COA 369895 WALTER LOVE V LASHAWN RUDOLPH Opinion - Authored - Published 12/18/2025

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
WALTER LOVE,
Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellee,
and
THRIVE PHYSICAL THERAPY LLC,
Intervening Plaintiff,
FOR PUBLICATION
December 18, 2025
1:57 PM
v No. 369895
Wayne Circuit Court
LASHAWN RUDOLPH, LC No. 22-005380-NI
Defendant/Cross-Appellee,
and
ALLSTATE PROPERTY AND CASUALTY
INSURANCE COMPANY and ALLSTATE
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendants/Cross-Defendants/Cross-
Appellees,
and
AUTO CLUB GROUP INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant/Cross-Defendant-
Appellant/Cross-Appellee,
and
THE HANOVER INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant/Cross-Defendant/Cross-
Appellant,
and

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STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant/Cross-Defendant/Cross-
Appellee,
and
FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE,
Defendant/Cross-Plaintiff/Cross-
Appellee,
and
CITIZENS INSURANCE COMPANY OF THE
MIDWEST,
Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
Before: ACKERMAN, P.J., and BORRELLO and LETICA, JJ.
BORRELLO, J.
This appeal is before this Court pursuant to our Supreme Court’s order remanding this
matter for consideration as on leave granted. Love v Auto Club Group Ins Co, ___ Mich ___; 16
NW3d 738 (2025). The issues before us involve a priority dispute under the no-fault act, MCL
500.3101 et seq., among multiple insurance companies stemming from an accident involving a
motorcycle and multiple motor vehicles. Defendant Auto Club Group Insurance Company appeals
the trial court’s orders denying summary disposition in favor of Auto Club on plaintiff’s claims
and defendant Farmers Insurance Exchange’s cross-claims under MCR 2.116(C)(10) based on the
court’s conclusion that Auto Club was within the order of priority under MCL 500.3114(5) and
had failed to establish that Auto Club satisfied the exclusion provided by MCL 500.3114(6).
Defendants Citizens Insurance Company of the Midwest and The Hanover Insurance Company
cross appeal the trial court’s orders denying summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) on the
issue whether the Volkswagen Jetta identified in the police report as Unit 3 was involved in the
accident for purposes of MCL 500.3114(5). For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
This case arises out of an accident involving a motorcycle and multiple motor vehicles. On
May 27, 2021, plaintiff was operating his motorcycle and attempting to merge onto the highway.
According to the police report, as one vehicle slowed to allow plaintiff to merge, another vehicle
approaching from behind failed to slow down and rear-ended another vehicle, which initiated a
chain reaction of collisions. One vehicle collided with plaintiff’s motorcycle, throwing him off

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the motorcycle. In total, according to the police report, the crash involved plaintiff’s motorcycle
and five other vehicles.1
The vehicle that, according to the police report, failed to slow down and caused the first
rear-end collision of the chain, was driven by Lauren Greene. The vehicle was owned by Greene’s
mother, defendant Lashawn Rudolph. Rudolph indicated that Greene was driving the vehicle that
day with Rudolph’s permission. Rudolph and Greene did not live in the same household. Rudolph
was not married, and she lived by herself. Greene lived with her grandmother or great-
grandmother.
Rudolph had a policy of insurance for the vehicle issued by Auto Club. Rudolph elected
not to have unlimited personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits on her policy and instead elected
what was designated as “Option 4,” which provided as follows:
Rudolph selected Option 4 and specifically excluded herself from PIP coverage:
1 Recognizing that one of the issues presented on appeal is whether one of these vehicles was
“involved” for purposes of MCL 500.3114(5), our statement that the crash involved 5 motor
vehicles merely reflects that 5 motor vehicles collided in some sense during the overall incident in
which the plaintiff motorcyclist was injured and should not be understood as resolving the issue
whether any one of those vehicles in particular was legally “involved” for purposes of MCL
500.3114(5).

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Notably, Rudolph did not elect Option 6, which provided as follows:
Plaintiff brought this action against Rudolph, Allstate Property and Casualty Insurance
Company, Allstate Insurance Company, Auto Club, The Hanover Insurance Company, State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, and the Michigan Assigned Claims Plan and/or Michigan
Automobile Insurance Placement Facility (MACP/MAIPF). In his complaint, plaintiff asserted
negligence and owner’s liability claims against Rudolph, an underinsured motorist claim against
Allstate Property and Casualty as plaintiff’s insurer, and claims for first-party benefits under the
no-fault act against the named insurance companies and the MACP/MAIPF. The MAIPF/MACP
assigned the matter to Farmers Insurance Exchange, which was substituted for the MAIPF/MACP
as a party to the case.

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Thrive Physical Therapy sought to intervene as a plaintiff based on medical treatment it
provided to plaintiff. The motion to intervene was granted, and Thrive Physical Therapy’s claim
was subsequently dismissed due to a settlement between the parties.
Hanover moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10). Hanover first argued
that there was no evidence that the Volkswagen Jetta identified in the police report as Unit 3, which
was allegedly insured by Hanover, was involved in the motor vehicle accident at issue for purposes
of the applicable priority statute, MCL 500.3114(5). Hanover maintained that Unit 3 was not
involved in the accident for purposes of priority because it was not a cause of the accident and did
not contact plaintiff as the injured party. Additionally, Hanover argued that it was not otherwise
in the order of priority because the Jetta identified as Unit 3 was actually insured by Citizens
Insurance Company of the Midwest. Hanover submitted a copy of the declarations page for a
Citizens Policy purporting to cover the Jetta.
The driver of the Jetta was Grace Fifer. She gave a recorded statement describing the
accident in relevant part as follows:
Um, so I think I was going south. Yeah, I gotten onto the freeway, um, and I had
started to speed up and get over into the, like, the first lane. Um, and I noticed
everybody was kind of, um, slamming on their brakes, like, in front of me.
* * *
So I, I had, um, I had just looked in my rearview mirror, um, and there was
a white car coming, um, like, coming up behind me. Um, and I had kind of, like,
blinked my brakes, like, at him, like, to see if he would notice and slow down. . . .
* * *
So he’s coming behind me and I can tell that he’s coming, like, really fast.
So I was just taught to pull over to the side, you know, get out of the way. So that’s
what I did. I got off, um, off to the side as far as I could, um, and he c-, like, hit me
on the driver side, like the left side in the back. Um, he had just kinda clipped me.
And then from what I can remember, he hit the car then, like, in front of me, and
then it went off diagonally into the second, like, the middle lane, and hit, like, one
or two cars, and then it came back into my lane. And I, I know for a fact there was
a guy on a motorcycle who got hit, and I think the car in front of him. Um, and
then I just waited and called my parents and asked what to do. And, um, the police
showed up and they asked me what had happened, and I told them the same thing
I’m telling you.
Plaintiff testified about the accident in his deposition as follows:
Q. Okay. In your own words, can you describe how the accident happened
for me?
A. Not a whole lot. I don’t-- I think I was -- when the accident happened,
I was hit from behind and I got off the side of the freeway. I don’t remember a

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whole lot. I did get hit from behind. I don’t remember. Like I guess I had to be a
blackout and when I got up, I was on the side of the freeway.
Plaintiff testified that he was completely stopped when he was hit from behind. He did not
know how many vehicles actually contacted his motorcycle. Plaintiff did not know what vehicles
were involved in the accident, which vehicles may have caused the accident, how the accident was
caused, or which vehicle hit him.
Greene testified that the traffic was “heavy.” She described the accident as follows:
I was driving on Southfield, and -- I was driving on Southfield, and it was
really bad traffic. So I was stopped and traffic or the speed started to pick up a little
bit as we started to move. And as I’m moving, a car just like cuts me off completely
as if I’m about to get hit. So I got over, and there was a car stopped, and I hit the
back of them.
Greene did not see the motorcycle or which vehicle hit the motorcycle. Greene testified
that her vehicle did not hit the motorcycle.
Farmers opposed Hanover’s motion for summary disposition, arguing that there were
questions of material fact whether the Volkswagen Jetta was involved in the motor vehicle accident
for purposes of MCL 500.3114(5). Essentially relying on the description of the accident from the
police report, Farmers argued that the Jetta was involved in the accident because it was actively
involved in the collision chain when it was struck by another vehicle from behind and then set the
vehicle in motion that struck plaintiff. This established a causal nexus between the Jetta and
plaintiff’s injuries. The police report described the accident as follows:
All Units were S/B M-39 Fwy in stop and go traffic, Unit 4 was slowing/stopping
in right lane to allow Unit 5 to merge onto the fwy. Unit 1 in the right lane and
unable to slow/stop, rear ending Unit 2 at high speed. This caused Unit 2 to rear-
end /sideswipe unit 3 [the Jetta]. Unit 2 continued and rear-ending Unit 4. This
caused Unit 4 to rear-end Unit 5 (motorcycle). The driver of Unit 5 was thrown
from his motorcycle. Unit 2 continued in a[n] out[-]of[-]control skid into the left
lane, facing the wrong way. Unit 2 and Unit 6 crashed head-on. Unit 2 came to
rest in the right shoulder/lane facing the wrong way. Unit 1 ended up in the center
lane, completely disabled.
Plaintiff also opposed Hanover’s motion, similarly arguing that there was a question of
material fact whether the Jetta was involved in the accident. Plaintiff relied primarily on Fifer’s
statement that she actively hit her brakes to flash the brake lights and influence another vehicle
involved in the collision. Plaintiff further argued that the Jetta redirected the vehicle that hit it.
Plaintiff moved for summary disposition, arguing that he was entitled to no-fault benefits
from Farmers as the insurer assigned through the MACP. Farmers acknowledged that plaintiff
would be eligible for no-fault benefits from Farmers as the assigned servicing insurer because of
the ongoing priority dispute. However, Farmers argued that it had been attempting to resolve
plaintiff’s claims and that plaintiff was being uncooperative. Farmers further maintained that

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plaintiff had other coverage available. Farmers thus argued that plaintiff was not entitled to PIP
benefits from Farmers.
Auto Club moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (C)(10). Auto
Club argued that it was not in the order of priority under MCL 500.3114(5) because Rudolph had
elected to decline PIP allowable expense coverage in her insurance policy with Auto Club and
plaintiff was therefore prohibited from claiming under Rudolph’s policy pursuant to MCL
500.3114(6). Rudolph and Auto Club also filed a response in opposition to Hanover’s motion for
summary disposition based on the same argument.
Plaintiff opposed Auto Club’s motion for summary disposition. Plaintiff argued that Auto
Club’s policy documents showed that Rudolph had not elected to entirely opt out of PIP coverage.
Instead, Rudolph had selected a $250,000 coverage limit applicable to anyone not excluded and
then had specifically excluded only herself from PIP coverage.
State Farm filed a response agreeing that Auto Club was entitled to summary disposition
because Rudolph had declined all PIP coverage and opposing the other motions for summary
disposition because there remained genuine questions of fact regarding which vehicles were
involved in the accident for purposes of determining priority among the insurers.
Farmers filed a motion for leave to file a cross-complaint, arguing that it was entitled to
reimbursement for benefits paid on behalf of plaintiff against the higher order of priority insurers
pursuant to MCL 500.3172(6). The trial court granted leave for Farmers to file the cross-
complaint.
Hanover and Citizens responded with a joint pre-answer motion for summary disposition
on the cross-complaint. Hanover and Citizens argued that there was no claim against Citizens
because Citizens had not formally been named a defendant in the matter and that, regardless,
summary disposition in favor of Hanover and Citizens was warranted for the same reasons argued
in Hanover’s earlier motion for summary disposition. Auto Club also moved for summary
disposition regarding Farmers’ cross-complaint on the same basis asserted by Auto Club in its
earlier summary disposition motion regarding plaintiff’s complaint.
Following a hearing, the trial court granted in part and denied in part Hanover’s and
Citizens’ motions for summary disposition. The court granted summary disposition with respect
to the issue whether Hanover was in the order of priority and dismissed Hanover with prejudice as
a defendant in the matter. The court also granted plaintiff’s request for leave to amend the
complaint to add Citizens as a defendant. However, the trial court denied the motion with respect
to the issue whether the Volkswagen Jetta identified in the police report as Unit 3 was involved in
the accident for purposes of MCL 500.3114(5). Citizens was ordered to answer the cross-
complaint filed by Farmers. The trial court entered another order granting in part plaintiff’s motion
for summary disposition as to entitlement to no-fault benefits from Farmers. The order further
ordered Farmers to pay plaintiff no-fault benefits to which he was entitled and ordered plaintiff to
file an amended complaint adding Citizens instead of Hanover as a party.
The trial court denied Auto Club’s motions for summary disposition based on its
conclusion that the coverage option selected by Rudolph only excluded Rudolph from PIP

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coverage and provided up to $250,000 others claiming under the policy such that Auto Club
remained in the order of priority under MCL 500.3114(5) and did not satisfy the exclusion
provided by MCL 500.3114(6).
The trial court subsequently entered an order staying the proceedings while appellate
remedies were pursued. This Court denied the application for leave to appeal, although Chief
Judge GADOLA indicated that he would have granted leave. Love v Rudolph, unpublished order of
the Court of Appeals, entered July 17, 2024 (Docket No. 369895). The Michigan Supreme Court
subsequently entered an order stating, “in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we REMAND this case
to the Court of Appeals for consideration as on leave granted.” Love, ___ Mich ___. Plaintiff’s
claim against Rudolph was dismissed with prejudice in accordance with a release executed by
plaintiff. Citizens and Hanover filed a joint claim of cross-appeal.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition de novo.
Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 118; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). Summary disposition is warranted
under MCR 2.116(C)(10) if “[e]xcept as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment or partial judgment as a matter of
law.” “A genuine issue of material fact exists when the record, giving the benefit of reasonable
doubt to the opposing party, leaves open an issue upon which reasonable minds might differ.”
West v Gen Motors Corp, 469 Mich 177, 183; 665 NW2d 468 (2003). Questions of statutory
interpretation are also reviewed de novo on appeal. Mich Ass’n of Home Builders v City of Troy,
504 Mich 204, 212; 934 NW2d 713 (2019).
III. PRIORITY – INSURED’S ELECTION TO EXCLUDE PIP COVERAGE
On appeal, Auto Club maintains that it is not in the order of priority applicable to an injured
motorcyclist involved in a motor vehicle accident set forth in MCL 500.3114(5) because Auto
Club’s insured, Rudolph, had elected to decline PIP coverage in her policy pursuant to MCL
500.3109a(2) and such policies are excluded from the order of priority set forth in MCL
500.3114(5) by operation of MCL 500.3114(6).
MCL 500.3114 provides in relevant part as follows:
(5) Subject to subsections (6) and (7), a person who suffers accidental bodily
injury arising from a motor vehicle accident that shows evidence of the involvement
of a motor vehicle while an operator or passenger of a motorcycle shall claim
personal protection insurance benefits from insurers in the following order of
priority:
(a) The insurer of the owner or registrant of the motor vehicle involved in
the accident.
(b) The insurer of the operator of the motor vehicle involved in the accident.
(c) The motor vehicle insurer of the operator of the motorcycle involved in
the accident.

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(d) The motor vehicle insurer of the owner or registrant of the motorcycle
involved in the accident.
(6) If an applicable insurance policy in an order of priority under subsection
(5) is a policy for which the person named in the policy has elected to not maintain
coverage for personal protection insurance benefits under section 3107d, or as to
which an exclusion under section 3109(2) applies, the injured person shall claim
benefits only under other policies, subject to subsection (7), in the same order of
priority for which no such election has been made. If there are no other policies for
which no such election has been made, the injured person shall claim benefits under
the next order of priority or, if there is not a next order of priority, under the
assigned claims plan under sections 3171 to 3175.
(7) If personal protection insurance benefits are payable under subsection
(5) under 2 or more insurance policies in the same order of priority, the benefits are
only payable up to an aggregate coverage limit that equals the highest available
coverage limit under any 1 of the policies.
Here, Auto Club’s insured, Rudolph, was the owner of a motor vehicle involved in the
accident and Auto Club argues that she had elected a policy with no PIP coverage. The issue is
whether plaintiff as the injured motorcyclist is prohibited from claiming benefits from Auto Club
by operation of MCL 500.3114(6).
Resolution of this issue presents a question of statutory interpretation because PIP benefits
“are mandated by statute under the no-fault act, MCL 500.3105; MSA 24.13105, and, therefore,
the statute is the ‘rule book’ for deciding the issues involved in questions regarding awarding those
benefits.” Meemic Ins Co v Fortson, 506 Mich 287, 298; 954 NW2d 115 (2020). “The role of this
Court in interpreting statutory language is to ascertain the legislative intent that may reasonably
be inferred from the words in a statute.” Mich Ass’n of Home Builders, 504 Mich at 212 (quotation
marks and citation omitted). Clear and unambiguous statutory language must be applied as
written. Id. “Proper statutory interpretation requires: (1) reading the statute as a whole, (2) reading
its words and phrases in the context of the entire legislative scheme, (3) while considering both
the plain meaning of the critical words and phrases along with their placement and purpose within
the statutory scheme, and (4) interpreting the statutory provisions in harmony with the entire
statutory scheme.” Nyman v Thomson Reuters Holdings, Inc, 329 Mich App 539, 544; 942 NW2d
696 (2019).
Under MCL 500.3114(6), an applicable insurance policy in the order of priority under
MCL 500.3114(5) becomes excluded from the order of priority if it “is a policy for which the
person named in the policy has elected to not maintain coverage for personal protection insurance
benefits under section 3107d, or as to which an exclusion under section 3109(2) applies.” MCL
500.3114(6).
Turning to the first of these possible situations, MCL 500.3107d(1) provides as follows:
For an insurance policy that provides the security required under section
3101(1) and is issued or renewed after July 1, 2020, the applicant or named insured

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may, in a way required under section 3107e and on a form approved by the director,
elect to not maintain coverage for personal protection insurance benefits payable
under section 3107(1)(a) if the applicant or named insured is a qualified person,
and if the applicant’s or named insured’s spouse and any relative of either that
resides in the same household have qualified health coverage or have coverage for
benefits payable under section 3107(1)(a) from an insurer that provides the security
required by section 3101(1).
MCL 500.31012 provides in relevant part:
(1) Except as provided in sections 3107d and 3109a, the owner or registrant
of a motor vehicle required to be registered in this state shall maintain security for
payment of benefits under personal protection insurance and property protection
insurance as required under this chapter, and residual liability insurance. Security
is only required to be in effect during the period the motor vehicle is driven or
moved on a highway.
(2) Except as provided in section 3107d, all automobile insurance policies
offered in this state must include benefits under personal protection insurance, and
property protection insurance as provided in this chapter, and residual liability
insurance.
MCL 500.3107(1)(a) provides in relevant part that “[s]ubject to the exceptions and
limitations in this chapter, . . personal protection insurance benefits are payable for . . . [a]llowable
expenses consisting of reasonable charges incurred for reasonably necessary products, services
and accommodations for an injured person’s care, recovery, or rehabilitation.”
With respect to the conditions for eligibility to decline PIP coverage under MCL
500.3107d, subsection (7) provides in pertinent part:
(7) As used in this section:
* * *
(b) “Qualified health coverage” means either of the following:
(i) Other health or accident coverage to which both of the following apply:
(A) The coverage does not exclude or limit coverage for injuries related to
motor vehicle accidents.
(B) Any annual deductible for the coverage is $6,000.00 or less per
individual. The director shall adjust the amount in this sub-subparagraph on July 1
2 The recent amendment to this statute did not involve any changes to subsections (1) or (2), which
are the only subsections relevant to the issue presented on appeal. See 2024 PA 224.

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of each year by the percentage change in the medical component of the Consumer
Price Index for the preceding calendar year. However, the director shall not make
the adjustment unless the adjustment, or the total of the adjustment and previous
unadded adjustments, is $500.00 or more.
(ii) Coverage under parts A and B of the federal Medicare program
established under subchapter XVIII of the social security act, 42 USC 1395 to
1395lll.
(c) “Qualified person” means a person who has qualified health coverage
under subdivision (b)(ii).
Furthermore, MCL 500.3107d(5) provides that an “election under this section applies to
the applicant or named insured, the applicant or named insured’s spouse, a relative of either
domiciled in the same household, and any other person who would have had a right to claim
personal protection insurance benefits under the policy but for the election.”
Reading the above statutory provisions together, it is evident that under MCL
500.3107d(1), the named insured may decline PIP coverage for allowable expenses if the named
insured is “a qualified person,” meaning the named insured has health coverage under parts A and
B of Medicare, and if household relatives also have the described required other coverage. MCL
500.3107d(1), (7)(b)(ii), and (7)(c); MCL 500.3107(1)(a).
Here, as Auto Club agrees, the record shows that Rudolph elected “Option 4” and
specifically excluded herself from PIP coverage. The PIP coverage elections documents expressly
stated that a named insured could only exclude PIP coverage pursuant to this option if the named
insured had qualified health coverage that was not Medicare. Moreover, Auto Club also attached
a letter to its motion for summary disposition that purported to indicate that Rudolph had health
insurance through her employer, and Auto Club admits that there is “no evidence that Rudolph has
Medicare Parts A and B.” The record reflects that Rudolph did not elect “Option 6,” which appears
from the election documents to be the option that mirrors the opt-out provision set forth in MCL
500.3107d(1). Accordingly, the record does not indicate that the opt-out provision in MCL
500.3107d(1) is applicable in this case because Rudolph did not purport to choose it and would
not have been eligible to choose it.
The second scenario provided by MCL 500.3114(6), pursuant to which an insurance policy
may be excluded from the order of priority, requires application of “an exclusion under section
3109(2).” This statutory cross-reference appears to be a typographical error, and it appears that
the properly intended statutory citation is MCL 500.3109a(2). MCL 500.3109(2) states, “An
injured person is a natural person suffering accidental bodily injury.” More on point, however, is
MCL 500.3109a,3 which provides in relevant part as follows:
3 Under the interpretive doctrine of “scrivener’s error,” the “totality of context” may be given
“precedence over a single word” when “on the very face of the statute it is clear to the reader that

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(1) An insurer that provides personal protection insurance benefits under
this chapter may offer deductibles and exclusions reasonably related to other health
and accident coverage on the insured. Any deductibles and exclusions offered under
this section must be offered at a reduced premium that reflects reasonably
anticipated reductions in losses, expenses, or both, are subject to prior approval by
the director, and must apply only to benefits payable to the person named in the
policy, the spouse of the insured, and any relative of either domiciled in the same
household.
(2) For an insurance policy issued or renewed after July 1, 2020, the insurer
shall offer to an applicant or named insured that selects a personal protection
benefit limit under section 3107c(1)(b) an exclusion related to qualified health
coverage. All of the following apply to that exclusion:
(a) If the named insured has qualified health coverage as defined in section
3107d(7)(b)(i) that will cover injuries that occur as the result of a motor vehicle
accident and if the named insured’s spouse and any relatives of either the named
insured or the spouse domiciled in the same household have qualified health
coverage that will cover injuries that occur as the result of a motor vehicle accident,
the premium for the personal protection insurance benefits payable under section
3107(1)(a) under the policy must be reduced by 100%.
(b) If a member, but not all members, of the household covered by the
insurance policy has qualified health coverage that will cover injuries that occur as
the result of a motor vehicle accident, the insurer shall offer a reduced premium
that reflects reasonably anticipated reductions in losses, expenses, or both. The
reduction must be in addition to the rate rollback required by section 2111f and the
share of the premium reduction for the policy attributable to any person with
qualified health coverage must be 100%.
(c) Subject to subdivision (d), a person subject to an exclusion under this
subsection is not eligible for personal protection benefits under the insurance
policy.
(d) If a person subject to an exclusion under this subsection is no longer
covered by the qualified health coverage, the named insured shall notify the insurer
that the named insured or resident relative is no longer eligible for an exclusion. All
of the following apply under this subdivision:
(i) The named insured shall, within 30 days after the effective date of the
termination of the qualified health coverage, obtain insurance that provides the
a mistake of expression (rather than of legislative wisdom) has been made.” Oshtemo Charter
Twp v Kalamazoo Co Rd Comm, 288 Mich App 296, 303; 792 NW2d 401 (2010).

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security required under section 3101(1) that includes coverage that was excluded
under this subsection.
(ii) During the period described in subparagraph (i), if any person excluded
suffers accidental bodily injury arising from a motor vehicle accident, the person is
entitled to claim benefits under the assigned claims plan.
(e) If the named insured does not obtain insurance that provides the security
required under section 3101(1) that includes the coverage excluded under this
subsection during the period described in subdivision (d)(i) and the named insured
or any person excluded under the policy suffers accidental bodily injury arising
from a motor vehicle accident, unless the injured person is entitled to coverage
under some other policy, the injured person is not entitled to be paid personal
protection insurance benefits under section 3107(1)(a) for the injury that occurred
during the period in which coverage under this section was excluded. [Emphasis
added.]
MCL 500.3107c provides in relevant part as follows:
(1) Except as provided in sections 3107d and 3109a, and subject to
subsection (5), for an insurance policy that provides the security required under
section 3101(1) and is issued or renewed after July 1, 2020, the applicant or named
insured shall, in a way required under section 3107e and on a form approved by the
director, select 1 of the following coverage levels for personal protection insurance
benefits under section 3107(1)(a):
(a) A limit of $50,000.00 per individual per loss occurrence for any personal
protection insurance benefits under section 3107(1)(a). The selection of a limit
under this subdivision is only available to an applicant or named insured if both of
the following apply:
(i) The applicant or named insured is enrolled in Medicaid, as that term is
defined in section 3157.
(ii) The applicant’s or named insured’s spouse and any relative of either
who resides in the same household has qualified health coverage, as that term is
defined in section 3107d, is enrolled in Medicaid, or has coverage for the payment
of benefits under section 3107(1)(a) from an insurer that provides the security
required by section 3101(1).
(b) A limit of $250,000.00 per individual per loss occurrence for any
personal protection insurance benefits under section 3107(1)(a).
(c) A limit of $500,000.00 per individual per loss occurrence for any
personal protection insurance benefits under section 3107(1)(a).
(d) No limit for personal protection insurance benefits under section
3107(1)(a).

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(2) The form required under subsection (1) must do all of the following:
(a) State, in a conspicuous manner, the benefits and risks associated with
each coverage option.
(b) Provide a way for the applicant or named insured to mark the form to
acknowledge that he or she has read the form and understands the options available.
(c) Allow the applicant or named insured to mark the form to make the
selection of coverage level under subsection (1).
(d) Require the applicant or named insured to sign the form.
(3) If an insurance policy is issued or renewed as described in subsection
(1) and the applicant or named insured has not made an effective selection under
subsection (1) but a premium or premium installment has been paid, there is a
rebuttable presumption that the amount of the premium or installment paid
accurately reflects the level of coverage applicable to the policy under subsection
(1).
(4) If an insurance policy is issued or renewed as described in subsection
(1), the applicant or named insured has not made an effective selection under
subsection (1), and a presumption under subsection (3) does not apply, subsection
(1)(d) applies to the policy.
(5) The coverage level selected under subsection (1) applies to the named
insured, the named insured’s spouse, and a relative of either domiciled in the same
household, and any other person with a right to claim personal protection
insurance benefits under the policy.
(6) If benefits are payable under section 3107(1)(a) under 2 or more
insurance policies, the benefits are only payable up to an aggregate coverage limit
that equals the highest available coverage limit under any 1 of the policies.
[Emphasis added.]
To answer the question at issue in this case whether a given policy is excluded under MCL
500.3114(6) from the order of priority in MCL 500.3114(5) because of an exclusion under MCL
500.3109a(2), it is necessary to start at the beginning of the statutory scheme and more succinctly
follow the precise elections made by the named insured in obtaining the policy at issue. Following
this process, the answer becomes clear.
First, MCL 500.3101(1) requires motor vehicle owners to maintain the security required
by the no-fault act, “[e]xcept as provided in sections 3107d and 3109a.” Next, MCL 500.3107c(1)
requires the applicant or named insured for an insurance policy providing the required no-fault
insurance to select one of the four coverage levels listed in § 3107c(1) for PIP benefits payable for
allowable expenses. Section 3107c(1) further provides that the selection is “subject to subsection
(5)” and, again, that the exceptions “in sections 3107d and 3109a” apply. Subsection (5) in turn
provides that the “coverage level selected under subsection (1) applies to the named insured, the

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named insured’s spouse, and a relative of either domiciled in the same household, and any other
person with a right to claim personal protection insurance benefits under the policy.” MCL
500.3107c(5) (emphasis added).
The next step is to determine the election made under MCL 500.3107c(1). Here, Rudolph
selected “Option 4,” which was designated, “Limited Coverage of $250,000, with some or all
persons excluded from PIP allowable expenses coverage.” The explanation also expressly states,
“This option is only available if you choose the $250,000 PIP allowable expenses limit.” Option
4 offered by Auto Club therefore corresponds—in part—to the option provided in MCL
500.3107c(1)(b) that states, “A limit of $250,000.00 per individual per loss occurrence for any
personal protection insurance benefits under section 3107(1)(a).”
A complete statutory basis for Option 4 requires the joint consideration of MCL
500.3109a(2), which provides that “the insurer shall offer to an applicant or named insured that
selects a personal protection benefit limit under section 3107c(1)(b) an exclusion related to
qualified health coverage.” As set forth in full earlier in this opinion, “a person subject to an
exclusion under this subsection is not eligible for personal protection benefits under the insurance
policy,” a person must generally have qualified health coverage as defined in § 3107d(7)(b)(i)
before the person may become subject to the exclusion under 500.3109a(2), and the individuals
eligible for the exclusion are limited in general terms to the named insured and household relatives.
MCL 500.3109a(2). Finally, MCL 500.3109a(1) states in pertinent part that “[a]ny deductibles
and exclusions offered under this section . . . must apply only to benefits payable to the person
named in the policy, the spouse of the insured, and any relative of either domiciled in the same
household.” (Emphasis added.)
Thus, MCL 500.3107c(1)(b) and MCL 500.3109a(2) expressly work in tandem and can be
understood as providing both a limit on PIP coverage and a separate exclusion from any PIP
coverage available only to certain designated individuals meeting certain conditions. The limit
applies to anyone with a right to claim PIP benefits under the policy. MCL 500.3107c(5).
However, any exclusion under MCL 500.3109a “must apply only to benefits payable to the person
named in the policy, the spouse of the insured, and any relative of either domiciled in the same
household.” MCL 500.3109a(1).
Here, plaintiff undisputedly does not fall within the category of individuals eligible for this
exclusion. Accordingly, the statutory scheme plainly does not provide the option, after choosing
the coverage level of $250,000 in MCL 500.3107c(1)(b), to then choose to exclude anyone from
eligibility for PIP benefits other than “the person named in the policy, the spouse of the insured,
and any relative of either domiciled in the same household.” MCL 500.3109a(1).
Returning to MCL 500.3114(6), there is no exclusion under MCL 500.3109a(2) that could
apply with respect to the claim by plaintiff. Auto Club therefore is not excluded from the order of
priority in MCL 500.3114(5) under MCL 500.3114(6). The trial court did not err by denying
summary disposition in favor of Auto Club, and we affirm the trial court’s ruling.
IV. INVOLVEMENT OF SPECIFIC MOTOR VEHICLE FOR PURPOSES OF MCL
500.3114(5)

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Next, Citizens and Hanover argue that the trial court should have granted summary
disposition in their favor because there was no evidence that the Volkswagen Jetta designated as
Unit 3 was “involved” in the accident for purposes of MCL 500.3114(5).
As previously stated, the applicable priority statute is MCL 500.3114(5), which provides
as follows:
(5) Subject to subsections (6) and (7), a person who suffers accidental bodily
injury arising from a motor vehicle accident that shows evidence of the involvement
of a motor vehicle while an operator or passenger of a motorcycle shall claim
personal protection insurance benefits from insurers in the following order of
priority:
(a) The insurer of the owner or registrant of the motor vehicle involved in
the accident.
(b) The insurer of the operator of the motor vehicle involved in the accident.
(c) The motor vehicle insurer of the operator of the motorcycle involved in
the accident.
(d) The motor vehicle insurer of the owner or registrant of the motorcycle
involved in the accident.
“The ‘involvement of a vehicle’ standard, which sets forth the priority of potential insurers’
liability for no-fault benefits, ‘encompasses a broader causal nexus between the use of the vehicle
and the damage’ than is required under the ‘arising out of’ standard under MCL 500.3105(1).”
Detroit Med Ctr v Progressive Mich Ins Co, 302 Mich App 392, 396 n 1; 838 NW2d 910 (2013)
(citation omitted). This Court has explained:
There is no “iron-clad rule” as to what level of involvement is sufficient
under MCL 500.3105. However, “while the automobile need not be the proximate
cause of the injury, there still must be a causal connection between the injury
sustained and the ownership, maintenance or use of the automobile and which
causal connection is more than incidental, fortuitous or but for.” “The injury must
be foreseeably identifiable with the normal use, maintenance and ownership of the
vehicle.” The causal connection between the injuries and the motor vehicle “cannot
be extended to something distinctly remote[.]” Moreover, the injuries must be more
than “tangentially related to the use of an automobile” to trigger the entitlement to
no-fault benefits. Actual physical contact between a motorcycle and a motor
vehicle is not required to establish the requisite involvement of a motor vehicle in
an accident as long as “the causal nexus between the accident and the car is
established.” For a motor vehicle to be involved in an accident, it “must actively,
as opposed to passively, contribute to the accident,” and have “more than a random
association with the accident scene.” “[T]here must be some activity, with respect
to the vehicle, which somehow contributes to the happening of the accident.” [Id.
at 395-396 (citations omitted; second alteration in original).]

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In Greater Flint HMO v Allstate Ins Co, 172 Mich App 783, 785; 432 NW2d 439 (1988),
this Court was presented with a multiple-vehicle and motorcycle collision that occurred on a
freeway. A semi-truck moved into the left lane, causing the vehicle behind the semi-truck to stop
suddenly. Id. Another driver in the chain of traffic failed to respond in time and multiple rear-end
collisions occurred. Id. The crash also involved motorcyclists. Id. On summary disposition, the
trial court found that there was a question of material fact whether there was an impact between
the motorcycles and a vehicle driven by Robert Buda. Id. at 786. However, the trial court granted
summary disposition in favor of the third-party defendant insurers “on the basis of the absence of
contact between the vehicles driven by [Barbara] Grossman and [Kirby] Hull [who were insured
by the third-party defendant insurers], and the vehicle driven by Buda or the motorcycles.” Id.
The issue addressed by this Court in Greater Flint HMO was “whether the third-party
defendants’ insureds’ motor vehicles might be found to have been sufficiently ‘involved’ in a
‘motor vehicle accident’ in which [the motorcyclist plaintiffs] were injured to trigger liability
under the no-fault act.” Id. at 787. This Court concluded as follows:
In this case, the court granted summary disposition as to the third-party
defendants, Mid–Century and National Ben Franklin, based on the absence of
physical contact between the vehicles of their insureds, Grossman and Hull, and the
vehicle of Buda or the motorcycles. However, the court’s reliance on a requirement
of “physical contact” is inconsistent with the [applicable] test. Moreover, it is not
difficult to imagine a situation in which there may be a causal nexus between a
motorist’s conduct and an accidental injury quite apart from any physical contact
between the insured vehicle and the other vehicles involved.
The relevant inquiry then is whether a causal nexus can be established that
would link the injuries incurred in the accident to a motor vehicle. Here, the
deposition testimony supports a reasonable inference that a sudden lane change of
the lead vehicle, the semitrailer truck, caused every driver in the chain of traffic,
which included Grossman and Hull, to make an emergency stop which contributed
to plaintiffs’ injuries.
When according Allstate the benefits of any reasonable doubt when
reviewing the record, as we must in a motion for summary disposition premised on
MCR 2.116(C)(10), the evidence does not preclude a finding that the trucker’s
action caused everyone in the chain of traffic to react to a single hazard which, in
turn, created a risk for each motorist in the line. If indeed the trier of fact would so
find, then the insurer of each motorist so “involved” would share in the liability to
injured plaintiffs in accordance with § 3114(5). Thus, there remains a question of
fact whether the Hull and Grossman vehicles in these circumstances were
sufficiently “involved” in the accident to trigger liability under the no-fault act.
Accordingly, summary disposition was improper.
We note in passing that under the no-fault act fault is irrelevant, that is, the
issue is not guilt or innocence but, rather, whether one fits within the protected
class. [Id. at 787-789 (citations omitted).]

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The same analysis is applicable in the instant case. Here, the record reflects that Fifer, as
the driver of the Volkswagen Jetta identified as Unit 3, saw a vehicle approach her from behind
and traveling “really fast,” which led Fifer to drive off the side of the road to “get out of the way.”
Fifer’s vehicle was then hit or “clipped” on the driver side by a vehicle that continued to strike
other vehicles in the chain of vehicles that eventually struck plaintiff’s motorcycle. Viewing this
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving parties, a jury could reasonably conclude
that the driver approaching from behind at an excessive speed for the stop-and-go traffic caused
each driver in that driver’s path, including Fifer, to take emergency action in response to the
hazard, which contributed to the crash that caused injuries to the motorcyclist plaintiff. Id. If the
jury so found, then Fifer’s vehicle would be “involved” in the accident. Id. Based on this genuine
question of material fact regarding the involvement of Fifer’s vehicle, the trial court did not err by
denying summary disposition on this issue. We thus also affirm this ruling.
Affirmed. No costs are awarded. MCR 7.219.
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
/s/ Matthew S. Ackerman
/s/ Anica Letica

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