COA 367348 PEOPLE OF MI V JAVONTE EDREECE ROSA Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 7/16/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
UNPUBLISHED
July 16, 2026
12:35 PM
v No. 367348
Kent Circuit Court
JAVONTE EDREECE ROSA, LC No. 22-006133-FC;
22-006316-FC;
22-006501-FH;
22-006536-FC
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: ACKERMAN, P.J., and REDFORD and FENNEY, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant, Javonte Edreece Rosa, appeals as of right his conviction of first-degree felony
murder, MCL 750.316(1)(b). We affirm.
I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
The night of May 24, 2022, Rosa and his codefendants, Rhishy Javon Manning and Jaheim
Hayes-Goree, began a crime spree in the greater Grand Rapids area. The spree continued into the
morning of May 25, 2022. Officers from the Grand Rapids Police Department, the Kentwood
Police Department, the Walker Police Department, the Wyoming Police Department, and the Kent
County Sheriff’s Office worked together to respond to reports of the criminal activity. Rosa,
Manning, and Hayes-Goree began the spree in a stolen blue Chevrolet Equinox. The first crime
event was an armed robbery at a Family Dollar store at 9:40 p.m. Rosa and Hayes-Goree entered
the store with guns and stole money from the cash register. They fired their guns, but no one was
shot. At 10:33 p.m., Hayes-Goree and Manning held Joseph Wilder at gunpoint while he was
using the automated teller machine (ATM) at a Huntington Bank. Wilder was shot and killed. In
the following hours, Manning, Rosa, and Hayes-Goree stole a white Audi sport utility vehicle,
attempted a robbery outside a Radisson Hotel, attempted to break into a convenience store, and
robbed a Speedway gas station attendant in Kentwood. These events were captured on the
businesses’ surveillance cameras. Flock traffic enforcement cameras recorded the movements of
the Equinox and the Audi as they moved from crime scene to crime scene.

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The spree ended when officers spotted the Audi and initiated a pursuit. The Audi fled but
crashed near an apartment complex. Manning and Hayes-Goree ran from the crashed Audi but
were pursued by a police drone and arrested. Rosa was not in the Audi during the pursuit. Law
enforcement officers identified Rosa as the third perpetrator from text messages he exchanged with
Manning on their iPhones. Rosa was arrested on May 26, 2022.
The perpetrators concealed their faces with face masks and the hoods of their sweatshirts.
This prevented witnesses from observing their faces. While their faces could not be seen in any
of the videos, the prosecutor used the distinctive shoes and other clothing items worn by Rosa and
his codefendants to identify each of them in the surveillance videos. Hayes-Goree wore a light-
gray or light-colored hooded sweatshirt and white “Croc” shoes or sandals. Manning wore a dark-
colored hooded sweatshirt and white athletic shoes with a blue stripe around the bottom. Rosa
wore a light-gray or light-colored hooded sweatshirt with yellow and red shoes. Rosa also wore a
blue and orange varsity jacket in some of the events of the spree. Manning was wearing his shoes
when he was arrested. Hayes-Goree discarded his shoes while he was running from the Audi, but
one was found along the path of his flight. Rosa’s shoes and jacket were found at his home after
he was arrested.
The prosecutor’s cases against defendants relied primarily on the surveillance videos and
data from their smart phones. The prosecutor’s evidence also included two firearms, including a
Smith & Wesson nine-millimeter semiautomatic handgun with a clear extended magazine that was
found near Rosa when he was arrested. The prosecutor offered expert testimony identifying bullets
and spent casings as ammunition fired by these weapons. Law enforcement officers determined
from Manning’s and Rosa’s cellular phone location data that their phones were in the vicinity of
the locations when and where the crimes were committed, and when and where the Flock cameras
recorded the vehicles.
Rosa was charged with armed robbery, MCL 750.529; conspiracy to commit armed
robbery, MCL 750.157a and MCL 750.529; and carrying a firearm during the commission of a
felony (felony-firearm), MCL 750.227b; in the Family Dollar and Speedway robbery cases. He
was charged with felony murder, conspiracy to commit armed robbery, and felony-firearm in the
ATM robbery and shooting. In a fourth case, he was charged with possession of a firearm by a
felon (felon-in-possession), MCL 750.224f; carrying a concealed weapon, MCL 750.227; and
felony-firearm. These cases were consolidated for trial and consolidated with the cases against
Manning and Hayes-Goree. Rosa and his codefendants were convicted of all charges against them.
On appeal, Rosa challenges only his conviction of felony murder.
II. NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE
Rosa moved for a new trial on the ground that Hayes-Goree and Manning signed written
statements denying that Rosa had any involvement in the ATM robbery and associated murder.
Manning later disavowed the statement, asserted he did not make it, that it was false, and that Rosa
had submitted it without his permission. The trial court denied Rosa’s motion, citing People v

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Terrell, 289 Mich App 553; 797 NW2d 684 (2010), overruled in part on other grounds by People
v Grissom, 492 Mich 296; 821 NW2d 50 (2012).1
We review a trial court’s decision on a motion for a new trial for an abuse of discretion.
People v Johnson, 502 Mich 541, 564; 918 NW2d 676 (2018). “An abuse of discretion occurs
when a trial court’s decision falls outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes.”
People v Franklin, 500 Mich 92, 100; 894 NW2d 561 (2017) (quotation marks and citation
omitted). “A trial court necessarily abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law.” Id.
“On the defendant’s motion, the court may order a new trial on any ground that would
support appellate reversal of the conviction or because it believes that the verdict has resulted in a
miscarriage of justice.” MCR 6.431(B). In People v Cress, 468 Mich 678, 692; 664 NW2d 174
(2003), our Supreme Court established a four-pronged test for determining whether a new trial
should be granted on the basis of newly discovered evidence:
For a new trial to be granted on the basis of newly discovered evidence, a defendant
must show that: (1) the evidence itself, not merely its materiality, was newly
discovered; (2) the newly discovered evidence was not cumulative; (3) the party
could not, using reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced the evidence
at trial; and (4) the new evidence makes a different result probable on retrial.
[Quotation marks and citations omitted.]
This Court’s decision in Terrell, 289 Mich App 553, addressed whether a codefendant’s posttrial
statement exculpating a defendant can serve as newly discovered evidence under the first prong of
the Cress test. In Terrell, the defendant and Reginald Myers had an argument with Deshawn
Evans. Id. at 556. According to the prosecutor, the defendant shot Evans during the argument.
Id. After the shooting, Myers and defendant ran to Dana Hudson’s car and drove away. Id. The
defendant was convicted of assault with intent to commit murder, MCL 750.83, and related
firearms offenses. Terrell, 289 Mich App at 554. Hudson was also charged, but he was acquitted.
Id. at 556. Hudson exercised his Fifth Amendment privilege and did not testify at trial. Id. The
defendant moved for a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence, namely Hudson’s
testimony that Evans was the initial aggressor and that Myers, not the defendant, shot Evans. Id.
at 557. According to Hudson’s posttrial statement, the defendant and Evans struggled over the
gun, Myers picked up the gun when it fell, and Myers, not the defendant, shot Evans. Id. at 557.
The trial court granted the defendant’s motion for a new trial, finding that “although the testimony
was not newly discovered evidence, it was not available to defendant at the time of trial[.]” Id.
This Court granted the prosecutor’s application for leave to appeal. Id. at 558.
This Court began its analysis by addressing the first inquiry under Cress, 468 Mich at 692,
namely whether Hudson’s statement was newly discovered. Terrell, 289 Mich App at 559. The
prosecutor argued “that newly available evidence does not equate with newly discovered evidence
1 Grissom, 492 Mich 296, does not refer to Terrell by name. Our Supreme Court held in Grissom
that a trial court may grant a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence for impeaching
the complaining witness. Id. at 319-322.

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and, as a consequence, the trial court’s order granting defendant a new trial on the basis of
Hudson’s statements should be reversed.” Id. at 560. The Court agreed that Hudson’s proffered
testimony was not newly discovered evidence; thus, the defendant failed to satisfy the first element
of the Cress test. Terrell, 289 Mich App at 560. The Court in Terrell surveyed the federal circuit
courts’ decisions regarding a codefendant’s testimony and found that the majority of the circuits
agreed that a codefendant’s belated exculpatory testimony was not newly discovered evidence. Id.
at 562-567. The Court acknowledged that a defendant could be denied the benefit of potentially
exculpatory testimony when a codefendant invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege, but
emphasized that a defendant could pursue procedural remedies, such as moving for severed trials
with limited immunity for the codefendant. Id. at 567. The Court found that the defendant was
aware at all times that Hudson had been present during the shooting, and that he had the ability to
give the exculpatory testimony. Id. at 569-570. The Court therefore reversed the trial court’s
decision to grant a new trial. Id. at 571.
Judge SHAPIRO agreed with the majority’s decision to reverse but wrote in favor of a case-
by-case approach. Terrell, 289 Mich App at 571 (SHAPIRO, J., concurring). He advocated
following a First Circuit case, United States v Montilla-Rivera, 115 F3d 1060, 1066 (CA 1, 1997),
which would “not . . . categorically exclude the testimony of a codefendant who asserted his Fifth
Amendment privilege at trial under the first prong,” but would consider the statement “with great
skepticism . . . .” Terrell, 289 Mich App at 571 (SHAPIRO, J., concurring). Under this approach,
the court would determine whether the defendant’s proffered evidence of an exculpatory statement
had a sufficient basis for further examination in an evidentiary hearing. Id. at 571-572. Judge
SHAPIRO explained why the defendant in Terrell would not be entitled to a new trial (and
presumably not entitled to an evidentiary hearing) under this test:
In this case, defendant is not entitled to a new trial under the First Circuit’s
test. First, there was other evidence admitted that showed the victim was armed.
Thus, defendant was able to present evidence in support of his self-defense claim.
Second, defense counsel did not interview or attempt to interview the codefendant,
thus undercutting the likelihood that there was a good-faith belief that he could
offer exculpatory testimony. Third, there was no request for severance or for the
codefendant’s trial to occur first, a mechanism that might have avoided the Fifth
Amendment problem. Fourth, there was no attempt to call the codefendant at trial
and to require him to assert his Fifth Amendment privilege outside the presence of
the jury. Fifth, there was no offer of proof at trial about what defendant believed
his codefendant could testify to if he did not assert his Fifth Amendment privilege.
These failures strongly suggest that the issue in this case related more to the
desirability of an appellate parachute rather than the existence of known
exculpatory testimony that was genuinely unavailable before defendant’s
conviction. [Terrell, 289 Mich App at 572-573 (SHAPIRO, J., concurring).]
MCR 7.215(J)(1) requires this Court to “follow the rule of law established by a prior
published decision of the Court of Appeals issued on or after November 1, 1990” unless the prior
decision has been “reversed or modified by the Supreme Court, or by a special panel of the Court
of Appeals as provided in this rule.” Rosa argues in his appellate brief that his circumstances are
factually distinguishable from Terrell, because, unlike the defendant in Terrell, Rosa did not know
that his codefendants would exculpate him because he was not present at the ATM robbery. This

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attempt at distinction is unconvincing, because Rosa knew that he and his codefendants were
charged with felony murder in relation to Wilder’s homicide and, at least by the time of trial, he
knew about the surveillance videos.
Rosa argues that this Court should follow the more flexible approach recommended in the
Terrell concurrence, but he concedes in his reply brief that this Court is obligated to follow Terrell.
He requests that this Court initiate the procedure for convening a conflict panel under MCR
7.215(J). “A panel that follows a prior published decision only because it is required to do so by
subrule (1) must so indicate in the text of its opinion . . . .” MCR 7.215(J)(2). After the opinion
is released, the chief judge must poll the judges of this Court “to determine whether the particular
question is both outcome-determinative and warrants convening a special panel to rehear the case
for the purpose of resolving the conflict . . . .” MCR 7.215(J)(3)(a). “Special panels may be
convened to consider outcome-determinative questions only.” MCR 7.215(J)(3)(a).
Initiation of the conflict-panel procedure is not warranted because the question is not
outcome-determinative, and because we conclude the majority opinion in Terrell was decided
correctly, and we do not favor the proposition suggested by the concurrence. Rosa fails to satisfy
the fourth prong of the Cress test, which addresses the probability that the new evidence would
lead to a more favorable outcome. Cress, 468 Mich at 692. Even if the concurring opinion became
adopted as law, Rosa still would not be entitled to an evidentiary hearing. Codefendants’
statements were notarized, but they were not sworn. Manning recanted his letter. The statement
that Rosa left his gun and phone in the Equinox seems crafted to explain why cell phone location
data corroborated Rosa’s presence with Manning and Hayes-Goree and why a bullet removed from
the victim’s body was fired by the gun associated with Rosa. Rosa had the gun and phone when
he was arrested the following day, and he was recorded on multiple surveillance cameras before
and after the ATM robbery. It simply is not probable that Rosa absented himself for the single
most serious stage of the overnight crime spree.
Additionally, Rosa failed to offer evidence that Hayes-Goree and Manning would waive
their Fifth Amendment privilege to testify on his behalf. Accordingly, their written statements
would be hearsay. Under the Michigan Rules of Evidence, “hearsay” is defined as a statement that
“1) the declarant does not make while testifying at the current trial or hearing; and (2) a party offers
in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.” MRE 801(c). Generally,
“[h]earsay is not admissible unless these rules provide otherwise.” MRE 802. MRE 804 provides
exceptions to the general prohibition of hearsay evidence for certain statements made by a
declarant who is unavailable. A declarant is unavailable when he is exempted from testifying
because of a legal privilege. MRE 804(a)(1). MRE 804(b)(4) provides an exception if an
unavailable declarant’s statement was a statement against interest, defined as a statement that:
(A) a reasonable person in the declarant’s position would have made only
if the person believed it to be true because, when made, it was so contrary to the
declarant’s proprietary or pecuniary interest or had so great a tendency to invalidate
the declarant’s claim against someone else or to expose the declarant to civil or
criminal liability; and
(B) must be supported by corroborating circumstances that clearly indicate
its trustworthiness, if it tends to expose the declarant to criminal liability.

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Manning and Hayes-Goree have already been convicted of felony murder. Rosa argued at the
motion for a new trial hearing that Hayes-Goree and Manning could jeopardize their chances of
receiving mitigated sentences. It is not clear, though, that admitting their responsibility and
exculpating Rosa would harm them if the trial judge had discretion to impose a lower sentence; on
the contrary, admitting responsibility to correct an alleged injustice could reflect favorably on
them. Furthermore, their statements are not corroborated by circumstances that indicate
trustworthiness. Their denial of Rosa’s presence at the Huntington Bank is inconsistent with
substantial evidence. The trial court therefore did not err in denying Rosa’s motion for a new trial.
III. GREAT WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE
Rosa argues that his conviction of felony murder was contrary to the great weight of the
evidence. A claim that the jury’s verdict was against the great weight of the evidence must be
preserved in a motion for a new trial. People v Lopez, 305 Mich App 686, 695; 854 NW2d 205
(2014). Rosa admits that he did not preserve this issue in his motion for a new trial, although he
attributes the omission to a delay in obtaining the surveillance video exhibits. This Court reviews
for abuse of discretion the trial court’s decision on a motion for a new trial on the ground that the
verdict was contrary to the great weight of the evidence. People v Lacalamita, 286 Mich App 467,
469; 780 NW2d 311 (2009). Unpreserved claims of error are reviewed for plain error affecting
the party’s substantial rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763-764; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).
“A verdict is against the great weight of the evidence and a new trial should be granted
when the evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict and a serious miscarriage of justice
would otherwise result.” People v Evans, 335 Mich App 76, 87; 966 NW2d 402 (2020). The trial
court is not permitted to “sit as a thirteenth juror” and invade the jury’s province “to determine
questions of fact and assess the credibility of witnesses.” People v Lemmon, 456 Mich 625, 637;
576 NW2d 129 (1998).
First-degree felony murder is defined as “[m]urder committed in the perpetration of, or
attempt to perpetrate,” one of the statutorily enumerated felonies, including robbery. MCL
750.316(1)(b). “The elements of first-degree felony murder are: (1) the killing of a human being,
(2) with the intent to kill, to do great bodily harm, or to create a very high risk of death or great
bodily harm with knowledge that death or great bodily harm was the probable result [i.e., malice],
(3) while committing, attempting to commit, or assisting in the commission of any of the felonies
specifically enumerated in” MCL 750.316(1)(b). People v Smith, 478 Mich 292, 318-319; 733
NW2d 351 (2007) (quotation marks omitted). “A jury may infer malice from evidence that the
defendant intentionally set in motion a force likely to cause death or great bodily harm.” Carines,
460 Mich at 759. “[T]o sustain a felony murder conviction, the prosecution must prove that each
defendant had the necessary malice to be convicted of murder.” People v Robinson, 475 Mich 1,
14; 715 NW2d 44 (2006).
“[O]ne who aids and abets a felony murder must have the requisite malice to be convicted
of felony murder, but need not have the same malice as the principal.” Id. “[A] defendant is liable
for the crime the defendant intends to aid or abet as well as the natural and probable consequences
of that crime.” Id. at 14-15. “ ‘Aiding and abetting’ describes all forms of assistance rendered to
the perpetrator of a crime and comprehends all words or deeds that might support, encourage, or
incite the commission of a crime.” Carines, 460 Mich at 757 (quotation marks and citation

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omitted). “The quantum of aid or advice is immaterial as long as it had the effect of inducing the
crime.” People v Lawton, 196 Mich App 341, 352; 492 NW2d 810 (1992). An aider or abettor’s
state of mind may be inferred from all the facts and circumstances, including a close association
between the defendant and the principal and the defendant’s participation in the planning or
execution of the crime. Carines, 460 Mich at 757; People v Bennett, 290 Mich App 465, 474; 802
NW2d 627 (2010).
The jury could infer that Rosa aided and abetted Manning and Hayes-Goree by driving a
getaway car, waiting and being ready to assist, acting as a lookout, or simply by encouraging them.
The jury could likewise infer that Rosa knew and supported what Manning and Hayes-Goree were
doing because Rosa was actively involved in the Family Dollar store robbery with Hayes-Goree.
Rosa demonstrated malice and a willingness to use deadly force by firing his gun in the store,
although no one resisted the robbery or interfered with Rosa in any respect. As described in the
previous issue, Rosa, Manning, and Hayes-Goree followed a plan throughout the overnight crime
spree in which two of them completed or attempted to complete a robbery, while the third waited
to drive the other two away. Manning’s and Hayes-Goree’s exculpatory notes did not cast doubt
on the jury’s verdict because the notes contradicted the surveillance video evidence. Detective
VanRhee’s statement that Rosa’s phone’s location data was “less accurate” than the data from
Manning’s phone did not seriously undermine the reliability of the data. Their explanation that
Rosa was “dropped off” and absent during the ATM robbery was unconvincing because Rosa was
with them both before and after the ATM robbery. Rosa therefore fails to establish entitlement to
a new trial or the necessity of an order of remand for an evidentiary hearing.
Affirmed.
/s/ Matthew S. Ackerman
/s/ James Robert Redford
/s/ Kathleen A. Feeney

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