COA 375163 TAYLOR MEAD V MITCHELL ROWE Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 12/22/2025

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
TAYLOR MEAD,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
UNPUBLISHED
December 22, 2025
11:52 AM
v No. 375163
Lenawee Circuit Court
MITCHELL ROWE, LC No. 20-047743-DP
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: ACKERMAN, P.J., and BORRELLO and LETICA, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this paternity action, plaintiff appeals as of right the order granting defendant joint legal
and physical custody of the parties’ minor child, LJM. In relevant part, the order also established
a parenting time schedule and determined which school LJM would attend. On appeal, plaintiff
argues the trial court erred in determining proper cause or change of circumstances existed to
modify custody, improperly determined an established custodial environment also existed with
defendant, and incorrectly applied the burdens of proof. We affirm.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In early 2019, the parties briefly dated before defendant married his current wife, GR.
Defendant’s daughter with GR, ER, was born three months after LJM. The trial court awarded
plaintiff sole physical custody of LJM and granted the parties joint legal custody with parenting
time to be “as the parties agree.”
The parties disagree regarding how much parenting time defendant exercised over the next
four years. According to defendant, he exercised parenting time nearly every weekend from either
Friday night or Saturday, through Sunday evening, plus at least one overnight during the week,
along with “multiple days at a time” during the summer. According to plaintiff, defendant had
parenting time for a few hours on Tuesdays along with one weekend overnight per week until the
fall of 2023. According to plaintiff, after an incident where LJM burned her hand in a firepit while
with defendant, her trust in him diminished and she withheld parenting time.

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At that time, LJM began pre-kindergarten in the Onsted School District (Onsted), which
was located less than 10 minutes from defendant and less than a mile from plaintiff. LJM had
attendance issues at Onsted. Since March of 2024, LJM had missed 20 days of school, was late
11 days, and was picked up early three days. According to plaintiff, she asked defendant’s opinion
on LJM changing schools to Addison Community Schools (Addison) and he agreed; however,
defendant denied assenting to that change and said that he expressed concerns to plaintiff about
how far Addison was.
In the fall of 2024, LJM began attending Addison. Although the parties disagree about
how often defendant was exercising parenting time up to this point, in October 2024, plaintiff
would only agree to defendant exercising parenting time every other weekend. At that point,
defendant moved to change the custody order, requesting joint physical custody and a set
parenting-time schedule. At the hearing on defendant’s motion, the trial court found the
allegations regarding the reduction of defendant’s parenting time could constitute a proper cause
or change of circumstances to schedule an evidentiary hearing regarding both custody and
parenting time.
At the evidentiary hearing, plaintiff alleged defendant exercised sporadic parenting time,
was not interested in parenting, and LJM did not want to see defendant. Plaintiff acknowledged
LJM had school attendance issues, including six morning absences, five afternoon absences, and
12 tardies at Addison as of November 2024, but asserted the attendance issues had been fixed, and
further that defendant did not want to participate in LJM’s schooling. Defendant testified that the
reduction of his parenting time drastically affected LJM and his family. Defendant also denied
that he was an absent parent, asserting plaintiff was the only reason he did not see LJM as much
as he wanted. Defendant further maintained that he was heavily involved in LJM’s schooling and
explained that he had to contact the schools after plaintiff told them that he was not involved. The
trial court admitted screenshots of text messages which generally corroborated defendant’s
testimony along with correspondence that defendant received from both schools.
The trial court issued a written opinion, granting the parties joint legal and physical custody
of LJM. The trial court found proper cause or change of circumstances existed to review custody
because of LJM’s school attendance issues and because plaintiff changed LJM’s school over
defendant’s objection despite their shared legal custody. The trial court found an established
custodial environment existed with both parents, reasoning:
[I]n order to establish an alternating weekend parenting time schedule consistent
with [plaintiff]’s request, it must be established by clear and convincing evidence
that this is in LJM’s best interests. The schedule proposed by [defendant] is for the
parties to have equal parenting time. Since this would not change the established
custodial environment, he must establish by a preponderance of evidence that this
is in LJM’s best interests.
The trial court ordered the parties to follow a 2-2-3 parenting time schedule with defendant
exercising parenting time from Monday after school to Wednesday morning, plaintiff exercising
parenting time from Wednesday after school to Friday morning, and the parties alternating
weekends. The trial court further ordered LJM would enroll at Onsted for the 2025-2026 school
year unless the parties agreed otherwise. This appeal followed.

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II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
In custody cases, this Court applies three standards of review. Merecki v Merecki, 336
Mich App 639, 644; 971 NW2d 659 (2021).
The great weight of the evidence standard applies to all findings of fact. In a child
custody dispute, all orders and judgments of the circuit court shall be affirmed on
appeal unless the trial judge made findings of fact against the great weight of [the]
evidence or committed a palpable abuse of discretion or a clear legal error on a
major issue. Specifically, [this Court] review[s] under the great-weight-of-the-
evidence standard the trial court’s determination whether a party demonstrated
proper cause or a change of circumstances. A finding of fact is against the great
weight of the evidence if the evidence clearly preponderates in the opposite
direction. An abuse of discretion standard applies to the trial court’s discretionary
rulings such as custody decisions. An abuse of discretion, for purposes of a child
custody determination, exists when the result is so palpably and grossly violative
of fact and logic that it evidences a perversity of will, a defiance of judgment, or
the exercise of passion or bias. Questions of law are reviewed for clear legal error.
A trial court commits legal error when it incorrectly chooses, interprets or applies
the law. [Id. at 644-645 (quotation marks and citations omitted).]
“These three deferential standards of review are part of the Legislature’s comprehensive
effort to promote the best interests and welfare of children.” Sabatine v Sabatine, 513 Mich 276,
284; 15 NW3d 204 (2024) (quotation marks and citation omitted). When reviewing a trial court’s
custody decision, a reviewing court must remember
that trial courts are in a superior position to make accurate decisions concerning the
custody arrangement that will be in a child’s best interests. Although not infallible,
trial courts are more experienced and better situated to weigh evidence and assess
credibility. Trial courts not only hear testimony and observe witnesses, but also
may elicit testimony, interview children, and invoke other judicial resources to
assure a thorough and careful evaluation of the child’s best interests. [Id. at 285
(quotation marks and citation omitted).]
Thus, this Court defers to the trial court on issues pertaining to credibility. Berger v Berger, 277
Mich App 700, 705; 747 NW2d 336 (2008).
III. ANALYSIS
“The Child Custody Act of 1970 (CCA), MCL 722.21 et seq., governs custody, parenting
time, and child support issues for minor children in Michigan, and it is the exclusive means of
pursuing child custody rights.” Barretta v Zhitkov, 348 Mich App 539, 550; 19 NW3d 420 (2023)
(quotation marks and citation omitted). The CCA “promotes the best interests of the child by
ensuring a stable environment free of unnecessary and disruptive custodial modifications,” and
“limits a court’s power to modify previous judgments or orders regarding custody and parenting
time.” Id. at 550-551.

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“Under MCL 722.27, a trial court may modify or amend a previous child custody order or
judgment for proper cause shown or because of change of circumstances if doing so is in the child’s
best interests.” Merecki, 336 Mich App at 645 (quotation marks and citation omitted). “In the
context of a motion for change of custody, a proper cause or change in circumstance is a significant
circumstance regarding one or more of the best-interest factors that has the potential for a
significant effect on the well-being of the child or children whose custody is at issue.” Id. at 646
(footnote omitted). See Vodvarka v Grasmeyer, 259 Mich App 499, 509-514; 675 NW2d 847
(2003) (addressing the required showing of proper cause or change of circumstances to modify
custody). “A party that seeks a change in custody has the initial burden of establishing, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that either proper cause or a change of circumstances exists to
warrant a change in custody.” Powery v Wells, 278 Mich App 526, 527; 752 NW2d 47 (2008).
See MCL 722.27(1)(c).
A. PROPER CAUSE OR CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES
On appeal, plaintiff first argues the trial court erred in finding proper cause or a change of
circumstances to warrant modifying custody. We disagree.
The trial court held a hearing on defendant’s motion, and found the alleged reduction of
his parenting time by over 50% to alternating weekends could constitute a proper cause or change
of circumstances to review custody and parenting time. After an evidentiary hearing, in its written
order, the trial court determined defendant previously exercised significant parenting time until the
parties’ recent disagreement. The trial court further found proper cause existed to review custody
because of LJM’s school attendance issues and because plaintiff changed LJM’s school over
defendant’s objection despite their shared legal custody.
Plaintiff argues the trial court incorrectly held an evidentiary hearing not based on the
parties’ existing judgment, but instead on defendant’s reduced parenting-time allegations, which
were not supported at the evidentiary hearing. While the parties disputed defendant’s parenting
time, the trial court determined the evidence tended to corroborate defendant’s version, finding
that until recently, LJM generally had “regular and consistent” parenting time with defendant every
weekend, which sometimes extended through Sunday nights, and also on Tuesdays. This Court
defers to the trial court regarding the parties’ credibility. See Berger, 277 Mich App at 705. While
the initial parenting-time order was “as the parties agree,” it was clear the parties were no longer
in agreement regarding parenting time, and contrary to plaintiff’s assertions, unilaterally changing
defendant’s parenting time from three to four nights a week to every other weekend is a change of
circumstance that “could have a significant effect” on LJM’s well-being. Vodvarka, 259 Mich
App at 513.
Further, after the original custody judgment was entered, LJM enrolled in school and was
struggling significantly with attendance. In the previous school year, LJM had about 20 absences
through March during plaintiff’s parenting time, which plaintiff seemingly disregarded, explaining
that because it was pre-kindergarten, LJM did not need to be there at all. On appeal, plaintiff
argues school difficulties are an insufficient basis to consider modifying custody; however, “proper
cause means one or more appropriate grounds that have or could have a significant effect on the
child’s life to the extent that a reevaluation of the child’s custodial situation should be undertaken.”
Vodvarka, 259 Mich App at 511. Despite defendant’s objection, plaintiff transferred LJM to a

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school farther away from both parties, effectively preventing defendant from exercising weekday
overnights with her or feasibly transporting her to school. And, plaintiff failed to list defendant as
an emergency contact at LJM’s new school. Moreover, according to the school, as of November
2024, LJM was “considered chronically absent,” and a letter was sent home noting concerns and
explaining how LJM’s education would suffer. Plaintiff acknowledged that after changing
schools, LJM had six morning absences, five afternoon absences, and 12 tardies, but testified that
her attendance had since improved without offering additional evidentiary support.
Plaintiff further argues her “single legal custody violation” in changing LJM’s school was
insufficient to warrant revisiting custody; however, the trial court found plaintiff “used her position
as the sole physical custodian of LJM to infringe upon [defendant]’s right to be involved in
important decisions” and acted to limit defendant’s involvement in LJM’s life. Review of the
record demonstrates that the trial court’s findings in this regard were not against the great weight
of the evidence.
We note that plaintiff also argues the trial court should have “limited itself to entering a
specific parenting time that retained” plaintiff’s sole physical custody and requests this Court
remand for an evidentiary hearing to set a parenting time schedule. Plaintiff ignores that the trial
court’s order did set a parenting time schedule. Plaintiff seems to conflate defendant’s request to
modify custody and his request to modify parenting time into one issue, but misunderstands the
analysis. Plaintiff incorrectly asserts that because defendant “sought fifty-fifty parenting time,”
which is the “epitome of joint physical custody,” the Vodvarka standard automatically applies.
It is true that different standards apply when considering whether proper cause or change
of circumstances exist regarding requests for modification of parenting time. See Shade v Wright,
291 Mich App 17, 25-29; 805 NW2d 1 (2010) (addressing the required standards to show proper
cause or change of circumstances to modify parenting time). Physical custody “refers to a child’s
living arrangements,” while parenting time “is the time a child spends with each parent.”
Lieberman v Orr, 319 Mich App 68, 79-80; 900 NW2d 130 (2017). “Whereas the primary concern
in child custody determinations is the stability of the child’s environment and avoidance of
unwarranted and disruptive custody changes, the focus of parenting time is to foster a strong
relationship between the child and the child’s parents.” Shade, 291 Mich App at 28-29.
Therefore, although normal life changes typically are insufficient to establish the
proper cause or change of circumstances required to proceed to consideration of a
child custody order, such changes may be sufficient for a court to consider
modification of a parenting-time order unless the requested change would alter the
established custodial environment. [Lieberman, 319 Mich App at 83.]
Accordingly, if a request to modify parenting time “involves a change that alters an established
custodial environment, then the more stringent framework from Vodvarka will apply.” Kaeb v
Kaeb, 309 Mich App 556, 570; 873 NW2d 319 (2015). “If, however, the request involves a change
to the duration or frequency of parenting time, the less stringent standard discussed in Shade will
apply.” Id.
“If the required parenting time adjustments will not change whom the child naturally looks
to for guidance, discipline, the necessities of life, and parental comfort, then the established

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custodial environment will not have changed.” Rains v Rains, 301 Mich App 313, 340; 836 NW2d
709 (2013) (quotation marks and citation omitted). In this case, the trial court found an established
custodial environment existed with both parties. Accordingly, the trial court found that a
parenting-time order granting the parties equal parenting time would not change the established
custodial environment in contrast to a parenting-time order granting defendant only alternating
weekends. See Powery, 278 Mich App at 528 (holding a modification of parenting time that would
relegate an equally active parent to a “weekend parent” would amount to a change in the child’s
established custodial environment) (quotation marks omitted). Because the evidence supporting
the trial court’s determination does not “clearly preponderate[] in the opposite direction,” the trial
court’s findings in this regard are not against the great weight of the evidence. Merecki, 336 Mich
App at 645 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
And, given that defendant’s request to modify parenting time would not alter the
established custodial environment, the Shade standard applied. See Shade, 291 Mich App at 23.
See also Kaeb, 309 Mich App at 570. Seeing as we have already determined proper cause or
change in circumstances to modify custody was sufficiently demonstrated under the higher
Vodvarka standard, it necessarily follows that the less stringent Shade standard for modifying
parenting time is also met. Therefore, the trial court’s conclusion that defendant showed sufficient
proper cause or a change of circumstances to warrant modifying custody and parenting time was
not against the great weight of the evidence.
B. ESTABLISHED CUSTODIAL ENVIRONMENT
Plaintiff next argues the trial court erred in determining defendant had an established
custodial environment with LJM. We disagree.
“Before modifying a custody order or a parenting-time order, a court must first consider
whether the moving party has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence a change of
circumstances or proper cause.” Barretta, 348 Mich App at 552. “The next step in considering a
motion for a custodial or parenting time change requires the court to consider the child’s
established custodial environment.” Id. “An established custodial environment is one of
significant duration in which a parent provides care, discipline, love, guidance, and attention that
is appropriate to the age and individual needs of the child.” Moote v Moote, 329 Mich App 474,
484; 942 NW2d 660 (2019) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Specifically,
[t]he custodial environment of a child is established if over an appreciable time the
child naturally looks to the custodian in that environment for guidance, discipline,
the necessities of life, and parental comfort. The age of the child, the physical
environment, and the inclination of the custodian and the child as to permanency of
the relationship shall also be considered. [MCL 722.27(1)(c).]
“[W]hether a custodial environment has been established is an intense factual inquiry.” Foskett v
Foskett, 247 Mich App 1, 6; 634 NW2d 363 (2001). Moreover, “[a]n established custodial
environment may exist with both parents where a child looks to both the mother and the father for
guidance, discipline, the necessities of life, and parental comfort.” Berger, 277 Mich App at 707.

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Here, the trial court found that an established custodial environment existed with both
parents because LJM looked to them “for guidance, discipline, the necessities of life, and parental
comfort.” On appeal, plaintiff argues the trial court erred because, similar to Ireland v Smith, 214
Mich App 235; 542 NW2d 344 (1995), aff’d as mod 451 Mich 457 (1996), an established custodial
environment existed solely with her as defendant “never had the sole obligation of taking care of
the child for any extended period of time because his relatives did that for him.” In Ireland, this
Court affirmed the trial court’s finding that an established custodial environment existed with the
plaintiff where the child lived with the plaintiff for most of the child’s life. The child’s maternal
grandmother provided most of the child’s necessities and, although the defendant’s recent visits
were regular and satisfactory, “he never had the sole obligation of taking care of the child for any
extended period.” Ireland, 214 Mich App at 242-243.
Plaintiff argues the trial court’s findings that LJM spent significant time with both parties
was not supported by the record. Contrary to plaintiff’s assertions, there was evidence in the record
that LJM spent sufficient time with both parties and she looked to them both for guidance,
discipline, the necessities of life, and parental comfort. Plaintiff asserts defendant relied on
relatives to care for LJM, and would rely on them to transport LJM to school; however, plaintiff
mischaracterizes defendant’s testimony. Defendant testified that his parents lived nearby and were
another form of support; nevertheless, he brought ER to school every day and would do so for
LJM. Moreover, GR, defendant’s wife, testified defendant was a very involved parent. At the
evidentiary hearing, plaintiff asserted defendant did not want to be involved in LJM’s schooling
or birthdays, but the record indicated the opposite and, as discussed, the trial court found proper
cause or change of circumstances existed to warrant an evidentiary hearing to consider modifying
custody.
Throughout the proceedings, plaintiff provided no evidence defendant was an absent parent
beyond her testimony, which was generally contradicted by defendant’s direct evidence. Plaintiff
asserts defendant’s evidence showed he could only account for “11 midweek overnights”;
however, the number of overnights alone is not determinative of whether an established custodial
environment exists. See Sabatine, 513 Mich at 293 n 5. Regardless, the trial court found that
while the parties disagreed regarding the amount of parenting time defendant exercised,
defendant’s text messages “tended to corroborate his version” of events and we defer to the trial
court regarding the parties’ credibility. See Berger, 277 Mich App at 705.
Further, the trial court found that it was “clear from the testimony and other evidence that
each party exercises his or her parenting time independently of the other,” and that LJM looked to
the parent she was with for comfort and guidance. Consequently, we cannot say the evidence
“clearly preponderates in the opposite direction” from the trial court’s finding that an established
custodial environment existed with both parties. See Merecki, 336 Mich App at 645.
C. BURDENS OF PROOF
Finally, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by applying the incorrect burdens of proof
to the parties. We disagree.
The applicable burden of proof in child custody matters presents a question of law that this
Court reviews de novo. Griffin v Griffin, 323 Mich App 110, 118; 916 NW2d 292 (2018). “When

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considering an important decision affecting the welfare of the child, the trial court must first
determine whether the proposed change would modify the established custodial environment of
that child.” Sabatine, 513 Mich at 286 (quotation marks and citation omitted). “If the proposed
change would modify the established custodial environment of the child, then the burden is on the
parent proposing the change to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that the change is in
the child’s best interests.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). The clear and convincing
evidence “standard also applies when there is an established custodial environment with both
parents” and the proposed change would modify it. Foskett, 247 Mich App at 6. “On the other
hand, if the proposed change would not modify the established custodial environment of the child,
the burden is on the parent proposing the change to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that the change is in the child’s best interests.” Sabatine, 513 Mich at 286 (quotation marks and
citations omitted).
As discussed, the trial court found that an established custodial environment existed with
both parties and this finding was not against the great weight of the evidence. Because defendant
proposed an equal parenting time schedule, the trial court found defendant needed to establish this
was in LJM’s best interests by a preponderance of the evidence because it would not change LJM’s
established custodial environment. In contrast, because plaintiff proposed an alternating weekend
schedule, she needed to establish this was in LJM’s best interests by clear and convincing evidence
because it would change LJM’s established custodial environment. Plaintiff argues this application
was clear legal error because the original custody judgment awarded her sole physical custody,
and defendant “sought to substantially reduce [her] court-ordered parenting time by requesting
fifty-fifty custody.”
We note plaintiff did not have specific court-ordered parenting time, as she asserts, but had
parenting time “as the parties agree,” and regardless, physical custody is a distinct concept from a
child’s established custodial environment. Physical custody “refers to a child’s living
arrangements,” Lieberman, 319 Mich App at 79; while an “established custodial environment is
the environment in which over an appreciable time the child naturally looks to the custodian in
that environment for guidance, discipline, the necessities of life, and parental comfort.” Marik v
Marik, 325 Mich App 353, 361; 925 NW2d 885 (2018) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
“An established custodial environment may exist in more than one home” and “a trial court must
not presume an established custodial environment by reference only to the most recent custody
order but rather must look into the actual circumstances of the case.” Id. at 361, 370 (quotation
marks and citations omitted). “A custodial environment can be established as a result of a
temporary custody order, in violation of a custody order, or in the absence of a custody order.”
Berger, 277 Mich App at 707. Accordingly, plaintiff’s argument fails because defendant was not
automatically held to a higher burden of proof regarding the established custodial environment
simply because plaintiff had sole physical custody.
Relatedly, plaintiff argues the trial court committed clear legal error when it applied the
clear and convincing evidence standard to her attempt to “continue the current order,” despite
MCL 722.27(1)(c) placing that burden on the moving party. While plaintiff requested the trial
court not modify physical custody, she also requested the trial court enter an order granting
defendant alternating weekend parenting time from Friday until Sunday. Because the trial court
found this would alter the established custodial environment, it held plaintiff to the higher burden
of proof. See Foskett, 247 Mich App at 8 (explaining that when an established custodial

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environment exists with both parents, neither parent’s “established custodial environment may be
disrupted except on a showing, by clear and convincing evidence, that such a disruption is in the
child[]’s best interests.”). Comparatively, because under defendant’s request, LJM’s joint
established custodial environments would remain the same, the trial court did not have to find clear
and convincing evidence that the change in parenting time served her best interests. Instead, the
determination required only proof by a preponderance of the evidence. See Lieberman, 319 Mich
App at 84; Shade, 291 Mich App at 23. Accordingly, the trial court did not commit clear legal
error because it properly applied the burdens of proof.
Affirmed.
/s/ Matthew S. Ackerman
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
/s/ Anica Letica

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