COA 370833 CITY OF GRAND RAPIDS V DEPARTMENT OF CIVIL RIGHTS Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 2/12/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
CITY OF GRAND RAPIDS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
UNPUBLISHED
February 12, 2026
11:08 AM
v No. 370833
Court of Claims
DEPARTMENT OF CIVIL RIGHTS, LC No. 23-000083-MZ
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: GADOLA, C.J., and CAMERON and RICK, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right an order of the Court of Claims granting summary disposition
in favor of defendant under MCR 2.116(C)(4) and MCR 2.116(C)(8). We reverse in part and
affirm in part.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This case arises out of multiple ongoing administrative proceedings against plaintiff under
the Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCRA), MCL 37.2101 et seq. Plaintiff’s police department
has been the subject of multiple civil-rights complaints filed with defendant, the Michigan
Department of Civil Rights (MDCR). MDCR proceedings involve an “investigation” phase
followed by a “charge” phase. The MDCR investigates and decides whether a charge of
discrimination should be issued on behalf of the aggrieved party after a civil-rights complaint is
filed. Mich Admin Code, R 37.6(1). If the MDCR issues a charge, the charge is heard by an
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) who makes a recommendation to the Michigan Civil Rights
Commission, and the Commission issues a final decision. Mich Admin Code, R 37.12, 37.16. The
final decision is appealable to the Circuit Court. Mich Admin Code, R 37.18.
Relevant to this case, there were 13 complaints filed with the MDCR against plaintiff. The
MDCR filed charges in response to three of the complaints, and plaintiff unsuccessfully sought
dismissal of those charges before the ALJ on statute-of-limitations grounds. Plaintiff argued the
three-year statute of limitations in the Revised Judicature Act (RJA), MCL 600.101 et seq., MCL
600.5805(2), applied to administrative proceedings under ELCRA. Plaintiff applied for
interlocutory relief in the circuit court, which was denied, and ultimately those three proceedings

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were dismissed for unrelated reasons. In one of the other investigations, plaintiff refused to comply
with the MDCR’s discovery order because plaintiff argued the proceeding was time-barred.
Plaintiff then commenced this action for declaratory and injunctive relief in the Court of
Claims, seeking (1) a declaratory judgment that the statute of limitations found at MCL
600.5805(2) applies to issuing charges in administrative ELCRA proceedings, and (2) injunctive
relief from further proceedings in the claims that plaintiff argued were barred by the statute of
limitations. After plaintiff filed its complaint in the Court of Claims, defendant filed a separate
complaint in circuit court requesting that plaintiff show cause for not responding to the discovery
order. The circuit court stayed the show-cause proceeding pending resolution of the Court of
Claims case and this appeal.
Defendant then moved to dismiss the case in the Court of Claims under MCR 2.116(C)(4)
for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, and under MCR 2.116(C)(8) for failure to state a claim. The
Court of Claims found it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because, under MCL 600.6419(5), the
circuit court has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from administrative agencies. The Court also
found that the three-year statute of limitations in the Revised Judicature Act was inapplicable to
administrative proceedings. Thus, the Court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss under both
MCR 2.116(C)(4) and (C)(8). Plaintiff now appeals.
II. ANALYSIS
A. SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION
Plaintiff first argues that the Court of Claims improperly granted summary disposition for
defendant under MCR 2.116(C)(4) because the Court of Claims has exclusive subject-matter
jurisdiction over plaintiff’s action for declaratory relief against defendant, and plaintiff was not
required to exhaust its administrative remedies. We agree.
We review jurisdictional questions under MCR 2.116(C)(4) de novo. Travelers Ins Co v
Detroit Edison Co, 465 Mich 185, 205; 631 NW2d 733 (2001). The Court of Claims has exclusive
jurisdiction over “any claim or demand for monetary, equitable, or declaratory relief . . . against
the state or any of its departments or officers notwithstanding another law that confers jurisdiction
of the case in the circuit court” Boler v Governor, 324 Mich App 614, 620; 923 NW2d 287 (2018),
quoting MCL 600.6419(1)(a). The statute goes on to clarify that, “This chapter does not deprive
the circuit court of exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from the district court and administrative
agencies as authorized by law.” MCL 600.6419(5).
Although plaintiff sought an interlocutory appeal of the ALJ’s rulings that the statute of
limitations did not apply in the three charged cases, leave to appeal was denied by the circuit court,
and those cases were voluntarily dismissed by defendant on other grounds before reaching final
judgment. And the circuit court stayed the show-cause action without ruling on the statute-of-
limitations issue. Because plaintiff does not challenge any final judgment or ruling, we cannot
characterize plaintiff’s claim as an appeal. Plaintiff’s claim is an action for declaratory judgment
and injunctive relief from an administrative agency of this State, a claim which is ordinarily within
the Court of Claims’ exclusive jurisdiction. MCL 600.6419(1)(a).

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Summary disposition for lack of jurisdiction under MCR 2.116(C)(4) is also proper when
a plaintiff has failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. Papas v Michigan Gaming Control
Bd, 257 Mich App 647, 656; 669 NW2d 326 (2003). But a party may be excused from exhausting
administrative remedies where review of the agency’s final decision would provide an “inadequate
remedy,” or where the “very harm that plaintiff seeks to avoid would inevitably occur if plaintiff
were required to exhaust administrative remedies before access to judicial review.” Huggett v
Department of Natural Resources, 232 Mich App 188, 191-192; 590 NW2d 747 (1998) (citation
omitted). Further, in circumstances where an issue is “clearly framed” as an issue of law “that
[does] not call for extensive findings of fact or technical expertise,” bypassing administrative
proceedings may be justified because exhausting administrative remedies would be “nothing more
than a formal step on the way to the courthouse.” Id. at 192-193 (quotation marks and citation
omitted).
Here, the administrative proceedings against plaintiff are not complete, and plaintiff has
not exhausted its administrative remedies. However, the expense and inconvenience of continuing
administrative proceedings that plaintiff argues are time-barred is the exact harm plaintiff seeks to
avoid. Plaintiff’s claim is based solely on an issue of statutory interpretation. Neither fact-finding,
administrative expertise, nor further administrative proceedings are required to rule on this issue.
Thus, we hold that plaintiff was excused from exhausting administrative remedies and summary
disposition was improper under MCR 2.116(C)(4).
B. FAILURE TO STATE CLAIM
Plaintiff next argues that summary disposition was improper under MCR 2.116(C)(8)
because the phrase “all actions to recover damages” found in the three-year statute of limitations
applicable to ELCRA claims refers to actions in a court and administrative proceedings, and
therefore applies to the MDCR issuing charges in administrative proceedings. We disagree.
A motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) tests the legal sufficiency of a
claim. El-Khalil v Oakwood Healthcare, Inc, 504 Mich 152, 159-160; 934 NW2d 665 (2019)
When considering a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8), the court “must accept all factual allegations
as true, deciding the motion on the pleadings alone[,]” and it “may only be granted when a claim
is so clearly unenforceable that no factual development could possibly justify recovery.” Id. at
160 (citations omitted).
In this case, plaintiff’s claim concerns the language in MCL 600.5805. “When interpreting
a statute, we must ascertain the Legislature’s intent,” which is accomplished “by giving the words
selected by the Legislature their plain and ordinary meanings, and by enforcing the statute as
written.” Griffin v Griffin, 323 Mich App 110, 120; 916 NW2d 292 (2018) (quotation marks and
citation omitted). “Every word or phrase of a statute is given its plain and ordinary meaning unless
it is defined in the statute or has a technical meaning. Dictionary definitions may be used to
determine the ordinary meaning of undefined terms.” San Marino Iron, Inc v Haji, 341 Mich App
634, 639; 991 NW2d 828 (2022).
MCL 600.5805(2) states that “the period of limitations is 3 years after the time of the death
or injury for all actions to recover damages for the death of a person or for injury to a person or
property.” The statute was enacted as part of the Revised Judicature Act, the title to which explains

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that the purpose of the RJA was to “revise and consolidate the statutes relating to the organization
and jurisdiction of the courts of this state” and “the time within which civil actions and proceedings
may be brought in said courts.” Boulton v Fenton Twp, 272 Mich App 456, 464; 726 NW2d 733
(2006), quoting 1961 PA 236, title (emphasis added). This indicates that the legislature intended
for the RJA to only be applicable to judicial proceedings in a court. The Legislature’s use of the
word “action” in the statute supports this interpretation. Dictionary definitions of “action” include
“the initiating of a proceeding in a court of justice by which one demands or enforces one’s right,”
Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed) (emphasis added), and “a civil or criminal
judicial proceeding,” Black’s Law Dictionary, (12th ed) (emphasis added). Thus, by its plain
meaning, the word “action” refers to actions in a court before a judge. Administrative proceedings
are nonjudicial and are not conducted before a court, so they are outside the scope of that definition.
Caselaw also supports this interpretation. When used “in a statute to refer to a legal process
or procedure,” the word action typically “refers to a lawsuit commenced in a court.” Dine Brands
Global, Inc v Eubanks, ___ Mich ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2025) (Docket No. 165391,
No. 165392); slip op at 9. See also Latreille v Michigan State Bd of Chiropractic Examiners, 357
Mich 440, 445; 98 NW2d 611 (1959) (complaint and hearing before an administrative agency
“was not a cause of action commenced in any of the courts of this state” and statute of limitations
did not apply). Given the Legislature’s stated purpose for enacting the RJA and the plain meaning
of “action,” the Legislature did not intend for the RJA to apply to administrative proceedings.
Thus, summary disposition was proper under MCR 2.116(C)(8) because plaintiff failed to
state a claim for which relief could be granted. Plaintiff sought declaratory judgment that the
three-year statute of limitations applies to administrative ELCRA proceedings conducted by the
MDCR and also sought injunctive relief preventing further proceedings in time-barred complaints.
However, as discussed, the statute of limitations in question does not apply to administrative
ELCRA proceedings. Thus, even assuming the factual allegations in plaintiff’s complaint were
true, the relief plaintiff seeks cannot be granted as a matter of law and dismissal was proper under
MCR 2.116(C)(8).
Plaintiff also argues that applying the statute to administrative actions is necessary to avoid
the “absurd results” of the MDCR being able to indefinitely bring charges, and a claimant being
able to avoid the statute of limitations in court and yet obtain the exact same remedies by choosing
the administrative forum. “Statutes should be construed so as to prevent absurd results, injustice,
or prejudice to the public interest.” McAuley v Gen Motors Corp, 457 Mich 513, 518; 578 NW2d
282 (1998). However, “a result is only absurd if it is quite impossible that the Legislature could
have intended the result.” Johnson v Recca, 492 Mich 169, 193; 821 NW2d 520 (2012) (quotation
marks, and citation omitted).
The only time limitation found in the administrative rules governing the MDCR is that an
individual must file a complaint within 180 days of the alleged discrimination. Mich Admin Code,
R 37.4(6). The filing of a complaint commences an MDCR proceeding, not the MDCR’s decision
to issue a charge of discrimination. Mich Admin Code, R 37.4(1). The respondent is given notice
of the administrative proceeding against them when the complaint is filed. Mich Admin Code,
R 37.4(9). Thus, there is a limitations period applicable to administrative ELCRA claims, but it
only applies to bringing a complaint, not bringing a charge. Indeed, the 180-day limitations period
for bringing a discrimination complaint that the administrative rules establish is far more restrictive

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than the 3-year limitations period for filing an action in a court of law. Neither the MDCR nor the
Legislature has imposed a deadline by which the investigation of a complaint must proceed to the
charging phase. If plaintiff believes this to be an absurd result, which this Court does not, the
proper forum to bring this concern would be the MDCR itself or the Legislature. This Court will
not impose a statute of limitations where one is not applicable.
III. CONCLUSION
We find the Court of Claims had subject-matter jurisdiction over this matter. Thus, we
reverse the order of the Court of Claims granting defendant summary disposition under MCR
2.116(C)(4). The Court of Claims was correct, however, in finding plaintiff failed to state a claim
on which relief could be granted. We affirm the order granting defendant summary disposition
under MCR 2.116(C)(8).
/s/ Michael F. Gadola
/s/ Thomas C. Cameron
/s/ Michelle M. Rick

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