COA 369697 JAMES JOSEPH V ENTERTAINMENT MANAGERS LLC Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 11/25/2025

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
JAMES JOSEPH,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
UNPUBLISHED
November 25, 2025
1:54 PM
v No. 369697
Kalamazoo Circuit Court
ENTERTAINMENT MANAGERS, LLC, doing
business as THE ENTERTAINMENT DISTRICT,
LC No. 2023-000092-AV
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: CAMERON, P.J., and REDFORD and GARRETT, JJ.
GARRETT, J. (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s determination that the district court did not abuse
its discretion by denying defendant’s motion to set aside the default judgment. Because the district
court failed to apply the proper legal framework when it analyzed defendant’s motion, I would
vacate the district court’s order and remand for further proceedings.
I. LEGAL PRINCIPLES
In order to set aside a default judgment, a defendant must demonstrate “good cause” and a
“meritorious defense” as stated in MCR 2.603(D)(1). Saffian v Simmons, 477 Mich 8, 14; 727
NW2d 132 (2007). These requirements “are analytically different concepts” and “a party must
show both in order to prevail on a motion to set aside a default judgment.” Barclay v Crown Bldg
& Dev, Inc, 241 Mich App 639, 653; 617 NW2d 373 (2000). A defendant may establish good
cause by showing “(1) a procedural irregularity or defect, or (2) a reasonable excuse for not
complying with the requirements that created the default.” Id. “Manifest injustice is not a third
form of good cause that excuses a failure to comply with the court rules where there is a meritorious
defense.” Id. “Rather, it is the result that would occur if a default were not set aside where a party
has satisfied the ‘good cause’ and ‘meritorious defense’ requirements of the court rule.” Id. In
determining whether a defendant has established good cause, courts should consider the following
nonexhaustive list of factors:
(1) whether the party completely failed to respond or simply missed the
deadline to file;

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(2) if the party simply missed the deadline to file, how long after the
deadline the filing occurred;
(3) the duration between entry of the default judgment and the filing of the
motion to set aside the judgment;
(4) whether there was defective process or notice;
(5) the circumstances behind the failure to file or file timely;
(6) whether the failure was knowing or intentional;
(7) the size of the judgment and the amount of costs due under MCR
2.603(D)(4); [footnote omitted]
(8) whether the default judgment results in an ongoing liability (as with
paternity or child support); and
(9) if an insurer is involved, whether internal policies of the company were
followed. [Shawl v Spence Bros, Inc, 280 Mich App 213, 238; 760 NW2d 674
(2008).]
Under MCR 2.603(D)(1), a defendant seeking to set aside a default judgment must provide
“an affidavit of facts establishing a meritorious defense” in order “to inform the trial court whether
the defaulted defendant has a meritorious defense to the action.” Huntington Nat’l Bank v Ristich,
292 Mich App 376, 392; 808 NW2d 511 (2011). If the defendant has a meritorious defense that
is strong, a lesser showing of good cause will suffice to set aside the default judgment. Barclay,
241 Mich App at 653. In determining whether the defendant has demonstrated a meritorious
defense, a court should consider whether the affidavit establishes that:
(1) the plaintiff cannot prove or defendant can disprove an element of the
claim or a statutory requirement;
(2) a ground for summary disposition exists under MCR 2.116(C)(2), (3),
(5), (6), (7) or (8); or
(3) the plaintiff’s claim rests on evidence that is inadmissible. [Shawl, 280
Mich App at 238.]
The determination whether to set aside a default judgment is a “fact-intensive” inquiry that the
trial court should base on the “totality of the circumstances.” Id. at 236-237.
II. ANALYSIS
The district court denied defendant’s motion to set aside the default judgment on the basis
that defendant failed to establish good cause for doing so. Regarding defendant’s calendaring
error, the court stated:

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I frankly just don’t find that that’s good cause. It’s not a matter of intent.
The Court Rules are the Court Rules. Yeah, sometimes they—somebody doesn’t
do something like calendaring something, forgetting about something, and it comes
back to bite ‘em, but I’m kind of a stickler for following the Court Rules as, I
believe, I’m required by law to do. If everybody plays by the same rules, whether
it’s plaintiffs, defendants, pro se parties or not, it’s better for everybody. You can
always turn to the rules.
The court’s reasoning makes clear that it did not consider whether defendant had a meritorious
defense as it was required to do. If defendant had a meritorious defense, a lesser showing of good
cause would have sufficed. Barclay, 241 Mich App at 653. Instead, the court determined that the
default judgment was warranted on the basis of defendant’s failure to comply with the court rules
without more.
In addition, the record shows that defendant had very strong, if not absolute, defenses.
Plaintiff was not a party to the contract. Rather, plaintiff’s daughter and future son-in-law, the
bride and groom of the planned event, signed the contract. Defendant raised that argument in its
motion to set aside the default judgment. Defendant also argued that plaintiff did not make any of
the payments for the event. Instead, plaintiff’s wife made the payments. Defendant attached a
verified statement to its motion as required under MCR 2.603(D)(1). In his verified statement,
Ryan Reedy, defendant’s member manager, averred that plaintiff was not a party to the contract
and did not make any of the payments for the event.
Plaintiff’s lack of standing to assert his claims was a defense that defendant asserted in its
affirmative defenses filed with its answer to the complaint. At the hearing on defendant’s motion
to set aside the default judgment, defendant argued that plaintiff was not a party to the contract
and was not the real party in interest. To have standing to assert a claim, “a party must have a
legally protected interest that is in jeopardy of being adversely affected.” Barclae v Zarb, 300
Mich App 455, 483; 834 NW2d 100 (2013) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “A plaintiff
must assert his own legal rights and interests and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights
or interests of third parties.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Reedy also averred that the event was originally scheduled to be held on August 14, 2020,
but the contract was amended twice and the event was postponed twice. Reedy stated that,
ultimately, the bride and groom chose “for personal reasons” not to hold the event altogether.
Defendant attached to its motion to set aside the default judgment e-mail correspondence
indicating that the event had been rescheduled with a 100% credit of payments made, but that the
amended contract stated that all payments were nonrefundable. The district court never considered
defendant’s meritorious defenses and instead focused exclusively on whether defendant’s reason
for filing a late answer to the complaint amounted to good cause. This was erroneous because, if
defendant had a meritorious defense, it was entitled to relief on a lesser showing of good cause.
Barclay, 241 Mich App at 653. The court was therefore required to consider defendant’s defenses

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and applied an improper legal framework by failing to do so. “A trial court necessarily abuses its
discretion when it makes an error of law.” Pirgu v United Servs Auto Ass’n, 499 Mich 269, 274;
884 NW2d 257 (2016). Accordingly, I would vacate the district court’s order and remand for
reconsideration under the proper legal framework.
/s/ Kristina Robinson Garrett

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