COA 374186 PEOPLE OF MI V KEISHAUN ANTHONY MACK Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 12/8/2025

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
UNPUBLISHED
December 08, 2025
10:16 AM
v No. 374186
Muskegon Circuit Court
KEISHAUN ANTHONY MACK, LC No. 2024-001254-FH
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: M. J. KELLY, P.J., and REDFORD and FEENEY, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this criminal interlocutory appeal, defendant, Keishaun Mack, appeals by delayed leave
granted1 the trial court’s order denying his motion to suppress. We affirm for the reasons stated
in this opinion.
I. BASIC FACTS
While conducting an undercover investigation, Detective Shanda Dziachan of the City of
Muskegon Police Department purchased narcotics from parolee Ezeree Crowley and arrested him.
On January 25, 2024, officers conducted a search of Ezeree’s registered address on parole. When
the parole agent and officers knocked on the door of the home, Mack answered. After the officers
informed Mack that they were present to conduct a parole search, Mack stated that he had to put
the dog away and shut the front door. Detective William Fry of the Michigan State Police then
heard “noises inconsistent with putting away a dog” and more like “stuff” was being moved inside
the home. Walking around the porch to the very front of the home, Detective Fry stood on a
wooden chair directly under a window to see inside. He observed Mack “next to a black tote
holding a clear plastic bag with an unknown white substance.”
1 People v Mack, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered July 25, 2025 (Docket
No. 374186).

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Shortly thereafter, homeowner Franchelle Crowley arrived, unlocked the front door, and
allowed the officers to enter the home. Franchelle stated that Ezeree stayed on a cot in the living
room just inside the front door and gave the officers permission to search that area.
When asked about rooms in the front of the home where Detective Fry had observed Mack,
Franchelle stated that that was her bedroom and an attached bathroom. The bathroom was being
remodeled and used as a storage room. Franchelle insisted that the officers could only search the
parolee’s area of control and objected to the officers searching other areas of her home. However,
Parole Agent Samantha VanderWagen asserted that the officers had the ability to search the entire
residence because Ezeree had permission to reside in the house and had access to the whole house.
Mack did not interject in the conversation or object to the search on his own behalf. However, he
asked the parole agent, “Ma’am, how are you checking her stuff?” During their search, the officers
located and searched the tote, which contained a significant quantity of controlled substances and
evidence of drug manufacturing, such as blenders and food coloring.
Mack was arrested and charged as a fourth-offense habitual offender, MCL 769.12, with
possession with intent to deliver 50 or more but less than 450 grams of the controlled substance
fentanyl, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iii), as a second or subsequent offense, MCL 333.7413(1);
possession with intent to deliver 50 or more but less than 450 grams of the controlled substance
cocaine, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iii), as a second or subsequent offense, MCL 333.7413(1); and
possession with intent to deliver 50 or more but less than 450 grams of the controlled substance
commonly known as ecstasy or MDMA, MCL 333.7401(2)(b)(i), as a second or subsequent
offense, MCL 333.7413(1). Mack moved to suppress the evidence found in the home.
Following a hearing, the court denied the motion, finding that Mack lacked standing
because he was only an “occasional overnight guest” and that his conduct at the time of the search
showed that he did not have a subjective expectation of privacy in the home.
II. STANDING
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Mack argues that the trial court erred by denying the motion to suppress and concluding
that he did not have standing to challenge the search. “Findings of fact regarding a motion to
suppress evidence are reviewed for clear error, and the findings will be affirmed unless the
appellate court is left with a definite and firm conviction that the trial court made a mistake.”
People v Wheeler, 336 Mich App 361, 365; 970 NW2d 438 (2021) (citation omitted). The court’s
“ultimate ruling on the motion is reviewed de novo.” Id.
B. ANALYSIS
“Both the United States and Michigan Constitutions guarantee the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures.” People v Armstrong, 344 Mich App 286, 295; 1 NW3d 299
(2022). See US Const, Am IV; Const 1963, art 1, § 11. “The lawfulness of a search or seizure
depends on its reasonableness.” People v Moorman, 331 Mich App 481, 485; 952 NW2d 597
(2020) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “Searches or seizures conducted without a warrant
are per se unreasonable, subject to several well-delineated exceptions.” Id., citing People v
Champion, 452 Mich 92, 98; 549 NW2d 849 (1996). Accordingly, “to show that a search was in

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compliance with the Fourth Amendment, the police must show either that they had a warrant or
that their conduct fell within one of the narrow, specific exceptions to the warrant requirement.”
Moorman, 331 Mich App at 485.
The right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures is personal and may not be
invoked by third parties. People v Brown, 279 Mich App 116, 130; 755 NW2d 664 (2008). “For
an individual to assert standing to challenge a search, the individual must have had a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the place or location searched, which expectation society recognizes as
reasonable.” Id. “A court determines the issue of standing by examining the totality of the
circumstances, and a defendant bears the burden of establishing that he has standing.” People v
Mahdi, 317 Mich App 446, 459; 894 NW2d 732 (2016). Relevant factors include
ownership, possession and/or control of the area searched or item seized; historical
use of the property or item; ability to regulate access; the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the search; the existence or nonexistence of a subjective
anticipation of privacy; and the objective reasonableness of the expectation of
privacy considering the specific facts of the case. [Id. quotation marks and citation
omitted.]
Overnight guests at a residence may have a reasonable expectation of privacy sufficient to
establish standing. People v Parker, 230 Mich App 337, 340; 584 NW2d 336 (1998). But mere
visitors and those present for business transactions do not have standing to challenge a search.
Minnesota v Carter, 525 US 83, 90-91; 119 S Ct 469; 142 L Ed 2d 373 (1998). The amount of
time at a place, the purpose of the visit, and the relationship with the owner are relevant
considerations to whether an individual has a cognizable privacy interest under the Fourth
Amendment. Id.
We agree with the trial court that, under the totality of the circumstances, Mack did not
have standing to challenge the search of the home. At the hearing, Franchelle testified about her
relationship with Mack. When asked if Mack was her boyfriend, Franchelle responded: “No. He’s
a—he’s a friend, sometimes a lover, not a boyfriend, though.” She explained that Mack spent the
night at Franchelle’s house “a couple times a week,” including the night before the search. Mack
had gone to work that day and arrived just before the officers had arrived. Franchelle testified that
Mack had a key to the home and permission to be in her bedroom. She added that Mack was also
working as a contractor, doing a “complete remodel” of the home and that he had a dresser of
clothes in her bedroom. Although the trial court recognized inconsistencies in Franchelle’s
testimony regarding how regularly Mack stayed at the residence, the trial court found that he was
an “occasional overnight guest.” When an issue involves the credibility of the witness whose
testimony is in conflict, the trial court’s resolution of a factual issue is entitled to deference. People
v Geno, 261 Mich App 624, 629; 683 NW2d 687 (2004). Accordingly, as found by the trial court,
the record does not establish that Mack intended to stay at the home that evening, only that he had
spent the previous night there and had returned after work. Because it is not clear that Mack was
an overnight guest, the trial court properly looked to several factors to determine whether Mack
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the home, and in particular Franchelle’s bedroom and
the attached bathroom or storage room. See Mahdi, 317 Mich App at 459.

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Franchelle’s description of her relationship with Mack was ambiguous, describing him as
a friend, sometimes lover, but not a boyfriend. She also testified that Mack worked on her home
as a contractor. However, there is no dispute that Mack did not own the home and that both Mack
and Franchelle stated to the officers that defendant did not live there. The ambiguous personal and
professional relationship, as well as the fact that Mack did not own the home or claim it as his
residence, suggest that he did not have standing. Although Mack exercised some control by
closing the door on the officers when they first arrived, he ultimately deferred to Franchelle about
allowing the officers inside and said nothing when she consented to searches of certain areas.
Accordingly, Mack was not exercising control over the home.
As the trial court found, Mack repeatedly denied any possessory interest in the home or
any particular area by stating that it was Franchelle’s house, “her” bedroom, and “her stuff.” Mack
never objected to the search on his own behalf but argued only that the officers could not search
“her stuff” and gave his opinion on the scope of the parole search. Mack’s actions suggested that
he did not have a subjective expectation of privacy or the ability to object to the search. Particularly
with regard to the storage room, Mack failed to establish that he had any expectation of privacy
in, or even used, that area.
Considering the factors relevant to standing in the Fourth Amendment context, Mack did
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the home. Because the trial court properly found
that Mack did not have standing, we need not address the merits of the Fourth Amendment claim.
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
/s/ James Robert Redford
/s/ Kathleen A. Feeney

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