COA 378738 IN RE SULLIVAN/BURGETT/WICKINGS MINORS Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 7/17/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
UNPUBLISHED
July 17, 2026
3:10 PM
In re SULLIVAN/BURGETT/WICKINGS, Minors.
No. 378738
St. Clair Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 24-000217-NA
In re E. R. SULLIVAN, Minor. No. 378739
St. Clair Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 24-000217-NA
Before: GADOLA, C.J., and BOONSTRA and CAMERON, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In Docket No. 378738 of these consolidated appeals,1 respondent-mother appeals as of
right the order terminating her parental rights to ERS, WOB, AMB, and GHW under
MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(iii) (nonparent abused child and reasonable likelihood that nonparent would
cause harm in the future if child is returned to parent), (c)(i) (conditions leading to adjudication
still exist without likelihood of being rectified in a reasonable time), and (j) (reasonable risk of
harm to child if returned to parent). In Docket No. 378739, respondent-father appeals as of right
the order terminating his parental rights to ERS under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i) (parent sexually
abused sibling and reasonable likelihood child would be harmed), (j), (k)(ii) (parent sexually
abused sibling, including penetration, and reasonable likelihood child would be harmed), and
1 In re Sullivan/Burgett/Wickings Minors; In re ER Sullivan Minor, unpublished order of the Court
of Appeals, entered December 26, 2025 (Docket Nos. 378738 and 378739).

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(m)(i) (parent convicted of sexual crime and continuing parental relationship would be harmful).
We affirm.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Respondent-mother and respondent-father are unmarried but had been in a relationship for
about 10 years when the petition underlying this case was filed. They had one child together, ERS.
Respondent-mother also had three more children, WOB, AMB, and GHW, by different fathers. In
September 2024, respondent-father sexually assaulted AMB while the two were home alone by
touching her breasts and inserting his fingers into her vagina. AMB immediately reported the
assault and underwent a sexual assault examination the same day. The subsequent police
investigation found that respondent-father’s cell phone had accessed pornographic videos
depicting sexual encounters involving stepfathers and stepdaughters before respondent-father
sexually assaulted AMB. DNA testing also revealed AMB’s DNA was present under respondent-
father’s fingernails. Accordingly, petitioner, the Michigan Department of Health and Human
Services (DHHS), sought to terminate respondent-father’s parental rights to ERS.
Initially, respondent-mother was not named in the petition and the children remained in her
care on the condition that she have no contact with respondent-father. But in the weeks leading
up to respondent-father’s trial for his criminal sexual conduct (CSC) involving AMB, respondent-
mother continued to communicate with him by telephone and allowed him in her home during her
unsupervised parenting time. Respondent-mother also attempted to bribe AMB to change her
testimony about respondent-father’s abuse. As a result of respondent-mother’s conduct, DHHS
filed a petition to terminate respondent-mother’s parental rights to WOB, AMB, ERS, and GHW.
Respondent-father was ultimately convicted of first-degree CSC (CSC-I), MCL 750.520b;
second-degree CSC (CSC-II), MCL 750.520c; and accosting a child for immoral purposes,
MCL 750.145a. He was sentenced for 25 to 40 years’ imprisonment for his CSC-I conviction, 10
to 15 years’ imprisonment for his CSC-II conviction, and 2 to 4 years’ imprisonment for his
accosting-a-minor conviction. The trial court found statutory grounds to terminate his parental
rights as noted above, and that termination was in ERS’s best interests.
Respondent-mother later pleaded guilty to witness interference, MCL 750.1227B, for
attempting to bribe AMB to change her account of respondent-father’s abuse. She was sentenced
to 5 months of jail time and 18 months of probation. After respondent-mother admitted to statutory
grounds to terminate her parental rights, the trial court concluded that it was in the children’s best
interests to terminate respondent-mother’s parental rights. These appeals followed.
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
“We review for clear error the trial court’s finding that there are statutory grounds for
termination of a respondent’s parental rights.” In re Atchley, 341 Mich App 332, 343; 990 NW2d
685 (2022). We also review a trial court’s best-interests determination for clear error. In re White,
303 Mich App 701, 713; 846 NW2d 61 (2014). “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if the
reviewing court has a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed, giving due
regard to the trial court’s special opportunity to observe the witnesses.” In re Miller, 347 Mich
App 420, 425; 15 NW3d 287 (2023) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

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III. STATUTORY GROUNDS
In Docket No. 378739, respondent-father argues that there was insufficient evidence to
terminate his parental rights to ERS. We disagree.
“To terminate parental rights, the trial court must find that at least one of the statutory
grounds for termination in MCL 712A.19b(3) has been proved by clear and convincing evidence.”
In re Pederson, 331 Mich App 445, 472; 951 NW2d 704 (2020) (quotation marks and citation
omitted). Under MCL 712A.19b(3)(m)(i), a trial court may terminate parental rights if the parent
was convicted of, in relevant part, CSC-I or CSC-II, and “continuing the parent-child relationship
with the parent would be harmful to the child[.]”
It is undisputed that respondent-father was convicted of CSC-I and CSC-II. Thus, the
relevant inquiry is whether continuing the parent-child relationship would be harmful to ERS.
Respondent-father contends that because he will be incarcerated for the foreseeable future, he
poses no risk of physical harm to ERS. But his argument ignores the impact of the parent-child
relationship on ERS’s emotional wellbeing. See In re Hudson, 294 Mich App 261, 268; 817 NW2d
115 (2011) (“Respondent focuses only on the potential of physical harm or abuse and ignores the
fact that the children had been, and continued to be, at risk of emotional harm.”). Indeed, the trial
court opined that respondent-father could cause significant mental and emotional harm to ERS by
engaging in grooming behaviors during visits and conversations even while incarcerated.
The record supports the trial court’s conclusion that continuation of the parent-child
relationship would harm ERS. Given the close relationship between ERS and AMB, respondent-
father’s sexual abuse of AMB would likely cause ERS extreme emotional and mental harm if she
were to have continued contact with him. Additionally, under the doctrine of anticipatory neglect,
how a parent treats one child is probative of how that parent may treat other children. In re Kellogg,
331 Mich App 249, 259; 952 NW2d 544 (2020). Although AMB is not respondent-father’s
biological child, she is ERS’s half-sister and respondent-father had been in AMB’s life for 10
years—nearly her entire life. See In re Mota, 334 Mich App 300, 323; 964 NW2d 881 (2020)
(“Although the doctrine is not a perfect fit in this case because LP is not respondent’s child,
respondent had been raising LP for a number of years as if she were his daughter.”). Even though
AMB is older than ERS, ERS will eventually reach the same age as AMB was when she was
abused. Thus, ERS and AMB are similarly situated and respondent-father’s sexual abuse of AMB
is indicative of how he may treat ERS in the future. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by
terminating respondent-father’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(m)(i).2
IV. BEST INTERESTS
In both dockets, respondent-mother and respondent-father argue that termination was not
in the children’s best interests. We disagree.
2 Because “[o]nly one statutory ground need be established by clear and convincing evidence to
terminate a respondent’s parental rights,” In re Ellis, 294 Mich App 30, 32; 817 NW2d 111 (2011),
we need not address whether termination was proper under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i), (j), or (k)(ii).

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“The trial court must order the parent’s rights terminated if [DHHS] has established a
statutory ground for termination by clear and convincing evidence and it finds from a
preponderance of the evidence on the whole record that termination is in the children’s best
interests.” In re White, 303 Mich App at 713. “The focus at the best-interest stage has always
been on the child, not the parent.” In re Atchley, 341 Mich App at 346 (quotation marks and
citation omitted). When determining whether termination is in a child’s best interests:
[T]he court should consider a wide variety of factors that may include the child’s
bond to the parent, the parent’s parenting ability, the child’s need for permanency,
stability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster home over the parent’s home.
The trial court may also consider a parent’s history of domestic violence, the
parent’s compliance with his or her case service plan, the parent’s visitation history
with the child, the children’s well-being while in care, and the possibility of
adoption. [In re White, 303 Mich App at 713-714 (quotation marks and citations
omitted).]
“Placement with a relative weighs against termination, but that fact is not dispositive given that a
trial court may terminate parental rights in lieu of placement with relatives if it finds that
termination is in the child’s best interests.” In re Atchley, 341 Mich App at 347 (quotation marks
and citation omitted). The trial court may also consider the preference of the child if they are of
sufficient age to have a preference. In re Medina, 317 Mich App 219, 238-239; 894 NW2d 653
(2016).
A. RESPONDENT-MOTHER
Termination of respondent-mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests.
Although respondent-mother had housing and employment, attended counseling, and participated
in parenting education, she did not show any benefit from participating in these services and her
parenting ability remained highly questionable. During unsupervised parenting times, respondent-
mother fell asleep and once left the children unsupervised while taking one child to get their nails
done. She also allowed respondent-father into her home during her unsupervised parenting time,
contrary to court orders. Respondent-mother did not believe AMB when AMB confided in her
about the sexual abuse, and respondent-mother tried to bribe AMB to persuade her to not testify
against respondent-father. Respondent-mother acknowledged her misconduct when she pleaded
guilty to witness interference, for which she was sentenced to jail time and probation. Her actions
show a willingness to violate the law to protect the abuser of her child, and that she placed her
relationship with respondent-father above the needs of her children.
Further, both WOB and AMB had little bond with respondent-mother, as reflected by the
fact that they did not want to be reunited with her. While ERS had more of a bond with respondent-
mother, ERS did not ask about her while in DHHS’s care. Although GHW and ERS are younger
and did not explicitly express that they did not want to be reunified with respondent-mother, both
were happy in their placements and wished to stay where they were. The foster home where WOB,
AMB, and ERS were placed provided them with stability and permanency, and the foster parents
expressed interest in adopting them. All three children experienced noticeable improvements in
their behaviors and academics after being placed in their foster home. As for GHW, he was placed
with his nonrespondent father, and the placement gave him a sense of stability and permanence.

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Like his siblings, GHW’s academics also improved after being removed from respondent-mother’s
care. Importantly, GHW’s father facilitated regular contact with his siblings, and took steps to get
sole custody of GHW. Although the fact that GHW was placed with a relative weighs against
termination, In re Atchley, 341 Mich App at 347, the trial court determined that this placement did
not outweigh the ongoing risks posed by respondent-mother. Because the record supports the trial
court’s best-interest findings, termination of respondent-mother’s parental rights was not clearly
erroneous.
B. RESPONDENT-FATHER
Termination of respondent-father’s parental rights was also in ERS’s best interests. On
appeal, respondent-father contends that it was not in ERS’s best interests to terminate his parental
rights because they “have a good relationship,” and he should be allowed to have contact with her
so that “[their] relationship can continue.” But the best-interests inquiry focuses on the needs of
the child, not the parent. Id. at 346. Moreover, despite respondent-father’s claims to the contrary,
ERS never asked about respondent-father while in DHHS’s custody, indicating a weak bond.
Respondent-father’s parenting ability was criminally inadequate as evidenced by his sexual assault
of ERS’s half-sister, AMB. For his conduct against AMB, respondent-father will be incarcerated
for at least 25 years and could not provide ERS with the same stability and support as ERS’s foster
parents, who were willing to adopt her and her siblings. Additionally, as noted above, ERS’s
academics and behavior noticeably improved in the care of her foster parents. Considering these
relevant factors, the trial court did not clearly err by finding that termination of respondent-father’s
parental rights was in ERS’s best interests.
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael F. Gadola
/s/ Mark T. Boonstra
/s/ Thomas C. Cameron

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