COA 375795 IN RE A DIXON MINOR Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 2/10/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
UNPUBLISHED
February 10, 2026
9:07 AM
In re A. DIXON, Minor.
No. 375795
Eaton Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 23-021001-NA
Before: GADOLA, C.J., and BOONSTRA and PATEL, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent-mother appeals by right the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights
to her minor child, AJD, under MCL 712A.19b(3)(i) and (j).1 We affirm.
I. PERTINENT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 2023, petitioner, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) petitioned the
trial court to remove AJD from respondent’s care after an incident in which respondent overdosed
in her home. AJD and her grandmother found respondent lying unconscious next to a syringe.
AJD told a DHHS worker that she had seen respondent pass out on four other occasions.
Methamphetamine was found in the home. Respondent told DHHS that she had a history of
substance use, but that she had not used illegal drugs since 2017. She claimed that she had fainted
on the night in question. The trial court authorized the petition and DHHS removed AJD from
respondent’s care and placed her with her maternal aunt and uncle.
At an initial dispositional hearing, DHHS reported that respondent had several barriers to
reunification with the child, including her emotional stability, substance use, lack of some
parenting skills, unemployment, and unstable housing. Over the course of the proceedings below,
1 The trial court also terminated the parental rights of AJD’s biological father, but he is not a party
to this appeal. We will refer to respondent-mother as “respondent.”

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respondent complied with services provided by petitioner to address her employment and
parenting skills barriers, and she made progress in those areas. However, respondent did not
consistently participate in her substance abuse counseling and had multiple positive drug screens.
By the time of the termination hearing, respondent had tested positive for benzodiazepine2 twice
and methamphetamine 17 times; her caseworker testified that there were only four nonconsecutive
months in which respondent did not test positive for methamphetamine. Notwithstanding the test
results, respondent repeatedly denied using substances, claiming that her positive screens were
false positives. Additionally, respondent’s caseworker testified at the termination hearing that
respondent’s emotional instability was still a barrier to her reunification with AJD because
respondent struggled with managing parenting visits, work, and therapy. The trial court also
determined that respondent had not successfully obtained stable housing, noting that respondent
had a month-to-month lease and had recently signed a document indicating her intent to leave the
house (although respondent claimed that the document was merely a ruse meant to satisfy her
landlord’s ex-wife).
The trial court found that statutory grounds for termination of respondent’s parental rights
had been established. The trial court then determined that termination was in AJD’s best interests.
The trial court found that a bond existed between respondent and AJD, but that the bond was
outweighed by AJD’s need for stability, permanency, and finality. The trial court considered the
fact that AJD was placed with relatives, but found nonetheless that AJD’s best interests were
served by terminating respondent’s parental rights, noting that respondent had no relationship with
AJD’s aunt and uncle despite their blood relation, and that they were willing to adopt her. This
appeal followed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A trial court “may terminate a respondent’s parental rights if one or more of the statutory
grounds for termination listed in MCL 712A.19b(3) have been proven by clear and convincing
evidence.” In re Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App 35, 40; 823 NW2d 144 (2012). After a
statutory ground has been proven, the trial court must terminate parental rights if it finds by a
preponderance of the evidence that termination is in the child’s best interests. In re Mota, 334
Mich App 300, 320; 964 NW2d 881 (2020). “This Court reviews for clear error the trial court’s
ruling that a statutory ground for termination has been established and its ruling that termination
is in the children’s best interests.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). Clear error exists
when “some evidence supports a finding, but a review of the entire record leaves the reviewing
court with the definite and firm conviction that the lower court made a mistake.” In re Baham,
331 Mich App 737, 751; 954 NW2d 529 (2020) (quotation marks and citation omitted). This
Court must give regard to “the special opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the
witnesses who appeared before it.” Mota, 334 Mich App at 320 (quotation marks omitted).
2 The active ingredient in Xanax, a prescription medication for which respondent did not have a
prescription.

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III. STATUTORY GROUNDS FOR TERMINATION
Respondent argues that the trial court clearly erred by finding that statutory grounds for
termination had been proven by clear and convincing evidence. We disagree.
The trial court terminated respondent’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) and
(j), which state in relevant part:
(3) The court may terminate a parent’s parental rights to a child if the court
finds, by clear and convincing evidence, 1 or more of the following:
* * *
(c) The parent was a respondent in a proceeding brought under this chapter,
182 or more days have elapsed since the issuance of an initial dispositional order,
and the court, by clear and convincing evidence, finds either of the following:
(i) The conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist and there is
no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable
time considering the child’s age.
* * *
(j) There is a reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of the
child’s parent, that the child will be harmed if the child is returned to the home of
the parent.
Termination under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) is appropriate if “[t]he conditions that led to
the adjudication continue to exist and there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be
rectified within a reasonable time considering the child’s age.” In re Atchley, 341 Mich App 332,
343; 990 NW2d 685 (2022).
In this case, the initial disposition occurred on February 15, 2024 and the trial court
terminated respondent’s parental rights on May 1, 2025. The time between these dates exceeds
182 days. Therefore, the first requirement of MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) was satisfied.
According to the petition, respondent’s initial barriers to reunification included her
substance use, emotional stability, and unstable housing. Although respondent participated in
various forms of substance abuse therapy throughout the case, she tested positive for Xanax twice
and for methamphetamine 17 times. Respondent also repeatedly refused to take accountability for
her substance abuse, only admitting to using methamphetamine one time in 2024 and claiming that
every other positive drug screen was a false positive. The trial court did not clearly err by
concluding that respondent had not addressed her substance abuse issues by the time of
termination.
Additionally, the trial court did not clearly err by finding that respondent’s emotional
instability was still a barrier to reunification. The psychologist who conducted respondent’s
psychological evaluation opined that respondent’s mental health conditions would likely cause

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respondent to struggle with creating a stable environment for AJD and with putting AJD’s needs
above her own. Although respondent had participated in therapy, her caseworker testified that her
emotional instability was still a barrier to reunification because respondent struggled to manage
her mental health while also juggling parenting-time visits, work, and therapy.
The trial court also did not clearly err by finding that respondent’s unstable housing
situation was still a barrier to reunification. Although respondent and her caseworker both testified
that respondent had a month-to-month lease on a house she shared with her landlord, respondent’s
testimony during the termination trial was that she had fraudulently signed a notice to quit her
current residence—a situation that could easily result in respondent’s loss of housing at any time.
Furthermore, the trial court did not clearly err by determining that there was no reasonable
likelihood that these conditions would have been rectified within a reasonable time considering
the child’s age. See MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i).
Respondent argues that the trial court should have given her more time to address her
barriers to reunification. We disagree. While respondent did make some progress in addressing
certain barriers, like parenting skills, she did not make sufficient progress in addressing her
substance use (the biggest barrier to reunification), or demonstrate any likelihood that she could
rectify that barrier within a reasonable time. Additionally, the psychologist who evaluated
respondent did not believe that there were any services that could be provided that would make
respondent a safe parent. See In re Pederson, 331 Mich App 445, 473; 951 NW2d 704 (2020)
(holding that, based on the evaluating psychologist’s testimony, the trial court did not clearly err
by finding that there was no reasonable likelihood that the respondents could address their barrier’s
to reunification within a reasonable time). The trial court emphasized that AJD had been removed
from respondent’s care for approximately half of her life, and noted that previous efforts to address
these issues through a guardianship for AJD had also been unsuccessful. All in all, the record
supported the trial court’s conclusion that there was no reasonable likelihood that these conditions
would be rectified within a reasonable time considering AJD’s age. See MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i);
Atchley, 341 Mich App at 343.
Given respondent’s unstable housing, continued emotional instability, consistent positive
drug tests, and refusal to take accountability for her substance use, the trial court did not clearly
err by finding by clear and convincing evidence that respondent’s barriers to reunification
continued to exist. 3 See Baham, 331 Mich App at 751.
3 As previously noted, the trial court also terminated respondent’s parental rights under
MCL 712A.19b(j) (reasonable likelihood of harm if returned to parent). But “[o]nly one statutory
ground need be established by clear and convincing evidence to terminate a respondent’s parental
rights.” In re Ellis, 294 Mich App 30, 32; 817 NW2d 111 (2011). Moreover, because the record
reflects that AJD suffered emotional harm when she was previously in respondent’s care and
because respondent failed to comply with her service plan, we agree that there was a reasonable
likelihood that AJD would be harmed if returned to respondent’s care. Therefore, termination was
also proper under MCL 712A.19b(j).

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IV. BEST-INTEREST DETERMINATION
Respondent also argues that the trial court erred by finding that termination was in AJD’s
best interests. Specifically, respondent argues that the trial court failed to give adequate weight to
AJD’s placement with relatives, and failed to consider alternatives to termination of her parental
rights, such as a guardianship under MCL 722.875b. We disagree.
A trial court should weigh all available evidence to determine what is in the child’s best
interests. In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 713; 846 NW2d 61 (2014). In doing so, courts may
consider factors such as
the child’s bond to the parent, the parent’s parenting ability, the child’s need for
permanency, stability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster home over the
parent’s home. The trial court may also consider a parent’s history of domestic
violence, the parent’s compliance with his or her case service plan, the parent’s
visitation history with the child, the children’s well-being while in care, and the
possibility of adoption. [Id. at 713-714.]
A trial court must also consider a child’s placement with relatives, which ordinarily weighs against
termination. Atchley, 341 Mich App at 347. However, the fact that a child is placed with relatives
is not dispositive and a trial court “may terminate parental rights in lieu of placement with relatives
if it finds that termination is in the child’s best interests.” Id., quoting Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App
at 43.
The trial court did not clearly err when it concluded that termination was in AJD’s best
interests. The court noted that respondent and the child shared a strong bond, which is a factor
that weighs against termination. See In re White, 303 Mich App at 713. And it recognized that
AJD’s placement with relatives would also ordinarily weigh against termination. In re Atchley,
341 Mich App at 347. However, the majority of the best interest factors supported the trial court’s
conclusion that terminating respondent’s parental rights was in AJD’s best interest. Respondent’s
caseworker testified that AJD struggled with the lack of permanency and stability in her life. The
caseworker and AJD’s therapist both noted that she was doing well and felt safe at her aunt and
uncle’s house. AJD’s therapist also testified that the neglect AJD had experienced in respondent’s
care continued to have an emotional impact on AJD. Additionally, the trial court noted that
respondent failed to follow the terms of her service plan and had repeatedly denied using
methamphetamine despite numerous positive drug screens. These factors all indicate that
reunification was not in AJD’s best interests. See White, 303 Mich App at 713-714.
Respondent argues that, because AJD was placed with relatives, the trial court erred by
failing to consider alternatives to termination of her parental rights, such as a guardianship under
MCL 722.875b. However, “[a] trial court is not required to establish a guardianship in lieu of
termination if it is not in the child’s best interests to do so.” In re Lombard, ___ Mich App ___;
___ NW3d ___ (2024) (Docket No. 367714); slip op at 6. In this case, AJD’s aunt and uncle had
previously been AJD’s guardians, but the caseworker opined that another guardianship would not
give AJD the permanency and stability she needed. The trial court additionally noted that
respondent had no relationship with AJD’s aunt and uncle, who were willing to adopt AJD. The
trial court did not clearly err by not considering implementing an additional guardianship because

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it properly determined that termination was in AJD’s best interests. See Baham, 331 Mich App
at 751.
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael F. Gadola
/s/ Mark T. Boonstra
/s/ Sima G. Patel

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