COA 367742 KATHRYN TEETS V WYANDOTTE PUBLIC SCHOOLS Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 1/9/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
KATHRYN TEETS, LISA BECK, and MELISSA
WAARA,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
UNPUBLISHED
January 09, 2026
1:24 PM
v No. 367742
Wayne Circuit Court
WYANDOTTE PUBLIC SCHOOLS, CITY OF
WYANDOTTE, WYANDOTTE BOARD OF
EDUCATION, WYANDOTTE CITY COUNCIL,
ROBERT A. DESANA, T-MOBILE CENTRAL
LLC, CATHERINE M. COST, KENNETH LAUB,
JESUS PLASENCIA, GREGORY J. MAYHEW,
MICHAEL SWIECKI, CYNTHIA KINNEY,
STEPHANIE MIELLO, KATHRYN BEDIKIAN,
DANA BROWNING, ROBERT KIRBY, PATRICK
SUTKA, THERESA CRNKOVICH, KATHLEEN
KANE, CAROLYN MARTINEZ, FRANK
TARNOWSKI, and KELLY WEBBER,
LC No. 23-006960-AW
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: GADOLA, C.J., and CAMERON and RICK, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiffs appeal the trial court’s orders granting summary disposition to defendants under
MCR 2.116(C)(7) (governmental immunity) and (C)(8) (failure to state a claim). We affirm.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This case involves plaintiffs’ challenge to a contract between T-Mobile Central LLC and
the Wyandotte School District. The contract allowed T-Mobile to lease space on the Washington
Elementary School building and install a wireless communications facility. Plaintiffs, who live
near the school, objected to the installation. They believed exposure to wireless radiation could
cause or exacerbate medical problems and diseases, and alleged that the equipment interfered with

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their quiet enjoyment of their properties and decreased the values of their homes. Plaintiffs
eventually filed suit alleging nuisance per se and private nuisance. After an unsuccessful attempt
to move the matter to federal court, various defendants moved for summary disposition in the trial
court, which it granted. Plaintiff now appeals.
II. JURISDICTION
As a preliminary matter, while the parties do not challenge this Court’s jurisdiction in this
case, “[t]he question of jurisdiction is always within the scope of this Court’s review[.]” Walsh v
Taylor, 263 Mich App 618, 622; 689 NW2d 506 (2004). Plaintiffs filed an appeal as of right in
this case from the trial court’s two orders granting the two motions for summary disposition filed
in this case. But not all of the defendants in this case were represented in the two motions for
summary disposition brought before the trial court. Defendants the city of Wyandotte, the
Wyandotte City Council, Robert Desana, Jesus Plasencia, and Gregory Mayhew did not move for
summary disposition. Thus, while the trial court’s order indicates it dismissed plaintiff’s claims
“as to all matters” and is a final order that closes the case, plaintiffs’ claims against the above
defendants have not been specifically addressed or resolved by the trial court.
This Court has “jurisdiction of an appeal of right filed by an aggrieved party from” a final
judgment or order “as defined in MCR 7.202(6)[.]” MCR 7.203(A)(1). A final judgment or order
includes “the first judgment or order that disposes of all the claims and adjudicates the rights and
liabilities of all the parties[.]” MCR 7.202(6)(a)(i). Because neither order granting summary
disposition directly provides for the dismissal of the above defendants, and “[t]rial courts speak
through their written judgments and orders[,]” Seifeddine v Jaber, 327 Mich App 514, 523; 934
NW2d 64 (2019), neither order is a final order, and this Court does not have jurisdiction over this
claim of appeal. But, in the interest of judicial economy, this Court chooses to exercise its
discretion to treat this appeal as being on leave granted. Wardell v Hincka, 297 Mich App 127,
133 n 1; 822 NW2d 278 (2012).
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s determination on a motion for summary
disposition as well as the legal question of whether a party has standing to sue.” UAW v Central
Mich Univ Trustees, 295 Mich App 486, 493; 815 NW2d 132 (2012). “In reviewing a motion for
summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(5), this Court must consider the pleadings,
depositions, admissions, affidavits, and other documentary evidence submitted by the parties.” Id.
(quotation marks and citation omitted).1
1 We recognize that the motions for summary disposition in this case invoked MCR 2.116(C)(7)
and (C)(8), while dismissal on the basis of standing falls under MCR 2.116(C)(5). But “[a] trial
court is not necessarily constrained by the subrule under which a party moves for summary
disposition. It is well settled that, where a party brings a motion for summary disposition under
the wrong subrule, a trial court may proceed under the appropriate subrule if neither party is
misled.” Computer Network, Inc v AM Gen Corp, 265 Mich App 309, 312; 696 NW2d 49 (2005).

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IV. ANALYSIS
Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in determining they did not have standing. We
disagree.
Generally, “a litigant has standing whenever there is a legal cause of action.” Lansing Sch
Ed Ass’n v Lansing Bd of Ed, 487 Mich 349, 372; 792 NW3d 686 (2010). Plaintiffs allege the
wireless communications facility is a nuisance per se because it violates Wyandotte’s zoning code.
A building’s use in violation of a zoning ordinance constitutes a nuisance per se under the
Michigan Zoning Enabling Act (MZEA), MCL 125.3101 et seq. MCL 125.3407. But the statute
requires the legislative body to designate a public official who will enforce the ordinance. Id. See
also Sakorafos v Charter Twp of Lyon, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2023) (Docket
No. 362192); slip op at 5-6. The designated public official would have standing to enforce the
purported public nuisance. An individual, on the other hand, typically lacks standing to enforce
an ordinance involving an alleged public nuisance. Towne v Harr, 185 Mich App 230, 232; 460
NW2d 596 (1990). Thus, to the extent plaintiffs claim they have standing because of any alleged
zoning ordinance violations, their argument fails.
However, a private citizen may bring an action to abate a nuisance arising from the
violation of a zoning ordinance if they show “damages of a special character distinct and different
from the injury suffered by the public generally.” Ansell v Delta Co Planning Comm, 332 Mich
App 451, 461; 957 NW2d 47 (2020).
To demonstrate that they can show damages of a special character, id., plaintiffs focus on
the alleged health risks caused by radio frequency radiation. In this respect, they rely on an
affidavit from their expert attesting that radio frequency radiation causes serious health risks, and
that the Federal Communication Commission’s (FCC) wireless radiation exposure emission limit
was too low. But plaintiffs, on appeal, “stress that they do not challenge the adequacy of the FCC
emission guidelines for wireless radiation[.]” Plaintiffs cannot concede that the FCC guidelines
are adequate while simultaneously claiming special damages by way of radio frequency radiation
from a facility that adheres to those same guidelines. As for the other alleged damages plaintiffs
raised below regarding aesthetics and property value depreciation, they make no arguments
relating to either of these points on appeal. Consequently, plaintiffs have abandoned these
arguments. See, e.g., Chen v Wayne State Univ, 284 Mich App 172, 206-207; 771 NW2d 820
(2009) (a party who fails to argue an issue on appeal abandons it). Plaintiffs have not identified
Moreover, while the trial court did not correct the parties by granting summary disposition on the
basis of standing under the correct subrule, “[a]n order granting summary disposition under the
wrong subrule may be reviewed under the correct one.” Energy Reserves, Inc v Consumers Power
Co, 221 Mich App 210, 216; 561 NW2d 854 (1997). Despite the parties and trial court using the
wrong court rule, as will be addressed below, summary disposition was warranted under
MCR 2.116(C)(5).

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any other “damages of a special character” that would endow them with standing. Ansell, 332
Mich App at 461. Because plaintiffs lacked standing, the trial court correctly dismissed the case.2
Affirmed. But because the trial court’s orders did not properly address some of the
defendants addressed above, we remand for the trial court to do so. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Michael F. Gadola
/s/ Thomas C. Cameron
/s/ Michelle M. Rick
2 Because plaintiffs lacked standing to sue, we need not consider the other issues they raise on
appeal.

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