COA 372187 PEOPLE OF MI V DYLAN LEWIS BOGLARSKY Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 1/16/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
UNPUBLISHED
January 16, 2026
9:28 AM
v No. 372187
Osceola Circuit Court
DYLAN LEWIS BOGLARSKY, LC No. 2023-006241-FC
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: SWARTZLE, P.J., and GARRETT and YATES, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant, Dylan Lewis Boglarsky, engaged in sexual penetration with two girls, ages 12
and 13, while he resided in the same household as them. He pleaded guilty to one count of first-
degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC-I), MCL 750.520b(1)(b)(i) (sexual penetration with person
at least 13 but less than 16 and member of same household), involving the 13-year-old in exchange
for the dismissal of five additional CSC-I charges. The trial court upwardly departed from the
sentencing guidelines and sentenced Boglarsky to 20 to 50 years’ imprisonment. He appeals by
leave granted1 the trial court’s order denying in part his motion to correct an invalid sentence.
Because the trial court failed to justify the extent of the sentencing departure imposed, we vacate
Boglarsky’s sentence and remand for resentencing.
I. BACKGROUND
Boglarsky lived in the same residence as two girls, ages 12 and 13, to whom he was
unrelated.2 It was eventually discovered that Boglarsky, then age 28, repeatedly sexually assaulted
both girls and impregnated the 13-year-old after telling her that having sex with him would help
1 People v Boglarsky, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered October 9, 2024 (Docket
No. 372187).
2 The girls’ adoptive mother stated that Boglarsky resided in the home “for protection,” to help out
around the house, and to drive the girls where they needed to go.

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her retaliate against her father for abandoning her and her sister. The prosecution charged
Boglarsky with three counts of CSC-I involving the 13-year-old3 and three counts of CSC-I
involving the 12-year-old.4 He pleaded guilty to one charge involving the 13-year-old in exchange
for the dismissal of the remaining charges.
At sentencing, the trial court adjusted the number of points assessed for OVs 9, 10, and 11.
The court assessed 10 points for OV 9, 15 points for OV 10, and 50 points for OV 11. After the
adjustments, Boglarsky’s sentencing guidelines were 108 to 180 months, or 9 to 15 years. The
trial court upwardly departed from the guidelines range, reasoning that the guidelines should be
higher because Boglarsky had 145 total OV points, but the upper limit of the sentencing grid was
100 OV points. The court stated that Boglarsky’s total of OV points was “45 points over . . . the
max guideline for a class A offense.” The court also stated that the facts of this case were “horrific”
and that Boglarsky should not have received the plea deal that allowed him to avoid the 25-year
mandatory minimum sentence for CSC-I involving the 12-year-old. Further, the court stated as
follows:
You persistently and perpetually abused a 12- and 13-year-old girl that was
living with you. You manipulated them, you preyed on them, you used them. And
you preyed, specifically, on their innocence and their insecurities for your own
advantage. You manipulated the trauma that the girls had in their own lives, that
was inflicted on them by somebody else and you used that as a means for you to
take advantage of them.
Throughout the entire presentence investigation report you place blame
everywhere else, and you insist was an accident [sic]. Multiple acts of sexual
penetration were an accident. That is what you said. That is what you told law
enforcement in your interview. Multiple times that you sent pictures of your naked
genitals to these two young girls, you said it was an accident.
None of this was an accident. And if you think that the Court believes that
you would have to be out of your mind. Not a single one of these acts was an
accident. And then you said in your report that if it wasn’t an accident, that the
sexual assaults that you perpetrated multiple times on these girls was because you
were asleep. The Court doesn’t believe that either.
* * *
I really don’t here [sic] much remorse. And the concern is, if you cannot
appreciate what you did and how you have traumatized these girls for the rest of
their lives, then there is really not a likelihood of rehabilitation for you. And if
there is not a likelihood of rehabilitation for you, then the only thing that this Court
3 MCL 750.520b(1)(b)(i) (sexual penetration with person at least 13 but less than 16 and member
of same household).
4 MCL 750.520b(1)(a) (victim under 13).

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can do is keep society safe from you. And that is to lock you up for as long as this
Court can.
The Court believes without a doubt that you are a predator, Mr. Boglarsky,
because the report indicates that the 12- and 13-year-old girls that you abused in
this case are not the only ones and that you have had prior victims as well. You
have a history of abusing underage girls, and the Court finds that based on the
information contained in this presentence investigation report, there is no real
likelihood of rehabilitation.
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Because of all that, I do not believe that the guidelines, which are 108 to
180 months on the minimum, are sufficient. I don’t believe that that adequately
reflects what you did in this case, and I don’t believe that if I sentenced you
somewhere in that guideline range, or even if I sentence you to the top of 180
months, it would not be proportionate to what you did here.
The court then sentenced Boglarsky to 20 to 50 years’ imprisonment.
Boglarsky moved to correct his sentence, challenging the scoring of OVs 9, 10, 11, and 13.
He asserted that the correction of those OVs would reduce his sentencing guidelines and entitle
him to resentencing. The trial court agreed that the scoring of OVs 9, 11, and 13 was erroneous
and reduced the number of points assessed for those variables. The court rejected Boglarsky’s
argument that OV 10, pertaining to predatory preoffense conduct, should be assessed zero points
rather than 15 points. The court reasoned that Boglarsky engaged in predatory preoffense conduct
by asking the 13-year-old whether she wanted to have sex with him to retaliate against her father,
by giving her a ring, by manipulating her into believing that she and Boglarsky were in a dating
relationship, and by exchanging genitalia pictures with her. The court determined that Boglarsky
groomed the 13-year-old in order to sexually assault her. The court also reasoned that Boglarsky
had sex with the girls’ mother and told the girls about it to make them jealous. The court
determined, under the preponderance of the evidence standard, that all of Boglarsky’s predatory
behavior occurred before the 13-year-old became pregnant because she was only seven-weeks
pregnant at the time the police became aware of Boglarsky’s conduct, which occurred over a longer
period of time than seven weeks.
The correction of the points assessed for OVs 9, 11, and 13 reduced Boglarsky’s total OV
score by 85 points and reduced his minimum sentencing guidelines range to 51 to 85 months, or 4
years and 3 months to 7 years and 1 month. The trial court declined to resentence Boglarsky,
however, relying on People v Mutchie, 468 Mich 50; 658 NW2d 154 (2003). The court stated that
if it granted resentencing it would impose the same sentence notwithstanding the change to the
sentencing guidelines. The court relied on the information contained in the presentence
investigation report and its determination that Boglarsky was a predator who could not be
rehabilitated. The court also stated that, at sentencing, “[i]t didn’t matter what the guideline range
was” because “the Court was going to go way above the guidelines.” Moreover, the court
recognized that the sentencing guidelines were advisory only after People v Lockridge, 498 Mich
358; 870 NW2d 502 (2015). The court further stated:

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If the Court of Appeals wants to remand . . . that’s okay with me. We can
go through the motions and give [Boglarsky] the opportunity to allocate [sic] again,
I guess, but it is not going to change my sentence.
In addition, the court recognized that, with the corrections to the OV scoring, the sentencing
guidelines did not “take into account much of the behavior that Mr. Boglarsky committed,”
including the numerous sexual penetrations that occurred in addition to the sentencing offense.
The court noted that those penetrations could not be considered under OVs 11, 12, or 13, and that
the court therefore considered them in sentencing Boglarsky to 20 to 50 years’ imprisonment,
which the court found reasonable and proportionate. This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
A. OV 10
Boglarsky first challenges the trial court’s assessment of 15 points for OV 10 on the basis
that he engaged in predatory conduct. We review for clear error the trial court’s factual
determinations when scoring the sentencing guidelines. People v Hardy, 494 Mich 430, 438; 835
NW2d 340 (2013). “Clear error occurs if the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm
conviction that the trial court made a mistake.” People v Johnson, 502 Mich 541, 565; 918 NW2d
676 (2018) (quotation marks and citation omitted). A preponderance of the evidence must support
the trial court’s factual determinations. Hardy, 494 Mich at 438. “Whether the facts, as found,
are adequate to satisfy the scoring conditions prescribed by statute, i.e., the application of the facts
to the law, is a question of statutory interpretation, which an appellate court reviews de novo.” Id.
OV 10 pertains to the “exploitation of a vulnerable victim.” MCL 777.40(1). MCL
777.40(1)(a) directs a sentencing court to assess 15 points if “[p]redatory conduct was involved.”
MCL 777.40(1)(b) instructs that 10 points should be scored if “the offender exploited a victim’s
physical disability, mental disability, youth or agedness, or a domestic relationship, or the offender
abused his or her authority status[.]” “Predatory conduct” is defined as “preoffense conduct
directed at a victim, or a law enforcement officer posing as a potential victim, for the primary
purpose of victimization.” MCL 777.40(3)(a). Our Supreme Court offered the following
guidance:
To aid lower courts in determining whether 15 points are properly assessed under
OV 10, we set forth the following analytical questions:
(1) Did the offender engage in conduct before the commission of the offense?
(2) Was this conduct directed at one or more specific victims who suffered from a
readily apparent susceptibility to injury, physical restraint, persuasion, or
temptation?
(3) Was victimization the offender’s primary purpose for engaging in the preoffense
conduct?

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If the court can answer all these questions affirmatively, then it may properly assess
15 points for OV 10 because the offender engaged in predatory conduct under MCL
777.40. [People v Cannon, 481 Mich 152, 161-162; 749 NW2d 257 (2008).]
In addition, discussing personal topics, exchanging messages, and spending leisure time
with the victim can constitute preoffense conduct because it leads the victim to trust the defendant
and to feel comfortable alone with them, thereby making it easier for the defendant to carry out a
sexual assault. See People v Lampe, 327 Mich App 104, 116; 933 NW2d 314 (2019). Further,
“[t]he timing and location of an offense—waiting until a victim is alone and isolated—is evidence
of predatory conduct.” People v Ackah-Essien, 311 Mich App 13, 37; 874 NW2d 172 (2015).
Boglarsky argues that the trial court erred when it determined that the predatory behaviors
on which it relied in scoring OV 10 occurred before the 13-year-old became pregnant and therefore
constituted preoffense conduct. Boglarsky’s argument lacks merit because, by his own admission,
he had been sleeping in the same room as the girls “for months,” he began “dating” the 13-year-
old in November 2022, and he believed he first had sex with her during that month—several
months before it was discovered that she was seven weeks pregnant. Therefore, Boglarsky’s own
admissions belie his argument.
Further, considering the other questions set forth in Cannon, it is clear that Boglarsky
engaged in predatory conduct. As the trial court recognized, Boglarsky preyed on the 13-year-
old’s susceptibilities and desire to “get back” at her father for abandoning her and her sister. The
presentence investigation report indicates that the 13-year-old has a cognitive developmental delay
and a cognitive impairment. Moreover, Boglarsky’s primary purpose for engaging in his behavior
was to convince the 13-year-old to have a sexual relationship with him. In fact, he maintained that
he and the 13-year-old were “dating,” and he gave her a ring. Accordingly, the record supports
the trial court’s assessment of 15 points for OV 10 on the basis that Boglarsky engaged in predatory
conduct.
B. PROPORTIONALITY
Boglarsky also argues that he is entitled to resentencing because the trial court failed to
justify departing from the sentencing guidelines, failed to justify the extent of the departure, and
relied on erroneous facts to support the departure imposed. We review for reasonableness a
sentence that departs from the applicable sentencing guidelines range. Lockridge, 498 Mich at
392. When reviewing a sentence for reasonableness, we apply the abuse-of-discretion standard.
People v Steanhouse, 500 Mich 453, 471; 902 NW2d 327 (2017). “[A] sentence is unreasonable
if the trial court failed to follow the principle of proportionality or failed to provide adequate
reasons for the extent of the departure from the sentencing guidelines.” People v Sherrill, ___
Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2024) (Docket No. 360133); slip op at 9. The principle of
proportionality requires that a sentence “be proportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances
surrounding the offense and the offender.” Steanhouse, 500 Mich at 474 (quotation marks and
citation omitted). Although the sentencing guidelines are advisory only, a trial court must “consult
the applicable guidelines range and take it into account when imposing a sentence.” Lockridge,
498 Mich at 391, 399.

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Before sentencing Boglarsky, the trial court consulted his sentencing guidelines. The court
again consulted Boglarsky’s sentencing guidelines before it declined to grant resentencing. The
court recognized that the guidelines were advisory only and determined that the guidelines,
particularly after they were corrected, did not “take into account much of the behavior that Mr.
Boglarsky committed.” In particular, the court referenced the multiple sexual penetrations that the
corrected guidelines did not account for. Although Boglarsky argues that the 12-year-old victim
denied having sex with him, Boglarsky admitted that he engaged in penile-oral, penile-vaginal,
and penile-anal intercourse with the 12-year-old. In addition, he admitted engaging in numerous
sexual penetrations with the 13-year-old that the sentencing guidelines did not consider. Further,
the trial court recognized that Boglarsky convinced both girls to send him pictures of their
genitalia, and he sent photos of his genitalia to them. In fact, the presentence investigation report
indicates that the 13-year-old became jealous and angry when she discovered that Boglarsky had
sent pictures of his penis to the 12-year-old.
The trial court repeatedly stated that it did not believe that a guidelines sentence was
proportionate. The court described Boglarsky’s actions as “horrific” and stated that it had never
seen a case as egregious as this case in the court’s 20 years as a prosecutor in the criminal sexual
conduct unit before joining the bench. The court reasoned that Boglarsky “persistently and
perpetually” abused both girls, “manipulated them,” and “preyed on them.” The court also
recognized that Boglarsky failed to take responsibility for his actions and instead stated that he
was asleep during the conduct or that he committed it by mistake. In our view, those excuses defy
reality and basic common sense. The court further recognized that this case was not the first time
that Boglarsky abused underage girls and that a lengthy prison sentence was necessary to protect
society considering that “there is no real likelihood of rehabilitation.”
Boglarsky argues that although the trial court’s reasons for departing from the guidelines
may have explained the 33% departure from the guidelines initially imposed, the court did not
adequately explain the 185% departure from the corrected guidelines range. On this point, we
agree. Although the court acknowledged that the departure imposed was very significant and
stated that the “drastic change and reduction in the advisory minimum guidelines” did not affect
its determination regarding a proportionate sentence, the court failed to justify the extent of the
departure. The principle of proportionality requires a sentencing court “to provide adequate
reasons for the extent of the departure sentence imposed . . . .” Steanhouse, 500 Mich at 476. The
trial court stated that it would have sentenced Boglarsky to the same 20-year minimum sentence
regardless of the sentencing guidelines, and regardless of whether this Court remands for
resentencing, but the court was nevertheless required to justify the extent of the departure. While
a 20-year minimum sentence may be reasonable considering the facts of this case, the court failed
to state adequate reasons on the record for us to conclude that it is so. Accordingly, we vacate
Boglarsky’s sentence and remand for resentencing. If the court again departs from the sentencing
guidelines, it must justify the departure, including the extent of the departure imposed.5
C. DIFFERENT JUDGE
5 Because we are remanding for resentencing, we need not address Boglarsky’s argument that the
trial court erred by denying resentencing after it corrected the scoring of his sentencing guidelines.

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Finally, Boglarsky argues that he is entitled to resentencing before a different judge
because the trial court’s remarks strongly suggest that the court cannot set aside its previously-
expressed beliefs. When this Court remands a case for resentencing, we have discretion to order
that a different trial court judge conduct the resentencing. People v Dixon-Bey, 340 Mich App
292, 303; 985 NW2d 904 (2022). In exercising our discretion, we examine three factors:
(1) whether the original judge would reasonably be expected upon remand to have
substantial difficulty in putting out of his or her mind previously-expressed views
or findings determined to be erroneous or based on evidence that must be rejected,
(2) whether reassignment is advisable to preserve the appearance of justice, and (3)
whether reassignment would entail waste and duplication out of proportion to any
gain in preserving the appearance of fairness. Id. at 304 (citation and brackets
omitted).
Having considered the factors, we decline to order that resentencing proceed before a
different judge. As previously stated, a 20-year minimum sentence may be reasonable considering
the facts of this case. Our decision to remand for resentencing stems from the trial court’s failure
to articulate reasons justifying the extent of its departure and not from a determination that the
sentenced imposed was necessarily disproportionate. We further conclude that assignment to a
different judge is unnecessary to preserve the appearance of justice.
Vacated and remanded for resentencing. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Brock A. Swartzle
/s/ Kristina Robinson Garrett
/s/ Christopher P. Yates

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