis to disrupt the trial court’s order awarding $46,334 in costs and fees to the Road
Commission defendants as a monetary sanction against plaintiff.7
Affirmed.
/s/ Philip P. Mariani
/s/ Kathleen A. Feeney
/s/ Christopher M. Trebilcock
7 We note that, in the course of opposing the trial court’s award of monetary sanctions to the Road
Commission defendants, plaintiff raises arguments about the content, terms, and continuing effect
of the August 2023 order, as well as what constitutes the controlling document for purposes of the
right of way. Many of these arguments overlap with arguments he makes in opposing the trial
court’s award of summary disposition to defendants (discussed supra), and they all, at bottom,
attempt to relitigate the right-of-way issue that (as the trial court explained) had already been
decided in the underlying Alpena Co case. To the extent these arguments might have any proper
bearing on the trial court’s award of monetary sanctions to the Road Commission defendants, we
see no merit or basis for relief as to them.
Additionally, plaintiff failed to raise below—and has thus waived appellate review of—his
arguments about the trial court’s signature, the Road Commission defendants’ responses to his
objections, the court clerk’s maintenance of the register of actions, and the court’s labeling of the
two final orders. See Doe, 350 Mich App at 9. We note, however, that from what we can glean
of these arguments, we see no merit or basis for relief as to any of them, either.

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