COA 374937 PEOPLE OF MI V KYLE RICHARD CRONIN Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 9/17/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
UNPUBLISHED
September 17, 2026
2:51 PM
v No. 374937
Kalkaska Circuit Court
KYLE RICHARD CRONIN, LC No. 2024-004931-FC
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: BAZZI, P.J., and PATEL and ACKERMAN, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his jury-trial convictions of assault with intent to commit
murder (AWIM), MCL 750.83; felon in possession of a firearm (felon-in-possession), MCL
750.224f(6); carrying a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm), MCL
750.227b(1); and transportation or possession of a loaded firearm in or upon a vehicle, MCL
750.227c(1)(a). On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court’s failure to reaffirm his waiver of
his right to counsel until after jury selection deprived him of his right to counsel during a critical
stage of the proceedings. We disagree and affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Defendant fired a rifle at the victim from a close range. The victim was struck in the ear
by a bullet and sustained injuries to his face. Shortly after, defendant was arrested and charged
with the crimes for which he was later convicted.
At his preliminary examination hearing, defendant stated that he wanted to represent
himself. Thereafter, the trial court began each subsequent hearing by reaffirming defendant’s
desire to represent himself. On the morning of defendant’s trial, the trial court went straight into
voir dire without reaffirming that defendant wished to continue representing himself. However,
prior to swearing in and impaneling the jury, the following exchange occurred:
THE COURT: So Mr. Cronin, I know we’ve gone over this a multitude of
times, I ordinarily would go over it at the very start of a proceeding. It’s awkward
to do that when we’ve got a jury full err—a room full of potential jurors but I wanna

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go through it now because it’s a requirement. You’ve [sic] obviously representing
yourself, correct?
[DEFENDANT]: Yes.
THE COURT: And I know this seems repetitive, we go through it at every
hearing but it’s a legal requirement. You want to represent yourself, is that true?
[DEFENDANT]: Yes, your Honor.
THE COURT: And you understand the risks that we’ve gone over and that
are evident in this case in terms of the maximum penalties?
[DEFENDANT]: Yes, your Honor.
THE COURT: Do you understand the maximum penalties for each offense
that you’re facing?
[DEFENDANT]: Yes, your Honor. And do you understand the mandatory
minimum penalties for the felony firearm offense?
[DEFENDANT]: Yes, your Honor.
THE COURT: Do you want me to go over any of those with any more detail
before we proceed further today?
[DEFENDANT]: No, your Honor.
* * *
THE COURT: And you understand you have a right to be represented by
counsel, correct?
[DEFENDANT]: Yes, your Honor.
THE COURT: And you chose to represent yourself?
[DEFENDANT]: Yes, your Honor.
THE COURT: Did you—if you change your mind, if you wanna consult
with an attorney just let me know and I’ll try to make that happen. It’s a little bit
more difficult on the day of a trial but I’ll make it happen if you ask to consult with
an attorney, do you understand?
[DEFENDANT]: Yes, your Honor.
At the conclusion of the trial, defendant was convicted as described above. Defendant now
appeals.

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II. ANALYSIS
Defendant argues that his waiver of his right to counsel was deficient and did not comply
with MCR 6.005(E). We disagree.
We review de novo whether a defendant validly waived the right to counsel and review for
clear error the court’s factual findings regarding whether the waiver was knowing and intelligent.
People v Helmer, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2026) (Docket No. 369063); slip op
at 7. Under de novo review, we review the issue independently, without deference to the lower
court. People v Smith, 351 Mich App 1, 9; 34 NW3d 593 (2024). An error is clear if this Court
has the definite and firm conviction that the trial court made a mistake. Id.
Every criminal defendant has a constitutionally guaranteed right to the assistance of
counsel in a criminal proceeding. People v Russell, 471 Mich 182, 187-188; 684 NW2d 745
(2004). On the other hand, a criminal defendant’s right to represent himself is guaranteed by the
United States Constitution and the Michigan Constitution. People v King, 512 Mich 1, 11; 999
NW2d 670 (2023). “The right to proceed pro se and the right to counsel have been described as
two faces of the same coin, because the waiver of one right constitutes the assertion of the other[.]”
People v Dennany, 445 Mich 412, 444; 519 NW2d 128 (1994) (cleaned up).
A trial court must substantially comply with the factors provided in People v Anderson,
398 Mich 361, 367-368; 247 NW2d 857 (1976) and MCR 6.005(D) for a defendant’s waiver to be
valid. King, 512 Mich at 11. After a defendant waives the right to counsel, MCR 6.005(E) requires
the court to confirm that waiver at each subsequent proceeding. Helmer, ___ Mich App at ___;
slip op at 8. MCR 6.005(E) states:
(E) Advice at Subsequent Proceedings. If a defendant has waived the assistance
of a lawyer, the record of each subsequent proceeding (e.g., preliminary
examination, arraignment, proceedings leading to possible revocation of youthful
trainee status, hearings, trial or sentencing) need show only that the court advised
the defendant of the continuing right to a lawyer’s assistance (at public expense if
the defendant is indigent) and that the defendant waived that right. Before the court
begins such proceedings,
(1) the defendant must reaffirm that a lawyer’s assistance is not wanted; or
(2) if the defendant requests a lawyer and is financially unable to retain one,
the court must refer the defendant to the local indigent criminal defense system’s
appointing authority for the appointment of one; or
(3) if the defendant wants to retain a lawyer and has the financial ability to
do so, the court must allow the defendant a reasonable opportunity to retain one.
The court may refuse to adjourn a proceeding for the appointment of
counsel or allow a defendant to retain counsel if an adjournment would significantly
prejudice the prosecution, and the defendant has not been reasonably diligent in
seeking counsel.

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“[I]f, during those proceedings, a trial court concludes the defendant no longer clearly understands
the options afforded to him, and the disadvantages of each, then it should once again engage in the
extensive Anderson litany.” Helmer, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 5 (cleaned up). However,
compliance with MCR 6.005(E) is not a constitutional requirement. Id. at ___; slip op at 8.
In this case, defendant contends that the trial court’s failure to reaffirm his desire to forgo
counsel before jury selection at his trial rendered defendant’s waiver of his right to counsel wholly
ineffective. Defendant relies on King, 512 Mich 1, for the proposition that a trial court must strictly
adhere to the requirements of MCR 6.005(E). Defendant’s reliance is misplaced. Our Supreme
Court in King only addressed whether the initial waiver of counsel (when he asserted his right to
represent himself) was ineffective. Id. at 7-8. But this is not an issue in the current appeal because
defendant has already conceded that his initial waiver of the right to counsel was proper. And
although the King Court mentioned the requirements of rule 6.005(D), subsection (E) was neither
considered nor addressed in that opinion. In sum, King is factually and legally inapposite to
defendant’s appeal.
Further, there is no support for the proposition that MCR 6.005(E) must be strictly adhered
to, and, in this case, the trial court asked defendant at the beginning of the trial whether he wished
to represent himself. Defendant stated that he continued to desire to represent himself. Defendant
has supplied no argument or precedent that would require a trial court ask that question before voir
dire. Accordingly, because compliance with MCR 6.005(E) is not a constitutional requirement,
Helmer, ___ Mich App at ___, slip op at 8, defendant was not deprived of his constitutional right
to counsel during jury selection, and the trial court did not err.
Affirmed.
/s/ Mariam S. Bazzi
/s/ Sima G. Patel
/s/ Matthew S. Ackerman

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