COA 370342 PEOPLE OF MI V WILLIAM GRANT MANN Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 2/10/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
UNPUBLISHED
February 10, 2026
11:52 AM
V No. 370342
Lapeer Circuit Court
WILLIAM GRANT MANN, LC No. 2022-014196-FC
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: RICK, P.J., and YATES and MARIANI, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant, William Grant Mann, was convicted by a jury of sexually abusing his daughter,
TS, when she was young. Throughout the trial, the prosecution consistently argued that defendant
committed the crime of first-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC-I), MCL 750.520b(1)(a) (victim
under 13 years of age), by making TS perform fellatio on him. But the prosecution was less clear
about the theory that supported the charge that defendant committed second-degree criminal sexual
conduct (CSC-II), MCL 750.520c(1)(a) (victim under 13 years of age), with TS. Nonetheless, the
jurors convicted defendant of both CSC-I and CSC-II, and defendant was sentenced to serve 25 to
40 years in prison for the CSC-I conviction, and 5 to 15 years in prison for the CSC-II conviction,
to be served concurrently. On appeal, defendant challenges both of his convictions, but neither of
his sentences. We affirm the conviction of CSC-I, but vacate the conviction of CSC-II and remand
the case for further proceedings on the CSC-II charge only.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
TS was born in August 2001. She initially lived with her parents and siblings in a trailer.
In December 2011, she moved with her family to a house in Lapeer. TS described her relationship
with defendant as similar to “a boyfriend/girlfriend relationship.” She said that, before her family
moved, defendant told her to use a vibrator while he watched her. After TS and her family moved,
TS explained that defendant would ask her, “[w]hat do I get in return?” if she wanted something.
According to TS, defendant meant he “wanted a hand job or a blow job[,]” so TS would “rub [her]
hand up and down his penis until he came.” She testified that that first happened when she was
“10 or 11” years old, and it took place “every couple weeks.” TS stated that the abuse occurred in

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defendant’s bathroom, on his bed, or in a hot tub that was “in the master bedroom right next to the
bathroom.” TS testified that defendant “had me come into the hot tub with him clothingless, and
he would have me give him a hand job as he touched my clitoris.” TS’s mother, T. Pack, testified
that the hot tub in the master bedroom did not work until a year or two after the family moved into
the house in Lapeer in December 2011.
TS also testified that defendant “would have [her] put [her] mouth on his penis” when she
was 11 years old. She stated “he would grab the back of my head by my hair [and] push my head
back and forth.” TS further explained that when she was 11 years old, defendant “put his penis on
my vagina” and had her “slide back and forth.” According to TS, that occurred “in the bath tub of
the master” bathroom, but Pack and TS’s brother, WLM, testified that there was no bathtub in the
master bathroom. During the time that the sexual activities were taking place, defendant told TS:
“You can’t say anything to anybody. If you do I’ll get taken away from you. You don’t want your
dad being taken away from you, do you? What about your siblings? Just promise me you won’t
say anything.”
TS testified that the assaults stopped when she was 13 years old because she started having
periods, and defendant said to her “[t]hat’s gross.” Years later, in May 2021, TS moved out of her
family’s house and began going to counseling. She told her counselor “about some of the problems
that I was having living on my own.” When the counselor asked TS “what could trigger that,” TS
told her about defendant’s abuse. TS initially indicated that she had not talked to defendant since
she moved out, but she later stated that defendant did visit her house with her siblings.
Defendant was first charged in a criminal complaint filed in October 2021 with two counts
of CSC-I, the first count under MCL 750.520b(1)(a) (victim under 13 years of age), and the second
count under MCL 750.520b(1)(b)(ii) (victim between 13 and 16 years of age and defendant related
to victim). At the preliminary examination, TS testified that defendant “asked me to perform oral
sex” when she was “around nine” years old in “2008.”1 She stated that the incident when defendant
“rubbed his penis against [her] vagina” took place when she was “[a]round nine or ten” years old.
Based on that testimony, the district court permitted the prosecution to amend the second count to
include a charge of CSC-II, under MCL 750.520c(1)(b)(ii) (victim between 13 and 16 years of age
and defendant related to victim).
In March 2022, the prosecution filed a two-count information against defendant. Count 1
alleged CSC-I by “sexual penetration, to-wit: Defendant’s Penis to Victim’s Mouth, with a child
under 13 years of age,” whereas Count 2 charged “sexual contact” with TS, a “victim being at least
13 but less than 16 years of age. . . .” The prosecution filed a first amended information in February
2023. In that amended information, the CSC-I charge in Count 1 remained the same, alleging that
defendant engaged “in sexual penetration, to-wit: entry into Victim’s mouth by Defendant’s Penis,
with a child under 13 years of age . . . .” But the CSC-II charge in Count 2 was revised to accuse
defendant of “sexual contact with a person under 13 years of age . . . .” The prosecution amended
the information again before trial in November 2023. The second amended information contained
the same CSC-I charge in Count 1, accusing defendant of engaging “in sexual penetration, to-wit:
entry into Victim’s mouth by Defendant’s Penis, with a child under 13 years of age . . . .” Likewise,
1 TS was born in 2001, so she could not have been nine years old in 2008.

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Count 2 of the second amended information set forth the same CSC-II charge as the first amended
information, alleging that defendant “did engage in sexual contact with a person under 13 years of
age . . . .” Defendant’s trial began one week after the second amended information was filed.
At defendant’s trial, the trial court instructed the jury on the nature of the CSC-I charge in
Count 1, stating that the prosecution had to prove “that the Defendant engaged in a sexual act that
involved entry into [TS]’s mouth by the Defendant’s penis.” That language matched the allegation
in Count 1 of the information. But the trial court’s instructions on the CSC-II charge in Count 2
gave the jury two options, stating that “the prosecutor must prove . . . that Defendant intentionally
touched [TS]’s genital area or intentionally made [TS] touch his genital area.” The jury convicted
defendant on both counts, and the trial court thereafter sentenced defendant to concurrent terms of
imprisonment on the two counts of conviction.
After defendant appealed to this Court, he filed a motion in the trial court for a new trial or
a Ginther2 hearing. In that motion, defendant contended that his convictions were against the great
weight of the evidence because TS’s trial testimony “was heavily impeached and contradicted on
key points.” Defendant further asserted that his trial counsel was ineffective for: (1) not adequately
impeaching TS; (2) not adequately impeaching Pack or moving for a mistrial; (3) not requesting a
specific unanimity instruction; and (4) not moving to inspect TS’s counseling records.3 Defendant
attached text messages that he and TS exchanged from May 2021 to August 2021, which defendant
allegedly gave to his attorney before trial.
The trial court denied defendant’s motion for a new trial or a Ginther hearing.4 Addressing
the claim about the great weight of the evidence, the trial court found that defendant had not shown
a “compelling reason why the jury should have had serious doubts about [TS]’s credibility . . . .”
Also, the trial court concluded that defense counsel was not ineffective because it was objectively
reasonable not to impeach TS or Pack, and defense counsel’s decision not to seek TS’s counseling
records was reasonable because he lacked a good-faith belief to request those records. Finally, the
trial court determined that defense counsel’s failure to request a specific unanimity instruction was
deficient because the prosecution had presented evidence of materially distinct acts to support the
CSC-II conviction, but defendant was not prejudiced because the evidence underlying his CSC-I
conviction, i.e., that he forced TS to perform fellatio, similarly supported his CSC-II conviction.
2 People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).
3 Defendant also argued that the cumulative effect of the instances of ineffective assistance denied
him a fair trial.
4 Defendant moved in this Court for a remand, arguing a Ginther hearing was necessary to develop
the record for appellate review, but this Court denied that motion “without prejudice to a case call
panel of this Court determining that remand is necessary[.]” People v Mann, unpublished order of
the Court of Appeals, entered July 9, 2025 (Docket No. 370342). For the reasons set forth in this
opinion, we continue to see no need for a remand to properly adjudicate defendant’s ineffective-
assistance claim on appeal.

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II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
On appeal, defendant presents two issues. First, he asserts that both of his convictions were
against the great weight of the evidence because TS’s testimony was incredible and contradictory.
Second, he requests a new trial because he claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel
from his trial attorney. We shall address those two arguments in turn.
A. GREAT WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE
Defendant argues that both of his convictions were against the great weight of the evidence.
A trial court’s denial of a motion for a new trial based on the great weight of the evidence is subject
to review for abuse of discretion. People v Unger, 278 Mich App 210, 232; 749 NW2d 272 (2008).
“An abuse of discretion occurs when a trial court chooses an outcome falling outside the range of
reasonable and principled outcomes.” People v Lacalamita, 286 Mich App 467, 469; 780 NW2d
311 (2009) (citation omitted). A jury’s verdict is contrary to the great weight of the evidence only
when “the evidence preponderates so heavily against the verdict that it would be a miscarriage of
justice to allow the verdict to stand.” People v Anderson, 341 Mich App 272, 276-277; 989 NW2d
832 (2022) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, defendant has failed to demonstrate that
his two convictions were against the great weight of the evidence because the credibility issues on
which he bases his claim are insufficient grounds to warrant a new trial.
Defendant was convicted on charges of CSC-I and CSC-II. The elements of CSC-I are:
“(1) the defendant engaged in sexual penetration, (2) with a person under 13 years of age.” People
v Duenaz, 306 Mich App 85, 106; 854 NW2d 531 (2014), citing MCL 750.520b(1)(a). “ ‘Sexual
penetration’ means . . . ‘fellatio, . . . or any other intrusion, however slight, of any part of a person’s
body or of any object into the genital or anal openings of another person’s body . . . .’ ” Duenaz,
306 Mich App at 106, quoting MCL 750.520a(r). “The elements of CSC-II are: (1) the defendant
engaged in sexual contact, (2) with a person under 13 years of age.” Duenaz, 306 Mich App at
106, citing MCL 750.520c(1)(a). “Sexual contact” means “the intentional touching of the victim’s
or actor’s intimate parts” if the “intentional touching can reasonably be construed as being for the
purpose of sexual arousal or gratification, done for a sexual purpose, or in a sexual manner . . . .”
MCL 750.520a(q). TS testified that defendant committed several sexual acts constituting CSC-I,
i.e., fellatio, or CSC-II, such as making TS touch defendant’s penis, touching TS’s genitals, and
rubbing defendant’s penis against TS’s vagina. No evidence contradicted that testimony from TS.
Consequently, defendant can only rely on the argument that TS’s credibility was undermined by
impeachment.
Credibility issues undermine a verdict only when the “testimony contradicts indisputable
facts or laws,” is “patently incredible or defies physical realities,” is “material and . . . so inherently
implausible that it could not be believed by a reasonable juror,” or “has been seriously impeached
and the case is marked by uncertainties and discrepancies.” People v Solloway, 316 Mich App
174, 183; 891 NW2d 255 (2016) (quotation marks and citation omitted). TS’s testimony does not
even approach any of those stringent standards.
Defendant contends that TS’s testimony was seriously impeached by Pack and WLM. TS
said one of the incidents of sexual abuse, when defendant touched her genital area with his penis,
occurred in a bathtub in the master bathroom. Pack and WLM testified that there was not a bathtub

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in the master bathroom. By claiming that the testimony of Pack and WLM made it impossible for
abuse to have occurred in the bathtub, defendant effectively asks this Court to find that Pack and
WLM were telling the truth and TS was lying. Yet this Court cannot interfere with the jury’s role
of assessing witness credibility. Id. at 181-182. Further, any conflict in the witnesses’ testimony
was immaterial in establishing the elements of the offenses. The prosecution just had to prove that
defendant committed sexual penetration or engaged in sexual contact with a person under 13 years
of age. Duenaz, 306 Mich App at 106. Where the penetration or contact occurred is not an element
of CSC-I or CSC-II.
Defendant’s assertion that sexual abuse could not have occurred in the hot tub in the master
bedroom also lacks merit. According to TS, the hot tub was one place where defendant forced her
to touch his penis. Pack testified that, after the family moved in December 2011, the hot tub did
not work for one to two years. TS never specifically stated that defendant assaulted her in the hot
tub in 2011 or 2012. And even if her testimony contradicted Pack’s testimony, where the assaults
occurred was immaterial. Any inconsistency about the hot tub would only affect when the assaults
occurred. The prosecution had to prove that TS was not yet 13 years old when the crimes occurred.
Duenaz, 306 Mich App at 106. TS never claimed that the abuse started after she was 12 years old,
and regardless of any inconsistencies in witness testimony regarding their timing, the record leaves
no doubt that the sexual assaults ended before TS turned 13. And again, we see no basis to interfere
with the jury’s credibility assessments. See Soloway, 316 Mich App at 181-182. Defendant has
not shown that the claimed discrepancies regarding the timing of the sexual assaults had any effect
on the validity of the jury’s verdicts.
Similarly, TS’s inconsistent testimony about when the sexual abuse began and ended does
not undermine the jury’s verdicts. TS said that defendant started forcing her to touch his penis and
perform fellatio after they moved into the house. TS initially said that her family moved when she
was 10 or 11 years old, but later stated that they moved in 2013, when she was 11 or 12 years old.
After Pack had her memory refreshed, she testified that the family moved in December 2011 when
TS was 10 years old. TS also claimed that defendant stopped assaulting her at about the time her
grandmother moved in, which Pack said was in 2013. None of that testimony reveals a material
contradiction that would entitle defendant to a new trial. Whether defendant started abusing TS
when she was 10, 11, or 12 years old was immaterial because TS never said the sexual abuse began
after she was 13 years old. TS’s inability to pinpoint exactly when defendant started abusing her
does not entitle him to a new trial. Indeed, although inconsistencies about the dates of the offenses
might “have affected the weight the jury chose to accord [TS’s] testimony,” those inconsistencies
“would not necessarily have negated its substance[,]” so we may not “assume the jury’s role of
weighing the evidence or of assessing complainant’s credibility.” People v Naugle, 152 Mich App
227, 236; 393 NW2d 592 (1986).
Finally, defendant contends that TS’s inability to remember when she stopped talking with
defendant undermined her credibility. TS initially said that she stopped talking to defendant after
she moved out of the family’s house, but she acknowledged that defendant visited her new home.
TS’s contact with defendant after she moved out is completely unrelated to the elements necessary
to sustain his convictions, i.e., whether he committed sexual penetration and sexual contact when
TS was under 13 years of age. This Court can interfere with the jury’s credibility assessment when
witness testimony is seriously impeached or is material and inherently implausible. Solloway, 316
Mich App at 183. A single inconsistency over an immaterial issue does not justify interfering with

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the jury’s role. Because a reasonable jury could find that TS’s testimony was credible, defendant’s
convictions were not against the great weight of the evidence.
B. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Defendant contends he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his trial attorney
(1) failed to adequately impeach TS, (2) failed to adequately impeach Pack or move for a mistrial,
(3) failed to move to review counseling records of TS, and (4) failed to request a specific unanimity
instruction. Defendant further asserts that the cumulative effect of all those instances of ineffective
assistance of counsel denied him a fair trial. An ineffective assistance of counsel claim presents a
mixed question of fact and constitutional law. People v Hoang, 328 Mich App 45, 63; 935 NW2d
396 (2019). This Court reviews the trial court’s findings of fact for clear error, and constitutional
issues are reviewed de novo. Id.
To obtain a new trial, defendant must first show that his counsel’s performance “fell below
an objective standard of reasonableness . . . .” People v Trakhtenberg, 493 Mich 38, 51; 826 NW2d
136 (2012) (citations omitted). Second, defendant must show that counsel’s deficient performance
prejudiced him, meaning that there must be “a reasonable probability that the outcome would have
been different” if defense counsel had satisfied the constitutional standard of effective assistance.
Id. (citations omitted). With these standards in mind, we shall address each of defendant’s claims
of deficient performance by his trial attorney.
1. IMPEACHMENT OF TS
Defendant argues that counsel should have attacked TS’s credibility using her preliminary
examination testimony and text messages, which revealed that TS stayed in contact with defendant
after she left the family house, contrary to her trial testimony. This Court does not “second-guess
counsel on matters of trial strategy,” including “how to question witnesses” at trial. People v Horn,
279 Mich App 31, 39; 755 NW2d 212 (2008) (citations omitted). But counsel may be ineffective
if counsel unreasonably fails to develop defenses by adequately impeaching the witnesses against
the defendant. People v Lane, 308 Mich App 38, 68; 862 NW2d 446 (2014).
During the preliminary examination, TS testified that defendant began abusing her in 2008,
when she was seven years old, or when she was nine years old. TS did not say that abuse occurred
in the bathtub in defendant’s master bathroom, nor did she say that defendant forced her to touch
his penis. But as we have already explained, those specific details about when and where defendant
abused TS, and how long she stayed in contact with him, are immaterial to proving the elements
of defendant’s crimes.5 As a matter of strategy, a trial attorney can choose not to impeach a witness
“on all contradictory aspects” of the witness’s testimony. People v McFadden, 159 Mich App
796, 800; 407 NW2d 78 (1987) (citation omitted). Here, trial counsel challenged TS’s credibility
5 Defendant provides no authority for his claim that TS’s failure to testify about each alleged sexual
act at the preliminary examination undermines TS’s credibility. Because “[a]n appellant may not
merely announce his position and leave it to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for his
claims,” People v Kelly, 231 Mich App 627, 640-641; 508 NW2d 480 (1998), we decline to give
any further consideration to that argument.

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extensively during the trial, and defendant has failed to show that it was objectively unreasonable
for counsel not to attempt to attack TS’s credibility based upon each and every inconsistency and
omission in her preliminary examination testimony and her text messages with defendant.
2. IMPEACHMENT OF PACK
Contrary to defendant’s contention, his trial attorney did not perform deficiently by failing
to impeach Pack or request a mistrial based on her allegedly incomplete testimony. At trial, Pack
did not recall when the hot tub in the master bedroom was fixed. In posttrial proceedings, defense
counsel alleged that Pack repeatedly told him the date on which the hot tub was fixed, although
defense counsel never said what that date was. Further, Pack allegedly told defense counsel that
she demanded that TS move out of the family home, but Pack did not testify about that during trial.
Defendant insists that defense counsel should have asked Pack about their conversations. Beyond
that, because defense counsel could not testify, pursuant to Michigan Rule of Professional Conduct
MRPC 3.7, counsel should have demanded a mistrial because his inability to effectively impeach
Pack undermined defendant’s right to a fair trial. We find defense counsel’s refusal to undertake
such a maneuver objectively reasonable. To obtain a mistrial, the party seeking relief must show
that “the error complained of is so egregious that the prejudicial effect can be removed in no other
way.” People v Dickinson, 321 Mich App 1, 18; 909 NW2d 24 (2017) (quotation marks and
citation omitted). As we have explained, when the hot tub was fixed and the circumstances of TS
moving out of the house were immaterial to proving defendant’s crimes. Defense counsel need
not highlight every single contradiction in a witness’s testimony to provide effective assistance.
McFadden, 159 Mich App at 800. A motion for a mistrial would have been meritless, and failing
to raise a meritless argument is not ineffective assistance of counsel. People v Ericksen, 288 Mich
App 192, 201; 793 NW2d 120 (2010).
3. TS’S COUNSELING RECORDS
Defendant argues that his attorney should have moved to inspect TS’s counseling records.
A trial court may inspect privileged records in camera when a defendant establishes “a good-faith
belief, grounded on some demonstrable fact, that there is a reasonable probability that the records
are likely to contain material information necessary to the defense.” People v Stanaway, 446 Mich
643, 677; 521 NW2d 557 (1994); see MCR 6.201(C)(2). Defendant contends that the information
in WLM’s affidavit created a reasonable probability of material information. Specifically, WLM
stated that TS’s allegations against defendant “were brought out by a counselor and questions that
she had asked [TS].” TS told her counselor about defendant’s abuse after the counselor asked her
about issues she was having with living on her own. But information about the counseling session
is immaterial to the defense because when or how a victim discloses sexual abuse is not an element
of CSC-I or CSC-II. Neither WLM’s affidavit nor TS’s testimony offers any basis for defendant’s
suggestion that the counselor may have convinced TS to fabricate her abuse allegations. The mere
statement that the counselor “brought out” the allegations does not furnish a good-faith belief that
TS’s allegations were fabricated. Had defense counsel moved to inspect TS’s counseling records,
the motion would have been denied because it was just based on “a hope of corroborating evidence,
untethered to any articulable facts.” People v Davis-Christian, 316 Mich App 204, 213; 891 NW2d
250 (2016). Defense counsel was not deficient for failing to make a meritless argument like that.
Ericksen, 288 Mich App at 201.

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4. SPECIFIC UNANIMITY INSTRUCTION
Defendant asserts that his attorney performed ineffectively by failing to request a specific
unanimity instruction on the CSC-II charge,6 and the trial court agreed that the failure to make that
request constituted deficient performance. A jury verdict must be unanimous, MCR 6.410(B), and
the trial court instructed the jurors that they had to reach a unanimous verdict. If “the state offers
evidence of multiple acts by a defendant, each of which would satisfy the actus reus element of a
single charged offense, the trial court is required to instruct the jury that it must unanimously agree
on the same specific act if the acts are materially distinct or if there is reason to believe the jurors
may be confused or disagree about the factual basis of the defendant’s guilt.” People v Cooks, 446
Mich 503, 530; 521 NW2d 275 (1994).
Analyzing defendant’s motion for a new trial, the trial court forthrightly acknowledged that
“the court’s instructions to the jury on the elements of criminal sexual conduct in the second degree
were insufficient because they permitted the jury to find the defendant guilty if each member of
the jury was convinced the defendant either touched the victim’s genitals or had the victim touch
his genitals, but did not require the jury to make a unanimous finding that he touched her or she
touched him.” Thus, the trial court ruled that “[t]rial counsel’s performance was . . . deficient for
failing to request a specific unanimity instruction.” We agree with the trial court’s analysis and its
conclusion that defendant’s trial counsel provided deficient representation in that respect.
We part ways with the trial court, however, on the issue of prejudice flowing from defense
counsel’s deficient performance. The trial court determined that the lack of a specific unanimity
instruction did not prejudice defendant because the evidence supporting defendant’s conviction of
CSC-I, i.e., that defendant forced TS to perform fellatio, also supported a CSC-II conviction. The
same evidence can support convictions of CSC-I and CSC-II. Duenaz, 306 Mich App at 107. But
here, the trial court instructed the jurors that, to convict defendant of CSC-II, they had to find that
defendant “intentionally touched [TS’s] genital area or intentionally made [TS] touch his genital
area.” Those two options did not include fellatio, which was mentioned only in the explanation of
the CSC-I charge in Count 1. Because jurors are presumed to follow their instructions, People v
Leffew, 508 Mich 625, 654; 975 NW2d 896 (2022), the jury could not have convicted defendant
of CSC-II based upon the same evidence that supported his CSC-I conviction. Consequently, we
conclude that defendant was prejudiced by his trial counsel’s failure to request a specific unanimity
instruction on Count 2 only, so we vacate defendant’s conviction of CSC-II and remand for further
proceeding on that count only. Defendant’s CSC-I conviction on Count 1 is affirmed because a
specific unanimity instruction was not warranted as to the CSC-I charge in Court 1.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings on Count 2 only.
We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Michelle M. Rick
/s/ Christopher P. Yates
/s/ Philip P. Mariani
6 Defendant properly does not fault his attorney for failing to seek a specific unanimity instruction
on CSC-I because the prosecution and the trial court described that charge as based only on fellatio.

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