COA 364803 PEOPLE OF MI V RAMONYEA TRAVON BISHOP Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 12/1/2025

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
UNPUBLISHED
December 01, 2025
11:00 AM
v No. 364803
Genesee Circuit Court
RAMONYEA TRAVON BISHOP, LC No. 2020-046964-FC
Defendant-Appellant.
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v No. 365083
Genesee Circuit Court
SHARMEL TEAGUE, LC No. 2020-046960-FC
Defendant-Appellant.
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v No. 365872
Genesee Circuit Court
LARRY EDWARD TEAGUE, JR., LC No. 2020-046961-FC
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: K. F. KELLY, P.J., and MARIANI and ACKERMAN, JJ.
PER CURIAM.

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In these consolidated cases,1 defendants, Ramonyea Travon Bishop (Bishop), Sharmel
Teague (Sharmel), and Larry Edward Teague, Jr. (Larry), appeal by right their jury-trial
convictions of first-degree premeditated murder, MCL 750.316(1)(a), and possession of a firearm
during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm), MCL 750.227b.2 The trial court sentenced
each of them to life in prison without the possibility of parole for first-degree murder and a
consecutive term of two years’ imprisonment for felony-firearm.3 We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
These cases arise from the shooting death of a store employee at a store in Flint on May 1,
2020, shortly after 2:00 p.m. Surveillance cameras captured many of the events in question, and
multiple eyewitnesses also testified about them. Sharmel and her daughter, Byra Bishop (Byra),4
were intending to shop at the store on the day in question, but the victim did not allow Byra to
enter because she was not wearing a mask, which was required at the time because of the COVID-
19 pandemic. Sharmel became upset and began arguing with the victim. The verbal altercation
escalated and Sharmel began yelling at the victim and calling him names, so the victim, with the
assistance of another store employee, escorted Sharmel and Byra out of the store to the parking
lot. After they did so, Sharmel turned around and spat on the victim’s face. Upset, the victim hit
Sharmel in response. Sharmel, with Byra as the sole passenger, then drove away in a GMC Envoy.
Video surveillance footage and phone records established that around this same time, Sharmel
pulled over, and a phone call was made from Sharmel’s phone to Larry (Sharmel’s husband) and
then to Bishop (Sharmel’s son) two minutes later. Shortly thereafter, Larry drove himself, Bishop,
Sharmel, and Byra to the store in Sharmel’s Envoy.
Video surveillance footage established that approximately 20 minutes after the altercation
between Sharmel and the victim, a man—later identified as Bishop—got out of the Envoy at a
traffic light a few blocks away from the store and began walking toward the store, arriving there
about a minute later. At the same time, Sharmel’s Envoy proceeded to the store and, when it
arrived, Larry got out. Bishop then entered the store and could be seen holding an object in his
right hand concealed in his pocket. Larry entered the store separately but very close in time to
Bishop’s entrance. Immediately upon entering the store, Larry began yelling, which prompted the
victim and an assistant store manager to approach him. According to the assistant store manager,
the victim began trying to calm Larry down. As the victim did so, Bishop approached the victim
from behind, put a gun to his left temple, and fatally shot him. Bishop and Larry then fled the
scene, running in opposite directions. Larry fled to Detroit and then to Houston, Texas, where he
1 People v Bishop, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered November 29, 2023 (Docket
Nos. 364803; 365083; 365872).
2 Bishop was convicted for his direct actions, and Sharmel and Larry were convicted under an
aiding-and-abetting theory of the crimes.
3 Larry was sentenced as a third-offense habitual offender, MCL 769.11.
4 The prosecution also charged Byra in connection with the incident, but she pleaded no contest to
lying to a police officer, tampering with evidence, and accessory after the fact. Her convictions
are not at issue in these appeals.

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was ultimately arrested five days after the shooting. Bishop fled to a friend’s home in Bay City,
where he was ultimately arrested seven days after the shooting.
At trial, Bishop testified on his own behalf, focusing on the core theory of his defense: that
he killed the victim in defense of Larry. Bishop admitted to shooting the victim as depicted by the
surveillance footage, but he maintained that he only did so because he saw the victim concealing
a gun in his left pocket and believed that the victim was going to use it against Larry during their
interaction. Multiple individuals involved in the criminal investigation testified that a gun with a
filed-off serial number was located near the victim’s body, but they were unable to determine who
the gun belonged to or if the victim possessed it at the time of the shooting. The surveillance video
did not show the victim holding a gun, pulling a gun from his pocket, or dropping a gun
immediately after he was shot, and instead showed the victim keeping his left hand in his pocket
throughout the entire ordeal. Several individuals from the store’s corporate office testified that the
victim would not have been permitted to carry a gun while working because it was against
company policy, several of the victim’s coworkers testified that he was not known to carry a gun
at work, and several eyewitnesses testified that they did not recall seeing the victim with a gun.
Defendants were convicted and sentenced as previously described. Bishop and Sharmel
subsequently filed postjudgment motions for a new trial, raising, in relevant part, nearly all of the
same issues now challenged on appeal. In written opinions and orders, the trial court found no
errors warranting relief and denied Bishop’s and Sharmel’s motions. These appeals followed.
II. EVIDENTIARY CHALLENGES
Defendants raise several evidentiary challenges on appeal.5 We review a trial court’s
evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. People v Thorpe, 504 Mich 230, 251-252; 934
NW2d 693 (2019). “The decision to admit evidence is within the trial court’s discretion and will
not be disturbed unless that decision falls outside the range of principled outcomes. A decision on
a close evidentiary question ordinarily cannot be an abuse of discretion.” Id. (quotation marks and
citations omitted). That said, “[t]he trial court necessarily abuses its discretion when it makes an
error of law.” People v Wisniewski, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2025) (Docket No.
361978); slip op at 7. “Preliminary questions of law, including whether a rule of evidence
precludes the admission of evidence, are reviewed de novo.” People v Burns, 494 Mich 104, 110;
832 NW2d 738 (2013). Underlying constitutional issues are also reviewed de novo. People v
Hawkins, 245 Mich App 439, 457; 628 NW2d 105 (2001). A preserved, nonconstitutional
evidentiary error does not warrant reversal “unless after an examination of the entire cause, it shall
affirmatively appear that it is more probable than not that the error was outcome determinative.”
People v Lukity, 460 Mich 484, 496; 596 NW2d 607 (1999) (quotation marks omitted).
5 With one exception (as discussed more thoroughly infra), defendants properly preserved all of
their evidentiary challenges for appellate review by objecting to the evidence on the same grounds
now raised on appeal. See People v Thorpe, 504 Mich 230, 252; 934 NW2d 693 (2019).

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A. WITNESS TESTIMONY
Bishop and Larry argue that the trial court improperly allowed the assistant store manager
to testify that Bishop and Larry planned the shooting ahead of time.
As indicated above, the assistant store manager witnessed the shooting firsthand. At trial,
this witness testified that immediately upon entering the store, Larry began yelling very loudly and
asking about the person who “put their hands on [his] wife,” so the witness and the victim walked
from the break room to the front of the store. The witness further testified that he stood nearby as
the victim attempted “to calm [Larry] down,” when a few seconds later he saw Bishop suddenly
appear behind the victim, put a gun to the victim’s temple, and shoot the victim. The witness
stated that he “could see everything” clearly because he was within 10 feet of the victim and Larry
and within five or six feet of Bishop when Bishop shot the victim. The witness further stated that
everybody in the store reacted to the gunshot except Larry, who “never flinched.” He explained:
“[Larry] didn’t react, he didn’t jump, he didn’t get startled, he was just standing there like nothing
phased him.” The witness also testified that he saw Larry look behind the victim and then take “a
couple steps back” immediately before Bishop shot the victim. When asked by the prosecution
what Larry’s behavior indicated to him, he replied, “That [Larry and Bishop] set that up.” Bishop’s
and Larry’s attorneys objected on the ground that the answer was impermissible lay opinion
testimony under MRE 701, and the prosecution rephrased the question.
Later in his testimony, the witness stated that, when he returned to the store after
unsuccessfully chasing Bishop, he “asked everybody where did [Larry] go because [he] knew that
that was planned.” Bishop’s and Larry’s attorneys again objected on MRE 701 grounds, which
the trial court sustained and struck the witness’s response from the record. The prosecution
subsequently asked the witness why he “thought [Larry and Bishop] were together,” and he
responded:
Because you just don’t come in yelling, making a big fuss, a big scene and
then somebody comes around the corner, blindsides you and shoots you in the head.
It just don’t [sic] play out like that. That’s just not something that you, you know
what I’m saying, that will happen on a daily basis. That’s . . . the only thing you
can do is think that, you know, two people had to be together for that to happen like
that . . . . It’s from me, from what I, you know what I’m saying, use your common
sense.
Bishop’s and Larry’s attorneys again objected on MRE 701 grounds, and following a bench
conference, the prosecution continued questioning the witness.
Bishop and Larry argue that the witness’s testimony constituted improper opinion
testimony under MRE 701 because he testified that they planned or premeditated the shooting
ahead of time. To start, contrary to their claims on appeal, the trial court did not allow the witness
to provide such testimony. At a pretrial hearing, the court expressly ruled that the witness could
“opine that one gentleman distracted the [victim] while the other pulled the trigger,” but it did not
allow him to “opine that the shooting in the store was planned.” The court subsequently elaborated
on this ruling at trial, stating that the witness’s testimony on this point was admissible because “the
video doesn’t show it all” and the witness was one of two eyewitnesses “who perceived something

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that . . . possibly the video isn’t showing,” and the court believed that his testimony would “aid the
jury in determining any facts at issue in this case.” Furthermore, the record clearly reflects that
each time that this witness testified that the shooting was “planned,” the court either struck the
response from the record, had the prosecution rephrase the question, or had the prosecution move
on with its line of questioning.
We see no error in the trial court’s handling of this witness’s testimony. As a lay witness,
the assistant store manager could provide opinion testimony so long as it was (1) “rationally based
on [his] perception,” and (2) “helpful to a clear understanding of [his] testimony or the
determination of a fact in issue.” MRE 701.6 And as the trial court duly recognized, although
there was video evidence of the shooting, this witness was mere feet from the victim when he was
shot and had personally observed things that were not fully captured by the video surveillance
footage, including details regarding Larry’s and the victim’s respective demeanors and tones of
voice during their interaction, where Larry was looking immediately before the shooting, and
Larry’s reaction (or lack thereof) to the shooting. An “ ‘opinion’ is an inference or conclusion
drawn by a witness from facts,” Dudek v Popp, 373 Mich 300, 305; 129 NW2d 393 (1964), and
this witness’s testimony clearly reflected such an opinion—namely, that based on his personal
observations of Larry’s behavior immediately before and after the shooting, the witness had
concluded that Larry and Bishop were acting together at the time of the shooting. Whether Larry
had assisted Bishop in the shooting, whether the two had planned the shooting ahead of time, and
whether Bishop had shot the victim in defense of Larry all presented facts at issue in the case; the
witness’s testimony about what he had observed, and what he had concluded based on those
observations, was helpful to the jury’s determination of them. That the witness’s opinion
testimony may have “embrace[d] . . . ultimate issue[s] to be decided by the trier of fact” did not
alone render it “objectionable.” MRE 704.
Bishop and Larry argue that the witness’s testimony improperly invaded the province of
the jury because it opined on their intent at the time of the shooting, which was “an ultimate issue
that the jury was fully competent to determine on its own” from other evidence, such as the video
surveillance footage. As already noted, however, this witness’s testimony was not “objectionable
just because it embrace[d] an ultimate issue,” MRE 704, nor was the witness simply opining on
matters that he was no better positioned than the jury to evaluate, see People v Fomby, 300 Mich
App 46, 52-53; 831 NW2d 887 (2013). To the contrary, other than Larry and Bishop, the witness
was the only other person within a few feet of the victim at the time of the shooting and was in the
best position to observe and assess the involved parties’ behaviors at that time—something which
the other evidence at trial did not comparably capture. On this record, Bishop and Larry have not
shown that the witness’s admitted testimony improperly opined on their guilt or impermissibly
invaded the province of the jury, see id., or that the trial court’s handing of the testimony was
outside the range of principled outcomes, see Thorpe, 504 Mich at 251-252. Accordingly, Bishop
and Larry have not demonstrated entitlement to relief on this issue.
6 Our Supreme Court revised the Michigan Rules of Evidence effective January 1, 2024. See 512
Mich lxiii (2023). We cite the version of the rules in effect at the time of defendants’ trial.

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B. POLICE WITNESS TESTIMONY
Sharmel argues that an investigating detective improperly testified that she was being
evasive and untruthful during a police interview.
At trial, an investigating detective recounted the details of his interview of Sharmel about
the shooting shortly after it had occurred. The detective testified that, during the interview,
Sharmel provided “a lot of detail” when “asked about things that were not related to the case,” but
she did not do so when asked about things that occurred “immediately before and after the
shooting.” Specifically, Sharmel indicated that “she made several phone calls” to Bishop and
Larry immediately before the shooting and had received several phone calls from them
immediately after the shooting, but when asked about the specifics of those conversations, she
repeatedly stated that she “couldn’t remember” and had “no recollection of th[ose] particular
conversation[s].” The detective testified that Sharmel’s responses were “a concern” to him
because it was “an indication that she’s being evasive” and that “she’s not being truthful” during
the interview.
Sharmel argues that this testimony amounted to improper commentary on her credibility
and ultimate guilt. Because Sharmel failed to object to the testimony on that ground at trial, this
issue is unpreserved. See Thorpe, 504 Mich at 252.7 “Unpreserved claims of evidentiary error are
reviewed for plain error affecting the defendant’s substantial rights.” People v Brown, 326 Mich
App 185, 195; 926 NW2d 879 (2019) (quotation marks and citation omitted). To obtain appellate
relief, the defendant must show: (1) an error occurred, (2) the error was clear or obvious, and (3)
the error affected substantial rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).
To satisfy the third element, the defendant must show that the error “affected the outcome of the
lower court proceedings.” Id. And even when these three requirements are met, “[r]eversal is
warranted only when the plain, forfeited error resulted in the conviction of an actually innocent
defendant or when an error seriously affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
proceedings independent of the defendant’s innocence.” People v Allen, 507 Mich 597, 614; 968
NW2d 532 (2021) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
“A witness may not comment on . . . the credibility of another witness” or “opine about the
defendant’s guilt or innocence in a criminal case” because doing so “invades the province of the
jury to determine issues in a case.” People v Serges, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW2d ___
(2024) (Docket No. 355554); slip op at 15 (quotation marks, citations, and alteration omitted).
“Nevertheless, a police officer may testify about his or her perceptions during the course of an
investigation of whether a defendant was being truthful.” People v Lowrey, 342 Mich App 99,
7 Sharmel raised the issue in her postjudgment motion for a new trial, but raising an evidentiary
issue for the first time in such a motion is insufficient to preserve the issue. See People v Butsinas,
___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2025) (Docket No. 364778); slip op at 10-12. In any
event, for the reasons discussed above, Sharmel has not shown that an error occurred; accordingly,
she would not be entitled to relief on this claim even if she had properly preserved it below.

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109; 993 NW2d 62 (2022). Nor is an officer “entirely forbidden” from “express[ing] the belief
that a statement made by a defendant during the course of an investigation was untrue.” Id. at 112.
The detective’s testimony in this case fits squarely within the confines of this caselaw. To
start, Sharmel did not testify at trial, so the detective’s testimony did not purport to comment on
“the credibility of another witness.” Serges, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 15 (quotation marks
and citation omitted). And, as noted above, an officer may testify about a defendant’s apparent
untruthfulness during an investigative interview so long as it is based on his perceptions during
the course of the investigation. Lowrey, 342 Mich App at 109, 112. Here, it is clear from the
record that the detective’s testimony regarding Sharmel’s truthfulness was based on his
perceptions during his interview of Sharmel. Indeed, the detective testified that he did not believe
that Sharmel was being truthful about the shooting during her interview because she provided
significant detail when discussing things unrelated to the case but stated that she could not
remember things that occurred immediately before or after the shooting—which had occurred only
hours before the interview. Accordingly, because the detective’s testimony did not improperly
comment on Sharmel’s credibility as a witness or on her guilt as a criminal defendant, the trial
court did not err by admitting the testimony. See Carines, 460 Mich at 763; see also Serges, ___
Mich App at ___; slip op at 15.
C. THE VICTIM’S CRIMINAL HISTORY
Bishop argues that the trial court erred by excluding evidence of the victim’s criminal
history, which prohibited the victim from possessing a gun at the time of the shooting. Bishop
further argues that because his defense theory at trial was that he shot the victim in defense of
Larry, the court’s exclusion of this evidence violated his constitutional right to present a defense.
We do not see merit in Bishop’s arguments.
First, the evidence was not admissible under MRE 404(a)(2) as Bishop claims. MRE
404(a)(2) is an exception to the rule that character evidence is generally inadmissible to prove that
a person “act[ed] in conformity therewith on a particular occasion,” and provides, in relevant part,
that a defendant charged with homicide may admit evidence of the victim’s aggressive character
“[w]hen self-defense is an issue.” See also People v Leffew, 508 Mich 625, 638-639; 975 NW2d
896 (2022) (recognizing that the self-defense and defense-of-others doctrines have the same
essential elements). This type of character evidence, however, may only be admitted in the form
of reputation or opinion testimony rather than specific instances of conduct, unless (1) character is
an essential element of a charge, claim, or defense, or (2) the testimony regarding those specific
instances is independently admissible for some other reason. MRE 405; People v Harris, 458
Mich 310, 316-319; 583 NW2d 680 (1998); People v Edwards, 328 Mich App 29, 36-37; 935
NW2d 419 (2019). Whether a defendant had a reasonable apprehension of harm—i.e., whether
the defendant “had a reasonable belief that he had to use deadly force to prevent . . . death or . . .
great bodily harm to” another—at the time of the homicide is an essential element of a defense-of-
others claim, and it is “well-settled law that specific acts of aggression by the decedent,” if known
to the defendant at the time of the homicide, “are admissible to establish a defendant’s reasonable
apprehension of harm.” Edwards, 328 Mich App at 35-38.
In this case, Bishop sought to introduce evidence of the victim’s prior criminal history.
Bishop argued that this evidence was necessary to establish his defense-of-others claim because

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the victim “was a convicted felon” who could not legally possess a gun at the time of the shooting,
an unidentified gun was found near the victim’s body, and evidence of the victim’s criminal history
“necessarily . . . goes towards aggression.” But the mere fact that the victim was a convicted felon
who could not legally possess a gun does not inherently equate to “a trait of character for
aggression.” MRE 404(a)(2).8 Nor is it apparent how such evidence would be properly relevant
to proving Bishop’s defense-of-others claim. Bishop’s primary purpose in offering evidence of
the victim’s criminal history was to show that the victim was the aggressor in the incident, which
was an inadmissible use of specific-acts evidence under MRE 405. See Edwards, 328 Mich App
at 36, citing Harris, 458 Mich at 319. And, to the extent that Bishop was attempting to use this
evidence to show that he had a reasonable apprehension of harm at the time of the shooting, it is
difficult to see how the evidence might be admissible for that purpose given that there is nothing
to suggest Bishop had any prior knowledge of the victim’s prior conviction. See Harris, 458 Mich
at 317 (“The purpose of this evidence is to show the defendant’s state of mind; therefore, it is
obvious that the victim’s character, as affecting the defendant’s apprehensions, must have become
known to him, otherwise it is irrelevant.”).
Bishop’s argument that evidence of the victim’s criminal history was also admissible under
MRE 404(b)(1) is equally unpersuasive. MRE 404(b)(1) provides:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may,
however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, scheme, plan, or system in doing an act, knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake or accident when the same is material, whether such other
crimes, wrongs, or acts are contemporaneous with, or prior or subsequent to the
conduct at issue in the case.
Bishop argues that the evidence is probative of the victim’s intent to pull a gun from his pocket
and use it against Larry. But even assuming that the victim possessed the unidentified gun later
found near his body (which is not at all clear from the trial evidence), Bishop fails to explain how
the mere fact that the victim could not possess a gun due to a prior conviction would be probative
of the victim’s intent to use it against Larry. Instead, this theory simply attempts to use the victim’s
prior conviction to draw an impermissible propensity inference about the victim. See MRE
404(b)(1); People v Denson, 500 Mich 385, 397; 902 NW2d 306 (2017) (noting that MRE
404(b)(1) reflects “the deeply rooted and unwavering principle that other-acts evidence is
inadmissible for propensity purposes”).
Relatedly, Bishop argues that the evidence is probative of identifying the gun as belonging
to the victim. According to Bishop, the gun found near the victim’s body had an “obliterated serial
number,” and the victim’s prior conviction prohibiting him from legally possessing a gun would
help explain why the victim would have such a gun in his possession. This theory, however, is
purely speculative, and the fact of a prior conviction would seem to at least equally suggest,
8 For instance, an individual may be deemed a convicted felon unable to legally possess a gun for
a specified period of time after he or she is convicted of embezzlement of $1,000 or more. See
MCL 750.174(4)-(7); MCL 750.224f(1) and (10)(b).

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consistent with the trial testimony of several of the victim’s coworkers, that the victim had a
particular reason not to have any gun in his possession at all. But even assuming it is probative of
the victim’s ownership of the gun, Bishop still does not explain how that would be properly
relevant to whether the victim intended to, or in fact did, pull out the gun in question and to whether
Bishop had a reasonable apprehension that the victim was going to use that gun against Larry. Nor
does he explain how any such tenuous probative value would not be substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice from admitting evidence of the victim’s prior conviction, given the
improper propensity inference the jury may draw once exposed to that evidence. See MRE 403;
MRE 404(b)(1).
In sum, because evidence of the victim’s criminal history was not admissible under MRE
404(a)(2) or MRE 404(b)(1), Bishop has not shown that the trial court abused its discretion by
excluding the evidence at trial. See Thorpe, 504 Mich at 251-252. And Bishop has also not shown
how, in the absence of any such error, his constitutional right to present a defense may have
nonetheless been violated. We see no basis for relief as to this issue.
D. JURY VIEW OF THE CRIME SCENE
Defendants argue that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing a jury view of the
scene where the shooting occurred and by denying their subsequent motions for a mistrial on that
basis. Specifically, Bishop and Sharmel argue that the jury view was needlessly cumulative
evidence and risked juror confusion, and all three defendants argue that it amounted to a due-
process violation warranting reversal because the “heavy” police presence during the jury view
created a presumption of guilt.
We review for an abuse of discretion a trial court’s decision on “[w]hether to grant a motion
for a jury view.” People v Herndon, 246 Mich App 371, 418; 633 NW2d 376 (2001). We also
review for an abuse of discretion a trial court’s decision regarding a motion for a mistrial. People
v Boshell, 337 Mich App 322, 335; 975 NW2d 72 (2021).
The prosecution moved for a jury view of the interior and exterior of the store where the
shooting occurred, arguing that the jury view would help the jury understand the routes Bishop
and Larry took before and after the shooting, as well as the entire timeline of events from when
Bishop and Larry arrived at the store until their flight immediately after the shooting. Defendants
objected, arguing that the prosecution did not need the jury view and that witness testimony and
video surveillance footage from the store would suffice. Defendants also argued that the store had
recently been remodeled and looked different than it had at the time of the shooting, so a jury view
would offer little, if any, useful information to the jury. The trial court granted the jury view over
defendants’ objections,9 noting that the view would “give the jury a better understanding of the
timeline of the to and . . . from—as it relates to the dollar store,” including when “the subject
9 The prosecution first moved for a jury view a few weeks before trial, and the trial court initially
denied the request. The prosecution subsequently moved for reconsideration of that decision
during trial and, after considering the parties’ arguments, the trial court permitted the jury view.

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vehicle stopped, how long it stopped, and how long it took to get to the next, you know, destination,
or the next point along the way.”
As noted, Bishop and Sharmel contend that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing
the jury view. MCL 768.28 provides that “[t]he court may order a view by any jury empaneled to
try a criminal case, whenever such court shall deem such view necessary.” “It is within the trial
court’s discretion to order a jury view of the crime scene.” People v Unger, 278 Mich App 210,
255; 749 NW2d 272 (2008).
It was not unreasonable for the trial court in this case to conclude that a jury view of the
store was necessary because it would assist the jury in understanding the progression of events
surrounding the shooting in light of the evidence the jury had already received. It is clear from the
record that the in-person view was useful to understanding where Sharmel’s Envoy was parked
when it arrived at the store—something that could not be seen in the surveillance video footage
presented to the jury—as well as to understanding how long it took Bishop and Larry to
independently walk to the store, to walk around the store immediately before the shooting, and to
flee the store immediately after the shooting based on the exit routes they took. Indeed, both the
prosecution and defense counsel stated on the record that they had themselves viewed the interior
and exterior of the store prior to trial and that the view had helped them better understand these
points. And although the store’s interior had been remodeled since the time of the shooting, the
scene remained sufficiently similar to assist the jury in understanding certain concepts at issue in
this case; only some of the aisles in the store had been reorganized, and testimony detailing any
changes that occurred after the shooting was provided to the jury. See, e.g., id. at 255-256.
Moreover, the court instructed the jury that it “must not consider anything you learned from seeing
the premises that was not covered by the evidence admitted in the trial.” See People v Mahone,
294 Mich App 208, 212; 816 NW2d 436 (2010) (“Jurors are presumed to follow their instructions,
and it is presumed that instructions cure most errors.”). On this record, the trial court’s decision
to grant the prosecution’s request for a jury view was not outside the range of reasonable and
principled outcomes. See Thorpe, 504 Mich at 252; Unger, 278 Mich App at 255; Herndon, 246
Mich App at 418.
Additionally, all three defendants argue that the “heavy” police presence displayed during
the jury view warranted a mistrial and that the trial court abused its discretion by denying their
motions for a mistrial on that basis. After the jury view occurred, defendants moved for a mistrial
based on “the extensive firepower”—i.e., the police presence—that was in place during the view.
The court concluded that a mistrial was not warranted, stating, in relevant part:
[T]he Court finds that the number of law enforcement officials present at the jury
view and their respective locations collectively and individually during transit to
and from the subject site, and in and surrounding the site, including patrol vehicles
with activated lights found in the parking lot of and along closed off streets
proximate the site did not undermine the presumption of innocence of defendants
here.
The Court finds further that the amount and type of weaponry possessed by
the deputies or other law enforcement officials was not a reflection upon any
perceived danger posed by defendants, but rather, was a reasonable and necessary

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effort of local law enforcement to protect, safeguard and secure defendants,
counsel, jury members, and others, especially considering the high-profile nature
of this case.
“A mistrial should be granted only for an irregularity that is prejudicial to the rights of the
defendant and impairs his [or her] ability to get a fair trial[.]” People v Haywood, 209 Mich App
217, 228; 530 NW2d 497 (1995) (citations omitted). The court concluded that the amount of police
presence at the view was both reasonable and necessary to protect everyone involved, including
defendants, and did not undermine the presumption of innocence such that defendants would be
denied a fair trial. We fail to see an error in this assessment. Moreover, the court instructed the
jury that “[t]he Genesee County Sheriff’s office present there at the time of the viewing was tasked
with protecting you and the attorneys and defendants” and that “[s]uch protection must not be
considered against the defendants in any way.” It is presumed that the jurors followed these
instructions. See Mahone, 294 Mich App at 212. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by denying defendants’ motions for a mistrial based on the police presence during the
jury view and, correspondingly, there was no due-process violation warranting reversal. See
Boshell, 337 Mich App at 335; Hawkins, 245 Mich App at 457; Haywood, 209 Mich App at 228.
III. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Larry contends that the prosecution presented insufficient evidence to support his
convictions and thus violated his due-process rights. In determining whether the evidence is
sufficient to sustain a conviction, we review the record evidence de novo in the light most favorable
to the prosecution and consider whether it was sufficient “to justify a rational trier of fact in finding
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v Harris, 495 Mich 120, 126; 845 NW2d 477 (2014).
“Circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences arising therefrom may constitute proof of the
elements of a crime, and it does not matter that the evidence gives rise to multiple inferences or
that an inference gives rise to further inferences.” People v Walker, 330 Mich App 378, 382; 948
NW2d 122 (2019) (quotation marks, citations, and alteration omitted). It is the jury’s role, as
factfinder, to determine “the weight of the evidence [and] the credibility of witnesses,” People v
Kanaan, 278 Mich App 594, 619; 751 NW2d 57 (2008), and “a reviewing court is required to
draw all reasonable inferences and make credibility choices in support of the jury verdict,” People
v Oros, 502 Mich 229, 239; 917 NW2d 559 (2018) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
In this case, the jury found Larry guilty of first-degree murder and felony-firearm under an
aiding-and-abetting theory of the offenses. For the jury to find Larry guilty of these offenses as
an aider and abettor, the prosecution was required to prove:
(1) the crime charged was committed by the defendant or some other person; (2)
the defendant performed acts or gave encouragement that assisted the commission
of the crime; and (3) the defendant intended the commission of the crime or had
knowledge that the principal intended its commission at the time that the defendant
gave aid and encouragement. [People v Plunkett, 485 Mich 50, 61; 780 NW2d 280
(2010) (quotation marks, citations, and alteration omitted).]
“An aider and abettor’s state of mind may be inferred from all the facts and circumstances,” and
factors to be considered in determining whether a defendant aided and abetted the commission of

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a crime “include a close association between the defendant and the principal, the defendant’s
participation in the planning or execution of the crime, and evidence of flight after the crime.”
Carines, 460 Mich at 757-758 (quotation marks and citation omitted). A defendant’s mere
presence, “even with knowledge that an offense is about to be committed or is being committed,”
is insufficient to establish that he or she was an aider and abettor. People v Norris, 236 Mich App
411, 419-420; 600 NW2d 658 (1999).
Larry does not challenge the jury’s determination that Bishop fatally shot the victim in the
store or the sufficiency of the evidence to support Bishop’s convictions on that basis. Rather,
Larry only argues on appeal that the prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence to establish
that he aided or encouraged Bishop during the commission of the offenses and that he intended, or
knew that Bishop intended, the commission of the offenses at that time. We disagree.
To start, Larry provides little meaningful argument or factual support for his position that
the prosecution failed to sufficiently prove the elements of an aiding-and-abetting theory. See
People v Burkett, 337 Mich App 631, 639 n 4; 976 NW2d 864 (2021) (“An appellant may not
simply announce a position or assert an error and then leave it up to this Court to discover and
rationalize the basis for his claims, or unravel and elaborate for him his arguments[.]”) (quotation
marks, citation, and alteration omitted). In any event, the prosecution presented sufficient evidence
from which a rational jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Larry performed acts or
gave encouragement that assisted Bishop in the shooting and that he intended or knew that Bishop
intended the shooting to occur. It is undisputed that Larry is Bishop’s stepfather. See, e.g.,
Carines, 460 Mich at 757-758. Additionally, video evidence and testimony from multiple
witnesses, including Bishop, established that Larry was very angry about the victim’s earlier
interaction with Sharmel and wanted to fight the victim. Bishop further testified that, shortly after
he and Larry learned about the victim’s earlier interaction with Sharmel, Larry drove Sharmel’s
Envoy to the store (with Bishop, Sharmel, and Byra as passengers) to confront the victim.
Testimony and video evidence also established that Larry dropped Bishop off a few blocks away
from the store so that Bishop could walk the remainder of the way; that Larry entered the store
very shortly after Bishop did; that Larry began yelling and making a scene immediately thereafter;
and that, while Larry was doing this, Bishop snuck up behind the victim, put a gun to his temple,
and shot him. Multiple eyewitnesses testified that the gunshot occurred within seconds of Larry
yelling and, as discussed, the assistant store manager testified that he saw Larry take a few steps
back from the victim immediately before Bishop shot the victim from behind. The assistant
manager further testified that Larry “didn’t react,” “jump,” or “get startled” by the gunshot, and
he instead “was just like standing there like nothing phased him.” Additionally, Bishop and Larry
both immediately fled the store after the shooting, with Larry ultimately fleeing to Texas where he
was arrested approximately five days later.
Given this evidence, a rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Larry
was more than merely present during the shooting and that instead he, through his actions or
encouragement, assisted Bishop in the shooting and intended or knew that Bishop intended the
shooting to occur. See Plunkett, 485 Mich at 61; Carines, 460 Mich at 757-758; see also Norris,
236 Mich App at 419-420. Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence to support Larry’s
convictions of first-degree murder and felony-firearm under an aiding-and-abetting theory, and
there was no due-process violation on this basis.

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IV. BISHOP’S RIGHT TO SILENCE
All three defendants argue that their due-process rights were violated when the prosecution
attempted to impeach Bishop using his post-arrest, post-Miranda10 silence. “Whether [a]
defendant was improperly impeached with his silence is a question of law that [this Court]
review[s] de novo.” People v Clary, 494 Mich 260, 264; 833 NW2d 308 (2013). We review de
novo “preserved constitutional errors to determine whether the beneficiary of the error has
established that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v Sammons, 505 Mich
31, 41, 56; 949 NW2d 36 (2020).
The United States Supreme Court’s holding in Doyle v Ohio, 426 US 610, 618-619; 96 S
Ct 2240; 49 L Ed 2d 91 (1976), “prohibits the admission of post-arrest, post-Miranda silence with
the police.” Clary, 494 Mich at 271. This silence “cannot be used to impeach a defendant’s
exculpatory testimony or as direct evidence of [a] defendant’s guilt in the prosecut[ion]’s case-in-
chief[.]” People v Shafier, 483 Mich 205, 213-214; 768 NW2d 305 (2009) (citations omitted).
Such prosecutorial references “violate a defendant’s due process rights.” Id. at 212-213.
During cross-examination in this case, the prosecution asked Bishop: “[Y]ou had two and
a half years to tell police what happened. . . . Why didn’t you?” Bishop’s attorney objected, and
the trial court instructed Bishop not to answer, but Bishop nonetheless responded, “Because I have
a right to enjoy a trial.” The prosecution then asked, “And it never occurred to you to say you
know what, it was self-defense [sic]?” Bishop’s attorney again objected, and the court told the
parties to “[s]top right there,” but Bishop still responded, “That’s what the jury of my peers is for.”
Following a brief bench conference, the prosecution moved on from this line of questioning.
Even assuming this exchange amounted to a Doyle violation, the prosecution has shown
that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Sammons, 505 Mich at 56. “When evaluating
whether erroneously admitted evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we must
determine the probable effect of that testimony on the minds of an average jury.” Id. (quotation
marks and citations omitted). And when looking at all of the evidence in this case, we do not
believe that “the average jury would have found the prosecution’s case significantly less persuasive
without the erroneously admitted testimony.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Throughout direct examination, Bishop repeatedly offered testimony about his decision to
remain silent and explained why he did not call the police any time after the shooting. Bishop
testified that he never told the police—either during his initial post-arrest, post-Miranda interview
or at any other time—that he saw the victim attempt to pull a gun on Larry (as he claimed at trial),
that he never contacted the police after the shooting because he was afraid to come forward, and
that he initially told the investigating detective at the start of his post-arrest interview that “it wasn’t
me,” because he “was scared.” In light of this offered testimony, it is difficult to see how any of
the defendants were meaningfully prejudiced by the prosecution’s ensuing, brief questioning on
the topic during its cross-examination of Bishop—particularly in light of the other ample, untainted
evidence of their guilt. This evidence included testimony regarding Sharmel’s altercation with the
victim shortly before the shooting; evidence that, immediately after the altercation, phone calls
10 Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966).

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were placed to both Larry and Bishop from Sharmel’s phone; video evidence of defendants
thereafter driving to the store, with Bishop getting out a few blocks away and walking the
remaining distance; video evidence of Bishop entering the store, and then Larry entering shortly
after Bishop and immediately making a scene; video evidence of Bishop shooting the victim and
fleeing immediately thereafter; Bishop’s admissions at trial that he shot the victim, fled the store,
and evaded the police for approximately a week; evidence of Larry’s post-shooting flight from the
store and ensuing out-of-state evasion of the police; testimony of several eyewitnesses that the
victim was not known to carry a gun on him at work, and of multiple employees of the store’s
corporate office that the victim was not permitted to carry a gun while on the job; and testimony
of several eyewitnesses regarding the entire series of events in the store, including the assistant
store manager’s testimony that Bishop had run up behind the victim as he was attempting to calm
Larry down and shot him in the temple.
Furthermore, as the challenged questions were occurring, the trial court instructed Bishop
not to answer, but he did so anyway. The prosecution also immediately moved on to a different
line of questioning after Bishop’s attorney objected. And at the close of proofs, the trial court
provided a curative instruction to the jury expressly telling them that Bishop’s “silence after he
received his [Miranda] warnings up until he exercised his right to testify during trial may not be
used against him for any purpose,” and it is presumed that the jurors followed these instructions.
Mahone, 294 Mich App at 212. Taken together, all of these considerations make clear that any
error as to the challenged questions was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly,
defendants are not entitled to relief on this basis. See Sammons, 505 Mich at 56.11
V. VOLUNTARY-MANSLAUGHTER INSTRUCTION
Bishop and Sharmel argue that the trial court should have instructed the jury on voluntary
manslaughter and that its failure to do so deprived them of due process.
“A defendant in a criminal trial is entitled to have a properly instructed jury consider the
evidence against him or her.” People v Dobek, 274 Mich App 58, 82; 732 NW2d 546 (2007). A
trial court must “give instructions on any theory or defense supported by the evidence upon
request.” People v Ogilvie, 341 Mich App 28, 35; 989 NW2d 250 (2022). Such an instruction is
warranted “if a rational view of the evidence supports [it].” People v Armstrong, 305 Mich App
230, 240; 851 NW2d 856 (2014). Jury instructions must be considered in their entirety “to
determine whether the court omitted an element of the offense, misinformed the jury on the law,
or otherwise presented erroneous instructions.” People v Hartuniewicz, 294 Mich App 237, 242;
816 NW2d 442 (2011). “We review a claim of instructional error involving a question of law de
novo, but we review the trial court’s determination that a jury instruction applies to the facts of the
11 Bishop and Sharmel also argue that the trial court abused its discretion by denying their
respective motions for a mistrial on this basis. The trial court denied their motions because it found
that any error was harmless and that a curative instruction was sufficient to rectify any error; as
already discussed, we agree with that assessment. See Sammons, 505 Mich at 56; Mahone, 294
Mich App at 212. Additionally, defendants were given the opportunity to craft the exact language
they wanted for the curative instruction—which they did—and the court ultimately instructed the
jury using that language.

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case for an abuse of discretion.” People v Everett, 318 Mich App 511, 528; 899 NW2d 94 (2017)
(quotation marks and citation omitted).
Voluntary manslaughter is a “necessarily included lesser offense[]” of murder. People v
Yeager, 511 Mich 478, 490; 999 NW2d 490 (2023). “Both murder and voluntary manslaughter
require a death, caused by defendant, with either an intent to kill, an intent to commit great bodily
harm, or an intent to create a very high risk of death or great bodily harm with knowledge that
death or great bodily harm was the probable result.” Id. at 489 (quotation marks and citation
omitted). Murder, however, “possess[es] the single additional element of malice.” People v Reese,
491 Mich 127, 144; 815 NW2d 85 (2012) (quotation marks and citation omitted). This malice
element is negated, and the crime is therefore voluntary manslaughter, when the defendant “kill[s]
in the heat of passion . . . caused by adequate provocation” with no “lapse of time during which a
reasonable person could control their passions.” Yeager, 511 Mich at 489-490.
In this case, the trial court found that a rational view of the evidence did not support a
voluntary-manslaughter instruction because it was unreasonable to conclude that Bishop was so
disturbed by emotional excitement at the time of the shooting that he, or a reasonable person in his
position, would have acted on impulse. And when denying Bishop’s and Sharmel’s postjudgment
motions for a new trial on this basis, the court further explained that no “reasonable juror would . . .
have concluded that there was an ‘emotional excitement’ sufficient to provoke a reasonable person
to act rashly and without deliberation” because the evidence in this case clearly established that
“the victim was acting as a peace maker” and “trying to calm everyone down” at the time of the
shooting. The court concluded that because a rational view of the evidence did not demonstrate
that Bishop was adequately provoked—a “fundamental characteristic of voluntary
manslaughter”—a voluntary-manslaughter instruction was not warranted.
Bishop and Sharmel have not shown that the court erred in this determination. They make
much of the fact that Bishop was in an elevated emotional state at the time of the shooting, arguing
that Bishop was acting out of sheer panic for Larry’s safety when he shot the victim. As the trial
court acknowledged, however, a touchstone requirement of voluntary manslaughter is adequate
provocation, and a heightened level of “emotional excitement” in itself is not enough to warrant a
voluntary-manslaughter instruction. Id. at 489. Rather, to constitute adequate provocation,
Bishop’s emotional excitement must have been so high that it both caused him “to act out of
passion rather than reason” and would have “cause[d] a reasonable person to lose control, not just
the specific defendant.” Id. When looking at all of the evidence in this case, it does not rationally
support the conclusion that Bishop’s emotional state met this legal standard. See id.
Bishop was undisputedly upset when he learned about the victim’s earlier interaction with
Sharmel at the store. But any resulting emotional state is insufficient to constitute adequate
provocation because enough time had passed between then and the shooting for Bishop to “control
[his] passions.” Id. And while a heightened emotional state based on Bishop’s alleged fear for
Larry’s safety is more immediate to the shooting, neither Bishop nor Sharmel offer any caselaw
indicating that simply seeing a family member engaged in a verbal dispute that could potentially
result in them getting hurt is sufficient to constitute adequate provocation negating malice. See id.
at 489-490 (noting that malice is “negated by the presence of provocation and heat of passion”)
(quotation marks and citation omitted; emphasis added). There was, for instance, no evidence of
physical contact during the dispute or that the victim did or said anything overtly inflammatory at

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that time; to the contrary, as the trial court acknowledged, the evidence indicated that the victim
was behaving calmly and was attempting to calm Larry down. Cf., e.g., People v Pouncey, 437
Mich 382, 391; 471 NW2d 346 (1991) (finding the evidence insufficient to establish adequate
provocation where “the decedent insulted the defendant” but “[t]here was no physical contact of
any kind” between them). And by his own admission at trial, Bishop shot the victim before any
immediate threat to Larry materialized. Specifically, Bishop testified that the victim’s left hand
(which Bishop asserted was on the handle of a gun) never left his pocket because Bishop shot the
victim first so as to not “give [the victim] a chance to kill [his] stepfather.”
Under “a rational view of the evidence” presented in this case, a reasonable jury could not
find that Bishop killed the victim “in the heat of passion . . . caused by adequate provocation” with
no “lapse of time during which a reasonable person could control their passions.” Yeager, 511
Mich at 489-490 (quotation marks and citation omitted). The trial court did not abuse its discretion
by determining that a voluntary-manslaughter instruction was inapplicable to the facts of this case
and therefore did not err by refusing to instruct the jury accordingly. See Everett, 318 Mich App
at 528. Accordingly, Bishop and Sharmel were not deprived of their due-process rights on this
basis.
VI. ANONYMOUS JURY
Defendants argue that the trial court erred during voir dire by referring to the jurors only
by numbers and not by names, thereby denying defendants their due-process rights. Bishop and
Sharmel preserved this issue by raising it in their postjudgment motions for a new trial, but Larry
did not preserve this issue because he failed to raise it in the trial court. See People v Hanks, 276
Mich App 91, 92; 740 NW2d 530 (2007). When preserved, a trial court’s “decision concerning
the conduct of voir dire,” such as a “court’s decision to refer to jurors by number rather than by
name,” is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v Williams, 241 Mich App 519, 522; 616
NW2d 710 (2000). When unpreserved, however, the same issue is reviewed for plain error
affecting substantial rights. Hanks, 276 Mich App at 92.
“An ‘anonymous jury’ is one in which certain information is withheld from the parties,
presumably for the safety of the jurors or to prevent harassment by the public.” Williams, 241
Mich App at 522-523 (quotation marks and citation omitted). A jury is not anonymous unless
“something more than just the jurors’ names is withheld from the parties,” such as “certain
biographical information about potential jurors.” Hanks, 276 Mich App at 93 (quotation marks
and citation omitted). “An anonymous jury implicates the following interests: (1) the defendant’s
interest in being able to conduct a meaningful examination of the jury and (2) the defendant’s
interest in maintaining the presumption of innocence.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).
“A challenge to an anonymous jury will only succeed where the record reflects that withholding
information precluded meaningful voir dire or that the defendant’s presumption of innocence was
compromised.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). Absent a successful challenge to an
anonymous jury, mere use of “juror numbers instead of names at trial” does not violate a
defendant’s due-process rights. Williams, 241 Mich App at 525.
When addressing this issue in Bishop’s and Sharmel’s motions for a new trial, the trial
court in this case determined that no error occurred at voir dire because the jurors’ biographical
information was not withheld from the parties, and so the jurors were not truly “anonymous.” This
determination aligns with this Court’s holdings in Hanks and Williams, and we see no error in it.

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The record reflects that the trial court used juror numbers instead of names during voir dire, but
there is nothing indicating that the jurors’ biographical information was withheld from the parties
during this time. See Hanks, 276 Mich App at 93-94; Williams, 241 Mich App at 522-524. Nor
do defendants contend as much on appeal. There is also “no indication that any of the jurors
believed that there was any significance in the use of numbers instead of names.” Hanks, 276
Mich App at 94.12 And both below and on appeal, defendants have offered nothing to demonstrate
that the trial court’s use of juror numbers instead of names prevented them “from conducting
meaningful voir dire” or compromised their presumption of innocence. Id. Because the jury was
“anonymous only in a literal sense . . . , none of the dangers of an ‘anonymous jury’ was
implicated,” and, accordingly, defendants are not entitled to relief on this issue. Id. (citation
omitted); see also Williams, 241 Mich App at 523-525.13
VII. SPOUSAL PRIVILEGE
Sharmel argues that she should not have been tried jointly with Larry and Bishop because
she and Larry are married. Specifically, Sharmel asserts that her and Larry’s marriage implicated
the spousal privilege, which impacted their respective abilities to testify in their own defense, and
separate trials were therefore necessary. But “[s]everance is mandated under MCR 6.121(C) only
when a defendant demonstrates that h[er] substantial rights will be prejudiced and that severance
is the necessary means of rectifying the potential prejudice,” People v Hana, 447 Mich 325, 331;
524 NW2d 682 (1994), and Sharmel makes no attempt to demonstrate either of these requirements.
Rather, she suggests in a conclusory fashion that this privilege impacted her decision not to testify,
but fails to meaningfully develop or substantiate that proposition. See Burkett, 337 Mich App at
639 n 4. Sharmel has thus failed to demonstrate that there was any error requiring reversal on this
issue. See id.
VIII. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT
Bishop and Sharmel raise multiple claims of prosecutorial misconduct. None of these
challenges were preserved because neither defendant contemporaneously objected to the alleged
instances of misconduct and requested a curative instruction. See People v Bennett, 290 Mich App
465, 475; 802 NW2d 627 (2010). Accordingly, we review these challenges for plain error affecting
substantial rights. See id.
Claims of prosecutorial misconduct are reviewed on a “case-by-case basis” by examining
pertinent portions of the record and evaluating “the prosecutor’s remarks in context.” People v
Mullins, 322 Mich App 151, 172; 911 NW2d 201 (2017) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
“This Court also must review the prosecution’s comments in light of the arguments made by
defense counsel and the relationship they bear to the evidence admitted at trial.” Wisniewski, ___
12 Bishop contends that the prosecution told the jurors that numbers were being used instead of
names for their “ ‘safety and protection.’ ” Such a statement, however, does not appear at the
transcript page cited by Bishop in his appellate brief and we have not located it elsewhere in the
transcripts.
13 We also reject Bishop’s request for a conflict panel under MCR 7.215(J)(2) as to this issue.

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Mich App at ___; slip op at 13 (quotation marks and citations omitted). Prosecutors are generally
afforded “great latitude regarding their arguments and are free to argue the evidence and all
reasonable inferences from the evidence as they relate to their theory of the case.” Mullins, 322
Mich App at 172 (quotation marks and citation omitted). We will not reverse where the alleged
prejudicial effect of the prosecution’s conduct could have been cured by a timely instruction.
Bennett, 290 Mich App at 476.
Bishop first argues that the prosecution committed misconduct by misrepresenting
evidence presented at trial, thereby misleading the jury. Specifically, Bishop argues that the
prosecution “exacerbated the court’s error” in excluding evidence of the victim’s criminal history
by improperly referring to the victim as a “security guard” when testimony from employees of the
store’s corporate office established that he was employed as a “greeter” rather than a “security
guard.” The record reflects that the prosecution did refer to the victim as a “security guard” on
multiple occasions throughout trial, but when reviewing these statements in context, it is clear the
prosecution did so because several witnesses who regularly worked with the victim referred to him
as a “security guard” during their testimony. Indeed, two store employees each referred to the
victim as “our security guard,” and the store manager referred to him as “my security guard, my
greeter.” A shopper at the store also described the victim as a “security guard” and testified that
she knew him because “[h]e’s security at various stores and nightclubs and things like that.” And
it is clear that these references were not implying that the victim’s status as a “security guard”
meant that he was permitted to carry a gun (indeed, ample testimony expressly stated the opposite),
but only that he was seen and treated as security for the store by his coworkers and some shoppers.
Accordingly, Bishop has not shown any misconduct in this regard. See id. at 475.
Bishop also argues that the prosecution improperly vouched for the credibility of the
assistant store manager by referring to him as a “good guy” during closing argument. Although
the prosecution “cannot vouch for the credibility of his witnesses to the effect that he has some
special knowledge concerning a witness’ truthfulness,” the prosecution is permitted to “comment
on his own witnesses’ credibility during closing argument, especially when there is conflicting
evidence and the question of the defendant’s guilt depends on which witnesses the jury believes.”
People v Isrow, 339 Mich App 522, 529-530; 984 NW2d 528 (2021) (quotation marks and citations
omitted). When reviewed in context, the prosecution’s remark was merely a passing reference to
the assistant store manager being a “good guy” based on how he acted during the shooting, and
there was no apparent suggestion of some special knowledge of the witness’s truthfulness. Bishop
has not shown misconduct as to this remark, either. Bennett, 290 Mich App at 475.
As to her claim of error, Sharmel argues the prosecution committed misconduct by
repeatedly referring to her daughter Byra, one of the prosecution’s own witnesses, as a liar. During
direct examination, the prosecutor asked Byra numerous times why she was lying during her
testimony and made several additional references to her alleged untruthfulness. But MRE 60714
allowed the prosecution to attack the credibility of its own witness. The prosecution also had Byra
14 At the time of defendants’ trial, MRE 607 provided: “The credibility of a witness may be
attacked by any party, including the party calling the witness.”

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declared a hostile witness before continuing this line of questioning pursuant to MRE 611(d)(3).15
Furthermore, that Byra repeatedly lied or was “a liar” was elicited from Byra herself. During her
testimony, Byra admitted that she lied to the police multiple times during their investigation,
including when she stated to them that she told Bishop he could not come to her apartment after
the shooting, that Bishop had gotten a ride after the shooting, and that Sharmel (rather than she,
from Sharmel’s phone) had called Larry and Bishop immediately after Sharmel’s earlier
interaction with the victim. Byra also admitted to pleading no contest to lying to a police officer,
tampering with evidence, and accessory after the fact in connection with this case. On this record,
Sharmel has not shown that the prosecutor’s remarks amounted to misconduct. See Bennett, 290
Mich App at 475.
IX. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Lastly, Bishop argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to: (1) request a
cautionary instruction when the trial court referred to jurors by badge numbers rather than names;
(2) file a motion in limine at the start of trial to preclude any references to the victim as a “security
guard,” or object to the prosecution’s references to such throughout trial and request a curative
instruction; and (3) object to the prosecution’s reference to the assistant store manager as being a
“good guy” during closing argument.16 As discussed above, however, Bishop has failed to show
error with regard to the trial court’s conduct during voir dire and with regard to any of his
assignments of prosecutorial misconduct. Accordingly, Bishop’s accompanying claims of
ineffective assistance also fail. See People v Ericksen, 288 Mich App 192, 201; 793 NW2d 120,
125 (2010) (“Failing to advance a meritless argument or raise a futile objection does not constitute
ineffective assistance of counsel.”).17
Affirmed.
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
/s/ Philip P. Mariani
/s/ Matthew S. Ackerman
15 At the time of defendants’ trial, MRE 611(d)(3) provided, in relevant part: “When a party calls
a hostile witness, an adverse party or a witness identified with an adverse party, interrogation may
be by leading questions.”
16 Bishop also asserts that the trial court erred by denying his request for a Ginther hearing on these
points, but given that the existing record is sufficient to substantively address them, we see no need
for such a hearing and no error in the trial court’s refusal to hold one. See People v Ginther, 390
Mich 436, 443; 212 NW2d 922 (1973); People v Chapo, 283 Mich App 360, 369; 770 NW2d 68
(2009).
17 Bishop and Sharmel also raise cumulative-error arguments on appeal. For the reasons discussed
above, we conclude that, at best, only one error potentially occurred, and any such error was
harmless; accordingly, reversal on this basis is not warranted. See Butsinas, ___ Mich App at ___;
slip op at 29.

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