COA 374950 JADE SEBASTIENE HAMILTON V MICHAEL DAVID KRONBACK Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 1/15/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
JADE SEBASTIENE HAMILTON,
Plaintiff-Counterdefendant-Appellant,
UNPUBLISHED
January 15, 2026
2:47 PM
v No. 374950
Livingston Circuit Court
MICHAEL DAVID KRONBACK, LC No. 2021-055897-DZ
Defendant-Counterplaintiff-Appellee.
Before: SWARTZLE, P.J., and GARRETT and WALLACE, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff moved to modify the custody, parenting time, and child support order governing
plaintiff and defendant’s child after she learned of defendant’s arrest for possession of cocaine. In
its decision concerning defendant’s objection to the referee’s recommendation of mediation, the
trial court denied plaintiff’s motion, finding no proper cause or change in circumstances justified
modification. Plaintiff then moved for the trial court to clarify its decision, and the trial court
clarified that plaintiff’s motion was denied in full. We affirm the trial court’s decision.
I. BACKGROUND
After plaintiff filed a complaint for child support, the trial court ordered joint legal custody
and parenting time for defendant, including three weekends each month. About two and a half
years after the trial court’s order, plaintiff moved to modify custody, parenting time, and child
support. In her motion, plaintiff argued that sole custody of the child was justified because of
proper cause and changes in circumstances including the following: defendant’s arrest and charge
for possession of cocaine, defendant’s charge for drunk driving, defendant driving with the child
without legal ability to do so, defendant’s refusal to participate in custody discussions, and
defendant’s last-minute changes in transportation plans.
In his response to plaintiff’s motion, defendant admitted that he was convicted of operating
a motor vehicle while intoxicated and use of a non-narcotic controlled substance, but that he was
also participating in monitoring and treatment through sobriety court, health services, and
counseling. Defendant admitted that he did not have a license, but argued that this was not a
changed circumstance because he did not have the ability to drive when the previous custody order

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was entered. Further, defendant responded that plaintiff was making unilateral decisions
concerning the child, including the child’s enrollment in school.
At an evidentiary hearing on the motion before a referee, plaintiff testified that every
weekend, either defendant or a family member would pick the child up, and that she could not
remember defendant missing any family time. Plaintiff believed that there were at least three
different occasions where the child went with defendant’s family during defendant’s parenting
time and defendant was not present because he was either in rehab or jail. Plaintiff thought that
defendant drove with the child and without a license because she witnessed the child’s car seat in
defendant’s vehicle. Further, plaintiff alleged that defendant called her derogatory names in front
of the child. She also testified that defendant would not help pay for the child’s extracurricular
activities, but defendant would ask for the child’s medical and school reports. Finally, plaintiff
testified that the child was improving educationally and in speech therapy.
Defendant testified that his mother would sometimes pick the child up from plaintiff but
that defendant would still see the child during the visits and assist him with speech therapy and
school work. When defendant was arrested during his parenting time, defendant claims that the
child did not witness the arrest because he was napping. When defendant was incarcerated, he
ensured that his family provided care to the child during his parenting time and called the child
when possible, never noticing a change with the child. And after his release, defendant was
compliant with the sobriety court.
Defendant admitted that he was upset with the co-parenting situation, including plaintiff’s
moves with the child from Holly to Howell to Milan. But, defendant claimed that he never
disparaged plaintiff while the child was present and that plaintiff and defendant amicably spent
time together shortly before the hearing. As for unilateral decisions made by plaintiff, defendant
did not object to plaintiff’s choices and thought that plaintiff’s choices for the child’s therapy and
schooling were appropriate. In addition to defendant’s testimony, defendant’s mother testified that
she sometimes supervised the child and that defendant and the child were “great together.”
After hearing the parties’ testimony and arguments, the referee expressed concern
regarding whether there was an established custodial environment with defendant and
recommended mediation. Defendant then objected to the recommended mediation order, arguing
that the referee erred by finding that no custodial environment existed between defendant and the
child. The trial court then held a hearing regarding the defendant’s objection to the referee’s
recommendation, where the parties reiterated their arguments. The trial court then informed the
parties that it would review the referee hearing and then either issue a written or oral opinion.
The trial court issued a written opinion, finding that there was an established custodial
environment with defendant and that plaintiff had not demonstrated proper cause or a change in
circumstances justifying a modification. Plaintiff’s motion to modify custody, parenting time, and
child support was denied but the order for mediation was not rescinded. Plaintiff then moved to
clarify the trial court’s order; plaintiff expressed confusion as to whether the order denied her entire
motion or just her request to modify custody, given that the court did not rescind the order for
mediation. The court entered an order clarifying that plaintiff’s entire motion was denied and
rescinded the order for mediation. This appeal followed.

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II. ANALYSIS
A. JURISDICTION
In this case, plaintiff appealed the order on her motion for clarification, not the order
denying plaintiff’s motion to modify custody, parenting time, and child support. The order on the
custody modification is a final order, but it is unclear whether the clarification order is a final order.
See MCR 7.202(6)(a)(iii); MCR 7.203(A)(1). If the clarification order is not a final order, the
Court lacks jurisdiction as of right because plaintiff filed this appeal more than 21 days after the
final order—the custody modification order. See MCR 7.204(A)(1). But, the Court may grant
leave to appeal judgments or orders “when an appeal of right could have been taken but was not
timely filed.” MCR 7.203(B)(5). Given plaintiff’s motion for clarification and defendant’s failure
to file a motion to dismiss this appeal, we will treat plaintiff’s appeal as an application for leave to
appeal and consider plaintiff’s appeal as if by leave granted.
B. CUSTODY
Plaintiff argues on appeal that the trial court erred by finding no proper cause or change in
circumstances. The Court will affirm custody orders unless (1) the trial court committed a palpable
abuse of discretion, (2) the trial court’s findings of fact were against the great weight of the
evidence, or (3) the trial court made a clear legal error on a major issue. Berger v Berger, 277
Mich App 700, 705; 747 NW2d 336 (2008). An abuse of discretion exists in a child custody case
“when the trial court’s decision is so palpably and grossly violative of fact and logic that it
evidences a perversity of will, a defiance of judgment, or the exercise of passion or bias.” Shade
v Wright, 291 Mich App 17, 21; 805 NW2d 1 (2010). Second, for the great weight of evidence,
the “Court should not substitute its judgment on questions of fact unless the facts clearly
preponderate in the opposite direction.” Id. And third, “clear legal error occurs when the trial
court errs in its choice, interpretation, or application of the existing law.” Id. (cleaned up).
The trial court may modify a previous order or judgment only for proper cause or because
of a change of circumstances; the modification must not change the child’s established custodial
environment “unless there is presented clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best interest
of the child.” MCL 722.27(1)(c). Proper cause includes “appropriate grounds that have or could
have a significant effect on the child’s life to the extent that a reevaluation of the child’s custodial
situation should be undertaken,” and the trial court may use the best-interest factors enumerated in
MCL 722.23 for guidance. Vodvarka v Grasmeyer, 259 Mich App 499, 511; 675 NW2d 847
(2003). For change of circumstances, movant must prove that the conditions surrounding custody
of the child have materially changed—more than normal life changes—since entry of the last
custody order. Id. at 513. In addition, there must be some evidence that these material changes
caused or will almost certainly cause “a significant effect on the child’s well-being.” Id.
The trial court did not make findings against the great weight of the evidence when it found
that plaintiff had not established proper cause or changes in circumstances to justify modification.
Plaintiff claimed that defendant’s substance abuse and incarcerations constituted cause or change,
but plaintiff did not introduce evidence on how defendant’s substance abuse and incarcerations
had or could have a significant effect on the child’s life. Plaintiff testified that the child was
improving in speech therapy and school, and plaintiff did not explain how defendant’s

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incarceration had a negative effect on the child. Further, defendant’s substance abuse and
incarceration were not likely to cause future significant changes in the child’s life considering
defendant’s evidence that he was compliant with sobriety court.
Along with defendant’s substance abuse and incarceration, plaintiff argued that defendant
was unable to co-parent, did not assist in the child’s medical and educational needs, and had
disparaged plaintiff in the child’s presence. Although unclear whether defendant disparaged
plaintiff in the child’s presence, defendant rebutted plaintiff’s other assertions. Defendant testified
that he helped the child with schoolwork and therapy. Further, defendant demonstrated that the
parties could co-parent and make decisions about the child, despite the distance between the
parties. Although plaintiff’s relationship with defendant is far from ideal, the evidence introduced
does not rise to the level of having a significant effect on the child’s well-being.
As for the trial court’s credibility determinations, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred
by using the video of the referee hearing to make its determination. The trial court held a de novo
hearing on this matter, and therefore did not need to defer to the referee’s credibility
determinations. MCL 552.507(4). MCR 3.215(F)(2) allows the trial court to conduct the judicial
hearing by reviewing the record of the referee hearing, as long as the trial court allows the parties
to present live evidence at the judicial hearing. The rule does not prohibit the trial court from using
a video of the referee hearing. Further, such use was not objected to by plaintiff, even though the
trial court informed the parties that it intended to review the referee hearing to make its decision.
Based on the evidence the parties presented, the trial court’s findings were not against the great
weight of the evidence. The trial court did not abuse its discretion or commit error when it denied
plaintiff’s motion for modification.
C. PARENTING TIME
Plaintiff further argues that the trial court erred when denying the portion of her motion
regarding parenting time, specifically that the trial court erred by applying the standard from
Vodvarka. Again, the trial court’s decision will be affirmed unless the findings were against the
great weight of the evidence, there was a palpable abuse of discretion, or there was a clear error.
Shade, 291 Mich App at 20-21. If a party proposes a change in parenting time that would result
in a change in the established custodial environment, then the trial court should apply the standard
under Vodvarka for proper cause and change of circumstances. Id. at 25-28. “An established
custodial environment exists if over an appreciable time the child naturally looks to the custodian
in that environment for guidance, discipline, the necessities of life, and parental comfort.”
Lieberman v Orr, 319 Mich App 68, 81; 900 NW2d 130 (2017) (cleaned up). “The age of the
child, the physical environment, and the inclination of the custodian and the child as to permanency
of the relationship shall also be considered.” MCL 722.27(1)(c).
Here, the trial court did not clearly err when finding that plaintiff’s proposed modification
to parenting time would result in a change in the custodial environment. Plaintiff requested in her
modification motion sole custody and that defendant receive “limited, supervised parenting time”
and for such time to occur at defendant’s mother’s house. Such proposed changes indicate a
decrease in defendant’s parenting time and a change in the physical environment, resulting in a
change in the custodial environment. Therefore, the evidence did not preponderate against a
change in established custodial environment as a result of the proposed changes, so the trial court

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did not err by applying the Vodvarka standard to plaintiff’s request for changes in parenting time.
See Shade, 291 Mich App at 20-21, 27.
III. CONCLUSION
After reviewing the trial court’s record and the parties’ arguments, the trial court did not
err or abuse its discretion when it denied plaintiff’s motion to modify custody, parenting time, and
child support. Plaintiff did not prove that proper cause or changes in circumstances justified
modification. Further, plaintiff’s proposed modifications would have changed the child’s custodial
environment.
Affirmed.
/s/ Brock A. Swartzle
/s/ Kristina Robinson Garrett
/s/ Randy J. Wallace

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