COA 374374 PEOPLE OF MI V EUGENE DAVID MEDLIN Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 7/13/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
UNPUBLISHED
July 13, 2026
2:29 PM
v No. 374374
Midland Circuit Court
EUGENE DAVID MEDLIN, LC No. 2024-009543-FH
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: M. J. KELLY, P.J., and PATEL and KOROBKIN, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant, Eugene David Medlin, appeals by right following his jury-trial convictions for
multiple offenses, including malicious destruction of personal property between $1,000 and
$20,000, MCL 750.377a(1)(b)(i), and explosives—possession of bombs with unlawful intent,
MCL 750.210(2)(a). On appeal, defendant challenges his conviction for malicious destruction and
his sentence for possession of explosives. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we disagree
with defendant’s arguments and therefore affirm.
I. BACKGROUND AND FACTS
On December 7, 2023, a deputy from the Midland County Sheriff’s Office responded to a
report of an individual causing a disturbance with a school bus. When that deputy visited the
reported location, he encountered defendant, who was dressed similarly to the individual described
in the report. That deputy knocked on the door of the “multi-bay garage or shop” on the property
and defendant came to the door and, seeing the deputy in his uniform, “immediately shut the door
in [his] face” and yelled expletive-laden language at the deputy, telling him to “[d]ie.” That deputy
left the scene but returned about a half hour later with another Midland deputy sheriff. Upon
arrival, the deputies noticed a strong smell of chemicals and heard a raspy voice inside of the
garage. As the deputies contacted the property owner, Tyron Ortiz, and two other Midland deputy
sheriffs to request assistance, the deputies heard what one of them described as “a female horror
movie-type scream come from inside.” The deputies then opened the garage door and saw
defendant approaching with a box cutter in one hand and an unidentified object in the other. The
garage door closed, and the deputies repeatedly told defendant to drop the weapon in his hand, but

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defendant “threw the door open” and stepped closer to the deputies yelling, “Come on.” One of
the deputies eventually deployed a taser that caused defendant to fall and enabled the deputies to
disarm and arrest him. Following defendant’s arrest, he informed the deputies that he was under
the influence of various drugs, and the deputies found a trail of a “very flammable” substance,
which had caused the strong chemical odor, a truck in the garage that had been scratched on all
sides, and a lighter in defendant’s pocket.
The following day, defendant was charged with the possession-of-explosives count alluded
to above, as well as two counts of assault with a dangerous weapon, MCL 750.82, and four counts
of assaulting/resisting/obstructing a police officer, MCL 750.81d(1), as a habitual offender—
fourth offense, MCL 769.12. On January 16, 2024, a preliminary examination was held in the
district court and Ortiz was called as a witness. Before the preliminary examination began, the
prosecution stated that it had informed defense counsel a few minutes prior that it would be
requesting to add a felony charge for malicious destruction of personal property between $1,000
and $20,000, given what the prosecution believed to be over $1,000 of damage to a truck on the
property at which the incident occurred. During the preliminary examination, Ortiz testified that
he had been allowing defendant to stay at his automotive paint and detail shop, and that Ortiz was
finishing working on a truck inside the shop that he had recently sold for $23,500. Ortiz further
stated that the truck “had $20,000 worth of paint on it,” that he had spent about $3,000 on clear
coating to protect the paint, and that the truck had no scratches on it before the incident, but that
following the incident, it had looked like someone had taken “a razorblade” or similar item around
the truck and damaged it. Ortiz testified that it would cost “way over” $10,000 to repair the
damage. Defendant cross-examined Ortiz. The following day, an amended information was filed
adding the malicious-destruction charge.
Defendant’s jury trial was held on October 28 and 29, 2024. Relevant to this appeal, the
prosecution had intended to call Ortiz as a witness, but at the beginning of the second day of trial,
the prosecution informed the trial court that Ortiz was not present to testify and requested that
Ortiz be deemed unavailable and that his preliminary examination testimony be admitted. The
prosecution explained that Ortiz’s gallbladder was removed during emergency surgery the prior
week and that it received a doctor’s note on October 25, 2024, indicating that Ortiz “was being
treated with opioids as part of his post-operative pain regimen” and “recommend[ing] that [Ortiz]
refrain from court proceedings . . . until he has recovered, which [the doctor] anticipated would be
three or four weeks.” The prosecution further expounded that although Ortiz had indicated in their
conversation on October 25, 2024 that he wanted to be present at trial, Ortiz was not present on
the first day of trial, and that when the prosecution contacted Ortiz midday on the first day of trial,
Ortiz “indicated he had been throwing up all night and was . . . having some health issues and
intended to” seek medical attention. The prosecution noted that it had not heard from Ortiz since
that conversation on the first day of trial. Over an objection from defense counsel, the trial court
admitted Ortiz’s preliminary examination testimony into evidence, reasoning that Ortiz was
unavailable under MRE 804(a)(4) given his “physical infirmity.” Defendant was ultimately
convicted of all charged offenses.
At sentencing, the trial court highlighted defendant’s extensive criminal history, explaining
how defendant has “been though the system over and over and over again” given his “22 prior
convictions,” and circumstances of defendant’s offense demonstrative of defendant’s “inten[t] to
cause serious injury.” The trial court also described how defendant was “fighting, and fighting,

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and fighting, doing everything [he] c[ould] to cause harm and chaos” and the stress imposed on
the police officers, noting that defendant “put them through all that.” On the possession-of-
explosives conviction, the applicable sentencing guidelines range was 50 to 200 months, and the
trial court imposed a sentence of 180 to 480 months. Defendant also received concurrent sentences
of 48 to 180 months on the two counts of assault with a dangerous weapon, 46 to 180 months on
the four counts of assaulting/resisting/obstructing a police officer, and 58 to 180 months for
malicious destruction of property.
Defendant now appeals.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review challenges to a trial court’s admission of evidence for an abuse of discretion,
which occurs when the trial court’s “decision falls outside the range of reasonable and principled
outcomes.” People v Duncan, 494 Mich 713, 722-723; 835 NW2d 399 (2013). “Preliminary
issues of law, including the interpretation of the rules of evidence and the effect of constitutional
provisions, are reviewed de novo.” People v Benton, 294 Mich App 191, 195; 817 NW2d 599
(2011). And more specifically, “[t]he constitutional question whether defendant was denied h[is]
constitutional right to confront the witnesses against h[im] is reviewed de novo.” Id. Further,
“[w]e review the trial court’s findings of fact for clear error,” People v Carson, ___ Mich ___,
___; ___ NW3d ___ (2025); slip op at 10, which exists when we are “left with the definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been made[,]” People v Norfleet, 317 Mich App 649, 667 n 11;
897 NW2d 195 (2016) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Regarding defendant’s challenge to his sentence, “[w]e review the reasonableness of a
sentence for an abuse of the trial court’s discretion[,]” People v Walden, 319 Mich App 344, 351;
901 NW2d 142 (2017), and the factual findings underlying a sentencing decision for clear error,
People v Lampe, 327 Mich App 104, 125-126; 933 NW2d 314 (2019).
III. ANALYSIS
A. ORTIZ’S PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION TESTIMONY
Defendant first challenges the admission of Ortiz’s preliminary examination testimony as
a violation of the Confrontation Clause and the rule against hearsay. We conclude that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this testimony.
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
assures criminal defendants the right “to be confronted with the witnesses against [them.]” US
Const, Am VI. “The United States Supreme Court has held that the introduction of out-of-court
testimonial statements violates the Confrontation Clause . . . unless the declarant appears at trial
or the defendant has had a previous opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.” People v Nunley,
491 Mich 686, 698; 821 NW2d 642 (2012), citing Crawford v Washington, 541 US 36, 53-54; 124
S Ct 1354; 158 L Ed 2d 177 (2004). The Court has also more specifically explained that admitting
the prior testimony of an unavailable witness does not violate the Confrontation Clause when the
defendant’s counsel is not “significantly limited in any way in the scope or nature of his cross-
examination of the witness . . . at [a] preliminary hearing.” California v Green, 399 US 149, 165-

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166; 90 S Ct 1930; 26 L Ed 2d 489 (1970); see also People v Garland, 286 Mich App 1, 7-8; 777
NW2d 732 (2009) (finding no Confrontation Clause violation regarding admission of preliminary
examination testimony). Notably, “[t]he Confrontation Clause guarantees only an opportunity for
effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to
whatever extent, the defense might wish.” People v Sardy (On Remand), 318 Mich App 558, 564;
899 NW2d 107 (2017), quoting United States v Owens, 484 US 554, 559; 108 S Ct 838; 98 L Ed
2d 951 (1988).
Under the Michigan Rules of Evidence, hearsay, “a statement that[] the declarant does not
make while testifying at the current trial or hearing[] and that a party offers in evidence to prove
the truth of the matter asserted in the statement,” MRE 801(c), is generally inadmissible, see MRE
802. MRE 804(b)(1), however, excludes former testimony given by an unavailable witness from
the general prohibition against the admission of hearsay. For hearsay to be admitted under this
exception, the witness must be deemed “unavailable” as that term is described in MRE 804(a), and
the testimony at issue must have been “given as a witness at a trial or hearing whether given during
the current proceeding or a different one” and be “now offered against a party who had . . . an
opportunity and similar motive to develop it by direct, or cross, or redirect examination[,]” MRE
804(b)(1). In deciding whether a party had a similar motive to develop testimony at a prior
proceeding, this Court has considered:
(1) whether the party opposing the testimony had at a prior proceeding an interest
of substantially similar intensity to prove (or disprove) the same side of a
substantially similar issue; (2) the nature of the two proceedings—both what is at
stake and the applicable burden of proof; and (3) whether the party opposing the
testimony in fact . . . cross-examine[d] the witness (both the employed and available
but forgone opportunities). [People v Farquharson, 274 Mich App 268, 278; 731
NW2d 797 (2007) (quotation marks and citation omitted).]
In short, this Court has held that “[f]ormer testimony is admissible at trial under both MRE
804(b)(1) and the Confrontation Clause as long as the witness is unavailable for trial and was
subject to cross-examination during the prior testimony.” Garland, 286 Mich App at 7. Here,
defendant contends that neither of these prerequisites was satisfied. We disagree.
First, defendant argues that insufficient evidence supported the trial court’s finding that
Ortiz was unavailable due to physical infirmity under MRE 804(a)(4). MRE 804(a)(4) provides
that a declarant is unavailable as a witness when that declarant “cannot be present or testify at the
trial or hearing because of death or a then-existing infirmity, physical illness, or mental illness[.]”
Our Supreme Court has explained that “ ‘[i]nfirmity’ is defined as ‘the quality or state of being
infirm; lack of strength[,]’ ” and in turn, “ ‘infirm’ is defined as ‘feeble or weak in body or health,
. . . because of age.” Duncan, 494 Mich at 725 (citation omitted).
We find no error in the trial court’s conclusion that Ortiz was unavailable under MRE
804(a)(4). The parties do not dispute the prosecution’s representations that Ortiz underwent
invasive, emergency surgery just the week before trial, was being treated with opioids, and suffered

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health issues, including “throwing up all night,” on the first day of trial.1 Further, Ortiz was at
most just over one week into, per his doctor, a three- to four-week recovery period. Ortiz’s health
issues support a finding that Ortiz was unable to be present at trial due to a then-existing infirmity.
See MRE 804(a)(4); Duncan, 494 Mich at 725; Garland, 286 Mich App at 7 (holding that the trial
court did not clearly err in deeming a witness unavailable when she “was experiencing a high-risk
pregnancy” and was unable to travel to Michigan from her out-of-state residence to testify); People
v Gross, 123 Mich App 467, 470; 332 NW2d 576 (1983) (concluding that a witness “was unable
to testify due to physical infirmity” when the witness “had a suspected aneurysm and had submitted
himself to a lumbar puncture”); People v Murry, 106 Mich App 257, 260; 307 NW2d 464 (1981)
(finding that “[t]he evidence clearly established that the witness was physically or mentally infirm”
when the witness was of advanced age, “hard of hearing,” “extremely upset about the possibility
of retestifying, and had suffered from hypertension, recurrent pneumonia, and myocardial
ischemia”). Indeed, requiring the prosecution to attain even more evidence of infirmity from a
witness who had undergone such a significant medical procedure and evidently continued to suffer
complications seems hardly feasible, let alone reasonable, under the circumstances presented here.
We therefore cannot say that the trial court erred in finding Ortiz unavailable under MRE 804(a).
Next, defendant argues that Ortiz’s preliminary examination testimony was erroneously
admitted into evidence because “[t]he defense did not have a full and fair opportunity to cross-
examine Ortiz.” After defendant had received initial discovery materials, and a few minutes before
Ortiz’s preliminary examination, the prosecution informed defense counsel that the malicious-
destruction charge would be added. Ortiz then testified at length during his direct examination
regarding the value of the truck, including the recent sale price of the truck, the cost of supplies
Ortiz used to paint the truck, and the estimated cost to repair the damage to the truck defendant
caused. And then defense counsel cross-examined Ortiz about various other matters, but did not
question him about the amount of damage to the truck.
On this record, we are unpersuaded by defendant’s argument that he was deprived of the
opportunity to effectively cross-examine Ortiz for purposes of the Confrontation Clause. When
defense counsel cross-examined Ortiz, counsel was aware that the amount of damage to the truck
was pertinent to the malicious-destruction charge and the prosecution had elicited testimony
supporting a finding that defendant caused over $1,000 of damage to the truck. Although defense
counsel chose not to capitalize on the opportunity to cross-examine Ortiz as to the damage to the
truck, a violation of the Confrontation Clause occurs only when a defendant has no opportunity to
cross-examine, not when a defendant chooses not to take advantage of that opportunity. See Sardy,
318 Mich App at 564 (noting that the Confrontation Clause does not guarantee “cross-examination
that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish”). And defendant
cites no caselaw indicating that the Confrontation Clause is violated when counsel had an
opportunity to conduct a full cross-examination at a prior hearing as was the case here. Similarly,
under MRE 804(b)(1), defendant evidently had an opportunity and similar motive to develop
1 “[B]ecause the issue of unavailability was a preliminary question for the trial court to decide
before the admission of evidence, the rules of evidence did not apply.” Garland, 286 Mich App
at 7, citing MRE 104(a). Here, as in Garland, “[t]he trial court had no reason to disbelieve the
prosecution’s representation.” Id. at 8.

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Ortiz’s testimony in cross-examination given that at the preliminary examination and at trial,
defendant faced a similar risk and had an identical interest in casting doubt upon the extent of the
damage to the truck. See Farquharson, 274 Mich App at 278.
In sum, the admission of Ortiz’s preliminary examination testimony violated neither the
Confrontation Clause nor MRE 804. See Garland, 286 Mich App at 7. The trial court therefore
did not abuse its discretion in admitting this evidence. See Duncan, 494 Mich at 722-723.
B. DEFENDANT’S SENTENCE
Defendant next contends that his within-guidelines sentence was disproportionate in light
of his circumstances and the circumstances of his offense. We are unpersuaded.
A sentence constitutes an abuse of discretion when it “violat[es] the ‘principle of
proportionality,’ which requires that a sentence be proportionate to the seriousness of the offense
and the circumstances of the offender.” People v Brcic, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___
(2026) (Docket Nos. 362727 and 366230); slip op at 10 (quotation marks omitted). “Factors that
may be considered by a trial court under the proportionality standard include, but are not limited
to: ‘(1) the seriousness of the offense; (2) factors that were inadequately considered by the
guidelines; and (3) factors not considered by the guidelines . . . .’ ” People v Ventour, 349 Mich
App 417, 430; 27 NW3d 660 (2023), quoting Lampe, 327 Mich App at 126. Further, a trial court
“must always bear in mind” the “four basic sentencing considerations first identified in People v
Snow, 386 Mich 586, 592, 594; 194 NW2d 314 (1972)[:] . . . (1) reformation of the offender; (2)
protection of society; (3) disciplining of the wrongdoer; and (4) deterrence of others from
committing like offenses.” People v Copeland, 350 Mich App 577, 584-585; 34 NW3d 9 (2024)
(citation and quotation marks omitted). “A within-guidelines sentence carries a rebuttable
presumption of proportionality[,]” and “[t]he defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that
their within-guidelines sentence is . . . disproportionate.” Brcic, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op
at 10 (quotation marks and citation omitted). “A defendant may overcome the presumptive
proportionality of a within-guidelines sentence by ‘present[ing] unusual circumstances that would
render the presumptively proportionate sentence disproportionate.’ ” Id. (alterations in original),
quoting Ventour, 349 Mich App at 430. “ ‘Unusual’ means ‘uncommon, not usual, rare.’ ”
Ventour, 349 Mich App at 430 (citation omitted).
On appeal, defendant asserts that the trial court ignored his substance abuse and mental
health disorders and relatedly highlights the possibility that his actions constituted “an attempt to
commit ‘suicide by cop.’ ” The trial court noted, however, the possibility that defendant “intended
to die” and the court’s discussion illustrates its attention to other pertinent considerations, such as
the seriousness of defendant’s actions and the Snow factors of protecting society and disciplining
the wrongdoer, which the court concluded supported a longer sentence within the guidelines range.
See Ventour, 349 Mich App at 430; Copeland, 350 Mich App at 584-585. Indeed, the trial court’s
findings that defendant “d[id] everything [he] c[ould] to cause harm and chaos” and “intended to
cause serious injury” supported prioritizing these factors. Defendant also argues against the trial
court’s explicit consideration of his criminal history because his prior convictions were already

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factored into the guidelines range by the scoring of many of the prior record variables.2 But the
trial court’s discussion illustrates that it considered defendant’s criminal history as relevant to
defendant’s potential for rehabilitation, a factor not otherwise considered by the sentencing
guidelines. See Walden, 319 Mich App at 352-353 (citation omitted). Further, as this Court has
described, considering the degree to which defendant may be reformed with the benefit of
hindsight is permissible “because the principle of proportionality requires sentencing courts to
tailor their sentences to each defendant’s individual circumstances.” Copeland, 350 Mich App
at 588-589. Thus, the trial court did not err in accounting for defendant’s criminal history in
considering whether defendant “ha[s] actually demonstrated the capacity for reform.” Id. at 588.
Further, and most fundamentally, none of the challenges defendant raises to his sentence on appeal
“present any unusual circumstances sufficient to overcome the presumption of proportionality.”
Ventour, 349 Mich App at 430. For these reasons, defendant has not overcome the burden of
demonstrating that his within-guidelines sentence is disproportionate.
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
/s/ Sima G. Patel
/s/ Daniel S. Korobkin
2 Defendant also asserts that the guidelines range was too wide, providing the trial court no
guidance in sentencing him. Defendant, however, fails to cite any legal support for this
proposition, citing only a report for the assertion that broad guideline ranges give trial courts
“undefined discretion.” “Defendant’s failure to cite any supporting legal authority constitutes an
abandonment of this issue.” People v Watson, 245 Mich App 572, 587; 629 NW2d 411 (2001).
For “[a]n appellant may not merely announce his position and leave it to this Court to discover and
rationalize the basis for his claims, nor may he give only cursory treatment with little or no citation
of supporting authority.” People v Johnson, 315 Mich App 163, 199; 889 NW2d 513 (2016)
(quotation marks and citation omitted). Therefore, to the extent defendant takes issue with the
guidelines range he was assessed as a whole, we deem this issue abandoned and decline to consider
it.

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