COA 371595 NORMAN YATOOMA V FLEMING & BOROWICZ PLC Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 8/19/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
NORMAN YATOOMA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
UNPUBLISHED
August 19, 2026
2:09 PM
v No. 371595
Wayne Circuit Court
FLEMING & BOROWICZ, PLC, formerly known as
FLEMING, YATOOMA & BOROWICZ, PLC,
GAVIN FLEMING, and BENJAMIN BAYRAM,
LC No. 23-013349-NM
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: CAMERON, P.J., and MALDONADO and WALLACE, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff, Norman Yatooma, appeals by right the order granting summary disposition to
defendants, Fleming & Borowicz, PLC (“F&B”),1 Gavin Fleming, and Benjamin Bayram, on
plaintiff’s claims of legal malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, and tortious interference with a
business relationship or expectancy. The trial court did not err in granting summary disposition
because plaintiff failed to meet his burden to submit documentary evidence to rebut defendants’
assertions that no genuine issues of material fact existed, and plaintiff otherwise failed to show
that defendants were not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
This case arises from a 2008 loan of $1.5 million from PNC Bank that plaintiff failed to
timely repay, a 2020 judgment in favor of PNC that plaintiff did not satisfy until 2023, and a 2021
offer by defendant Bayram to purchase the PNC judgment on behalf of plaintiff’s brother, Jeffrey
Yatooma (Jeffrey), who was defending a different lawsuit in which plaintiff was an opposing party.
Plaintiff, an attorney practicing law since 1997, secured the $1.5 million loan with a commercial
guaranty, and the terms provided payment was due on demand. Beginning in 2010, PNC sent
1 The firm was formerly known as Fleming, Yatooma & Borowicz, PLC. Plaintiff’s brother,
Gregory Yatooma, was formerly a named member, but left the firm.

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demand letters to plaintiff, but he did not repay the loan or settle with PNC. In 2012, an attorney
representing the bank sent an email to plaintiff, inquiring as to whether a $250,000 settlement of
the debt was an option, but also indicating that any such deal would first require defendant to send
his firm’s financial documents to PNC for review.2 Plaintiff responded that such a settlement was
not an option because he did not have the ability to pay that amount at that time. In 2016, PNC
brought an action in federal district court against plaintiff’s law firm3 and plaintiff alleging breach
of promissory note and breach of guarantee. Fleming represented plaintiff in the PNC lawsuit.
Meanwhile, in 2019, plaintiff and his brother Jeffrey jointly formed Cannabis Property
Brokers, LLC, and raised $6 million with the help of an investment firm, of which plaintiff was a
member.
The PNC lawsuit resulted in a 2020 judgment of over $2.1 million, which the Sixth Circuit
affirmed. PNC Bank, Nat’l Ass’n v Legal Advocacy, PC, 841 Fed Appx 755 (CA 6, 2020).4
The investment firm, Value Investors, sued Jeffrey in May 2021 over a dispute arising from
the above-referenced investment. Plaintiff was later added as a third-party defendant in that case
and was represented by an attorney who worked with him. Bayram, who was affiliated with F&B
at the time, represented Jeffrey in the Value Investors lawsuit, a fact of which plaintiff was aware
given Bayram’s attendance at the settlement conferences and mediation. Plaintiff did not move to
disqualify Bayram. On October 15, 2021, Bayram contacted PNC’s counsel via email and stated
that Jeffrey desired to purchase PNC’s judgment against plaintiff. PNC did not sell the judgment
to Jeffrey and, as noted, resolved the matter with plaintiff in 2023.
For at least two years, plaintiff failed to satisfy the PNC judgment, and PNC’s efforts to
collect were unsuccessful, so the court eventually granted PNC’s request for a receiver. See PNC
Bank, Nat’l Ass’n v Legal Advocacy, PC, 626 F Supp 3d 972, 980 (ED Mich, 2022). The parties
reached a settlement for over $2.5 million in 2023.
In October 2023, two years after Bayram’s October 2021 email offer to purchase the PNC
judgment, plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit, stating that the Michigan Rules of Professional
Conduct (MRPC) would have prohibited Fleming from representing Jeffrey in the Value Investors
lawsuit such that Bayram and F&B likewise were barred from representing Jeffrey. Plaintiff
alleged that Bayram’s conduct was “ultimately devastating” to the settlement negotiations in the
2 Although the email sent by PNC’s attorney to plaintiff does not appear to constitute an actual
settlement offer, due to the fact that it was contingent upon PNC reviewing plaintiff’s firm’s
financial documents, for the sake of simplicity, we will refer to it as a conditional offer.
3 Defendant’s firm, Legal Advocacy, was formerly known as Norman Yatooma & Associates, PC.
4 The Sixth Circuit’s opinion in that matter, which issued September 7, 2022, indicated that
plaintiff’s last voluntary payment on the balance of the loan occurred in 2010. The money
judgment in the amount of $2,141,524.68 entered against plaintiff and his law firm, jointly and
severally, consisted of “the principal in the amount of $1,499,276.36, accrued but unpaid interest
in the amount of $445,961.83, a late charge of $21,993.05, reasonable attorneys’ fees of
$165,450.50, non-attorney fees of $1,539.00, and other expenses of $7,117.98.” Id. at 974.

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PNC lawsuit, claiming that PNC first offered to settle for $250,000, but after Bayram’s email, the
settlement was over $2.5 million. Plaintiff alleged legal malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, and
tortious interference with a business relationship or expectancy.
Defendants moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7), (8), and (10),
arguing that plaintiff had not shown the individual defendants committed legal malpractice. The
motion argued that plaintiff did not allege that Fleming, with whom plaintiff had an attorney-client
relationship, breached a duty or caused damages, and did not allege he had an attorney-client
relationship with Bayram.
Defendants also argued that plaintiff’s legal malpractice claim must fail because it was
based it on an alleged breach of the MRPC, which does give rise to a cause of action for legal
malpractice. Further, defendants contended plaintiff did not show any causal relationship between
Bayram’s email and damages. In order to prevail under this theory, defendant argued that plaintiff
would have to prove that he would have been successful in compromising the PNC judgment if
Bayram had not sent the October 2021 email to PNC’s attorney. But, according to defendants, the
evidence demonstrated that plaintiff rejected PNC’s 2012 conditional offer to settle for $250,000
because he could not pay it and later filed for bankruptcy twice. Plaintiff likewise did not
demonstrate that Bayram’s single email, which was made nine years after the conditional $250,000
offer was made, influenced the negotiations to settle the PNC judgment. Defendants also relied
on the doctrines of equitable estoppel and unclean hands, and maintained that the statute of
limitations and laches barred plaintiff’s legal malpractice claim. Finally, defendants argued
plaintiff’s remaining claims of breach of fiduciary duty and tortious interference with a business
relationship or expectancy should be dismissed because they were merely restatements of
plaintiff’s legal malpractice claim. Defendants attached multiple documents and affidavits to
support their motion, including an affidavit by Fleming swearing, inter alia, that Bayram was never
an employee of F&B and never had an ownership interest in F&B.
Plaintiff’s response to the motion for summary disposition argued in support of his legal
malpractice claim that he had an attorney-client relationship with Fleming and F&B, as well as
Bayram. It further argued Bayram should have been disqualified from representing Jeffrey, and
F&B’s position that Bayram was not its employee was untrue. Plaintiff argued the doctrine of
equitable estoppel did not apply and defendants were attempting to confuse the issue by relying
on irrelevant facts. Plaintiff contended the statute of limitations did not bar his malpractice claim
given that the conduct at issue occurred within two years of the instant lawsuit. Plaintiff stated
that his damages were a direct result of defendants’ wrongful conduct because Bayram’s
interference prolonged plaintiff’s settlement negotiations with PNC. Plaintiff went on to
distinguish the caselaw defendants cited in support of their contention that his claims of breach of
fiduciary duty and tortious interference with a business relationship or expectancy should be
dismissed. Finally, plaintiff maintained that any alleged misconduct by him arose after the alleged
malpractice such that the doctrine of unclean hands did not apply. Plaintiff attached nothing in
support of his response.
In their reply, defendants observed that plaintiff failed to provide any documentary
evidence in support of his stated facts and instead relied on the allegations in his complaint.
Defendants pointed out plaintiff failed to allege—or sustain—any wrongful act of Fleming.
Plaintiff also failed to challenge or contradict the affidavits of Fleming, Bayram, and PNC’s

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counsel, the last of whom stated that Bayram’s October 2021 email did not affect PNC’s decision
to seek total satisfaction of the judgment against plaintiff.
The trial court granted summary disposition for multiple reasons, including those expressed
in defendants’ brief supporting the motion for summary disposition. The court dismissed Fleming
under MCR 2.116(C)(8) because plaintiff failed to establish how Fleming’s representation
disqualified Bayram from representing Jeffery or communicating with PNC’s counsel. The court
ruled plaintiff could not maintain a malpractice claim against Bayram because not only did plaintiff
fail to allege an attorney-client relationship, he asserted that he and Bayram did not have an
attorney-client relationship. The court also noted that plaintiff failed to rebut the affidavit of PNC’s
counsel, and could not rely on conclusory assertions in his complaint. The trial court further
concluded that a violation of the MRPC did not give rise to a cause of action in legal malpractice.
The court decided that the equitable estoppel doctrine barred plaintiff’s malpractice claim, as did
the statute of limitations. Finally, the court dismissed plaintiff’s additional claims—breach of
fiduciary duty and tortious interference with a business relationship or expectancy—because they
were merely professional malpractice claims in disguise. Consequently, the court granted
summary disposition to all parties on all claims.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition under a de
novo standard. Yellow Tail Ventures, Inc v City of Berkley, 344 Mich App 689, 699; 1 NW3d 860
(2022). MCR 2.116(C)(7) provides in part that summary disposition may be brought on the basis
of an expired statute of limitations. In deciding a (C)(7) motion, a court considers the documentary
evidence submitted by the parties and accepts the complaint’s contents as true, unless they are
contradicted by documentary evidence. Soave v Dep’t of Treasury, 349 Mich App 516, 523; 28
NW3d 407 (2023). If the facts are not in dispute, whether a claim is barred by the statute of
limitations is a question of law subject to de novo review. In re Gerald L Pollack Trust, 309 Mich
App 125, 134; 867 NW2d 884 (2015). The application of equitable tolling is likewise a question
of law that is reviewed de novo. Knight v Northpointe Bank, 300 Mich App 109, 113; 832 NW2d
439 (2013).
Summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) is appropriately granted “when the opposing
party has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” Bodnar v St John Providence,
Inc, 327 Mich App 203, 212; 933 NW2d 363 (2019). “A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8) tests the
legal sufficiency of a complaint on the basis of the pleadings alone. All well-pleaded factual
allegations are to be accepted as true and are to be construed in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party.” Id. (citation omitted).
A motion for summary disposition citing MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests a complaint’s factual
sufficiency. Charter Twp of Pittsfield v Washtenaw Co Treasurer, 338 Mich App 440, 449; 980
NW2d 119 (2021). The moving party must identify and support the issues as to which it contends
no genuine issue of material fact exists. Id., citing MCR 2.116(G)(4). The court must examine
the “affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions, and other evidence” submitted with the motion,
and must do so in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. (quotation marks and citation
omitted). In response, the opposing party may not rely on only allegations or denials, it must
provide documentary evidence supporting specific facts to demonstrate that a genuine issue of

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material fact exists for trial. Id. In cases in which the trial court considered materials outside the
pleadings, including affidavits, we review the motion as having been granted under MCR
2.116(C)(10). See Cuddington v United Health Servs, Inc, 298 Mich App 264, 270; 826 NW2d
519 (2012).
III. ANALYSIS
Plaintiff argues the trial court erred in granting summary disposition of his claims. We
disagree.
Plaintiff contends the trial court erred in dismissing his legal malpractice claims because
Bayram should have been disqualified from representing Jeffrey’s interest against plaintiff in the
Value Investors lawsuit because Fleming represented plaintiff in the PNC lawsuit. Plaintiff’s
arguments do not withstand scrutiny.
In a legal malpractice action, a plaintiff has the burden of establishing four elements: “(1)
the existence of an attorney-client relationship; (2) negligence in the legal representation of the
plaintiff; (3) that the negligence was a proximate cause of an injury; and (4) the fact and extent of
the injury alleged.” Charles Reinhart Co v Winiemko, 444 Mich 579, 585-586; 513 NW2d 773
(1994) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
As to Fleming, plaintiff has not alleged that Fleming committed legal malpractice.
Plaintiff’s complaint indicates that Bayram, not Fleming, contacted PNC’s counsel to offer
Jeffery’s purchase of the PNC judgment. Further, plaintiff does not allege that Fleming
represented Jeffrey, or acted on Jeffrey’s behalf. Summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) is
properly granted “when the opposing party has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted.” Bodnar, 327 Mich App at 212. Even construing the allegations in the complaint in the
light most favorable to plaintiff, he has not alleged negligence in Fleming’s legal representation of
him in the PNC lawsuit. In view of that, the trial court properly dismissed the legal malpractice
claim against Fleming pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8).
Plaintiff’s legal malpractice claim also fails against Bayram because plaintiff has not
alleged that he had an attorney-client relationship with Bayram, and Bayram denies that he
represented plaintiff. Rather, plaintiff alleges that he had a relationship with F&B, and therefore
had a relationship with Bayram. He argues Bayram should have been barred from representing
Jeffery because Bayram worked with, if not for, the law firm that represented plaintiff in the PNC
lawsuit. Plaintiff’s argument relates more to an alleged conflict of interest, or an MRPC violation,
rather than legal malpractice. Further, plaintiff failed to rebut Fleming’s affidavit, which avers
that Bayrum was never an employee or owner of F&B. Because plaintiff failed to demonstrate an
attorney-client relationship between himself and Bayram to establish a question of material fact as
to the first element of a legal malpractice action, the trial court correctly granted summary
disposition to Bayram pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8).
Plaintiff also alleges that defendants violated the MRPC and, consequently, committed
malpractice. On appeal, plaintiff cites the rule regarding conflicts of interest, MRPC 1.7. But a

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violation of the MRPC does not give rise to a cause of action, as expressly noted in the rule
regarding the MRPC’s scope:
Failure to comply with an obligation or prohibition imposed by a rule is a
basis for invoking the disciplinary process. The rules do not, however, give rise to
a cause of action for enforcement of a rule or for damages caused by failure to
comply with an obligation or prohibition imposed by a rule. In a civil or criminal
action, the admissibility of the Rules of Professional Conduct is governed by the
Michigan Rules of Evidence and other provisions of law. [MRPC 1.0(b) (emphasis
added).]
The rule regarding the reporting of professional misconduct provides that a significant violation
of the MRPC is subject to disciplinary proceedings by the Attorney Grievance Commission.
MRPC 8.3(a). Further, as noted in In re Mardigian Estate, 502 Mich 154, 174; 917 NW2d 325
(2018) (MARKMAN, C.J., for an equally divided Court), private parties may not seek to enforce the
MRPC, and a breach of the MRPC does not create a cause of action.5
Plaintiff argues that his claims do not rely solely on the MRPC—his claims arose when
F&B took an adverse action in the PNC lawsuit while also representing plaintiff in that case.
Plaintiff asserts defendants “played a shell game” by arguing that Fleming did not represent
plaintiff in the Value Investors lawsuit and Bayram did not have an attorney-client relationship
with plaintiff. For purposes of the conflict of interest rules, attorneys working for a single law
firm are treated as one entity. MRPC 1.10(a). Again, plaintiff’s argument pertains to a potential
conflict of interest rather than a legal malpractice action. Plaintiff recognizes this fact when he
notes that Bayram “should have been disqualified” and the offer to purchase was a “most egregious
conflict of interest.” Even assuming for the sake of argument that a conflict existed,6 plaintiff has
not demonstrated the second element of a legal malpractice claim—proximate cause.
Plaintiff maintains he has shown causation because defendants’ alleged interference
prolonged the settlement negotiations between plaintiff and PNC and the final settlement was well
above the amount of the judgment. We disagree.
A claim of malpractice requires an actual injury that was caused by the malpractice.
Colbert v Conybeare Law Office, 239 Mich App 608, 620; 609 NW2d 208 (2000). To prevail in
a legal malpractice lawsuit, a plaintiff must also establish that, but for the attorney’s negligence,
5 To be clear, this Court makes no finding on whether defendants violated any portion of the
MRPC; rather, consistent with In re Mardigian Estate, this Court finds that allegations of a
violation of the MRPC do not give rise to a claim of legal malpractice in Michigan.
6 “It is a well-established ethical principle that an attorney owes undivided allegiance to a client
and usually may not represent parties on both sides of a dispute.” Killingbeck v Killingbeck, 269
Mich App 132, 148; 711 NW2d 759 (2005) (quotation marks and citations omitted). “The
Michigan Rules of Professional Conduct (MRPC) generally prohibit an attorney from representing
multiple clients when the representation of one client is directly adverse to, or may materially limit,
the attorney’s representation of another client.” Id., citing MRPC 1.7.

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the outcome would have been in plaintiff’s favor. Radtke v Miller, Canfield, Paddock & Stone,
453 Mich 413, 424; 551 NW2d 698 (1996). Generally, proximate cause is a question of fact, but
the court should decide the issue as a matter of law if reasonable minds could not differ on the
point. Farmer v Christensen, 229 Mich App 417, 424; 581 NW2d 807 (1998). To establish
proximate cause, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant’s act was a cause in fact of the
injury at issue. In other words, a plaintiff must show that but for the alleged malpractice, the
plaintiff’s underlying suit would have succeeded. Manzo v Petrella, 261 Mich App 705, 712; 683
NW2d 699 (2004). “This is the ‘suit within a suit’ requirement in legal malpractice cases.” Id.
Plaintiff asserts that, but for Bayram’s interference, the PNC lawsuit would have settled
earlier, and would have settled for less. In support, plaintiff points to PNC’s conditional offer to
settle the matter for $250,000. First, plaintiff has supplied no actual evidence that such an offer
was made. Defendant has attached evidence consisting of affidavits and emails indicating that an
attorney representing PNC sent an email to plaintiff in 2012 asking whether a $250,000 settlement
of the debt owed by plaintiff was an option and, if so, plaintiff would have to furnish certain
financial statements to be evaluated by PNC. Thus, based on the evidence presented, what
occurred was, at best, an offer that was contingent upon PNC’s review of his law firm’s financial
records. Regardless, even if we treated the 2012 email as an offer to settle for $250,000, the
evidence before us shows that, not only did plaintiff reject that offer, he did so four years before
PNC filed its lawsuit, eight years before PNC obtained a $2.1 million judgment, and nine years
before Bayram’s inquiry about Jeffrey purchasing the judgment. Plaintiff has offered no evidence
to support the notion that PNC had any incentive whatsoever to settle for $250,000 once it obtained
the $2.1 million judgment.
We find this argument by plaintiff to be without merit. Paragraph 22 of plaintiff’s
complaint states: “Defendant Bayram’s conduct was ultimately devasting to the settlement
negotiations occurring in the PNC Case. While PNC Bank once offered to settle the matter for
$250,000.00, it ultimately extracted $2,549,792.52 from Plaintiff.” (Empasis added). Plaintiff
insinuates that he went from negotiating a $250,000 resolution of a debt to having to pay
$2,549,792.52 because of a single email Bayram sent to PNC two years before plaintiff resolved
the debt. Plaintiff’s argument ignores that: (1) plaintiff rejected the conditional offer in 2012; (2)
PNC was forced to sue plaintiff to recover the $1.5 million loan that he failed to repay; (3) the
litigation over that loan dragged on for another five years, which included an appeal to the Sixth
Circuit, two attempts at filing bankruptcy, and the appointment of a receiver; (4) interest on the
loan continued to accrue during the approximately 12 year period between the date of the loan and
the 2020 judgment; (5) in addition to awarding interest, the federal court also awarded PNC
attorney fees and late fees, and (6) judgment interest would have accrued on the more than $2.1
million judgment during the two to three years it took for plaintiff to resolve the debt after entry
of judgment. His suggestion, that PNC would have accepted $250,000 or anything comparable,
to satisfy the debt after all of the above occurred is unlikely and directly contradicted by the
affidavit of PNC’s attorney who sent a letter to plaintiff in 2016 confirming prior conversations
with plaintiff indicating that the now-years-ago negotiations regarding the possible resolution of
the PNC debt terminated long ago without resolution. The fact that plaintiff blames Bayram for
his failure to pay his debt until approximately 10 years after ceasing payments on a seven-figure
loan is likewise not only unsupported by evidence, it is rebutted by the PNC’s attorney’s affidavit
averring that Bayram’s inquiry “did not affect PNC Bank’s decisions with regard to seeking total
satisfaction” of the PNC judgment against plaintiff.

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We also find it significant that, in support of their motion for summary disposition,
defendants submitted over two dozen documents, including affidavits from PNC’s counsel,
Fleming, and Bayram, to support the lack of a genuine issue of material fact regarding plaintiff’s
claims. Plaintiff’s late answer to the motion was not accompanied by any documentary evidence,
not even his own affidavit, to establish a genuine issue of material fact, despite the requirements
of MCR 2.116(C)(10).
“Affidavits, depositions, admissions, or other documentary evidence in support of the
grounds asserted in the motion are required . . . (b) when judgment is sought based on subrule
(C)(10).” MCR 2.116(G)(3). The moving party must “identify the undisputed factual issues” and
produce documentary evidence to show that no genuine issue exists regarding any material fact.
MCR 2.116(G)(4) and (5); E R Zeiler Excavating Inc v Valenti Trobec Chandler Inc, 270 Mich
App 639, 644; 717 NW2d 370 (2006).
The burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine issue of
disputed fact exists. Where the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue rests
on a nonmoving party, the nonmoving party may not rely on mere allegations or
denials in pleadings, but must go beyond the pleadings to set forth specific facts
showing that a genuine issue of material fact exists. If the opposing party fails to
present documentary evidence establishing the existence of a material factual
dispute, the motion is properly granted.” [Koenig v City of South Haven, 460 Mich
667, 674-675; 597 NW2d 99 (quotation marks and citation omitted).]
In reviewing a (C)(10) motion, a court must examine the pleadings, affidavits, depositions,
admissions, and any other documentary evidence submitted by the parties and, drawing all
reasonable inferences therefrom in favor of the nonmoving party, determine whether a genuine
issue of material fact exists. MCR 2.116(G)(5); Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 120; 597
NW2d 817 (1999); Downey v Charlevoix Co Bd of Road Comm’rs, 227 Mich App 621, 626; 576
NW2d 712 (1998). A genuine issue of fact exists when reasonable minds could differ as to the
conclusions to be drawn from the evidence. West v Gen’l Motors Corp, 469 Mich 177, 183; 665
NW2d 468 (2003). Plaintiff did not present documentary evidence to create an issue on which
reasonable minds might disagree.
Accordingly, plaintiff simply has not demonstrated that, but for Bayram’s alleged
malpractice, the PNC settlement amount would have been smaller or that it would have occurred
sooner. See Manzo, 261 Mich App at 712. Because plaintiff has not established the elements of
a legal malpractice claim, the trial court properly granted summary disposition. In light of that
conclusion, we decline to address the parties’ arguments regarding the statute of limitations,
equitable estoppel, and the unclean hands doctrine.
Finally, plaintiff maintains that the trial court erred in dismissing his claims for breach of
fiduciary duty and tortious interference. The trial court dismissed those claims because they were
merely additional professional malpractice claims by another name. When reviewing a plaintiff’s
complaint, courts should “disregard the labels given to the claims and instead read the complaint
as a whole, seeking the gravamen of the claims.” Trowell v Providence Hosp and Med Ctrs, Inc,
502 Mich 509, 519; 918 NW2d 645 (2018). The court is not obliged to adhere to the labels chosen

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by parties for their claims, but should look beyond the labels to determine the claims’ exact nature.
Zelasko v Charter Twp of Bloomfield, 347 Mich App 141, 159; 14 NW3d 441 (2023).
Plaintiff’s complaint alleged defendants breached their fiduciary duty by representing
Jeffrey when Fleming had represented plaintiff in the PNC case. Plaintiff also alleged defendants
interfered with plaintiff’s business relationship or expectancy when Bayram contacted PNC’s
counsel to offer to purchase the PNC judgment. The gravamen of both of those claims is that
defendants failed to meet the standard of care of an attorney in sending the email offer to purchase.
Those claims rely on the same alleged relationships and the same conduct that plaintiff alleged in
the legal malpractice claim. Because the additional allegations are duplicative of that claim, they
sound in legal malpractice. We are not bound by the alternative labels plaintiff attached to the
latter claims. Trowell, 502 Mich at 519; Zelasko, 347 Mich App at 159. Plaintiff’s claims arose
from defendants’ alleged failure to protect his interests in the PNC case and he alleges defendants
failed to represent him adequately. That claim sounds in malpractice, not breach of fiduciary duty
or tortious interference. As the prevailing parties, defendants-appellees are entitled to tax costs.
MCR 7.219.
Affirmed.
/s/ Thomas C. Cameron
/s/ Allie Greenleaf Maldonado
/s/ Randy J. Wallace

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